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At present, This makes more sense in areas confine to Urban and specifically around Jammu, Such a combat drones can be used a lower levels :
Indian Counter Terror Operations Pictures & Discussions
- Thread starter Kunal Biswas
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J&K: Why The Army Is Seemingly Facing Reverses And How It Should Handle Stone-Pelters
The ambush on 44 Rashtriya Rifles’ (RR’s) returning vehicle column at 2am on 23 February 2017 was the fourth reverse in succession for the Army in Kashmir, in less than 10 days – an unusual phenomenon. Let me place on record that this was one of my finest units some years ago. I have nothing to doubt that it still is, going by its sustained reputation. The unit was probably out on night operations based on a tip-off or returning from operations, and a mounted column came under fire leading to fairly heavy casualties, some fatal. Mounted movement by troops is often necessary when the potential target site is at a distance but vulnerability increases manifold. Such opportunity ambushes by night are rare in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and that too so deep in the countryside. The feasibility of a trap based on fed intelligence is of course being examined by the Army.
Much against common belief, counter terror operations in the Valley do witness an upswing in January-February of some years. I recall that in South Kashmir as a staff officer I handled five operations simultaneously on a single day during a bad winter. But times have changed and the current operations have to be viewed contextually.
Firstly, the simple explanation from experience is that the colder the winter, and more the snow at the higher reaches, more is the terrorist presence in the Valley floor; survival in improvised hideouts isn’t easy in higher areas.
Secondly, the encounter has taken place a week after the Army Chief’s supposedly controversial statement about the intent of the Army to be tough on those who give assistance to terrorists in any form. This reverse has nothing even remotely to do with that statement; the Army’s operations continue 24X7 irrespective of what happens in Delhi. It is true that 44 RR was operating in search of terrorists in a village, and a few local people attempted to disrupt a part of the cordon, but the contact at 2am on the night of 22-23 February was between a mounted convoy and terrorists, who probably observed the movement and exploited the short term vulnerability.
General Rawat
Thirdly, the one thing the operation does convey is that the zone between the Jammu-Srinagar National Highway and the Pampore-Pulwama-Shupiyan Road in South Kashmir continues to be an area with high density presence of terrorists; mostly local, but evidently some foreign too. It is here that the flash mobs have been most active in the recent past and during 2016. This is the area where the induction of additional troops took place in late 2016. The attacks on the convoys along the National Highway from Pampore to Bijbehara were also launched from built up areas in this belt.
India security in Kashmir (Chris Hondros/Getty Images)
Our concern should be for the turbulence here, and it needs to be addressed comprehensively. But before anything, the degree of terrorist presence just has to be reduced. Numbers are being indicated as up to a 100 newly inducted recruits and an unquantified group of resident and foreign terrorists. Total figures for the Valley are being estimated at 400 which are probably the highest since 2010. There is no need for additional troops if the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) deployment is coordinated with that of the RR.
Fourthly, there is a world of difference in the operational environment of today and that which existed some years ago. In the early millennium, we could conduct large sized cordon and search operations in these areas without any civil resistance. Even if all operations were not successful, the domination effect then was high, and the freedom of movement afforded to terrorists was much lower. Today, while freedom to operate exists for the troops, the dynamics are a little different with the caution imposed due to flash mobs and the apparent confidence with which the civilian elements oppose the presence of the Army and other Special Forces (SF).
The intelligence is flowing but obviously the presence of mobs and the need to handle these situations without undue employment of violence is causing worries. This increases the challenge manifold, especially if the Army suffers casualties momentarily in adverse statistical ratios, for whatever reasons. The external pressure on the Army was limited in earlier times. Through the nineties there was hardly a media presence. In the early millennium, the Army had just emerged victorious after the Kargil mis-adventure by Pakistan – drawing room media presence and social media were yet far away. South Kashmir was then considered less dangerous than the North, where a large number of troops had vacated their deployment to move up to Kargil.
A patrol in Kashmir (Chris Hondros/Getty Images)
Today, there are television, social media and divergent political voices with every individual empowered to advise on the national discourse through the smart phone. The government itself is pressurised and the Army leadership has increasingly remained even more concerned about casualties and the effectiveness of its operations, for a larger national audience and its internal rank and file too. It isn’t as if it was not concerned earlier about casualties, but then the Army took much higher casualties in the past, but with lesser public scrutiny and pressure.
Fifthly, the Army leadership is made up of some solid experience and professionalism. The larger picture is extremely clear to it. It understands the necessity of political guidance in the handling of contentious situations such as in J&K from time to time and the constraints that the political authorities face. Equally it must urge the political authorities to continue taking military advice, even in fields outside the military domain. There is no other way but a joint political-military approach. General Bipin Rawat’s advice and opinion in no way betrayed this crucial aspect when he spoke.
There are some basics which have stood the test of time and cannot be tampered with. Among them is the understanding that operations are important for domination, elimination of terrorists is essential but despite every provocation (and provocation is part of the adversary’s strategy) the people of the conflict zone must remain the supreme concern. They will be misled, they will be against the Forces but indiscriminate targeting of the people is sacrilege. This is a challenge in the face of stone pelting, considered and sold as an idea by separatists that it is a non-violent act.
Stone pelting in Kashmir (Paula Bronstein/Getty Images)
Instead of targeting the local population, which is what many uninformed people recommend out of anger and passion, the only nuanced thing to do here is to target the rogue leaderships of stone pelters, flash mob motivators and those whose actions create situations which threaten lives of troops. They must be objectively targeted to prevent their effectiveness. It’s a difficult task in the face of public ire but only the police can do it as they are aware of the methods. The Army must back up the police for this.
Three closing issues. The ideologue who gave muscle to the idea of modern nonviolent revolt is Gene Sharp; the man who inspired the Arab Spring. Those involved in handling J&K need to empower themselves intellectually by absorbing some of what he wrote. The Army’s professional ethos needs to continue but equally the concern being expressed about its woeful protection equipment for such operations is relevant. Some of the emergency purchases being resorted to must cater for more hardened vehicles and night vision equipment for the RR troops.
Lastly, more than ever before, there is huge need for psychological conditioning of troops, and this must extend to the CRPF and J&K police too. There is a thin line which exists here and therefore to condition men for such exhausting operations is a dire necessity. The staying power of the Army and that too in fully stable frame of mind is outstanding, but this aspect must never ever be taken for granted in such operations when they extend for long.
The ambush on 44 Rashtriya Rifles’ (RR’s) returning vehicle column at 2am on 23 February 2017 was the fourth reverse in succession for the Army in Kashmir, in less than 10 days – an unusual phenomenon. Let me place on record that this was one of my finest units some years ago. I have nothing to doubt that it still is, going by its sustained reputation. The unit was probably out on night operations based on a tip-off or returning from operations, and a mounted column came under fire leading to fairly heavy casualties, some fatal. Mounted movement by troops is often necessary when the potential target site is at a distance but vulnerability increases manifold. Such opportunity ambushes by night are rare in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and that too so deep in the countryside. The feasibility of a trap based on fed intelligence is of course being examined by the Army.
Much against common belief, counter terror operations in the Valley do witness an upswing in January-February of some years. I recall that in South Kashmir as a staff officer I handled five operations simultaneously on a single day during a bad winter. But times have changed and the current operations have to be viewed contextually.
Firstly, the simple explanation from experience is that the colder the winter, and more the snow at the higher reaches, more is the terrorist presence in the Valley floor; survival in improvised hideouts isn’t easy in higher areas.
Secondly, the encounter has taken place a week after the Army Chief’s supposedly controversial statement about the intent of the Army to be tough on those who give assistance to terrorists in any form. This reverse has nothing even remotely to do with that statement; the Army’s operations continue 24X7 irrespective of what happens in Delhi. It is true that 44 RR was operating in search of terrorists in a village, and a few local people attempted to disrupt a part of the cordon, but the contact at 2am on the night of 22-23 February was between a mounted convoy and terrorists, who probably observed the movement and exploited the short term vulnerability.
General Rawat
Thirdly, the one thing the operation does convey is that the zone between the Jammu-Srinagar National Highway and the Pampore-Pulwama-Shupiyan Road in South Kashmir continues to be an area with high density presence of terrorists; mostly local, but evidently some foreign too. It is here that the flash mobs have been most active in the recent past and during 2016. This is the area where the induction of additional troops took place in late 2016. The attacks on the convoys along the National Highway from Pampore to Bijbehara were also launched from built up areas in this belt.
India security in Kashmir (Chris Hondros/Getty Images)
Our concern should be for the turbulence here, and it needs to be addressed comprehensively. But before anything, the degree of terrorist presence just has to be reduced. Numbers are being indicated as up to a 100 newly inducted recruits and an unquantified group of resident and foreign terrorists. Total figures for the Valley are being estimated at 400 which are probably the highest since 2010. There is no need for additional troops if the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) deployment is coordinated with that of the RR.
Fourthly, there is a world of difference in the operational environment of today and that which existed some years ago. In the early millennium, we could conduct large sized cordon and search operations in these areas without any civil resistance. Even if all operations were not successful, the domination effect then was high, and the freedom of movement afforded to terrorists was much lower. Today, while freedom to operate exists for the troops, the dynamics are a little different with the caution imposed due to flash mobs and the apparent confidence with which the civilian elements oppose the presence of the Army and other Special Forces (SF).
The intelligence is flowing but obviously the presence of mobs and the need to handle these situations without undue employment of violence is causing worries. This increases the challenge manifold, especially if the Army suffers casualties momentarily in adverse statistical ratios, for whatever reasons. The external pressure on the Army was limited in earlier times. Through the nineties there was hardly a media presence. In the early millennium, the Army had just emerged victorious after the Kargil mis-adventure by Pakistan – drawing room media presence and social media were yet far away. South Kashmir was then considered less dangerous than the North, where a large number of troops had vacated their deployment to move up to Kargil.
A patrol in Kashmir (Chris Hondros/Getty Images)
Today, there are television, social media and divergent political voices with every individual empowered to advise on the national discourse through the smart phone. The government itself is pressurised and the Army leadership has increasingly remained even more concerned about casualties and the effectiveness of its operations, for a larger national audience and its internal rank and file too. It isn’t as if it was not concerned earlier about casualties, but then the Army took much higher casualties in the past, but with lesser public scrutiny and pressure.
Fifthly, the Army leadership is made up of some solid experience and professionalism. The larger picture is extremely clear to it. It understands the necessity of political guidance in the handling of contentious situations such as in J&K from time to time and the constraints that the political authorities face. Equally it must urge the political authorities to continue taking military advice, even in fields outside the military domain. There is no other way but a joint political-military approach. General Bipin Rawat’s advice and opinion in no way betrayed this crucial aspect when he spoke.
There are some basics which have stood the test of time and cannot be tampered with. Among them is the understanding that operations are important for domination, elimination of terrorists is essential but despite every provocation (and provocation is part of the adversary’s strategy) the people of the conflict zone must remain the supreme concern. They will be misled, they will be against the Forces but indiscriminate targeting of the people is sacrilege. This is a challenge in the face of stone pelting, considered and sold as an idea by separatists that it is a non-violent act.
Stone pelting in Kashmir (Paula Bronstein/Getty Images)
Instead of targeting the local population, which is what many uninformed people recommend out of anger and passion, the only nuanced thing to do here is to target the rogue leaderships of stone pelters, flash mob motivators and those whose actions create situations which threaten lives of troops. They must be objectively targeted to prevent their effectiveness. It’s a difficult task in the face of public ire but only the police can do it as they are aware of the methods. The Army must back up the police for this.
Three closing issues. The ideologue who gave muscle to the idea of modern nonviolent revolt is Gene Sharp; the man who inspired the Arab Spring. Those involved in handling J&K need to empower themselves intellectually by absorbing some of what he wrote. The Army’s professional ethos needs to continue but equally the concern being expressed about its woeful protection equipment for such operations is relevant. Some of the emergency purchases being resorted to must cater for more hardened vehicles and night vision equipment for the RR troops.
Lastly, more than ever before, there is huge need for psychological conditioning of troops, and this must extend to the CRPF and J&K police too. There is a thin line which exists here and therefore to condition men for such exhausting operations is a dire necessity. The staying power of the Army and that too in fully stable frame of mind is outstanding, but this aspect must never ever be taken for granted in such operations when they extend for long.
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IAI Eitan can go upto 45000 feet. I don't know what's status of procurement, why so much delays. with 2000kg payload it can carry atleast 4 Sudarshan LGB. But I doubt if the Sudarshan LGB is accurate enough
for this purpose, ie. to be used in Kashmir.
Even a 10m off target would bring Human Rights crack down on the government.
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LGB or conventional dumb bombs strikes are conducted in mountains like IAF did it during Operation Safad Sagar, In present situation like Terrorist hideouts and ammunition bunkers of PA near LOC ..
Sophisticated weapons are limited here due to environment conditions, Exceptions are only few months of a year ..
Sophisticated weapons are limited here due to environment conditions, Exceptions are only few months of a year ..
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Oh well once India has this IAI Eitan deployed, it could easily carry 5 conventional and 2 LGBs.LGB or conventional dumb bombs strikes are conducted in mountains like IAF did it during Operation Safad Sagar, In present situation like Terrorist hideouts and ammunition bunkers of PA near LOC ..
Sophisticated weapons are limited here due to environment conditions, Exceptions are only few months of a year ..
The movement sensor, thermal imager, drone with satelite link up will be a good start to further fortify the area and provide better cover during infilteration bid.
The only problem is environmental issues that they cant use drone strike if the tangos sneak into a city. I hope there is some way.
In any case to give a message they have to carry out drone strikes ( non hostage situation) even if there is some collatral damage. The EDI building already got destroyed during last two operations, it makes less difference.
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Such a big article and the gist is what? that our forces need more conditioning? instead of taking strong actions against the mobs? this is the equivalent to surrendering the narrative to the enemy. The mobs are being allowed to dictate how the forces conduct their operations.J&K: Why The Army Is Seemingly Facing Reverses And How It Should Handle Stone-Pelters
The ambush on 44 Rashtriya Rifles’ (RR’s) returning vehicle column at 2am on 23 February 2017 was the fourth reverse in succession for the Army in Kashmir, in less than 10 days – an unusual phenomenon. Let me place on record that this was one of my finest units some years ago. I have nothing to doubt that it still is, going by its sustained reputation. The unit was probably out on night operations based on a tip-off or returning from operations, and a mounted column came under fire leading to fairly heavy casualties, some fatal. Mounted movement by troops is often necessary when the potential target site is at a distance but vulnerability increases manifold. Such opportunity ambushes by night are rare in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and that too so deep in the countryside. The feasibility of a trap based on fed intelligence is of course being examined by the Army.
Much against common belief, counter terror operations in the Valley do witness an upswing in January-February of some years. I recall that in South Kashmir as a staff officer I handled five operations simultaneously on a single day during a bad winter. But times have changed and the current operations have to be viewed contextually.
Firstly, the simple explanation from experience is that the colder the winter, and more the snow at the higher reaches, more is the terrorist presence in the Valley floor; survival in improvised hideouts isn’t easy in higher areas.
Secondly, the encounter has taken place a week after the Army Chief’s supposedly controversial statement about the intent of the Army to be tough on those who give assistance to terrorists in any form. This reverse has nothing even remotely to do with that statement; the Army’s operations continue 24X7 irrespective of what happens in Delhi. It is true that 44 RR was operating in search of terrorists in a village, and a few local people attempted to disrupt a part of the cordon, but the contact at 2am on the night of 22-23 February was between a mounted convoy and terrorists, who probably observed the movement and exploited the short term vulnerability.
General Rawat
Thirdly, the one thing the operation does convey is that the zone between the Jammu-Srinagar National Highway and the Pampore-Pulwama-Shupiyan Road in South Kashmir continues to be an area with high density presence of terrorists; mostly local, but evidently some foreign too. It is here that the flash mobs have been most active in the recent past and during 2016. This is the area where the induction of additional troops took place in late 2016. The attacks on the convoys along the National Highway from Pampore to Bijbehara were also launched from built up areas in this belt.
India security in Kashmir (Chris Hondros/Getty Images)
Our concern should be for the turbulence here, and it needs to be addressed comprehensively. But before anything, the degree of terrorist presence just has to be reduced. Numbers are being indicated as up to a 100 newly inducted recruits and an unquantified group of resident and foreign terrorists. Total figures for the Valley are being estimated at 400 which are probably the highest since 2010. There is no need for additional troops if the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) deployment is coordinated with that of the RR.
Fourthly, there is a world of difference in the operational environment of today and that which existed some years ago. In the early millennium, we could conduct large sized cordon and search operations in these areas without any civil resistance. Even if all operations were not successful, the domination effect then was high, and the freedom of movement afforded to terrorists was much lower. Today, while freedom to operate exists for the troops, the dynamics are a little different with the caution imposed due to flash mobs and the apparent confidence with which the civilian elements oppose the presence of the Army and other Special Forces (SF).
The intelligence is flowing but obviously the presence of mobs and the need to handle these situations without undue employment of violence is causing worries. This increases the challenge manifold, especially if the Army suffers casualties momentarily in adverse statistical ratios, for whatever reasons. The external pressure on the Army was limited in earlier times. Through the nineties there was hardly a media presence. In the early millennium, the Army had just emerged victorious after the Kargil mis-adventure by Pakistan – drawing room media presence and social media were yet far away. South Kashmir was then considered less dangerous than the North, where a large number of troops had vacated their deployment to move up to Kargil.
A patrol in Kashmir (Chris Hondros/Getty Images)
Today, there are television, social media and divergent political voices with every individual empowered to advise on the national discourse through the smart phone. The government itself is pressurised and the Army leadership has increasingly remained even more concerned about casualties and the effectiveness of its operations, for a larger national audience and its internal rank and file too. It isn’t as if it was not concerned earlier about casualties, but then the Army took much higher casualties in the past, but with lesser public scrutiny and pressure.
Fifthly, the Army leadership is made up of some solid experience and professionalism. The larger picture is extremely clear to it. It understands the necessity of political guidance in the handling of contentious situations such as in J&K from time to time and the constraints that the political authorities face. Equally it must urge the political authorities to continue taking military advice, even in fields outside the military domain. There is no other way but a joint political-military approach. General Bipin Rawat’s advice and opinion in no way betrayed this crucial aspect when he spoke.
There are some basics which have stood the test of time and cannot be tampered with. Among them is the understanding that operations are important for domination, elimination of terrorists is essential but despite every provocation (and provocation is part of the adversary’s strategy) the people of the conflict zone must remain the supreme concern. They will be misled, they will be against the Forces but indiscriminate targeting of the people is sacrilege. This is a challenge in the face of stone pelting, considered and sold as an idea by separatists that it is a non-violent act.
Stone pelting in Kashmir (Paula Bronstein/Getty Images)
Instead of targeting the local population, which is what many uninformed people recommend out of anger and passion, the only nuanced thing to do here is to target the rogue leaderships of stone pelters, flash mob motivators and those whose actions create situations which threaten lives of troops. They must be objectively targeted to prevent their effectiveness. It’s a difficult task in the face of public ire but only the police can do it as they are aware of the methods. The Army must back up the police for this.
Three closing issues. The ideologue who gave muscle to the idea of modern nonviolent revolt is Gene Sharp; the man who inspired the Arab Spring. Those involved in handling J&K need to empower themselves intellectually by absorbing some of what he wrote. The Army’s professional ethos needs to continue but equally the concern being expressed about its woeful protection equipment for such operations is relevant. Some of the emergency purchases being resorted to must cater for more hardened vehicles and night vision equipment for the RR troops.
Lastly, more than ever before, there is huge need for psychological conditioning of troops, and this must extend to the CRPF and J&K police too. There is a thin line which exists here and therefore to condition men for such exhausting operations is a dire necessity. The staying power of the Army and that too in fully stable frame of mind is outstanding, but this aspect must never ever be taken for granted in such operations when they extend for long.
The simple thing is, the jobless stone throwers are paid 500rs for it. This amount is not enough to run a family or to do anything significant, so then, who is providing the money for their other expenses, food, rent, electricity? WE ARE!
The Kashmiri people are exploiting our aid to their advantage where even after giving them billions, they are disloyal to India, while, they feel loyal to Pakistan which pays them 500rs. It is for GOI to realize that they cannot allow the jihadis to have it both ways. There are lakhs of Kashmiris, and Pakistan does not have the money to fund all their expenses. We pay 98% of their survival costs, and Pakistan gets to buy their complete loyalty by pumping in a few crores.
It's time for India to negotiate hard for the money we invest in Kashmir. There is no need to go into a deep philosophical debate every time there is stone pelting in Kashmir. Just cut off electricity, water and food supplies for a week and watch all the crowd congregate towards their nearest shops to stock up on essentials. What is happening now is that we are feeding the rats and they are using the surplus calories to throw stones at our forces.
SOLUTION : Simply catch stray dogs from all over India, give them 'attack dog' training for 3 weeks, keep them hungry, and let them lose in Kashmir. It doesn't have to be a pure breed German Shepherd or a Labrador, any damn flea infested dog is good enough, and there is complete deniability. What are the Kashmiri rats going to say? "we went to a stone throwing procession and got bitten by a dog?" good, who is to blame for that? Stray dogs are all over India.
Put the fear of ̶G̶O̶D̶ DOG in them.
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@pringles, arrest your anger. Channel it somewhere else, productively. We need to be pragmatic about this situation.
We are a democracy and we value human rights. Not all Kashmiris are out stone-pelting or the situation would be way more serious than it is now. We are loosing our citizens and soldiers by the day. But contrary to our instincts, we need to follow our logical thinking. Humans are different from animals in that they possess means to reason and do not solely depend upon instinct. Therefore there is indeed a need to go into a "deep philosophical debate".
Your suggestion is akin to suggesting that if someone have a cancer in the lungs, he should hurt the lungs, for how dare the lung turn against the body? It needs to be taught a lesson.
Hehe. You are well suited to be an army man. You like to keep it simple and only make two classifications viz. enemy or friendly. That kind of thinking is desirable in army men, cause it keeps them from hesitating at the trigger. Which is a good thing. But if we have a politician that deals only in absolutes, such a thinking can be disastrous for the nation. This is the reason Armed Forces are under civilian control, and even the people who serve in the armed forces understand this.
HariPrasad-1
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They are not amenable to any democratic mean or solution. We must explore other ways to deal with them. Democracy, peace and pursuance is not always the solution.
My suggestion:
1)confiscate any mosque from which any provocation is made and jail anybody who promotes it.
2) Catch stone platter and put them in rigorous reeducation camp with a warning that if they are caught in any anti national activity next time, punishment shall be sever.
3) Settle retire military personnel in Kashmir with weapon.
4) Celebrate Hindu festival in big way in public and voice mantras from loud speakers and make them listen them.
5) give work to the laddies and simultaneously teach them patriotism also.
6) eliminate hurriyat leader in Government supported terrorism.
7) Announce that who so ever is caught in any anti national activity, His house shall be confiscated and do that.
8) Ask for the source of fund for any mosque constructed after 1990s. If they fails to provide this, confiscate it. Make sanskrit mahavidyalay over there.
My suggestion:
1)confiscate any mosque from which any provocation is made and jail anybody who promotes it.
2) Catch stone platter and put them in rigorous reeducation camp with a warning that if they are caught in any anti national activity next time, punishment shall be sever.
3) Settle retire military personnel in Kashmir with weapon.
4) Celebrate Hindu festival in big way in public and voice mantras from loud speakers and make them listen them.
5) give work to the laddies and simultaneously teach them patriotism also.
6) eliminate hurriyat leader in Government supported terrorism.
7) Announce that who so ever is caught in any anti national activity, His house shall be confiscated and do that.
8) Ask for the source of fund for any mosque constructed after 1990s. If they fails to provide this, confiscate it. Make sanskrit mahavidyalay over there.
sayareakd
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Instead caught them, then send them to work on deep underground mines in south India for 5 years that will bring them, to senses. They will be paid for there work.
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mayfair
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Why do you wish to send this filth to South India sir?
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Allow me to give you a Golden Rule regarding the Kashmir Situation:-
We need to be stealthy and sly in Kashmir. We should appear passive. We should act behind the scenes and away from the camera lenses. We should act in a manner where the results of our actions are not immediately visible to the public or press.
"Never suggest an action that could give the Indian authority in Kashmir bad press"
We need to be stealthy and sly in Kashmir. We should appear passive. We should act behind the scenes and away from the camera lenses. We should act in a manner where the results of our actions are not immediately visible to the public or press.
- We cannot take out Hurriyat leaders, even covertly, or it would give the Jihadis an opportunity to "reveal" the covert activities of the Indians who covertly eliminated the Hurriyat. This is why it has not happend yet.
- We cannot overtly force Hinduism on to the people of Kashmir for they'll realise what we are trying to do and naturally resist us even more. Propoganda needs to be subtle. If its obvious, it will fail.
- We cannot ask military retired personnel to serve there cause it would look like an attempt towards demographic modification of the region by India, which again makes for bad press, which in turn pushes people away from our narrative. Moreover, we cannot ask those who have spent their lifetime protecting us to continue to do so forever. They have earned a rest.
- Dealing with stone throwers should be priority, and the preferred stop gap measure IMHO is to do what you said, but with a transparent judicial regulatory mechanism to keep the presstitutes away.
- The long term solution for stone-pelters, however, is to hit Jihadi finances. Now when we have people like the ex-CBI chief using the Hawala system, that means we are not serious about this one yet.
AnantS
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And next time we find they have strong bonds with Naxalites
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Andaman is best.
Sentinel tribe will cook their ass.
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sayareakd
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Its our version of labour camps of siberia in deep mines.
Let them do hard labour under ground. That will cool them off.
mayfair
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If hard labour is what you have in mind, let them slog as mules and porters, hauling supplies to forward bases and haul back trash.
Set them to clean drains, sewers and toilets as a part of Swachh Bharat abhiyaan or Ganga Action Plan.
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Wouldnt that be upgraded to be used with LGBs?
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See guys. . . Stone pelting is much more serious thing than we believe.
Look who is supporting them. .
P.S. Observe the t-shirt.
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