SEAN P. WINCHELL
Pakistan’s ISI: The Invisible Government
Since partition, no political force within Pakistan has driven the nation’s
domestic and international political agenda as has its army, and more
specifically, one of its intelligence units, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
agency. Comprised of the three branches of Pakistan’s military, the Army,
Navy, and Air Force, the ISI, in its time has been linked to political
assassinations, the smuggling of heroin and opium, and the smuggling of
materials and components for nuclear weapons. From headquarters on
Khayban-e Suharwady Street in Islamabad, the ISI has worked to suppress
political opposition to the military regimes that have dotted Pakistan’s
political landscape since 1947.
It has also embraced radical Islamic extremism and worked with the
United States in aiding the Afghan mujahideen in expelling the Soviets
from Afghanistan. At the same time, it has been charged with using
Islamic militants in a campaign of terror to wrench control of the
provinces of Jammu and Kashmir from the Indians. Now, in light of the
events of 11 September 2001, ISI’s exploits over the course of the last fifty
years have entered into the Western Hemisphere’s mainstream press as the
United States is compelled to work with the organization in pursuing its
war on terror.1
BACKGROUND
In 1948, following Pakistan’s loss of the first Indo-Pakistani War, and the
abysmal intelligence performance of Pakistan’s intelligence service, the
Intelligence Bureau, the then–Deputy Army Chief of Staff General
R. Cawthorne2 formed the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency.3
Sean P. Winchell teaches in the Grandview, Missouri, School District. He
earned honors degrees in Political Science and History at the State
University of New York, Stony Brook.
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 16: 374–388, 2003
Copyright # 2003 Taylor & Francis Inc.
ISSN: 0885-0607 print/1521-0561 online
DOI: 10.1080/08850600390201477
374 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE
Created from the three branches of Pakistan’s military, and modeled after
Iran’s intelligence service, the SAVAK, the ISI coordinates with the Army,
Navy, and Air Force intelligence units of Pakistan’s military in the
collection, analysis, and dissemination of military and nonmilitary
intelligence, focusing mainly on India. After receiving its training from the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the French intelligence service, the
SDECE4, the ISI originally had no active role in conducting domestic
intelligence collection activities, except in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir
(POK) and Pakistan’s Northern Areas (NA) of Gilgit and Baltistan. The
ISI’s role in Pakistani politics changed in 1958, when then–Army Chief of
Staff General Ayub Khan seized power in a coup, adding a new political
dimension to the ISI’s responsibilities.5
THE ISI UNDER AYUB KHAN
Prior to the 1958 coup and the implementation of martial law, the ISI,
which is part of Pakistan’s Ministry of Defense, reported directly to the
Army Chief of Staff. After the implementation of martial law, the ISI
began to report to then-President Ayub Khan and the martial law
administrator. In addition, under General Khan, the ISI became
responsible for monitoring Pakistani politicians, especially those in what
was then Eastern Pakistan. Khan expanded the ISI’s role to the
protection of Pakistan’s interests, which included the creation of a
covert action division within the ISI to assist Islamic militants in
Northeast India, as well as to assist the Sikh Home Rule Movement
in the 1960s.6
Under General Khan, the ISI was given the mission of conducting ‘‘the
collection of foreign and domestic intelligence, coordination of intelligence
functions of the three military services; surveillance over its cadre,
foreigners, the media, politically active segments of Pakistani society,
diplomats serving outside of the country; the interception and monitoring
of communications; and the conduct of covert operations.’’7
Through the 1960s, the ISI and other Pakistani intelligence services were
largely concerned with conducting domestic counterintelligence operations.
At the behest of Ayub Kahn, the ISI warned social organizations with
potential political influence, such as student groups, trade organizations,
and unions not to become involved in the political arena, and kept these
groups under tight surveillance. In addition, the ISI instructed Islamic
clerics to leave any political rhetoric out of their exhortations.8
General Khan further expanded the ISI’s powers when he began to suspect
the loyalty of Bengali officers in the Intelligence Bureau’s Dakha Branch in
East Pakistan. Khan ordered the ISI to conduct domestic intelligence
operations in the region, and to monitor East Pakistani politicians.9
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During the 1964 presidential elections the ISI became particularly active.
The ISI monitored candidates running for office, especially in what was
then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), keeping Bengali politicians in
Dakha, Pakistan’s legislative capital,10 under close surveillance. The ISI
attempted to keep Khan apprised of the political mood in East Pakistan,
which the ISI believed had swung in favor of President Khan. But the ISI
had miscalculated the popularity of Khan’s opponent, Fatima Jinnah.11
The following year, the ISI’s intelligence collection and analysis during the
Indo-Pakistani War, which took place over Kashmir, was a fiasco. The ISI,
under Director-General Brigadier Riaz Hussain,12 was then vigorously
conducting domestic intelligence collection operations inside Kashmir, and
had numerous assets inside the Indian-controlled sector. Once the conflict
started, all its assets in the region went underground, blinding the ISI to
what was occurring, both militarily and politically. This included losing
track of a division of Indian tanks. Part of the problem that faced the ISI
was that prior to the conflict, it had devoted itself to domestic intelligence
operations, including keeping track of the regime’s various political
opponents. The ISI had also been conducting intelligence operations
against India. As a result, the ISI was at a complete loss in addressing the
army’s (and the government’s) needs for timely military intelligence.
Through the late 1960s and into the 1970s, the ISI worked in tandem with
the CIA, under the Richard Nixon administration, to provide aid and
support to the Khalistan movement in Punjab.13 In addition, the CIA and
the ISI collaborated to discredit then–Indian Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi’s granting of naval facilities to the Soviet Union at Vizag and on
the Andaman and Nicobar islands. The program came to an end with
Gandhi’s death in 1984.14
YAHYA KHAN AND THE GROWTH OF ISI
Under President Yahya Khan, the ISI once again escalated its domestic
intelligence collection activities, especially in East Pakistan. It sought to
guarantee that no East Pakistani candidate would win the presidential
election. But, the operation was a complete failure. Throughout the
1960s, the Awami League, led by Bengali leader Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman, gained in popularity. In 1970, the Awami League won an
overwhelming majority of seats to the National Assembly in the general
election and, under Parliamentary law, had the right to form a
government with Rahman as the newly elected Prime Minister. President
Khan, who did not want to grant East Pakistan greater political
autonomy, then delayed the commencement of the National Assembly,
which in turn provoked a civil war.15
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE
For the next two years, as East and West Pakistan fought a bloody civil
war, the ISI attempted to crush the Bengali resistance movement in East
Pakistan. The ISI’s efforts included the assassination of several prominent
Bengali politicians. The conflict was finally brought to an end in late 1971
when the Indian military interceded on behalf of the East Pakistani
government, leading to the defeat of Pakistan proper on 16 December
1971, and the formation of Bangladesh, or the Bengali state.16
Following Pakistan’s defeat and the independence of Bangladesh, Yahya
Khan was forced to step down and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was elected
President of Pakistan.
THE ISI IN A DEMOCRACY
President Bhutto tried to bring the ISI under control by appointing
Lieutenant General Gulam Gilani Khan as its director. At Khan’s behest,
Bhutto promoted Lieutenant General Zia ul-Haq to the position of Army
Chief of Staff.
Despite being in a democracy, the ISI had become so entrenched in
Pakistani society by the time that President Bhutto came to power that it
was readily adopted by his regime. In 1972, Bhutto, faced with a revolt by
Baluchistani nationals in Baluchistan, and suspecting the loyalty of officers
in the Quetta branch of the Intelligence Bureau, once again increased the
ISI’s mandate, making it responsible for conducting intelligence operations
in the region.17
In March 1977, Pakistan held its first general elections, with Bhutto’s
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) winning a substantial victory. His opponents
decried the election results as fraudulent. These accusations led to violent
protests and strikes. On 5 July 1977, General Zia ul-Haq, with the aid of
the ISI, seized power in a coup. Zia then ordered Bhutto’s arrest and had
him tried for the 1974 murder of a political opponent. Convicted of the
murder, Bhutto, on 4 April 1979, amid worldwide protests, was executed.
On 17 September 1978, amidst the negative fanfare, Zia declared himself
President and ruled under martial law until 30 December 1985, when he
restored some of the Pakistani people’s civil rights.
ZIA UL-HAQ AND THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN
The son of an Islamic cleric, Zia was a fundamentalist who believed that the
only way Pakistan could become a major regional power was to turn it into
an Islamic state. Consequently, he made a deliberate attempt to Islamize the
Pakistani military. During this period, officers were actively encouraged to
become Islamic fundamentalists, and only those officers who were
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practicing Muslims received promotion. Experts now believe that
approximately thirty percent of the country’s army officers are Islamic
fundamentalists.18
The ISI’s powers were expanded to collect domestic intelligence on
political and religious organizations that were opposed to Zia’s regime. In
addition, the ISI began to smuggle arms and aid to Sikh extremists in the
Indian province of Punjab.19
In 1974, India conducted its first nuclear test, Pokharan I. In tandem with
Pakistan’s third defeat at the hands of India, the Bhutto government had
established a division within the ISI to conduct the ‘‘clandestine
procurement’’ of nuclear materials and missile technology from China and
North Korea. In order to hide the establishment of the nuclear weapons
program, the division received funding from both Saudi Arabia and Libya.
In addition, proceeds from heroin and opium smuggling were deferred to
the program. Finally, the ISI also began smuggling nuclear technology out
of Europe, all of which the United States knew, but did nothing about.20
The Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion of Afghanistan compelled the CIA to
increase its ties with the ISI. The Agency had previously been working
with the ISI to discredit Indira Gandhi and to aid the Sikh Home Rule
Movement. Now, the CIA began collaborating with the ISI in training the
Afghan mujahideen to combat the Soviets, also providing them with
logistical support and financial and military aid.21
CIA intelligence officers were sent to Pakistan to liaise with the ISI, and
members of the ISI’s covert action division received training in the United
States. The CIA, through the ISI, ultimately channeled some three billion
dollars worth of arms to the Afghan mujahideen.22
But the CIA did not know at the time that the ISI was not using all of the
arms or money as Washington had intended. The ISI was appropriating arms
destined for the mujahideen and selling them to the Iranians and pocketing
the proceeds. When the Ronald Reagan administration learned of the ISI’s
activities, it sent a fact-finding mission to Pakistan to investigate. But by
then the ISI had already altered its records of the transactions and
destroyed any evidence that might show its complicity. The ISI was also
using the CIA-provided funds to enroll graduates from Pakistani
madrasas23 to fight in the war against the Soviets, and in the process
laying the ground for the rise of the Taliban.24
Between 1983 and 1997, the ISI trained approximately 83,000 Afghan
mujahideen. For its efforts Pakistan paid a price, as Soviet forces located
inside Afghanistan began bombing Pakistani cities located along the
Afghanistan–Pakistan border.25
In addition to supporting Afghan mujahideen fighters, the ISI began to
assist Kashmiri separatists in their efforts to make Kashmir part of
Pakistan. In 1988, as part of that support, then–President Zia created
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE
Operation Tupac.26 The idea behind the project was to avenge Pakistan’s
defeat in the 1971 war with India and, in the process, attempt to balkanize
it. Operation Tupac had three operational objectives: (1) the disintegration
of India; (2) the utilization of spy networks to conduct acts of sabotage;
and (3) the ISI was to ‘‘exploit porous borders with Nepal and Bangladesh
to establish bases and conduct operations’’ [inside India].27
In addition, the CIA gave a wink and a nod to the production of opium
and heroin in northern Afghanistan under the ISI’s auspices. The growth
and sale of the substances is important for three reasons: (1) The drugs
and their subsequent use by many of the Soviet forces stationed in
Afghanistan turned many of the Soviets stationed there into drug addicts,
diminishing both their will and their ability to fight; (2) the proceeds from
the sale of the heroin in Europe and the United States afforded the ISI the
opportunity to continue to finance its proxy war against the Soviets; and
(3) the proceeds from the drugs also helped to support Pakistan’s
burgeoning nuclear weapons program. It, too, was a program the United
States knew of, but did nothing about. Following the expulsion of the
Soviets from Afghanistan, heroin smugglers in Pakistan used their
experience from Afghanistan to increase their smuggling to the West.28
Several notable terrorists rose out of the ashes of the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan and the CIA–ISI’s joint efforts to oust them. Included among
them are Ramzi Yousef, the individual responsible for the February 1993
bombing of New York City’s World Trade Center; Mir Aimal Kansi, who
in 1993 murdered two CIA employees outside of CIA headquarters in
Langley, Virginia; and Osama bin-Laden, as well as a whole host of
Islamic militants in the Philippines and narcotics smugglers in Pakistan.29
THE KASHMIR ISSUE
Since partition in 1947, Pakistan has tried in vain to wrest control of Muslimdominated
Jammu and Kashmir from India. For most of this period, the ISI
has used Islamic militants living in Kashmir to foment discord. Since
partition the ISI has also served as the ‘‘principal liaison’’ with militant
Islamic organizations, many of which the United States now considers
terrorist organizations. Included are the Allah Tigers, al-Umar
Mujahideen, Harkat ul-Ansar, Hizb-ul-Islam, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Jamaat
Hurriyat Conference, and the Muslim mujahideen.30
Joint Intelligence North (JIN), the ISI section that supervises Islamic
militants in Jammu and Kashmir, has been largely responsible for
providing financial aid, military assistance, and logistical assistance to
militants in the region.31
The modern plan to drive India out of Jammu and Kashmir was
formulated in 1984 by then ISI Director-General Hamid Gul. The ISI
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originally implemented its plan via propaganda, then steadily increased
pressure in the 1990s as ISI-backed Islamic militants began to launch
strikes and street rallies. The militants then conducted terrorist attacks
against Indian interests in Kashmir.32
Young Islamic militants were trained in Jammu and Kashmir, and the ISI
is believed to have funded the campaigns of Kashmiri politicians or bribed
them outright, to gain their support.33
Starting in 1989, following the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the
election of Benazir Bhutto34 to the presidency, the ISI began supporting
Islamic separatist organizations, such as the Jamaat E-Islami as part of
a ‘‘process of Islamization and revolt.’’35 Consequently, the ISI started
using monies garnered from its Afghani drug smuggling operation to
finance ISI-backed terrorist incursions into the Indian provinces of