State of the Indian Army
A crisis of relevance?
By
Maj Gen G D Bakshi SM,VSM (Retd) Published : December 2009
There is a major debate in Washington about the future role and armament pattern of the American Armed Forces. The Brass is keen to prepare for conventional conflicts with peer nations like Russia or China. Robert Gates, the Defense Secretary, however wants them to focus on actual Low Intensity Conflicts ongoing in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Indian Army is similarly in the throes of a parallel crisis regarding its role and relevance in a post- nuclear context.
The issue is summed up in the graph below. The histogram indicates the number of Divisions employed in combat in each of India's Post-independence military conflicts
The Tactical Phase. It is obvious that till 1962 it was the tactical phase of our military history. All that India was capable of was the tactical employment of two to three divisions only. This was the level of force usage in the 1947-48 J&K conflict as also in the 1962 war with China.
The Phase of Operational Art. With the 1965 war, the Army graduated to the level of Operational Art and used up to 12 Divisions in combat. It launched two Corps sized offensives in Punjab and forced Pakistan to recoil from Akhnur. It destroyed the Pakistani First Armoured Division in a Land-Air conflict. However, overall this cold start operation was a stalemate that yet provided very useful learning experience to our armed forces.
The Strategic Phase. With the 1971 War over the liberation of Bangladesh, the Indian Armed Forces had come of age. India launched a text book Tri- Service campaign that in just 14 days cut Pakistan in two and created a new nation state. Over 93,000 POWs were taken. It was a historic military victory and the peak of Indian military power in conventional terms.
The Era of Mechanization. The late 1970s and early 1980s were the era of mechanization of our Army led by Gen Krishna Rao, Gen Sundarji and Gen Hanut Singh. The Soviets continued to heavily support our military buildup. However the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 radically altered the Strategic scenario in South Asia.
The Era of Low Intensity Conflict. Pakistan began to support the Khalistani terrorist movement in Punjab from 1983 onwards. This movement was decimated within a decade and the Brasstacks Exercise helped to coerce Pakistan into curtailing its support. However in 1989 the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan. This relieved Pakistan of its two-front dilemma and freed its XI and XII Corps for employment against India. The Soviet Union collapsed in 1990 and the next year the Indian economy was also close to collapse. Pakistan launched the Proxy War in J&K the same year. A weak political leadership and economic difficulties forced India to respond in a purely reactive and defensive manner on her own soil. Despite this, some two decades down the line, the back of this terrorist movement has largely been broken.
The Nuclearisation of South Asia. In 1998, India and Pakistan went overtly nuclear. This led to hubris in the Pakistani Military-ISI complex which launched the Kargil misadventure in 1999. India's resolute and energetic response shook Pakistan. India confined her response to its own side of the Line of Control (LC), used upto two Divisions but massed effects by extensive employment of artillery (100 tubes to support a battalion attack) and air power.
However, Pakistan learnt the wrong lessons from India's failure to cross the LC. It felt its conventional military parity had deterred India from a trans- border response. 95% of the weight of deterrence in Pakistani military thinking, says Peter Lavoy, shifted to the conventional level.
The next crisis in 2001-02 saw India mobilizing its entire Armed Forces but doing nothing for months before it pulled back its forces on half-hearted assurances that Pakistan would scale back and dismantle its terrorist Jihad infrastructure.
The Phase of Drift. Almost 10 years later, Mumbai saw a zero military response from India to yet another mass casualty strike in the major metropolis of Mumbai. Pakistani terrorists inflicted the 26/11 carnage, and initially, the ISI propaganda outfit shamefully tried to put the blame on Indian politicians.
Operationally, the Army was tasked to holding the outer cordon while the Government mobilised the National Security Guard (NSG). It took the NSG three days to clear eight terrorists, mainly because it had to ensure the safety oof hostages on the one hand and because it had no access to the layout of the hotels under siege. The live media telecast complicated the operation as the Pakistani handlers continuously updated the terrorists about the movement of the Indian troopers.
The Army's commitments in J&K and the North East are petering out and winding down. The State Authorities in Kashmir are impatient to see the Army out despite the clear risk of a slide back due to the premature withdrawal of troops. The Army is not keen to be deployed against the Naxals in the Indian heartland as it will stymie its cold start timings.
However, the Mumbai carnage unfortunately highlighted our cold feet when it comes to using actual military force. The Indian State spends close to 30 billion dollars a year on its Armed Forces. What then is their relevance to such sub-conventional Provocations?
From Mumbai to Munich? The political authorities seem keen to relegate the Armed might of the Services to irrelevance. Routine statements are made that war is simply not an option. Deterrence is primarily a mind game and such well intentioned proclamations of peace severely erode our deterrence posture and the ability to deter sub-conventional attacks.
The Gaping Voids. What is utterly confounding is the excruciatingly slow pace of our arms acquisition process, mostly due to negative politics played by politicians. The entire Soviet era stock of capital equipment is now due for replacement. Yet major arms acquisitions have been delayed for years. The Comptroller and Auditor General's Report has highlighted the following glaring slippages :-
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8th Plan (1992-97) Just 5% of the planned acquisition of Tanks and ICVs was carried out. This was the era of a major systemic upheaval in Russia and our own economy was close to collapse. The delays/ slippages were understandable.
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9th Plan (1997-2002) Despite a great upsurge in the Indian Economy only 10% of the planned for acquisition could be made. Possibly we were trying to complete our economic modernization before embarking on a military build up.
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10th Plan (2002-2007) Despite the Kargil and Op Parakram crisis the percentage of equipment acquired fell woefully short of planned targets. Thus :-
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Tanks: Only 30% of planned acquisitions could be completed.
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Infantry: The Infantry that faces the Proxy war in J&K and insurgencies in the North East could acquire only 48% of the equipment it had planned for.
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Mechanized Infantry: Only 42% of the planned acquisition could be affected.
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Artillery: This arm has suffered most grievously since the Bofors scandal, the entire mediumisation and modernization of the Artillery has been held up. Self propelled and Ultra Light Weight Howitzers are being delayed inordinately and the manufacture of ammunition for the Bofors has just not taken off. Only 48% of the planned acquisition could be completed.
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Air Defence Artillery: Only 23% of planned acquisition was done.
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Signals Only 35% of the planned acquisition could be done.
In fact, of the 250 items planned for acquisition in the 10th Plan, only 96 items could be acquired. This is opening up alarming voids in our defence preparedness.
Before the 1962 debacle, for almost a decade India's Defence Expenditure was reduced to just between 1-2% of the GDP. This invited not just the Chinese attack in 1962 but also the Pakistani Invasion of 1965. Thereafter India had to spent upto 3.5% of its GDP on defence for the next three decades and it was the Soviet assistance that enabled the historic victory of 1971.
For almost 10 years after the Kargil War, the Indian Army has seen no meaningful combat. Is this phase reminiscent of the pre-1962 era of drift? An absence of any combat challenge can induce a "peacetime Army syndrome" and erode effectiveness and elan. There is an urgent need for the Armed forces in general and the Indian Army in particular to redefine its role and evolve doctrines for Limited War against a Nuclear backdrop that can deter/ prevent such sub conventional provocations.
If India is unfortunately attacked with nuclear weapons, the attacker must not be allowed to exist and threaten us ever again.
India urgently needs to speed up its arms acquisition process and field dominant war fighting capabilities in South Asia. While India's defence budget is just $ 30 billion, that of China is estimated to be in the region of $ 139 bn.
This gives us an idea of the size of the capability gap that is being opened inadvertently.
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