ladder
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Good Idea, the Indian Navy should consider allowing some civilians.
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INS Vikramaditya (Adm Gorshkov) aircraft carrier
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Neil
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Aircraft Carrier INS Vikramaditya weathers storm in the Barents Sea
Indian aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya braved a stom as it crossed the Russian Borders on the evening of 7th December. The ship had departed after its scheduled stop at Murmansk, where it was replenished.
During its journey in Barents Sea, the ship faced winds blowing and Spray from the waves overwhelmed the flight deck windows and reached the pilothouse. "Vikramaditya" once again showed excellent seaworthiness. Indian sailors steered the aircraft carrier in such difficult conditions, coped well ", said Igor Leonov, who is responsible for delivery of the ship, which is headed towards India. He stressed that the ships systems are functioning normally.
The aircraft carrier is accompanied by tanker INS Deepak" and the frigate INS Trikhand. The ship will sail along coast of Norway before entering North Sea, sail by UK, cross the Bay of Biscay and reach Lisbon, capital of Portugal, where it will replenish and refuel.
Aircraft Carrier INS Vikramaditya weathers storm in the Barents Sea
Indian aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya braved a stom as it crossed the Russian Borders on the evening of 7th December. The ship had departed after its scheduled stop at Murmansk, where it was replenished.
During its journey in Barents Sea, the ship faced winds blowing and Spray from the waves overwhelmed the flight deck windows and reached the pilothouse. "Vikramaditya" once again showed excellent seaworthiness. Indian sailors steered the aircraft carrier in such difficult conditions, coped well ", said Igor Leonov, who is responsible for delivery of the ship, which is headed towards India. He stressed that the ships systems are functioning normally.
The aircraft carrier is accompanied by tanker INS Deepak" and the frigate INS Trikhand. The ship will sail along coast of Norway before entering North Sea, sail by UK, cross the Bay of Biscay and reach Lisbon, capital of Portugal, where it will replenish and refuel.
Aircraft Carrier INS Vikramaditya weathers storm in the Barents Sea
happy
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Cross Hairs | Navy lessons from Gorshkov
In February 1968, Time magazine carried a cover story about a Russian admiral, grudgingly respected by Americans as one single-handedly responsible for building a derelict Soviet navy into an aggressive, disciplined and a formidable force, capable of challenging the hitherto unquestioned US maritime dominance.
Russia's naval history had been tumultuous, with early rulers like Peter the Great and Czarina Catherine building it into the third largest naval force behind only the English and the French for most of the 19th century. While formidable in numbers, the navy was largely ceremonial and untested, and this lack of battle proficiency cost them dearly in their first major conflict with the Japanese in 1904-05 off the island of Tsushima. Admiral Togo of Japan first pinned the Russian Pacific fleet at Port Arthur and then routed and sunk their entire Baltic fleet of 37 vessels, which had been sent as reinforcement, in a humiliating battle.
At the beginning of World War II, the Russian navy was little more than a rag-tag bunch of ships that seldom strayed from the coasts. Since the Red Army played the dominant role in Russian conflicts, Soviet navy had been neglected until Stalin took over and embarked on a major build-up. However, most of the Soviet vessels were still under construction when they were overrun by the advancing Germans during World War II. It was during this raging battle to protect Crimea that a young naval captain named Sergey Georgiyevich made his mark protecting the oilfields of the Caucasus.
Even as a young officer, Sergey showed the capabilities of fleet-building for which he would be renowned later. Welding turrets from T-34 tanks, Sergey modified motorboats into gunships, harassing the advancing Germans and in the process catching the attention of two generals fighting in the same area, who would go on to play important roles in Russia's destiny—Leonid Brezhnev and Nikita Khrushchev.
Sergey became Russia's youngest admiral, when he was just 31, and went on to reshape and guide the Soviet quest for oceanic supremacy for several decades, as the chief of its navy. He realized that to build a strong navy, Russia needed not just a complement of ships, destroyers, aircraft carriers and submarines, but also affiliations with countries along the theatre of operations who would provide berthing, refuelling and rearmament facilities. For this, he embarked on a series of relationship-building visits to countries and established refurbishment arrangements in ports as distant as Cuba, Angola, Yemen and several Middle Eastern countries.
Appreciating that Soviet engineering was still behind American, especially in submarine and nuclear propulsion technology, Sergey offset this disadvantage by leveraging Russian strength of numbers and its political system. He enhanced Russia's sea presence by developing thousands of merchant ships that could be transformed into military missions with minimal conversion. He also co-opted over 4,000 Russian fishing vessels into the navy, tasking them with the responsibility of logistics and gathering intelligence while they were out fishing. The Soviet Union also had the largest oceanographic fleet whose ships were tasked with gathering militarily valuable information like depths, currents and lurking spots.
Perhaps the most important change that Sergey brought into his forces was an infusion of aggressive spirit. Despite being numerically and qualitatively inferior, Soviet ships and submarines started stalking American carrier groups, at times coming dangerously close and even passing through US formations. This surface and underwater stalking games taught the Soviets valuable lessons about their adversaries' strengths, weaknesses, drills and strategies. As a matter of fact, the Soviets nicknamed their own Mediterranean fleet after the US Sixth Fleet from whom they learnt so much.
Admiral Sergey Georgiyevich went on to become that rare legendary warrior who not only inspired his contemporary generation, but influenced the Soviet Naval doctrine for several decades, evolving doctrines of power projection and sea control halfway across the globe in the Arabian Peninsula and Vietnam.
When Admiral Sergey died, Soviet Union renamed one of their largest aircraft carriers, the Baku, in his honour as Admiral Sergey Gorshkov. It is this redoubtable carrier of history that has been rechristened as INS Vikramaditya upon its commissioning into the Indian Navy. When the vessel docks in India, it will be reminiscent of her namesake who had visited India in the 1960s in one of his missions to cement India-Soviet relationship.
Sailors believe that all vessels have a spirit of their own. If that is true, then the Indian Navy has acquired more than just a weapons platform. It also has the reminder to learn from the legacy of a warrior who elevated the Soviet navy from its position of second fiddle to the Red Army to becoming the primary rapier of Soviet foreign policies.
Gorshkov's strategies have much learning for India, where too the Navy has historically been a relatively neglected arm. India, too, must realize that building a navy requires more than just acquiring vessels. While India's traditional threats have been land-based, its future aspirations must appreciate the strategic importance of its vast coastline, its offshore areas of interest and the shift of centre of gravity from land-based operations in its north to power projection into the real blue ocean. As Gorshkov often quoted, every potentate who uses only ground forces has but one hand. Yet, whoever uses a powerful navy, has both.
Cross Hairs | Navy lessons from Gorshkov - Livemint
In February 1968, Time magazine carried a cover story about a Russian admiral, grudgingly respected by Americans as one single-handedly responsible for building a derelict Soviet navy into an aggressive, disciplined and a formidable force, capable of challenging the hitherto unquestioned US maritime dominance.
Russia's naval history had been tumultuous, with early rulers like Peter the Great and Czarina Catherine building it into the third largest naval force behind only the English and the French for most of the 19th century. While formidable in numbers, the navy was largely ceremonial and untested, and this lack of battle proficiency cost them dearly in their first major conflict with the Japanese in 1904-05 off the island of Tsushima. Admiral Togo of Japan first pinned the Russian Pacific fleet at Port Arthur and then routed and sunk their entire Baltic fleet of 37 vessels, which had been sent as reinforcement, in a humiliating battle.
At the beginning of World War II, the Russian navy was little more than a rag-tag bunch of ships that seldom strayed from the coasts. Since the Red Army played the dominant role in Russian conflicts, Soviet navy had been neglected until Stalin took over and embarked on a major build-up. However, most of the Soviet vessels were still under construction when they were overrun by the advancing Germans during World War II. It was during this raging battle to protect Crimea that a young naval captain named Sergey Georgiyevich made his mark protecting the oilfields of the Caucasus.
Even as a young officer, Sergey showed the capabilities of fleet-building for which he would be renowned later. Welding turrets from T-34 tanks, Sergey modified motorboats into gunships, harassing the advancing Germans and in the process catching the attention of two generals fighting in the same area, who would go on to play important roles in Russia's destiny—Leonid Brezhnev and Nikita Khrushchev.
Sergey became Russia's youngest admiral, when he was just 31, and went on to reshape and guide the Soviet quest for oceanic supremacy for several decades, as the chief of its navy. He realized that to build a strong navy, Russia needed not just a complement of ships, destroyers, aircraft carriers and submarines, but also affiliations with countries along the theatre of operations who would provide berthing, refuelling and rearmament facilities. For this, he embarked on a series of relationship-building visits to countries and established refurbishment arrangements in ports as distant as Cuba, Angola, Yemen and several Middle Eastern countries.
Appreciating that Soviet engineering was still behind American, especially in submarine and nuclear propulsion technology, Sergey offset this disadvantage by leveraging Russian strength of numbers and its political system. He enhanced Russia's sea presence by developing thousands of merchant ships that could be transformed into military missions with minimal conversion. He also co-opted over 4,000 Russian fishing vessels into the navy, tasking them with the responsibility of logistics and gathering intelligence while they were out fishing. The Soviet Union also had the largest oceanographic fleet whose ships were tasked with gathering militarily valuable information like depths, currents and lurking spots.
Perhaps the most important change that Sergey brought into his forces was an infusion of aggressive spirit. Despite being numerically and qualitatively inferior, Soviet ships and submarines started stalking American carrier groups, at times coming dangerously close and even passing through US formations. This surface and underwater stalking games taught the Soviets valuable lessons about their adversaries' strengths, weaknesses, drills and strategies. As a matter of fact, the Soviets nicknamed their own Mediterranean fleet after the US Sixth Fleet from whom they learnt so much.
Admiral Sergey Georgiyevich went on to become that rare legendary warrior who not only inspired his contemporary generation, but influenced the Soviet Naval doctrine for several decades, evolving doctrines of power projection and sea control halfway across the globe in the Arabian Peninsula and Vietnam.
When Admiral Sergey died, Soviet Union renamed one of their largest aircraft carriers, the Baku, in his honour as Admiral Sergey Gorshkov. It is this redoubtable carrier of history that has been rechristened as INS Vikramaditya upon its commissioning into the Indian Navy. When the vessel docks in India, it will be reminiscent of her namesake who had visited India in the 1960s in one of his missions to cement India-Soviet relationship.
Sailors believe that all vessels have a spirit of their own. If that is true, then the Indian Navy has acquired more than just a weapons platform. It also has the reminder to learn from the legacy of a warrior who elevated the Soviet navy from its position of second fiddle to the Red Army to becoming the primary rapier of Soviet foreign policies.
Gorshkov's strategies have much learning for India, where too the Navy has historically been a relatively neglected arm. India, too, must realize that building a navy requires more than just acquiring vessels. While India's traditional threats have been land-based, its future aspirations must appreciate the strategic importance of its vast coastline, its offshore areas of interest and the shift of centre of gravity from land-based operations in its north to power projection into the real blue ocean. As Gorshkov often quoted, every potentate who uses only ground forces has but one hand. Yet, whoever uses a powerful navy, has both.
Cross Hairs | Navy lessons from Gorshkov - Livemint
mahesh
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INS Vikramaditya and the Aircraft Carrier Debate | The Diplomat
The Indian Navy has been energized by the commissioning of its new aircraft carrier, the INS Vikramaditya. Coming two months after another significant achievement – the nuclear reactor of the Arihant, India's first indigenous nuclear powered submarine, going critical – the Vikramaditya is being seen as a game changer, with the potential to transform the Indian Navy's profile in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and beyond.
The ship's proportions and capabilities are indeed significant. At 45,400 tons, the Vikamaditya is considerably larger than any ship the Indian Navy has ever had. Its primary aviation assets, the Kamov-31 helicopters and MiG 29K multirole fighter aircraft – the mainstay of its integral combat capability – are among the most advanced in the world. In addition, the naval version of the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) may also be positioned onboard, making the Vikramaditya the first Indian aircraft carrier to operate two aircraft of the Short Take off but Assisted Recovery (STOBAR) variety.
Interestingly, Vikramaditya's commissioning seems to have re-ignited an old debate among maritime analysts: of the relevance of aircraft carriers in a maritime contemporary context. Proponents of aircraft carriers argue it constitutes the core of maritime strategy and must play a central part in a blue-water navy's operational plans. Opponents posit that the aircraft carrier's high vulnerability (to new disruptive weapons and technologies), and inadequate logistical sustainability render it an irrelevant asset. Not only is it a financially expensive proposition, they point out, it is also incapable of projecting significant offensive power. The fact that it is virtually defenseless against underwater attacks, long-range strategic airpower and ballistic missiles makes it a near liability in war.
As compelling as the criticism appears, there is a more nuanced rationale for retaining the giant ships. Modern day maritime discourse requires such ships to be located in a new conceptual framework. Ocean-going navies today need three types of conventional assets. The first category comprises "hard-power" assets: fighting platforms like destroyers, frigates, missile boats and attack submarines meant for the real combat operations in a naval battle. These are used in both offensive and defensive operations, and are meant to influence the tempo and outcome of a maritime conflict. The second lot is of "soft-power" assets like hospital ships, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) platforms, survey vessels, etc. These provide a valuable regional (and global) service and are crucial for a navy's soft-power outreach. Finally, and most significantly, a navy needs assets for "power projection" – a critical component of a nation's maritime strategy. Power projection assets are an embodiment of a nation's strategic capability and political intent. Navies strive to accrete power and project it far beyond the home country as a metric of national influence and their own regional relevance. Aircraft carriers fall into this category.
This is not to suggest that aircraft carriers no longer have an important combat role to play. It is just that they do not necessarily have to be involved in high intensity combat operations against adversaries and must be seen as fungible assets, in terms of their utility in advancing national interests. There is certainly prestige involved in possessing an aircraft carrier. But prestige is increasingly coming to be recognized as equaling national influence. As aircraft carrier supporters point out, the arrival of an aircraft carrier at a regional port of call imparts a diplomatic impact that cannot be matched by a submarine or a destroyer. Therefore, even while acknowledging the flexible demands of future maritime missions on maritime forces that would necessitate a shift towards multi-purpose warships (such as amphibious assault vessels), the likelihood that aircraft carriers would continue to be relevant in their present form and configuration, remains high.
If this gives some perspective to the aircraft carrier debate, it still doesn't settle the supposed contest between sea control and sea denial. Inducting an aircraft carrier, it has been suggested, signifies the triumph of the concept of sea control over the more practical and much less expensive notion of sea denial. The analysis tries to draw a false equivalence between two fundamental concepts intrinsic to national maritime strategy. While the former is a prerequisite in dictating the terms of a naval engagement, the latter (as a subset of the former) has limited application and is meant to deny a stronger adversary the use of maritime space. Both play a vital role in a nation's larger maritime strategy, but none supplants the other.
There is one significant difference though. Since sea-denial is useful in defending a nation's maritime territory against an aggressive adversary, it is primarily a war-time concept. Sea control, on the other hand, allows for both battle-space domination in war and the expansion of naval sphere of operations in peacetime (a critical component of grand national strategy). Its utility as a metaphorical enabler in naval strategy is, therefore, far greater.
For the Indian Navy, operating two full-fledged carrier battle groups (CBGs) – one each for the Eastern and Western seaboards – is not just a long-standing ambition, but also a key component of its operational strategy. With the INS Viraat nearing the end of its operational life, the Indian Navy has been under pressure to position a suitable replacement. The INS Vikramaditya brings it one step closer to achieving a desirable end-state. As things stand, by the end of 2018 the navy will induct the 40,000-tonne INS Vikrant being built at the Cochin Shipyard. The Vikramaditya, in the words of India's Naval Chief, Admiral D K Joshi, is intended to "bridge the gap between the INS Viraat's decommissioning, and the entry of the INS Vikrant."
An aircraft carrier, however, doesn't by-itself guarantee an expanded sphere of naval influence. With a limited integral defensive capability and even lesser maneuverability, a carrier needs an armada of armed escort ships and aircraft to protect it from external threats. In this, the Vikramaditya has an inherent disadvantage as it lacks an on-board close-in-weapon-system (CIWS) and long-range surface-to-air missiles (LR-SAMS). Its near total dependence on layered in-depth defense provided by its screening ships and aircraft is a challenge that the Indian Navy will need to address in due course.
The Indian Navy will also be mindful of the maritime ambitions of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N) and the role that its new aircraft carrier – the Liaoning – is likely to play in China's Indian Ocean expansion. China's new aircraft carrier might be used both for the PLA-N's power projection, as well as an instrument for its soft-power diplomacy – a key component of the "far-seas" naval strategy. That apart, the PLA-N is also said to be considering using aircraft carrier in a hard-power role for the expansion of its island barrier defenses, also known as the inner and outer island chains. In fact, analysts agree that China is most likely to pursue the construction of additional aircraft carriers in the future – which only indicates the PLA-N's belief in the worthiness of its aircraft carrier program.
Ultimately, possessing an aircraft carrier does not just indicate blue-water capability, but it is also representative of a navy's essential vision. If a maritime force can conceive of an aircraft carrier's role as a versatile and flexible asset – one that can switch easily between soft power diplomacy, power projection and combat operations – it can be a game changer, for both national foreign policy and naval strategy.
If used intelligently, the Vikamaditya could prove to be critical in shaping the Indian Ocean's strategic environment.
The Indian Navy has been energized by the commissioning of its new aircraft carrier, the INS Vikramaditya. Coming two months after another significant achievement – the nuclear reactor of the Arihant, India's first indigenous nuclear powered submarine, going critical – the Vikramaditya is being seen as a game changer, with the potential to transform the Indian Navy's profile in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and beyond.
The ship's proportions and capabilities are indeed significant. At 45,400 tons, the Vikamaditya is considerably larger than any ship the Indian Navy has ever had. Its primary aviation assets, the Kamov-31 helicopters and MiG 29K multirole fighter aircraft – the mainstay of its integral combat capability – are among the most advanced in the world. In addition, the naval version of the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) may also be positioned onboard, making the Vikramaditya the first Indian aircraft carrier to operate two aircraft of the Short Take off but Assisted Recovery (STOBAR) variety.
Interestingly, Vikramaditya's commissioning seems to have re-ignited an old debate among maritime analysts: of the relevance of aircraft carriers in a maritime contemporary context. Proponents of aircraft carriers argue it constitutes the core of maritime strategy and must play a central part in a blue-water navy's operational plans. Opponents posit that the aircraft carrier's high vulnerability (to new disruptive weapons and technologies), and inadequate logistical sustainability render it an irrelevant asset. Not only is it a financially expensive proposition, they point out, it is also incapable of projecting significant offensive power. The fact that it is virtually defenseless against underwater attacks, long-range strategic airpower and ballistic missiles makes it a near liability in war.
As compelling as the criticism appears, there is a more nuanced rationale for retaining the giant ships. Modern day maritime discourse requires such ships to be located in a new conceptual framework. Ocean-going navies today need three types of conventional assets. The first category comprises "hard-power" assets: fighting platforms like destroyers, frigates, missile boats and attack submarines meant for the real combat operations in a naval battle. These are used in both offensive and defensive operations, and are meant to influence the tempo and outcome of a maritime conflict. The second lot is of "soft-power" assets like hospital ships, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) platforms, survey vessels, etc. These provide a valuable regional (and global) service and are crucial for a navy's soft-power outreach. Finally, and most significantly, a navy needs assets for "power projection" – a critical component of a nation's maritime strategy. Power projection assets are an embodiment of a nation's strategic capability and political intent. Navies strive to accrete power and project it far beyond the home country as a metric of national influence and their own regional relevance. Aircraft carriers fall into this category.
This is not to suggest that aircraft carriers no longer have an important combat role to play. It is just that they do not necessarily have to be involved in high intensity combat operations against adversaries and must be seen as fungible assets, in terms of their utility in advancing national interests. There is certainly prestige involved in possessing an aircraft carrier. But prestige is increasingly coming to be recognized as equaling national influence. As aircraft carrier supporters point out, the arrival of an aircraft carrier at a regional port of call imparts a diplomatic impact that cannot be matched by a submarine or a destroyer. Therefore, even while acknowledging the flexible demands of future maritime missions on maritime forces that would necessitate a shift towards multi-purpose warships (such as amphibious assault vessels), the likelihood that aircraft carriers would continue to be relevant in their present form and configuration, remains high.
If this gives some perspective to the aircraft carrier debate, it still doesn't settle the supposed contest between sea control and sea denial. Inducting an aircraft carrier, it has been suggested, signifies the triumph of the concept of sea control over the more practical and much less expensive notion of sea denial. The analysis tries to draw a false equivalence between two fundamental concepts intrinsic to national maritime strategy. While the former is a prerequisite in dictating the terms of a naval engagement, the latter (as a subset of the former) has limited application and is meant to deny a stronger adversary the use of maritime space. Both play a vital role in a nation's larger maritime strategy, but none supplants the other.
There is one significant difference though. Since sea-denial is useful in defending a nation's maritime territory against an aggressive adversary, it is primarily a war-time concept. Sea control, on the other hand, allows for both battle-space domination in war and the expansion of naval sphere of operations in peacetime (a critical component of grand national strategy). Its utility as a metaphorical enabler in naval strategy is, therefore, far greater.
For the Indian Navy, operating two full-fledged carrier battle groups (CBGs) – one each for the Eastern and Western seaboards – is not just a long-standing ambition, but also a key component of its operational strategy. With the INS Viraat nearing the end of its operational life, the Indian Navy has been under pressure to position a suitable replacement. The INS Vikramaditya brings it one step closer to achieving a desirable end-state. As things stand, by the end of 2018 the navy will induct the 40,000-tonne INS Vikrant being built at the Cochin Shipyard. The Vikramaditya, in the words of India's Naval Chief, Admiral D K Joshi, is intended to "bridge the gap between the INS Viraat's decommissioning, and the entry of the INS Vikrant."
An aircraft carrier, however, doesn't by-itself guarantee an expanded sphere of naval influence. With a limited integral defensive capability and even lesser maneuverability, a carrier needs an armada of armed escort ships and aircraft to protect it from external threats. In this, the Vikramaditya has an inherent disadvantage as it lacks an on-board close-in-weapon-system (CIWS) and long-range surface-to-air missiles (LR-SAMS). Its near total dependence on layered in-depth defense provided by its screening ships and aircraft is a challenge that the Indian Navy will need to address in due course.
The Indian Navy will also be mindful of the maritime ambitions of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N) and the role that its new aircraft carrier – the Liaoning – is likely to play in China's Indian Ocean expansion. China's new aircraft carrier might be used both for the PLA-N's power projection, as well as an instrument for its soft-power diplomacy – a key component of the "far-seas" naval strategy. That apart, the PLA-N is also said to be considering using aircraft carrier in a hard-power role for the expansion of its island barrier defenses, also known as the inner and outer island chains. In fact, analysts agree that China is most likely to pursue the construction of additional aircraft carriers in the future – which only indicates the PLA-N's belief in the worthiness of its aircraft carrier program.
Ultimately, possessing an aircraft carrier does not just indicate blue-water capability, but it is also representative of a navy's essential vision. If a maritime force can conceive of an aircraft carrier's role as a versatile and flexible asset – one that can switch easily between soft power diplomacy, power projection and combat operations – it can be a game changer, for both national foreign policy and naval strategy.
If used intelligently, the Vikamaditya could prove to be critical in shaping the Indian Ocean's strategic environment.
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sayareakd
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Why no Indian Flag on Vikram ?
One helicopter in the background must be british having a good look at Wiki.
rvjpheonix
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Where are our escort ships? Cant see them in the background.
happy
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It says - "Also in the area was INS Deepak and INS Trikand. The ships held talks over VHF and then went their seperate ways later in the day."
HMS Monmouth helps mammoth aircraft carrier through Channel | Royal Navy
You can see this bit when you click on the slideshow. I do not know what it means by separate ways ??
Neeraj Mathur
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ship is looking awesome
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Uh oh....did Royal Navy just leak details of the entire escort complement of Vikramaditya (Deepak and Trikand), which is basically just a refueler and a single frigate? It doesn't seem sufficient? Maybe IN plans to add more vessels to that group after it passes through European waters?
shafiq alam
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dnt worry I think you are underestimating Trikand & vikramaditya's firepower. Plus they will have enough people(SPB & may be MARCOS) on board to deal with any idiot who wants to fool around
nirranj
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Some more ships will join the convoy in Gibralter.
nirranj
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This abive quote was from the RN website. Did Viky paid a visit to a English naval base??? Why did it visit a foreign naval base? May be for replenishing?
HMS Monmouth helps mammoth aircraft carrier through Channel | Royal Navy
Abhijeet Dey
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They should take a photo of Viky passing through Suez Canal. That would be awesome.
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