Coping with China
Indian Army raises two mountain divisions
By Brig. Arun Sahgal (retd) and Pravin Sawhney
http://www.forceindia.net/coverstory2.aspx
In order to meet the Chinese threat, the Indian Army and Indian Air Force have launched an accretion and modernisation drive. The process is slow for two reasons: Equivocation at the political level. This has resulted in ambiguous signals to the defence services, on what is the end-game that is sought by a military confrontation. The second reason is that the Eastern Front continues to remain a lower priority than the front with Pakistan.
In concrete terms, the government has cleared an exclusive mountain strike corps in the East. The existing 3 Corps at Dimapur has been designated as the offensive Corps. Two new mountain divisions, 41 Mountain Division in Binaguri and 56 Mountain Division, to be raised in 2010, are being created. The important thing is that these mountain divisions will be an accretion to the Indian Army strength and will not be created from existing man-power assets. In effect, by 2011, the offensive 3 Corps will have under it, 56 Mountain Division and 2 Mountain Division in Rangia (under 4 Corps headquarters). It will also have 41 Division under the order of battle of 4 Corps (in Tezpur) available to it for the offensive battle. Consequently, the three corps in the East, namely, 33 Corps in Sukhna (for Sikkim)...
4 Corps in Tezpur and 3 Corps in Dimapur will be utilised completely against the Chinese front.
According to sources, troops of 3 Corps presently on counter-insurgency operations will be pulled out for training in conventional operations. Notwithstanding the new raisings and reorganisations, the overall posture will remain one of strategic defence, which implies limited tactical offensive capabilities.
To provide the forces with rapid reaction capabilities these formations will have heli-lift capability, ultra light 155mm howitzers capable of being heli-lifted as also dedicated combat support resources. 3 Corps headquarters in the East will be the controlling headquarters for working out operational employment contingencies. Similarly, the two holding Corps of the Indian Army in the Eastern theatre too are being provided with inbuilt brigade level rapid reaction capabilities including heli-lift capacity, aim being, quick response to any local contingencies. To improve fire power, plans exist, for providing dedicated artillery resources with possibility of raising a separate artillery division based on 155mm/52calibre guns.
To enhance intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, India is embarked upon a programme of satellite-based navigation system project GAGAN (GPS Aided Geo Augmented Navigation or GPS and Geo Augmented Navigation) system. Experience of creating the GAGAN system will be utilised for the creation of an autonomous regional navigation system called the Indian Regional Navigational Satellite System (IRNSS) and that it might use the GSAT-4 satellite as a technology demonstration system phase of the proposed navigational system. One of the big advantages of GAGAN is high positional accuracies over wide areas, thereby enhancing weapon accuracies among other attributes.
At the tactical level to increase ISR capacities, army is inducting three additional troops of Heron UAV’s apart from satellite-based information systems. Similarly, to ensure high degree of communication security and connectivity, a satellite-based dedicated defence network is being planned for the armed forces. What is being attempted is provision of similar ‘informationalised’ conditions backed by dedicated air and rotary wing assets as available to PLA forces. Tactical air defence cover is also being improved by inducting low level quick reaction AD missiles to replace existing Igla shoulder-fired systems.
To enhance mobility in the mountainous regions dedicated infrastructure and strategic road development programme has been launched to enhance both connectivity and mobilisation including logistics. On implementation by 2011, there will be significant increase in forward deployment and maintenance capability.
Army’s modernisation and force development programmes are also being matched by forward deployment and increase in air profile in the East. The Eastern Air Command is seized of the fact that it will be called upon to deliver parallel operations on the complete spectrum of war. Like the army, the operations will be more defensive than offensive. The focus on conduct of operations in support of the army is primarily due to the prevalent weather and terrain conditions. This would include precision fighter strikes on vital targets, air defence of third dimension, rapid movement of large scales of ground forces across battle zones, ISR operations, special heli-borne operations and maintenance of operational logistics chain.
Given the nature of firepower, the IAF will have far more offensive capabilities that will provide deterrence to the PLA, than the Indian Army. Offensive operations indicate that the IAF will retain the initiative to strike and plan to probe deep into the adversary land. Towards this end, infrastructure for permanent deployment of a squadron of Su-30MKI in Tezpur by early March 2010 is in full swing. The infrastructure has been planned to cater for regular operations from hardened and blast-protected structures. It would blend in modern passive air defence features and NBC protection right from the inception stage. Other assets that the Eastern Air Command hopes to get to bolster the offensive arm are versatile platforms like heavy and medium-lift helicopters along with AWACS and Flight Refuelling Aircraft (FRA).
According to the IAF, the improvements planned for the ALGs in Arunachal Pradesh are because of both domestic requirements of communications and connectivity, as well as strategic compulsion. Work is in progress to upgrade ALGs in Arunachal Pradesh at Vijaynagar, Pasighat, Tuting, Along and Mechuka. Other ALGs like Walong and Ziro are being improved as well. In parallel, the IAF is also upgrading all the air fields in its area of responsibility since most of them are becoming ‘joint user airfields’ and need to be capable of handling a higher density of traffic by day and night.
To appreciate the need for operational awareness and preparedness, a holistic overview of India’s China policy is in order. This policy has been marked by friendship, sentimentalism, fear, diffidence, appeasement, brinksmanship, wishful thinking and engagement. Off late, despite positive political overtures, there is growing negativism in relations. The negative elements include slow progress in border talks marked by claim on Twang together with publicly expressed claims over the whole of Arunachal Pradesh. Continuing military modernisation together with incremental upgradation of its military posture in Tibet in terms of rapid force deployment and sustainment capability, forward development of logistics and communications infrastructure, and significantly growing border incursions, including the settled areas like Sikkim, are all pointers to coercive tactics aimed at keeping tensions alive.
Added to above is the growing stridency of the anti-India discourse with chorus being joined by the influential media, Chinese bloggers and even important think tanks — importantly those associated with the Peoples Liberation Army. The patronising and threatening tone of this discourse in the Chinese media indicates hardening of anti-India posture and raises a serious question of possible tensions being triggered on one pretext or the other.
Why the growing Bellicosity?
The rationale and logic of Chinese bellicosity appears to be what they see as a critical shift in Indian defence posture, one that calls on India to expand its military horizons beyond Pakistan and pay more attention to a dangerous Chinese encirclement of the Indian subcontinent, by creating a strong ‘dissuasive defensive posture’. In this context, increasing number of Chinese academics and even officially sanctioned websites and think tanks are ratcheting up India threat scenario, holding Indian military modernisation and incremental improvement in India’s defensive and offensive posture together, with statements by senior Indian military leadership and think tank discourse responsible.
The political construct of this is provided by the growing Indo-US strategic relationship, increasing US footprint in South and Central Asia apart from the Indian Ocean, which China sees as attempts to restrict its strategic space. Adding to that is stable polity and an improving economy which has enhanced India’s global standing.
From a Chinese perspective, Indian military developments along the border are particularly disconcerting. Chinese see this as an Indian attempt to carve out a strategic space along its troubled periphery in its favour, particularly in South Asia, where China is weaving a web of proxies through economic and political influence and growing military cooperation. Contextualising these developments, Chinese analysts appear to have come to the conclusion that India was upping the ante and attempting to create a scenario wherein non-resolution of the boundary dispute will lose the leverages that Chinese political leadership presumes it has. Aiding such a perception is growing American footprints in Pakistan which has the potential of robbing China of its most steadfast regional proxy.
In order to put this debate in a perspective, it is important to underscore the growing Indian concerns about Chinese military build-up in Tibet, which provides China with multiple and glaring strategic advantages.
Doctrine of ‘Active Defence’
First and foremost is the Chinese doctrine of ‘Active Defence’. Underlying Chinese military modernisation and force development models is the doctrine of active defence. The new doctrine is more assertive than previously and is not bound by any restrictions to confine and limit future conflict to within China’s national boundaries. According to China’s White Paper, active defence is a defensive military strategy. The doctrine demands the creation of a capability to project force across China’s borders through rapid deployment, conventional SRBMs and cruise missiles, information warfare, electronic warfare, precision-guided munitions, night-fighting capabilities and other advanced military technologies. The PLA expects to fight the next war under conditions of what it calls ‘informationalisation’ — this is Chinese euphemism of net-centric and RMA-assisted warfare.
Second and importantly is the infrastructural and capability upgradation in Tibet. China can support a force over 20-25 Divisions in Tibet which can be build over a single campaigning season. This is backed by forward location of operational logistics that could support large forces. Aiding the above posture is the increasing Chinese rapid reaction and punitive strike capability. As per current assessments, PLA has the capacity to air transport approximate a division plus (15,000 troops) in one go and air drop a brigade (3,500 troops) in a single airlift. Its heli-lift capacity is nearly two battalions in a single lift. This capability is now at display in exercise ‘Stride-2009’, involving 50,000 troops from four major regional military commands — stationed in the cities of Shenyang, Lanzhou, Jinan and Guangzhou, which are likely to stretch over the next two months. The sophisticated nature of the far-flung deployments together with projected manoeuvres 12–1600 km away from their bases is an exceptional power projection capability, involving force mobilisation using high-speed civilian rail and air links in the rapid deployment of troops. According to the official Xinhua News Agency, the exercises are a test of the PLA’s ‘long-range force projection’ capability in army’s ‘largest-ever tactical military exercise’.
These developments need to be seen in the backdrop of possible rapid reaction force deployment in Tibet. Chinese Rapid Reaction Forces, better known as ‘Resolving Emergency Mobile Combat Forces’ (REMCF), are prepared for a 24 to 48 hour response to any contingency that might threaten Chinese interests. This exercise implies, China today, is in a position to deploy upto 3-4 divisions in a rapid deployment mode following induction of its REMCF at a place of its choice along the Sino–Indian border, an awesome military projection capability by any standards.
