India's Nuclear Doctrine

Should India have tested a Megaton warhead during Pokran?


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Razor

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Irrespective of the doctrine one must have capability to strike at whim. Striking a desired target is totally a different science and something which has less to do with how many underground tests you have done. I wouldn't challenge some expert if he or she may call nuclear strike capability of India, Pakistan and (may be) China a bluff. However i would always wish Indian army to be nuclear battle field and Indian cities nuclear war ready in near future.
I wouldn't call our capability a bluff. But I doubt the will of our politicians, like womanmohan singh. I think they might bend to american pressure when they ask us not to nuke.
And also how good is the "no first use"? I mean we could assume something that they launch to be nuclear and use it to justify our attack (retaliation), right? or am I wrong?
 

pmaitra

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India's No First Use (on Nuclear Weapons) Policy Change

India's No First Use (on Nuclear Weapons) Policy Change

This thread is for discussing the current status of India's No First Use or NFU of Nuclear Weapons.


Address by Foreign Secretary at NDC on 'Challenges in India's Foreign Policy'

November 19, 2010

Commandant NDC Lt. General Prakash Menon
Faculty members
Ladies and Gentlemen

...

46. Despite a complex regional and global environment, India's policies have been marked by a sense of responsibility and restraint. We have been one of the earliest proponents of nuclear disarmament. Even as a nuclear weapon state, India remains steadfast in its support for the global, universal and non-discriminatory elimination of all nuclear weapons. India has a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and their non-use against non-nuclear weapon states and we support enshrining them into global legal arrangements. Terrorists gaining access to WMDs has emerged as a major threat for our national security as well as globally. We remain engaged with the international community through participation in initiatives like the Nuclear Security Summit and the Global Initiative in order to combat nuclear terrorism to address these challenges.

...

Source: MEA - Ministry of External Affairs
 
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pmaitra

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Statement by the PM of India Dr. Manmohan Singh at the Nuclear Security Summit

Yet another statement given by the PM of India, Dr. Manmohan Singh that mentions India's No First Use policy.

Statement by the Prime Minister of India Dr. Manmohan Singh at the Nuclear Security Summit

April 13, 2010

President Barack Obama,
Excellencies,
Distinguished Heads of Delegations,

...

We are encouraged by the Nuclear Posture Review announced by President Obama. India supports the universalisation of the policy of No First Use. The salience of nuclear weapons in national defence and security doctrines must be reduced as a matter of priority.

...

Source: MEA - Ministry of External Affairs
 
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pmaitra

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Adapted from another thread:

NFU is only against "non nuclear armed" nations, not against the nuclear armed nations.
I think India NFU policy is for all countries, regardless of whether they posses nukes or not.

Here are some links and none specify any distinction between N-states and non-N-states:
MEA - Ministry of External Affairs *
MEA - Ministry of External Affairs
http://www.mea.gov.in/meaxpsite/others/01cv01.pdf

* - Note:
46. Despite a complex regional and global environment, India's policies have been marked by a sense of responsibility and restraint. We have been one of the earliest proponents of nuclear disarmament. Even as a nuclear weapon state, India remains steadfast in its support for the global, universal and non-discriminatory elimination of all nuclear weapons. India has a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and their non-use against non-nuclear weapon states and we support enshrining them into global legal arrangements. Terrorists gaining access to WMDs has emerged as a major threat for our national security as well as globally. We remain engaged with the international community through participation in initiatives like the Nuclear Security Summit and the Global Initiative in order to combat nuclear terrorism to address these challenges.
I have highlighted 3 sentences in a compound sentence. This, to my understanding means:
  • India will not be the first one to use nuclear weapons. That's it. It does not mention whether the enemy state has nukes or not.
  • India will not use nuclear weapons against a non-Nuclear state. Obviously. If India is nuked, it will only be by one who has nukes and India can return the favour.
  • India favours making a NFU policy legally binding on a global basis.
 

nitesh

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^^
Apparently, there were change suggested in the policy, thereby restricting it to only against "non nuclear states"

Did India Change its Nuclear Doctrine?: Much Ado about Nothing | Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses


A recent concern has broken out amongst some analysts that India has shifted its nuclear doctrine away from no first use. The publicly released summary of India's 2003 official nuclear doctrine pledged "no first use" of nuclear weapons and an additional negative security assurance of "non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states." On 21 October 2010, India's National Security Advisor, Shivshankar Menon, gave a speech to the National Defence College in which the text employs the formulation that India's nuclear doctrine emphasizes "no first use against non-nuclear weapons states.
 

pmaitra

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^^
Apparently, there were change suggested in the policy, thereby restricting it to only against "non nuclear states"

Did India Change its Nuclear Doctrine?: Much Ado about Nothing | Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
Thanks for the interesting post Nitesh.

So what we have is two different possibilities:
  • We will not use nukes against, say Pakistan, even if they posses nuclear weapons unless they attack us with nuclear weapons first.
  • We will use nukes against, say Pakistan, simply because they have it, even if they have not yet used it on us.

I think the MEA site should clarify this. The former bullet point is recent (March 1, 2011) and this implies India now will be willing to use nukes against any country that has nukes instead of waiting to be nuked first. Smart and sensible step. Now, my concern is, why did MEA not post this on their website, or did I miss something or not look well enough? Was the speech by Mr. Shivshankar Menon a (1) slip of tongue or (2) meant only for the defense college audience?

Someone please clarify.
 

Sikh_warrior

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there is no other country in the world which has two nuclear armed neighbours, with whom wars have been fought!

its India's neighbours, CHIPAK, who are armed and dangerous, and are arming themselves without any threats from India.

CHIPAK do have a policy of agression against India, low intensity proxy war through non state and officially supported terrorists as a state policy of pakistan.

China has been making agressive postures by building up offensive defences along the indian border.

Pakistan has been making direct threats to target india with its nukes.

....and there are many other reasons arising out of CHIPAK that are threating India directly.

i dont think India should continue with NFU considering the neighbourhood and the non present 2nd strike capability of india!

if our neighbours dont have a NFU, why should we have?

Time to change with the change of time and situation!
 

Singh

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It is better to keep deliberate ambiguity about the whole situation. Viz a viz Pakistan we should emphasize NFU so that they don't react aggressively to Cold Start, viz a viz China we should maintain ambiguity saying we will do whatever is in our power to safeguard our interests, security and sovereignty.
 

nitesh

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pmaitra,

I guess there is a movement inside GoI to change the posture, as pakistan is deliberately lowering the nuclear threshold. So Mr. menon must have said these words to signal that there is a change in policy, which we might not see in official words. According to me, a confusing gesture is being maintained, but for how long is the question. Because, as per our policy we don't keep nuclear warheads in ready to fire state, but as soon as Arihant comes on line, we will have minimum of 12 nukes in ready to fire mode.

In my view we have changed our posture from "no first use" to "no first use against non nuclear states"
 

Singh

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Paaji,

Please format your post, its too tough to read


===

there is no other country in the world which has two nuclear armed neighbours, with whom wars have been fought!
Sorry but the other country would be China.

===

its India's neighbours, CHIPAK, who are armed and dangerous, and are arming themselves without any threats from India.CHIPAK do have a policy of agression against India, low intensity proxy war through non state and officially supported terrorists as a state policy of pakistan.China has been making agressive postures by building up offensive defences along the indian border.
Pakistan has been making direct threats to target india with its nukes.
China is arming itself not because of any perceived threat from India per se but because of a host of factors.
Pakistan doesn't have the money to arm itself, they are cranking up their nuclear programme because they believe in the gun to the head policy. In simple terms, they want to be too important to fail.
China and India have a territorial dispute. And China is keen on resolving it through force imo. In a previous thread I mentioned how Chinese could pull a Cold Start on us.
Pakistan has an irrational paranoia viz a viz India. Pakistan has officially started using terror as a policy because the investment was low and return high. I don't see Pakistan giving it up, as long as they don't have the money and they don't get punished severely. Its too lucrative in the short term.


....and there are many other reasons arising out of CHIPAK that are threating India directly.
i dont think India should continue with NFU considering the neighbourhood and the non present 2nd strike capability of india!
if our neighbours dont have a NFU, why should we have?
Time to change with the change of time and situation!
India's adoption of NFU was to stabilize the region, we don't want to be seen as an aggressor. The newly added element of ambiguity is welcome imo simply because nobody will be able to find out our real intention.
 

sayareakd

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@pmaitra, against nuclear state add this too

"However, in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons."
 

sayareakd

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question we should ask is: Has Pakistan changed its nuclear doctrine ???

earlier pakistani nuclear doctrine had principle of "credible minimum deterrence" which has not changed without any declaration.

now it appears that they have shifted/changed to "minimum credible deterrence" same as Indian doctrine, this may had happen because of Indian BMD programme, this is evident from the fact that pakistan has increased its nuke at alarming rate and now it has worlds fastest nuclear weapon making programme.
 

Yusuf

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i dont think India should continue with NFU considering the neighbourhood and the non present 2nd strike capability of india!
Funny!! If we don't have second strike capability according to you, where do we get the first strike capability from?
 

nitesh

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here it comes again :D

Indian Official Touts Work On Nuclear Deterrent | AVIATION WEEK


"There is a huge amount of work going on toward creating a credible minimal deterrence to ensure our adversaries don't take us by surprise. We are way up and ahead of what we need to do in protecting the country," says Air Vice Marshal K.J. Mathews, commander-in-chief of Strategic Forces Command.

SFC, established in 2003, operates independently and is responsible for India's nuclear arsenal from preparation to delivery to the armed forces. The command also is tasked with the use of nuclear weapons under the eight-point nuclear doctrine, which is committed to no-first strike or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear nations.
 

nitesh

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here it comes again :D

Indian Official Touts Work On Nuclear Deterrent | AVIATION WEEK


"There is a huge amount of work going on toward creating a credible minimal deterrence to ensure our adversaries don't take us by surprise. We are way up and ahead of what we need to do in protecting the country," says Air Vice Marshal K.J. Mathews, commander-in-chief of Strategic Forces Command.

SFC, established in 2003, operates independently and is responsible for India's nuclear arsenal from preparation to delivery to the armed forces. The command also is tasked with the use of nuclear weapons under the eight-point nuclear doctrine, which is committed to no-first strike or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear nations.
 

ejazr

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A little off topic, but relevant post on Mearsheimer explaining why India needs the nuclear bomb. If you don't know, Mearsheirmer is like the founding father of the offensive realism paradigm in international relations theory. John Mearsheimer - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

India Needs The Bomb - New York Times
Despite its huge population, booming economy and growing nuclear arsenal, President Clinton, like his predecessors, refuses to show India the respect it deserves. He thereby perpetuates a needless estrangement between two natural allies.

This disrespect is most apparent on the nuclear front. In his address to the Indian Parliament on Wednesday, Mr. Clinton acknowledged many of India's concerns, but he did not give up his call for India to abandon its nuclear weapons. The administration wants India to sign both the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

India, however, refused to sign the nonproliferation treaty when it took effect in 1970 and refused again when the treaty was extended in 1995. India tested nuclear weapons in 1998 and has made it clear that it intends to build powerful nuclear forces.

The Clinton administration should stop opposing these moves and recognize that India is not going to give up its nuclear arsenal. India did not acquire these weapons for frivolous reasons, like misplaced pride or domestic politics, as some Americans believe. Rather, India, like the United States, had sound strategic reasons for wanting them.

Nuclear weapons are an excellent deterrent against aggression, and India lives in a dangerous neighborhood. Since gaining independence in 1947, it has fought three wars with Pakistan and has come close to war with Pakistan three other times. India also fought a losing war with China in 1962 over the still-contested Sino-Indian border. Moreover, both Pakistan and China have their own nuclear weapons, and over the next two decades, China will move to develop a much larger arsenal. India would be foolish to allow China to gain a nuclear advantage over it.

The Persian Gulf war of 1991 and the Kosovo war in 1999 also hardened India's determination to possess nuclear weapons. The United States easily beat Iraq and Serbia by exploiting its enormous advantage in conventional arms. Had either foe possessed nuclear weapons, the United States might not have gone to war. This lesson was not lost on India.

Finally, as President Clinton acknowledged on Wednesday, American hypocrisy on nuclear issues rubs Indians the wrong way. The United States allows itself to have nuclear weapons for its own security but says India should not have them for the same purpose. We expect India to sign the test ban treaty even though the United States Senate rejected it.

The Clinton administration should reverse course and recognize that India is a legitimate nuclear state, like Britain and Russia, not a dangerous nuclear rogue like North Korea. It should allow India to keep its nuclear weapons and sign the nonproliferation treaty, with all the attendant rights and obligations.

As a start toward closer political ties, the administration could support India's membership in the United Nations Security Council. At the same time, however, the United States should not one-sidedly favor India against Pakistan when Pakistan has legitimate concerns. Instead, the United States should strive to be a fair broker when disputes arise.

A more realistic policy toward India would benefit both Asia and American interests.

First, the United States could do more to resolve the conflict between India and Pakistan over the territory of Kashmir. India adamantly refuses to allow the United States to mediate that 53-year-old conflict because it has long felt that Washington favors Pakistan. But if the United States demonstrated even-handedness, showing greater sensitivity to India's interests, India might conceivably welcome constructive mediation.

Second, a more realistic policy would promote nuclear stability on the subcontinent. For example, by dropping its prohibition on nuclear weapons, the United States could provide India and Pakistan modern command-and-control technologies that would make their arsenals safer and more reliable. It could also share valuable safety lessons it learned from its competition with the Soviet Union.

Third, in the not-too-distant future, the United States may need other Asian countries to help it contain China. It would be difficult to fashion an effective coalition of Asian countries without India as a central pillar.

Fourth, with its increasing economic power, especially in software and pharmaceuticals, India is becoming an important player in international economic groups like the World Trade Organization. The United States has an interest in making India a cooperative rather than a disruptive force in those institutions.

India and the United States are the world's two largest democracies, and they are both multicultural democracies to boot. It only makes sense for them to be on the same side. It is thus not only in America's economic and strategic interests to become closer to India, but fully in line with its principles and ideals.
 

Galaxy

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Tit for Tat: A Nuclear Retaliation Alternative

Tit for Tat: A Nuclear Retaliation Alternative

October 3, 2011

India's deterrent posture is based on an assurance of inflicting 'unacceptable damage' as punitive retaliation in case of a Pakistani nuclear first use of any sort – either on Indian territory or on Indian forces 'anywhere'. The declaratory nuclear doctrine of 2003 has it that such a retaliation would be 'massive'. That the term carries some significance can be discerned from the use of the word 'very heavy' by the former Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee to describe India's likely nuclear reaction. It echoes General Padmanabhan's warning during Operation Parakram that: 'The perpetrator of that particular outrage shall be punished, shall be punished so severely that the continuation of any form of fray will be doubtful.

'
The option of 'unacceptable damage' commands a consensus in India for understandable reasons. India's nuclear doctrine is for deterrence and not warfighting. However, there is one contingency that the doctrine does not address adequately well, namely, Pakistan's defensive use of a nuclear weapon on its own territory. Such an eventuality of lower order nuclear first use does trigger the Indian doctrine since it covers Indian forces 'anywhere'. The meting out of unacceptable damage for such a transgression or breaking of the nuclear taboo may seem disproportionate by Pakistan. In light of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal in the lower triple digits, an Indian response along the expounded lines may trigger a counter strike that inflicts 'unacceptable damage' on India. This may in turn lead to a further Indian response and ensuing escalation. Such a dénouement may not be in Indian interests, even if in the event Pakistan is 'finished'.

Therefore, there is a case for revisiting the nuclear doctrine to address this contingency. Currently, there are two prominent nuclear retaliation options. One is as per the official doctrine of 'massive' punitive retaliation; and the second is inflicting 'unacceptable damage' which does not necessarily involve a 'massive' counter strike. There is also a possible third option – non-retaliation. Since India's doctrine is one of 'assured retaliation', the last is not discussed any further. This commentary, however, brings out a fourth alternative: 'tit for tat' nuclear retaliation.

India's nuclear doctrine is certainly credible in case the Pakistani first use is of first strike proportions or a counter value, counter command and control, counter force or decapitation strike. In such cases, India would be politically, legally and morally empowered to return the strike with interest. Given the high credibility of such deterrence, this manner of nuclear first use may be less likely. Lower order nuclear first use as in the contingency discussed is not impossible to visualize since Pakistan would be banking on the low level 'opprobrium quotient' for such a strike. It would be counting on the strike to help focus war termination efforts particularly of the international community. It may wish to run the risk of a disproportionate counter by India as per its doctrine for the purpose. The moot question then is: 'How credible is such intent of nuclear retaliation against first use not of such levels?'

Analysts who privilege deterrence rightly note that in such cases India ought to show resolve by inflicting unacceptable damage irrespective of the type of first use. To them, this would ensure deterrence of even lower order nuclear first use. Assured of India's punitive retaliation which would exact an unacceptable price, Pakistan would rationally choose against first use – rationality being in an easily made costs-gains calculation. However, deterrence based on the threat of 'unacceptable damage' may not credibly cover this lower level of nuclear first use since India would be open to a like counter strike. In case this is to be degraded, then a 'massive' punitive strike is called for. This is as per India's nuclear doctrine that analysts themselves argue against. Leaving Pakistan the means to strike back would imply opening India to a similar strike. In case India destroys 5-10 Pakistani cities or value targets, Pakistan would for proportionate vengeance attempt to take out more than 10 Indian targets. Unwillingness to sustain such a strike may self-deter India. That is not to say there should be no retaliation, but that the non-punitive option suggests itself in such a case, i.e. the tit for tat option. The operational translation of this option is of a quid pro quo or a quid pro quo plus response.

The advantage in terms of deterrence of this option is in its higher credibility for the contingency. It counters Pakistani attempts at projection of a low nuclear threshold by innovative measures such as the demonstration of the 'Nasr' tactical missile recently. Pakistan ends up being struck twice over by its resort to nuclear first use, one being its own weapon on its territory and the second the retaliatory one by India. It does away with the issue of disproportionate response. It enables the cornering of Pakistani decision makers in the court of international opinion, thus staying their nuclear hand further. It conveys India's resolve adequately.

At the political level, it helps capture the moral high ground. It caters for the understandable operation of self-deterrence in political level nuclear decision making. The decision maker has an additional option as an alternative to escalation. It does not discount the other two options on the table – 'massive' and 'assured retaliation'. The 'threat that leaves something to chance' continues. Pakistani targets remain as hostages for further attacks, thus heightening in-conflict deterrence. In sparing Pakistan, India would itself be spared 'unacceptable damage'. Discontinuing the exchange(s) would be easier at the lower level, conflict termination easier and the environment more amenable for post conflict peace than in the case of higher order nuclear exchanges.

First use would unmistakably change the war into a nuclear one. Since a conflict that has gone nuclear has the potential to turn into a Total War, with undesirable consequences also for India, strategic prudence dictates attempts to restrict the cost. This can be done through two ways. One is damage limitation strikes or a massive punitive retaliation to degrade Pakistan's retaliatory capability, which will considerably disarm Pakistan though at great environmental cost. Pakistan is reported to have about 100 weapons located at over 10 sites. Camouflage, deception and other passive and active protection measures would cumulatively deny India a first strike capability. In effect, Pakistan would have a second strike capability which would be enough to inflict 'unacceptable damage', even if not of 'assured destruction' levels. In the light of India's declaratory doctrine Pakistan would have taken measures for pre-delegation to meet such a contingency, including a 'dead hand' discharge of weapons in a 'use them-lose them' mode.

The second way lies in incentivising limitation even in a nuclear war. This can be done by following a 'tit for tat' strategy at lower levels of nuclear use. It would involve imitative strikes that would leave the onus to escalate on Pakistan, as also denying it any intended gains. India's variegated capability, increasing numbers of nuclear weapons over time and second strike capability would ensure escalation dominance thus deterring Pakistan from upping-the-ante.
In effect, India's doctrine would be assured but flexible retaliation. It would amount to deterrence by denial at lower levels of nuclear first use and to deterrence by punishment for higher order nuclear use.


Tit for Tat: A Nuclear Retaliation Alternative | Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
 

trackwhack

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Who wrote this rubbish? India knows all of Pakistans nuclear weapons installations. The retaliation would be such that Pakistan does not have the ability to counter retailiate.

The artcle has to be re-written from the perspective of a gradually escalating conflict in which case the imperative shifts to each force knowing the movement of nuclear arsenels of the other. Current capabilities indicates only India being able to decipher this, unless China supplies Pakistan with the information. However, all this is speculative and requires deep scenario based study.

Tit for Tat response, you must be kidding. This is Pakistan we are talking about. If they attack with nuclear weapons, we incinerate them within 3 hours, no questions asked. There is no point giving them a counter strike option as they will use it.
 

trackwhack

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:shocked:

Isn't IDSA one of the best think tanks in the country ?
Yessir but they can be wrong.
Do you really want a scenario of - oh you dropped one bomb, we will drop one too but a little bigger. With Pakistan? These guys will play that game till they run out of it.

If Pakistan shows the intention of using nuclear weapons even if against troops only, we have to take out all their weapons installations. There is no point playing chicken with Pakistan. But yes, no first strike, ever irrespective of how provocative the enemy is.
 

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