Indian Army To Operate Attack Chopper Units

[Bhadra]

Attack hepters as concept was developed in NATO theatre where there are miles and miles of plain grass land with visibility extending up to ten of Km. Applying that in our context every where like NE would not be correct. I have seen attack hepters being employed in one of our neighbouring country where they were utter failure causing casualties at times to own troops.

In Vietnam hepters operations won battles but lost the war. Every thing has limitations and must be employed so. In Tibet hepter operations would have great success. Against Pakistan, a great success but in middle India jungles and NE I have my apprehensions.

 

[Sunder singh]

Singh Sahab,
Tell me how do you deploy attack hepters in thick jungles on Dantewada, Nagaland, Assam and Mizoram against any military threat ! Let us not be theoreticians par excellence !

veitnam is a gud exmple jungles r on land not in air they can use gun and air ground missiles and now plzz dont say america loss veitnam war which i contantly hear. regarding theoris AH has a very important role in Urban as wel as jungle warfear plzz google it b4 u speak thank u

 

[Payeng]

Technically possible, for example an extremist camp located in remote area inaccessible by conventional means, airborne assault would come handy but after the act of 1966 Air assault on Aizwal brought much outrage for IAF and the then PM of India. That was considered as the first and last air assault of its kind, after that no such similar event have been retried again, such an act is considered as barbaric in nature where you don't give the other side a chance to surrender after all it is inside national territory, not a war with another nation.

 

[Sunder singh]

Technically possible, for example an extremist camp located in remote area inaccessible by conventional means, airborne assault would come handy but after the act of 1966 Air assault on Aizwal brought much outrage for IAF and the then PM of India. That was considered as the first and last air assault of its kind, after that no such similar event have been retried again, such an act is considered as barbaric in nature where you don't give the other side a chance to surrender after all it is inside national territory, not a war with another nation.

thats gud point since i mention ambush they mostly in ROP or convoy movement so no one is going to surrender bcoz enemy knows they r at gud posistion.

 

[Payeng]

thats gud point since i mention ambush they mostly in ROP or convoy movement so no one is going to surrender bcoz enemy knows they r at gud posistion.

Hope this will clear your queries.

In the history of India's counter-insurgency, we have used air strikes by the Air Force only once----in 1966 when the Mizo National Front (MNF), in a surprise attack, overran practically the whole of Mizoram, including Aizawl, its capital. To dislodge the MNF insurgents from Aizawl, air strikes by the Air Force of a limited duration were ordered. Apart from that we have not used air strikes by the Air Force for dealing with internal security situations. A basic principle followed by many countries is that one cannot resort to air strikes in one's own territory against one's own people.

Air strikes on one's own nationals tend to aggravate an insurgency situation by causing casualties of civilians, damaging the environment in forest areas and driving more people to join the ranks of the insurgents. They also attract the attention and criticism of international human rights organisations such as the Amnesty International and humanitarian relief organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

The use of air strikes by our Air Force against the Maoist positions on the ground would be inadvisable. It could brutalise our counter-insurgency operations. Over the years, India has made for itself a name as a role-model in its restrained counter-insurgency approach. We have dealt with serious situations without resorting to air strikes and the use of heavy artillery. We should not deviate from our exemplary record of the past in dealing with alienated sections of our population who have taken to arms against the State.

. The Armed Forces should be used only in a desperate ground situation. The situation in the Maoist-controlled areas is serious, but not desperate.

Counter-Insurgency: Use of Air Power Vs Use of Air Force

 

[W.G.Ewald]

veitnam is a gud exmple jungles r on land not in air they can use gun and air ground missiles and now plzz dont say america loss veitnam war which i contantly hear. regarding theoris AH has a very important role in Urban as wel as jungle warfear plzz google it b4 u speak thank u

US Congress cut funds for troops in VN in 1973. Saigon fell in 1975.

 

[Sunder singh]

US Congress cut funds for troops in VN in 1973. Saigon fell in 1975.

same happened in other way with us in sri lanka we have to come back bcoz of opposition parties were against india and america r democratic nation u need public support for war or even help

 

[Bhadra]

veitnam is a gud exmple jungles r on land not in air they can use gun and air ground missiles and now plzz dont say america loss veitnam war which i contantly hear. regarding theoris AH has a very important role in Urban as wel as jungle warfear plzz google it b4 u speak thank u

"Air mobility" came at a heavy price, however. During the Vietnam War, between 1962 and 1973, the United States lost 4,869 helicopters to all causes (with more than a thousand lost in 1968 and another thousand in 1969). Fifty-three percent of these losses were due to enemy fire (including enemy attacks on airbases). The rest resulted from operational accidents. The high rate of operational accidents occurred largely because helicopters are prone to mechanical breakdown if not regularly maintained, and during a war, maintenance often suffers. Vietnam's heavy jungle canopy also made helicopter operations difficult, with few places to land a stricken helicopter.

Helicopters at War

 

[Bhadra]

veitnam is a gud exmple jungles r on land not in air they can use gun and air ground missiles and now plzz dont say america loss veitnam war which i contantly hear. regarding theoris AH has a very important role in Urban as wel as jungle warfear plzz google it b4 u speak thank u

US deployed close to 5000 hellicopters. For carrying out US types operations in central India (naxal areas ) one would need 20, 000 hellicopters?
Do you have it in you.

And still fail !!

Just leave it and enjoy.

[video]http://archive.org/details/gov.archives.arc.654153[/video]

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Attack hepters as concept was developed in NATO theatre where there are miles and miles of plain grass land with visibility extending up to ten of Km. Applying that in our context every where like NE would not be correct.

Singh Sahab,
Tell me how do you deploy attack hepters in thick jungles in Dantewada, narayangarh, Jagadal pur, Nagaland, Manipur, Assam and Mizoram against any military threat ! These machines would only do Casualty evacuations. Let us not be theoreticians par excellence !

Gunships were deployed in Assam before and they were successful..

But its not right to use Air-power....

acepted but sir area like North east were forces like assam rifles which is contineous under conter insergency opps AH is need u short call like an ambush to petrol party or ambush on ROP.

There are specialized Coin HELO are in use which are light Gunships..

I cant say about Assam but these are quite active in J&k..

Hope this will clear your queries.
Counter-Insurgency: Use of Air Power Vs Use of Air Force

Right on Point..

 

[Ray]

Gunships were deployed in Assam before and they were successful..

It was used against Mizo Guerillas in 1966 once.

IAF was never used again to combat terrorists and insurgents anywhere thereafter.

India does not use anything more lethal, to include air, than Infantry weapons (less mortars etc) against terrorists and insurgents.

 

[Sunder singh]

^^ i mean wat we US s
using drones against terrorist in pak frontier so india can use AH against maoist and NE insurgents groups may it can show gud results why not just run a pilot experiment.

 

[ALBY]

Attack hepters as concept was developed in NATO theatre where there are miles and miles of plain grass land with visibility extending up to ten of Km. Applying that in our context every where like NE would not be correct. I have seen attack hepters being employed in one of our neighbouring country where they were utter failure causing casualties at times to own troops.

In Vietnam hepters operations won battles but lost the war. Every thing has limitations and must be employed so. In Tibet hepter operations would have great success. Against Pakistan, a great success but in middle India jungles and NE I have my apprehensions.

Fielding attack choppers in CT ops as support role to the infantry is a brilliant tactics unless it receive a huge outcry from civilians against it. Attack choppers if deployed could prevent worst cases like massacre of dantewada from happening once again. Concerning the safety of attack choppers except militants of J&K no one in India deploys Rpg7s in wide numbers.And am sure Mi25s couldn't be brought down by .303s or kalashnikovs or countrymade double barell guns.

 

[Bhadra]

Sunder Singh and ALBY,
US are operating in a freign country who have come there to win their War.
Are we at war in Chattisgarh or are we trying to bring back our own people to mainstream?

Counter insurgency operations by Indian Army for last 65 years have been directed at convincing own population that they are our own people and not enemies. That is the secret of success against such massive counter insurgency operations such as in Nagaland, Tripura, Punjab and J&K. How can one use gunships and air power against own people. CI operations involve use of minimum rather than maximum force. Maximal is in existence but not in use.

Do we have such sophisticated technologies as US drones are equipped with to be accurate or does Indian rockets recognise Maoists?. Do we want to land up in massacres?. That is why General VKS even refused to deploy Army in Chattisgarh as central govt has deployed CRPF ? BSF there but they have been hardky used. Let Chidamabaram put his hands up (which he many times does) in real, then let the govt take a decision after disbanding these forces.

Or why the hell MHA raised more than 250 CRPF battalions? The CRPF numbers is getting closer to Indian Army? For what purpose? To do sewadaars of IAS and IPS barbiturates and ministers?

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Attack Choppers to Add Teeth to Indian Army's Strike Corps
by N C Bipindra
New Delhi, May 18 (IANS)

Defence ministry officials, when asked about the army's aviation plans, said the IAF would continue to play a "strategic" role while the army would acquire its air assets for a "tactical" role.

The army, obviously, wants to have "full command and control" over the "tactical" operations of air assets so that it could meet its rapid deployment needs and for combat air support.

The army is already looking at procuring 114 of the indigenously-developed light combat helicopter (LCH), which took to the skies for the first time in March 2010, and 64 of which IAF is buying.

Army Aviation pilots are deputed to HAL and are working closely with HAL engineers to perfect the LCH and recent launch of LCH TD-2 with Digital cameo in recently held Aero India 2011, was based on suggestion of Indian army and HAL is currently working on better Digital Cameo for LCH after taking Army feed back.

Attack Choppers to Add Teeth to Indian Armys Strike Corps
http://www.deccanherald.com/content/162309/ipl-2012.html

Dedicated thread:
http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/...pers-add-teeth-indian-armys-strike-corps.html

I am yet to see any concrete proof for the AAC LCH procurement. From what I have learned, it is merely an internet rumour.

Who said this is a rumor..

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Fielding attack choppers in CT ops as support role to the infantry is a brilliant tactics unless it receive a huge outcry from civilians against it.

We should not use Air power in our own country, If we are fighting in some other`s land we can use...


" One dead civilian give rise to 10 volunteers "

 

[Singh]

Army's demand for attack choppers triggers fresh turf war with IAF



NEW DELHI: Army chief General Bikram Singh has launched an aggressive campaign among the top echelons of the government demanding that the Army be allowed to have its own attack helicopters. The move has triggered a fresh round of stand-off between the Army and the Indian Air Force (IAF), while many sources in the security establishment are appalled by the persistent turf wars among the three services and their failure to integrate themselves for modern warfare.

Gen Singh made the pitch for the Army to have its own attack helicopters during a meeting with defence minister AK Antony last week. The Army chief is also believed to have reiterated the demand in a meeting with national security advisor (NSA) Shivshankar Menon. Sources said a reluctant IAF chief may also have been called into the meeting by the NSA.

Gen Singh's forceful campaign has surprised many in the security establishment since the issue is under examination by a high-power committee. More importantly, at a time when defence forces around the world are working towards integration into a seamless unit for fighting modern warfare, the turf battle is symbolic of the Indian reality — of each service protecting its turf, and fending off all integration efforts.

The crux of the matter is the Army's desire to have a bigger aviation wing, including attack helicopters and medium lift choppers. Now, the Army is only authorized to operate helicopters that weigh less than 5 tonnes. Under the Joint Army Air Instruction of 1986, the Army is empowered to operate light utility helicopters for communication, directing artillery fire etc. All heavier helicopters, including attack choppers and fixed wing aircraft, are to be operated by the IAF. The Navy enjoys exemption because of its unique need for operating in maritime environs.

The Army demanded helicopters heavier than 5 tonnes, including attack choppers for itself, in the Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) for 2012-27 that it had submitted several months ago. Though LTIPP for the military was approved by the defence acquisition council, headed by Antony in April, the Army's demand for operating bigger helicopters was referred to a panel, headed by Vice Admiral S P S Cheema, deputy chief of the integrated defence staff (perspective planning and force development), and comprising representatives from various services. This committee's study has been underway, when Gen Singh made his aggressive pitch.

The IAF is not amused and has strongly opposed the Army's demand, saying it would be wastage of resources. The IAF also believes that it could take up to three to four decades for the Army to inculcate an aviation culture for maintaining and flying heavier helicopters. IAF also points out that it has projected the total needs of both the Army and the Air Force in LTIPP, and does not discriminate between the two.

Sources in the security establishment are appalled by the turf wars between the services. A senior official argued that the government needs to exercise its political leadership and ensure that the three services move quickly in adopting inter-operability and developing more unified concepts.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...sh-turf-war-with-IAF/articleshow/14871959.cms

 

[Kunal Biswas]

I like the way media sells article headings..