Indian Special Forces (archived)

[Unknowncommando 2]

From Army Day 2020

Para Special Forces
Force Light Strike Vehicle
PKM Light Machine Gun
IWI G-TAR 21 + ITL MARS + MKEK T40 UBGL
Batlskin Viper P2 Ballistic Helmet

 

[vampyrbladez]

The foot soldier has done more than what is required of him to compensate for the lack of gear.
True, SF has been very successful. Lacking all the gears that are required. Imagine how powerful they would be with full gear. And airborne support.
Going through the pics posted above, there was a pic of the cobra commando:
View attachment 44878

This should be the gear for regular infantry. Not a commando. And needs matching camo boots and knee guards. Start from the bottom. Regular infantry equipments and gear. Decide on that. then move over to the SF and specialist units. Comtacs, helmets, plate carriers and plates, medical gear...

If there is a possibility to draw a parallel, para sf would be akin to the green berets. AFSOD, to the navy seals. AFSOD will be deployed via, land , sea and air. These specialized units can be equipped with all the above said gear that’s is supplied by local industries. Very much possible.

I am not sure on categorizing the rashtriya rifles. Are they purely CT or can be regarded as SF? Either way, they remind you of the US SF that go
Undercover with rag tag clothing to blend in:
View attachment 44879

COBRAs operate in jungle environments. They don't use most of the gear shown except the BPJ, uniforms and service weapons. They are roughly equal to GHATAK units of Indian Army in terms of relevance who in turn are equivalent to Scout Sniper of USMC and Reconnaissance Platoons of British Army.

As always MARCOS and NSG lead the charge and thus their gear is closest to modern SF. In 1-2 years all our SF will look like them as even the PARA SF are using similar gear.

 

[Lupus]

In 1-2 years all our SF will look like them as even the PARA SF are using similar gear.

On what evidence are you basing this hypothesis ?

 

[vampyrbladez]

On what evidence are you basing this hypothesis ?

If you have eyes,go through the attached images. They are of last 1 years.

 

[Mangal]

Self deleted



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[Lupus]

If you have eyes,go through the attached images. They are of last 1 years.

You seem to have taken my remark a bit too close to the heart. I can't control how you respond, would only say that it was a genuine question, nothing more than that.

I have looked at most of the Para (SF) pics available in public domain but unfortunately they don't inspire much confidence. The kind of gear NSG has to perform its mandated tasks is far, far better than Paras. There's just no comparison.

The only good thing to come out recently were those Nagrota encounter pics but they were apparently AFSOD, not Para SF.

 

[Unknowncommando 2]

Good episode and very informative. Very well filmed.

 

[vampyrbladez]

You seem to have taken my remark a bit too close to the heart. I can't control how you respond, would only say that it was a genuine question, nothing more than that.

I have looked at most of the Para (SF) pics available in public domain but unfortunately they don't inspire much confidence. The kind of gear NSG has to perform its mandated tasks is far, far better than Paras. There's just no comparison.

The only good thing to come out recently were those Nagrota encounter pics but they were apparently AFSOD, not Para SF.

.........................................................................................................

 

[Sridhar_TN]

Two points.

1) I don't understand this desi fetish of sucking up to Amreeka. They don't give two hoots about our welfare, only the safeguarding of 'murican interests which btw align with India only on the surface. We should indeed cooperate with the US to make up for our power/wealth disparity vis-a-vis China but NEVER rely on the US.

NEVER.

American friendship is akin to fancy wine in a poisoned chalice. I'd rather go thirsty.

2) This discussion has little to do with Indian Special Forces so I suggest we end it here to prevent further derailing this thread.

Agree with the second point.

This DESI FETISH is not about depending on amreeka. It’s the only checkpoint for China today to play it down in the Indian Ocean. It’s not a DESI FETISH for me at least.
Whether you like it or not, you need to suck it up. That’s the position India is in today. Until a time, where Indian navy poses overwhelming superiority to PLN. This is a widely shared belief amongst think tanks that are analyzing INDOPAC treaties.

 

[Unknowncommando 2]

#MARCOS under Watlab Sector reach out to the fishermen community in the Wular Lake to spread awareness about #COVID19. Extending a helping hand by distributing rations to the needy.
#Kashmir
#OpNamaste
#CoronaMuktAwam
#IndianArmy
@adgpi @NorthernComd_IA

 

[Suryavanshi]

#MARCOS under Watlab Sector reach out to the fishermen community in the Wular Lake to spread awareness about #COVID19. Extending a helping hand by distributing rations to the needy.
#Kashmir
#OpNamaste
#CoronaMuktAwam
#IndianArmy
@adgpi @NorthernComd_IA
View attachment 44923 View attachment 44924 View attachment 44925 View attachment 44926

This is MARCOS holy shit I thought It was some foreign SF.

 

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

This is MARCOS holy shit I thought It was some foreign SF.

haha bhai itna bhi nhi he...foreign sf are using much better helmets and enhancements than this.

but yeah decently equipped.

 

[Unknowncommando 2]

Para SF Commandos

IWI S-TAR 21 ( Bipod )
IWI G-TAR 21 ( MKEK T40 UBGL )
ITL MARS Sight + IR & Visible Laser
BEL Single Tube Full Field View Binoculars
MKU Ballistic Helmets
Over vest with armour plate inserts

 

[Lupus]

haha bhai itna bhi nhi he...foreign sf are using much better helmets and enhancements than this.

but yeah decently equipped.

Certain Para SF battalions are believed to be more special than others...how does that work ? Is the difference only in probation standards and equipment...or it's also in training and tasking as well ?

 

[Lupus]

An enigmatic new insignia popped up on a soldier’s uniform a few years ago which sent defence enthusiasts and experts alike into a tizzy. The insignia, worn above the service patches, above the left pocket, belongs to servicemen of the SG — Special Group. Tenanted mostly by men from the Para (SF) battalions of the Indian Army there are also Tibetans and a few Marine Commandos to be found within their ranks.

The Special Group’s two battalions (1200–1500 personnel), are a part of the shadowy Establishment-22 or the Special Frontier Force, SFF, which is under the operational command of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). By virtue of not being under the Ministry of Defence, the SFF, let alone the SG, are seldom discussed in the Parliament. Almost all their missions, to date, are classified. As are their ranks.

A parallel to the Special Group inside the National Security Guards (NSG), under the Ministry of Home Affairs, are the 51st and 52nd Special Action Groups (SAG). These groups are specially trained for counter terrorism and hijacking scenarios, largely in an urban landscape. The SAGs, which make up 54% of the force, are the assault element, tenanted exclusively by personnel of the Indian Army. The remaining personnel form the “holding force”, called the Special Rangers Group. The 52nd SAG successfully executed Operation Ashwamedh in 1993, rescuing 141 passengers from a hijacked plane at Amritsar with 0 casualties. The 51st SAG executed Operation Black Thunder in 1988, at the Golden Temple, the very place which birthed the NSG four years ago.

What sets Special Group (SG) apart is their exclusive use by the intelligence agencies of this country. It is a direction which the US has irreversibly set the world’s clandestine agencies and special forces on. Great, strategic and tactical, operations are now intelligence led. Only the clandestine agencies can provide actionable intelligence on various targets owing to the complex machinations surrounding identification of targets, tapping diplomatic channels, tracing terror financing, coordinating the inter-agency and inter-country support for the attack etc. These missions have to be executed with extreme stealth and by hardened personnel who train for, and execute, similar missions for years; a level of expertise which only the Special Forces can provide. The CIA led — SEAL Team Six executed mission to kill Osama Bin Laden is foremost example of such coordination. This uneasy alliance, yet to be officially enshrined in India, is a result of the threat matrix which most countries now face. This also increasingly places uniformed officers and men of the Indian Army under the operational command of civilian leadership, something the Army is yet to come to terms with.

While it is clear that the proverbial “tip of the spear”, across all the aforementioned forces, is provided by the Army’s Para (SF) battalions, the mandate of these forces is very different. After years of target-specific training, the reflexes of the soldier can’t be un-trained in the few hours it takes for the soldier to be air-dropped to the mission-site. The use, and misuse, of these forces is what frames the debate around the special forces doctrine in this country and their future deployment.

1 | OPERATIONS

“An impression has been assiduously created that Punjab is not being dealt with” — Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in her address to the nation before Operation Bluestar, June 1984

The infamous Operation Blue Star, was an Army led operation, under the operational command of Lt. General Sundarji (GOC-in-C Western Command), which was carried out with typical Army bluster and heavy handedness. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s address also set the tone for the Operation. There would be no siege and choking off of supply lines for those holed inside the compound and there would be no negotiations. Fatally, there would also be limited intelligence on the compound and its’ fortifications. The first wave of Indian Army offensives, led by the Para (SF) battalions, were easily beaten back by the Sikh extremists. This led to the enduring image of the operation — battle tanks entering an area so pious that people leave their footwear outside. The operation was an unqualified failure, and led to the creation of the National Security Guard (NSG) who successfully executed Operation Black Thunder I and II, in conjunction with Punjab Police, in May 1988.

A tactic of “patient pressure”, which the police and NSG are well suited to carry out, but the Army is ill-suited to, was applied in Operation Black Thunder and it led to the surrender of almost 400 terrorists (along with 43 killed). The operation was also carried out in the full glare of the global media, something an operation involving the Special Group and Para (SF) wouldn’t permit. The success of this operation lay in its’ solid foundations — the NSG was created as a “target specific” force; a temple complex, a hijacked airplane, a hotel building; essentially Close Quarter Battle (CQB). Their weapons, training and men are tailored to such missions. Coordination with the state governments and police forces becomes easier by virtue of being governed by the Ministry of Home Affairs.

The attack on the Pathankot Air Base, in January 2016, was an attack on an Armed Forces base — an Armed Forces base. The Armed Forces, in the absence of an enshrined doctrine, could deploy whichever force they chose fit to for the mission to bring it to its’ successful conclusion. This was not a Close Quarters Battle situation — the base is spread over hundreds of acres, and the mission required a “holding force”, an “attack team” and a team to protect the assets at the base — something the infantry and the three Para (SF) battalions stationed nearby could easily provide. The Operation by the NSG and Garud Commandos of the Air Force lasted a mammoth 72 hours — an unacceptable timeline for a siege which could have seriously damaged one of India’s operational/attack air nodes. The extended timeline was a direct consequence of the lack of mission-specific training and experience that both these forces had.

The innumerable attacks on Army bases in Kashmir are all cleared out by the Army, not the NSG. An attack on the 61st Cavalry’s camp in Samba, in 2013, was neutralized by 9 Para (SF) who slithered down ropes, dangling from helicopters, and secured the camp within hours. Something similar was required for securing the Pathankot Air Base. The NSG, have no expertise in dealing with such a wide area and no expertise in combing. While deployed effectively in such operations, the unasked question around the Special Forces still lingers, unasked; were they ever meant to carry out such operations?

2 | OVERKILL

The next leg in understanding the “identity crisis” of the Special Forces, lies in understanding the gross over-use of the Para (SF) battalions and the proliferation of the coveted “Maroon Beret” across the Kashmir valley and the North East. Special Forces were envisioned, and christened, to bring about strategic change — not tactical. The Special Forces are meant to be force-multipliers on steroids owing to their tactical flexibility, mastery over a wide range of advanced weaponry and strategic mobility.

While occasionally deploying them to clear Army bases, for lack of better alternatives, is just about acceptable, sending them in to clear buildings in the middle of towns and COIN (Counter-Insurgency) operations on the LoC is plain wrong. Deploying the Para (SF) on countless, and endless, such defensive missions has led to an alarming rise in Special Forces casualties, along with blunting their readiness for “strategic, politico-military missions”. Combing and clearing missions can easily be carried out by the “Ghatak Platoons” of the regular Infantry battalions.

“India’s SF are so only in name, not orientation because the country’s higher defence organisation lacks military professionals. Their ability to employ SF on politico-military missions at strategic levels is lacking.They (SF) continue to be employed tactically” lamented Lieutenant General Prakash Katoch, a former SF officer.

The Army will soon raise its’ tenth Para (SF) battalion, bringing its’ Special Forces personnel to 7,000–8000. The Indian Navy has a 1000–1200 strong force of Marine Commandos (MARCOS), while the Indian Air Force has a 1000 strong force of Garud Commandos. These numbers exceed the strength of the United States Special Operations Command (US-SOCOM) which has a global remit and regularly carries out missions in all terrains, geographies and against all enemies, unlike India.

3 | THE SPECIAL FORCES IDENTITY

Another facet, which the Special Forces community inside the Army feel very strongly about is the regimental identity itself. India is probably the only major country which has grouped its’ airborne and special forces battalions under the same parental regiment — the Parachute Regiment. The Para and Para (SF) battalions are also under the same command and control structure. This has caused much consternation among the Special Forces operators. The “conversion” or “baptism” that existing or new Para Battalions have to go through to become a “SF” battalion has also been severely watered down to six months served in a hostile area.

The bone of contention is clear for all to see — the Para (SF) wear the coveted “Balidaan” (Sacrifice) badge; which sets them apart from mere airborne forces. Airborne forces are merely airborne infantry — they aren’t designed to carry out “surgical strikes” or other high value strikes. The race to earn the coveted “Balidaan” (Sacrifice) badge has led to a large number of maroon berets operating in Kashmir and the North East; doing tasks that regular Infantry battalions can easily carry out — all in a quest to serve six months and earn that badge. They are also pushed into these operations by a high command which continues to believe in the outdated logic that CI operations are a good training ground for these Special Forces.

Administratively, a lot of tasks at the Army HQ in Delhi, which require a SF officer are carried out by a regular paratrooper. Posts like the ADGMO (SF) are regularly tenanted by Para officers and not specifically Para (SF) officers. This further circumscribes the Special Forces’ operational remit as “regular paratrooper” officers are unable to adequately represent the capabilities of the special forces at the Army HQ, and consequently in front of the country’s political masters.

In the absence of a centralized command for the Special Forces of all arms, mission duplication is rife along with the lack of a centralized and standardized procedure for selection, deployment and weapons procurement.

Even among the Para (SF) battalions, selection procedures vary as men undergo part of the “probationary” period with a particular battalion and not a combined Para (SF) center. This effectively means a different standard to get into, say, 9 Para (SF) versus 1 Para (SF).

The Garud Commandos of the Air Force, raised in 2004, were envisioned to conduct para-rescue of downed pilots behind enemy lines, “lasing of targets” for air strikes and other “offensive” tasks. IAF’s plan to add a further 700 men to this Garud Force, in the wake of the Pathankot attack, will only blunt the force by deploying them to protect air force installations and air expos. This future, poignant, misuse is akin to blunting the combat readiness of the NSG’s Special Rangers Group with mandates to provide mindless, and endless, VIP security.

4 | A SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Acentralized tri-service special operations command, which cuts across arms and regimental rivalry and provides unity in command and control for the Special Forces is the need of the hour. Integration of the military special forces (Para (SF), Garud and MARCOS) should be the priority before integration with the Paramilitary special forces (NSG and SG). Force rationalization should soon follow — 4 battalions of Para (SF); say 1,9,10 and 21 Para (SF), along with the current battalion+ size of the Garud and MARCOS, along with a few aviators from all arms, will clearly suffice as the tip of the spear. A simple formation patch on their tricep can indicate their service in the Special Operations Command. Other Para and Para (SF) battalions should be be attached to the Army’s operational commands and continue to hold exclusive expertise in the kind of operations they are currently deployed for.

Training in capturing and neutralizing enemy nuclear weapons, securing our own and destroying enemy nuclear installations should be mandatory. Closer integration with the already existing Strategic Forces Command will, therefore, be a must. The National Security Advisor, as the conduit between the military and the PMO, shall act as the de-facto head of this command while operational command will lie with a three-star officer; a Lt. General or equivalent. These commanders should be bred, not through the regular route of commanding conventional brigades, divisions and squadrons, but by spearheading operations and reconnaissance for the Special Operations Command, after having commanded their battalions.

The recently cleared Defence Acquisition Council’s (DAC) Rs. 300 crore war-chest for the Para (SF) is woefully inadequate considering the size of their task and the number of battalions at present. It is much safer to have a sharper tip of the spear than an unwieldy and blunt spear. The storied, and “legacied”, 1,3,9,10 and 21 Para (SF) battalions are almost entirely staffed with the Israeli Tavor rifles but face a shortage of the 7.62mm Galil Snipers. The newly raised battalions bear the brunt of the weapons shortage — the freshly raised 12 Para went into a mission with the antiquated and ineffective INSAS 5.5, in which even the regular Army’s trust has completely eviscerated, let alone the Para (SF). Other new battalions are still equipped with the AK series of assault rifles. The shortage of advanced weapons for the Special Forces should be decoupled from the broader weapons shortage within the three services, by having a two window clearance from the Defence Minister and the Prime Minister. Doing away with the serpentine weapons procurement process for the Special Operations Command is necessary for its’ efficacy and survival.

 

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

Certain Para SF battalions are believed to be more special than others...how does that work ? Is the difference only in probation standards and equipment...or it's also in training and tasking as well ?

9 Para SF you are talking about .

They have a big mental factor which is motivation.High standards set from the beginning.Always involved in ops.

So that brings it to paltan ki izzat.

They like to believe that they are invincibles and that helps actually till the first bullet hits you and you realise you are a normal human being.

One incident i will share....

4 terrorists were hiding in a cave in a jungle.RR guys sorrounded them but when they tried to approach they took casualties.

Hence they decided they wont approach.But the location of the cave was also unknown.

So a team of Para was called.

This team had mix bunch of operators from few Para SF units.

Firstly the Para doesnt hang around with RR or regulars because they have a superiority complex.

Secondly withing the mix para sf unit the 9 para sf guys decided they will approach the cave headon without even knowing where the cave is exactly located.

2 operators from 9 para sf charged an upslope and one was hit on the forehead and other on the body... the rest of the operators neutralised the cave bunker.

So this is what they are at the end..their belief that they are invincibles.

Mostly it has gone in their favour..but not in this incident.

 

[Lupus]

9 Para SF you are talking about .

They have a big mental factor which is motivation.High standards set from the beginning.Always involved in ops.

So that brings it to paltan ki izzat.

They like to believe that they are invincibles and that helps actually till the first bullet hits you and you realise you are a normal human being.

One incident i will share....

4 terrorists were hiding in a cave in a jungle.RR guys sorrounded them but when they tried to approach they took casualties.

Hence they decided they wont approach.But the location of the cave was also unknown.

So a team of Para was called.

This team had mix bunch of operators from few Para SF units.

Firstly the Para doesnt hang around with RR or regulars because they have a superiority complex.

Secondly withing the mix para sf unit the 9 para sf guys decided they will approach the cave headon without even knowing where the cave is exactly located.

2 operators from 9 para sf charged an upslope and one was hit on the forehead and other on the body... the rest of the operators neutralised the cave bunker.

So this is what they are at the end..their belief that they are invincibles.

Mostly it has gone in their favour..but not in this incident.

So you're saying that it's all hawwa that they have created to make themselves feel better and they're all roughly similar at the end of the day ?

PS. I'm personally in favour of a Green beret type selection where all volunteers undergo selection together and then assigned to a SFG based on choice etc

 

[Brahmaputra Mail 2]

Some recent pics of Indian Special Forces :
View attachment 44866

View attachment 44867

PARA SF / AFSOD (?) - INDIAN ARMY / SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND

Para SF, not AFSOD.

30 characters

 

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

So you're saying that it's all hawwa that they have created to make themselves feel better and they're all roughly similar at the end of the day ?

PS. I'm personally in favour of a Green beret type selection where all volunteers undergo selection together and then assigned to a SFG based on choice etc

SF is about that only. To think you are special. But in the end we are humans.

Its like you join IIT and you feel like oh i must perform now.

Otherwise 1,9 and 10 para are all same.

But all Bollywood movies is full of 9 para officers like Commando etc.

 

[Brahmaputra Mail 2]

Certain Para SF battalions are believed to be more special than others...how does that work ? Is the difference only in probation standards and equipment...or it's also in training and tasking as well ?

Probation standards are all same. Older units are much more experienced, hence are on the limelight more often. Also having permanent unit HQ in insurgent hit areas is a plus point for these units.

For NE it was 21 Para SF which looked after it. Now 11 & 12 Para SF has reduced the burden on 21 Para SF.
While probation standards are same for all, 21 definitely has edge over the other two, based on its experience.