The carrier task force will contain Destroyers and Frigates - which are ASW platforms.
The carrier itself is a fast moving, fighting ship not a defenseless jewel to be saved. Look at Viraat's complement. It has 6 ASW Sea Kings. These are the best ASW platforms in the Navy.
P-8I and IL-38: These are sub hunters as well.
Submarines are a threat yes. But that does not force a carrier vs submarine debate. Carriers and Submarines are different tools in Naval strategy - sea control vs sea denial. Furthermore, IN will employ its own submarines to hunt for enemy subs.
Indian Navy has the requirement and space for both type of ships. We need not trade one for the other. I repeat my point, aircraft carriers are not sitting ducks and add a great capability to the surface navy i.e. the visible navy. Submarines do not bring the same capability.
'Submarines are a threat' is an understatement.
But before I go further let just say it loud that IMO the IN will require at least 2/3 carriers on tap almost always.
On the topic however, the Carrier based ASW, that you highlight, are meant mainly for protecting the CBG itself. This is how threatened a CBG feels from Subs. And quite a few of the sub-carrier encounters I have listed in the last post had the ASW suite deployed full monty. And yet.
Only the P-8I and IL-38SDs, again cited by you, can help and that too only marginally. For example IL-38 used to get a sub hunted only every 24th mission. Some figures actually hint at even less. And you can rest assured the American equivalent is not going to fare any better. The situation is even more difficult with the Sonobouys, which are a critical item on board ASW aircrafts. How many sonobouys do you think could be needed and how many do you think are there in the inventory?
You want to do serious sub-hunting you must have Kamortas, Talwars, Shivaliks and TAS on as many ships as possible each with at least 1 (preferably 2 ASW helos). Persistence is what you get with these vessels. And persistence pays, with the sub-hunting being a especially difficult task and sub-tracking often times being >50 hour events. Carrier based ASW is merely to protect the vulnerable old lady.
With the AShM bearing Subs now proposed to be coupled with extensive C4ISR there is no hope in hell for large flotillas. This infact was the basis of the first CBG protection strategy of dispersing the CBG assets (‘Haystack tactics’ of 1950s). The second strategy of EMCON (Uptide series) was envisioned for the same reason - because the CBG was progressively getting exposed. But both the series of exercises, were a self-debilitating set of exercises good for a future warfare of the 21st Century considering the extent of, challenges & debilitations for a CBG, in this Century. Unfortunately for the present day navies, those tactics have by now been studied in their every form by the submariners.
The following comes from a link which, I have seen Carrier proponents use in support of their wishes
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The forces participating in the HAYSTACK exercises and those conducting the UPTIDE series struggled to command and control widely dispersed forces under EMCON.
In UPTIDE 3-A, the delay times for messages with immediate operational relevance ranged from ten to 318 minutes. Even flash-precedence messages were delayed for up to sixty minutes.58
Perhaps the best period for the CBG was before the 1973 face off. For example in 62 face-off the Soviet sub threat had been upstaged. But by 1973, while the Soviets were still lagging massively, they at least knew how to go against multiple carriers and destroy all mega-global-scale-strategizing.
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/zhukov/files/2004_GoldsteinZhukov_NWCR.pdf
Semenov recalls an interesting ruse: “ [U.S.] Airplanes and helicopters are flying nonstop, looking for our subs. We dropped a grenade, as if for communication with our sub, and again the intensity of the flights rose.”
One Soviet submarine officer aboard a Charlie-class SSGN (pr. 670) in the October crisis, recalls:
During the events of 1973, our submarine carried out its service for some time in the vicinity of the Sidra Gulf, by the Libyan coast. Here, a group of U.S. Navy antisubmarine ships, evidently acting on some intelligence, or maybe simply presuming that there might be a Soviet submarine about, was vigorously carrying out a search operation for two days. However, we gathered the impression that the ships achieved no success. Nothing suggested that our boat had been discovered, even though we were thoroughly listening to their hydroacoustic transmissions and sometimes the hum of the ships’ propellers.130
Nevertheless, only ten years after Nikita Khrushchev’s humiliation during the Cuban missile crisis, when Soviet blue-water capabilities were embryonic at best, the Soviet Navy had established a permanent presence, and a very substantial threat to the U.S. Navy, in what had hitherto been a NATO “lake.” Moreover, it accomplished this feat without permanent basing in the region and despite having to deploy all units to the theater through NATO controlled choke points
In the words of one participant: “It’s no secret that our ships had many flaws in their construction. Furthermore, we were behind in the development of computer technology, in fact very seriously so, in radio-location and in electronic warfare. The loudness of our nuclear submarines was also no secret. We knew about all these drawbacks, and tried to solve the problem. . . . [However,] by the assessment of our commanders, all ships in the Fifth Operational Eskadra performed with sufficient effectiveness during the Arab-Israeli War. All the while, a certain level of expertise was accumulated with regard to trailing and delivering blows onto aircraft carriers.209”
Although the asymmetry in capabilities between the two fleets was unquestionably acute, as it was for the duration of the Cold War, the Soviet strategy was largely free of illusions to the contrary. In fact, it was oriented specifically to offsetting this lack of parity.
Today even the Americans are seeing the writing on the wall. Please note the same RAND that used to run grandiose studies like "American Carrier Air Power at the Dawn of a New Century" just around 2005 today says that Chinese subs are the biggest challenge to US superiority and further that US superiority against the Chinese has already suffered.
Check out the new RAND Study : The U.S.-CHINA Military Scorecard. Esp. Pages 236-239 – detailing development of Chinese Anti-Surface warfare using PLAN submarines:
Third, the modeling results suggest that not only is the threat increasing rapidly, but it has also become significant in absolute terms, a fact that may have implications for how the United States employs its carriers. Even without cueing, Chinese submarines might have close to an even chance of engaging a single U.S. carrier over a seven-day period. With cueing, submarines might expect to gain several offensive opportunities over the same period. Moreover, if more than one U.S. carrier were in the operational area, the number of Chinese attack opportunities would rise almost proportionately. Given the cost, number of personnel, and symbolic importance of U.S. aircraft carriers, this level of risk could prompt U.S. commanders to hold carriers back until areas closer to China could be sanitized by U.S. anti-submarine assets.
By 2017, further improvements across all areas of Chinese anti-surface warfare, especially submarine capabilities, lead to Chinese advantage in the Taiwan case and approximate parity in the Spratly Islands scenario. It should be remembered that Chinese advantage refers only to the situation at the first few weeks of conflict. While this period could prove critically important to, for example, a ground campaign in Taiwan, it does not necessarily suggest that China would be able to hold U.S. warships at a similar degree of risk during a more protracted conflict. Also, even at the outset of conflict, U.S. commanders could reduce the risk to carriers by holding them farther from the coast, though this would reduce their contribution to the air battle.
USN - PACOM commanders have spoken on record about their urgent need for more subs while treating the F-35 laden carriers with lukewarm support.
Its not like Indian Navy already does not sees it all. In fact my guess is that Indian Navy knew well that US naval reactor tech is not going to be made available and that is exactly why they went ahead and asked for it. In the Indian Navy even the erstwhile Carrier proponents like Adml. Arun Prakash have come on record, probably to avert any misgivings, that we should be increasing our Nuke-sub capabilities. But that is a different story.
Regards your view that:
Submarines are a threat yes. But that does not force a carrier vs submarine debate.
US Navy and Indian Navy have already gone through this debate as must have the Russian and Chinese navies. Both USN and IN are trying their level best to get their respective sub capabilities rationalized and/or increased in sizes. Carriers in nearly all navies are either laggards (Chinese & Indian) or do not exist (Russian) or severely curtailed (British). The 71 ops in Karachi have already shown how meaningless the carrier can be. BTW the sole IN carrier in 1971 was jumping about the ocean even when it had only a much stunted enemy in East Pakistan to take care of.
