Indian Army: News and Discussion

[WolfPack86]

India's Defence FDI Rules Should Not Treat the Sector as Homogeneous

India is the third largest defence spender in the world, only behind USA and China. Between 2015 and 2019, India was the second biggest arms importer, accounting for 9.2% of the total global arms imports. China, on the other hand, with a 249% higher defence budget than India, accounted for only 4.9% of global arms imports. But during that period, India accounted for only 0.2% of the total global arms exports, while China accounted for 5.5% of global arms exports. This absolute and relative discrepancy in the difference between India’s arms imports and exports builds a compelling case for India’s defence requirements to be manufactured in India. The government’s announcement to raise the cap in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in defence, through the automatic route, from 49% to 74% is therefore a welcome move. But the dynamics of defence manufacturing, unlike most other industries, is very complex and the recent announcement in hiking FDI limits across all types of defence manufacturing doesn’t adequately address this complexity. Defence manufacturing is predicated on higher order engineering capabilities and cutting-edge innovation, and an economy that excels in defence manufacturing, creates a blueprint for cascading excellence in other types of manufacturing. The correlation between GDP per-capita and a nation’s engineering advancements is also unmistakable. Central to advanced defence manufacturing capability is the development of critical technologies that form the core of cutting-edge weapons and platforms development. However, unlike in many other industries, these technologies cannot be seen as homogeneous. Different weapon platforms have different levels of technology complexity, and greater the complexity, the greater has to be incentive for global defence manufacturers to invest in India. It would, therefore, be more prudent if rules for investment in the defence aerospace sector were more relaxed from the rest. In November 2015, the Indian government announced an increase in FDI limits in defence, under the automatic route, from 24% to 49%. However, despite the government’s relentless push, the new rule yielded very little foreign investments. Between April 2000 and December 2019, India incrementally increased its FDI limits, but received only $8.82 million as FDI into its defence sector. In 2016-17, India failed to attract any FDI in defence. In 2017-18, India received $0.01 million, and in 2018-19, it received $2.18 million. These numbers don’t justify the enormous potential for foreign investments in India’s defence sector. However, the recent announcement of increasing the FDI cap in defence to 74%, under the automatic route, has the potential to attract foreign investments, but they would not be effective across the entire spectrum of defence manufacturing. In February 2017, L&T announced a joint-venture with Europe based MBDA for the development of sophisticated weapon systems. Back in 2013, Pune-based Bharat Forge, too, collaborated with Israel-based Elbit Systems to manufacture towed and mounted gun systems. There have also been many other JVs that were inked for collaboration in manufacturing of fuselage, missiles, defence software, defence components etc., even during the period when actual investments were low. The recent FDI limit hike announcement will give a significant fillip to investments through such collaborations. However, foreign collaborations in technologically sophisticated aerospace defence hasn’t taken off. Developing advanced defence aerospace technologies is a costly and a complex process, and, therefore, accessing them is understandably restricted. Given the enormous investments poured into their research and development, and the huge entry barriers into this industry, it does not make any commercial sense for global aerospace defence manufacturers to part with their proprietary technology. The 74% FDI calls for an Indian private or government partner owning 26% of the partnership, along with access to core technologies developed by the foreign partner. While this may be appropriate for manufacturing other defence platforms such as missiles or ancillary components such as fuselages, it discourages global aerospace firms with sensitive and core defence aerospace technologies from entering into such arrangement. In order to effectively and comprehensively attract FDI into the defence aerospace sector, India must make it easy for global firms to completely own their proprietary technology and their manufacturing process in India, and this calls for allowing 100% FDI in the defence aerospace sector through the automatic route. Defence aerospace manufacturing is at the higher end of the engineering and economics value chain. Nine out of the 10 largest global defence manufacturers are into defence aerospace manufacturing. When such high value and advanced weapons and platforms are manufactured in India, it would generate employment, and result in development and proliferation of higher order engineering skills. Such global manufacturers will also develop and nurture a robust eco-system of domestic suppliers to avail cost advantages, which would further encourage the growth of allied industries such as sensors, advanced communications, semiconductors and so on in India. Eventually, India could become the export hub for some of the key aerospace weapon platforms and high-end components. Allowing global aerospace manufacturers to set up fully owned subsidiaries would also proliferate the spread of technology and skill development opportunities across other sectors such as automotive, heavy engineering, industrial and product design, information technology, advanced communications etc. Given its complexity, foreign investments in defence aerospace significantly impacts other aspects of the economic machinery. The top five global defence companies are American aerospace defence majors, and they come under the 1976 United States Arms Control Export Act. This act makes it almost impossible for US arms manufacturers to sell or share their contemporary critical technologies with any foreign company or nation. Establishing a 100% subsidiary in a foreign land, with complete control over the research, design and manufacturing process doesn’t amount for sale or sharing of critical technologies. Even defence aerospace firms from nations that don’t have such laws will favourably respond to a 100% FDI limit. Boeing’s investment in a 100% subsidiary in Australia is a good example of how investments by global aerospace majors could lead to cascading gains. Set up in 2002, Boeing Australia is Boeing’s largest presence outside the US with 3,000 employees in 38 locations. It supports in excess of 9,300 jobs, works with 1,500 suppliers and contributed $1.15 billion to the Australian economy. In 2015, it exported $400 million worth of equipment. In 2016, it spent $400 million in supply chain. It’s involved in the manufacturing of five commercial aircraft programs and five aerospace defence equipment programs, such as fighter jets and helicopters. Such investments and the cascading economic benefits would not be possible without allowing for 100% FDI in aerospace defence. The notion that defence manufacturing is strategic and must be limited to Indian PSUs, Indian firms or JVs with Indian firms holding the majority stake has not yielded any economic or national security gains. Given India’s need for high end capital defence equipment, its heavy reliance on imports, and the limited contribution of the manufacturing sector to its economy, bringing advanced defence manufacturing into its shores would be a strategically sound move. This would not only reduce the cost of its defence imports expenditure, but would also result in other cascading benefits across the economic, employment, entrepreneurship, and skill development spectrums. Allowing for 74% FDI under the automatic route is therefore a good move in that directions. However, given the heterogenous nature of defence manufacturing, 100% FDI in aerospace defence sector must be allowed under the automatic route. Such differential treatment also sends out a strong message of intent to the global aerospace production majors.

India's Defence FDI Rules Should Not Treat the Sector as Homogeneous

India is the third largest defence spender in the world, only behind USA and China. Between 2015 and 2019, India was the second biggest arms importer, accounting for 9.2% of the total global arms imports. China, on the other hand, with a 249% higher defence budget than India, accounted for only...

www.defencenews.in

 

[scatterStorm]

Indian Army Modern Equipment on LOC

All equipment's look good, pack a punch, I am a bit surprised to see Chinese drones for Chinese troops surveillance? I am happy to see grenade launcher and night spec optics.

However they do require a mil-spec grade laptop. This laptop won't cut in. Probably a Thinkpad or dell latitude series would've been better.

 

[Mikesingh]

For info.....

 

[Gautam Sarkar]

Army’s oldest artillery man Jallawalia passes away at 102

Army's oldest artillery man Jallawalia passes away at 102

Retd Major was veteran of WW-II, 2 wars with Pakistan

www.deccanchronicle.com

 

[12arya]

Indian Army Makes Move To Purchase Land In Kashmir Valley; Writes To District Administration In Baramulla

Breaking away from the norm of leasing land from the Government of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) for its camps, the Indian Army has made a move to purchase a parcel of land in Baramulla of Kashmir Valley, reports Hindustan Times

swarajyamag.com

Indian Army Makes Move To Purchase Land In Kashmir Valley; Writes To District Administration In Baramulla

An Indian Army contingent rehearses for Indian Republic Day parade along Rajpath in New Delhi. (MONEY SHARMA/AFP/Getty Images)



Breaking away from the norm of leasing land from the Government of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) for its camps, the Indian Army has made a move to purchase a parcel of land in Baramulla of Kashmir Valley, reports Hindustan Times.

With Article 370 having been deoperationalised by the two houses of Parliament in August last year, the Indian Army no longer requires the UT's Government's nod for land to house its soldiers. If the land purchase materialises, it would come as a booster for troops which are already "temporarily stationed" in Baramulla district.

It should also be noted that this marks the first such instance when the Army has directly written to the district administration, requesting it to inform if the latter would be willing to sell the land to the force.

The Army looks to purchase 129 kanal (6.5 hectares) of land at Kreeri high ground at Tapperwari in Pattan area of the district.

The request for the purchase of land has been made by the Quartermaster for Commanding Officer of the Army's 19 Infantry Division Ordnance Unit.
Army has requested the district administration to reply to its letter by 30 May

 

[12arya]

India Is Building Border Roads Faster Than Before; This Could Be One Reason Behind China’s Aggressive Posture Along The LAC

India is building border roads faster than it was until a few years ago.India’s improving infrastructure could be one of the reasons behind China’s aggressive posture along the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh.

swarajyamag.com

India Is Building Border Roads Faster Than Before; This Could Be One Reason Behind China’s Aggressive Posture Along The LAC

Representative Image

Snapshot

• India is building border roads faster than it was until a few years ago.
  India’s improving infrastructure could be one of the reasons behind China’s aggressive posture along the Line of Actual Control in Ladak
  

In April 2019, an 11-member motorcycle expedition completed its run from Karu near Leh to the Karakoram Pass and back, a journey of around 1,000 kilometres, over the Chang La pass, and then along the Shyok river, traversing the challenging terrain of north-eastern Ladakh at over 17,000 feet.

This expedition was different from those which take place in Ladakh every summer — it was the first-ever to pass through the newly-built 255-kilometre Darbuk-Shayok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DS-DBO) road, and had personnel from the Army Service Corps, the logistics arm of the Indian Army, which was to be one of the primary users of this road.

Critical for connectivity in north-eastern Ladakh — termed Sub-Sector North by the Army, the DS-DBO road provides all-weather access to far-flung areas abutting the 38,000 square km territory of Aksai Chin under Chinese occupation, such as the Depsang Plains, which saw a tense India-China stand-off in 2013.

Darbuk-Shayok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DS-DBO) road (Google Maps)



The road had been under construction for 19 years — work on it begun sometime around the year 2000, was to be completed by 2012, and progress was monitored directly by the Prime Minister’s Office.

However, in 2011, by the time a large part of the road was complete, an inquiry into its construction found the road had been laid on flat terrain along the bed of the Shyok River instead of being built on the mountainside.

As a result, every year during summer months from June to October, as melting snow flooded the Shyok river, some portions of the road were damaged.

By some accounts, the road remained closed for up to 94 days due to the rise in water level in the Shyok River during the summer months. This left the road, that was closing completion nearly 12 years after work began, unfit for military use.

These issues are not unique to the DS-DBO road. The construction of strategic roads along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has been plagued with endless delays — there are never-ending tales of projects passing deadlines by several years, costs quadrupling during execution and defective construction.

In 1997, the government along with the China Study Group, identified 73 strategic roads with the total length of 4,643 km, labelled India China Border Roads (ICBRs), to be built along the LAC to improve the movement of troops and match China’s infrastructure build-up in occupied territories and Tibet.

Out of these 73 ICBRs, 61 roads having a total length of 3,409 km were to be built by the Border Roads Organisation (BRO), while the remaining 12, with the total length of over 1,230 km, were entrusted to the Central Public Works Department.

State-wise distribution of ICBRs.


Approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security in 1999, BRO was tasked to complete the construction of these roads by the year 2012.

However, as the Comptroller and Auditor General of India pointed out in its report (PDF here) in 2017, only 15 of the 61 roads that the BRO was entrusted with had been completed by the end of the deadline in 2012.
Counting the number of roads which have been completed is not the best way to measure the progress made in the ICBR project (or any road project) — some progress is made on most roads that are part of the project but only a few reach completion every year.

However, comparing numbers over a long period of time, say a few years, does offer some insight into the pace of construction.
For this reason, consider the following: 12 ICBRs with a total length of 520 km were completed by the end of 2009, and by early 2015, 19 roads of length 625 km had reached completion.

With this, it can be safely concluded that construction of strategic roads was moving at a slow pace. That the progress on ICBRs was slow is not a new finding, but there is one — this may no longer be the case.
The 2018 year-end review of the Ministry of Defence says that the “completed length of ICBRs is 2316.62 km”, which is 68 per cent of the total length of the 61 roads to be built by the BRO, and the year-end review for 2019 states that around “75 per cent road length has been blacktopped” by the organisation.

This shows the progress of around 7 per cent in one year between 2018-19. Had the BRO constructed ICBRs at this pace ever since it started working on the project, all border roads along the LAC would have been ready years ago.

Progress started improving much before 2018-19. In 2016-17, as this Times of India report says, formation cutting (cutting along the face of the hill or mountain) increased to 147 km from 107 km in 2014-15. Similarly, progress on surfacing increased to 233 km in 2016-17 from 174 km in 2014-15.

Clearly, work on ICBRs has been progressing faster in the last few years. Apart from a surge in Chinese transgressions and the Doklam stand-off of 2017 forcing India to increase the pace of infrastructure build-up, there are many other reasons to believe this — much has changed for the BRO since 2014-15.

One, in 2015-16, the organisation was brought under the full control of the Defence Ministry. Under the earlier arrangement, BRO received funding from the Ministry of Road Transport, while its tasks were defined by the Defence Ministry. This dual control was an impediment in the smooth functioning of BRO.

Two, in 2017, on the day the India-China standoff at Doklam ended, the Modi government announced that it was doing away with the need for forest clearance for infrastructure projects for the army within 100 km of the LAC.

The Narendra Modi government had also given a similar general approval after coming to power in 2014. Delay in the forest and environmental clearance held up road projects for years.

Three, in the midst of the Doklam stand-off in July 2017, the government delegated more administrative and financial powers to BRO officers. In some cases, financial powers were increased as much as ten-fold and fifteen-fold.

These, along with improvement in technology and surveying over the last decade, seem to have helped the BRO speed up the construction of new roads and bridges along the LAC significantly.

Around 67 per cent of BRO’s 32,000-strong workforce is now deployed along the border with China.

It has completed many critical connectivity projects in Ladakh the Northeast in recent years, the DS-DBO road being one.

India’s highest altitude all-weather permanent bridge, christened after ‘Lion of Ladakh’ Col Chewang Rinchen, built on Shyok river at 14,650 feet.


After the road was found unfit for all-weather military use in 2011, a large part of it, around three quarters by some accounts, was realigned by the BRO, along with the construction of India's highest altitude all-weather permanent bridge in eastern Ladakh, and completed in early 2019.
It is in one of the areas which the DS-DBO road passes through — the Galwan River Valley — that India and China are currently locked in a tense face-off, apparently because India is building a new road (satellite image here).

India still has a lot of catching up to do, but this is quickly changing.
For decades, as India ignored border areas and then started building infrastructure at a crawling pace, China used its superior infrastructure to change the status quo along the LAC at will.

With the infrastructure gap narrowing, its actions are now being challenged.

 

[12arya]

How The Fist That Felled Chinese Army Officer In Sikkim On Saturday Packed Three Generations Of Valour

According to a senior officer, the young Lieutenant was provoked into the act by the PLA Major’s loud claim that Sikkim belonged to China and that the Indian Army had ‘transgressed’ into Chinese territory.

swarajyamag.com

How The Fist That Felled Chinese Army Officer In Sikkim On Saturday Packed Three Generations Of Valour

Snapshot

• According to a senior officer, the young Lieutenant was provoked into the act by the PLA Major’s loud claim that Sikkim belonged to China and that the Indian Army had ‘transgressed’ into Chinese territory.

A young, lean and lithe Indian Army Lieutenant delivered a hard punch to a burly Major of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on Saturday afternoon, sending him sprawling to the rocky and sandy ground at Naku La in Northern Sikkim.

The punch left the Major with a bloody nose, but it badly bruised the collective ego of the formidable PLA.

Especially since it was delivered by a very young officer who was commissioned into the army barely a year ago.

According to a senior officer at the Army’s East Command headquarters in Kolkata’s Fort William, the young Lieutenant* was provoked into the act by the PLA Major’s loud claim that Sikkim belonged to China and that the Indian Army had ‘transgressed’ into Chinese territory.

This incident was the high point of the hours-long face-off and fist-fights between Indian and Chinese soldiers at Naku La, which is close to the Line Of Actual Control (LAC) in North Sikkim, on Saturday (May 9) morning.
A few Indian and Chinese soldiers sustained injuries in the standoff that was ultimately resolved after senior officers of both the sides intervened.
It is learnt that the PLA Major was shouting and moving menacingly towards another young Indian Army officer of the rank of Captain.
The young Lieutenant intervened and threw a punch at the Major, who went reeling and fell on the ground. Even his name tag came off.

The young Lieutenant was in the mood for landing a few more punches, but his colleagues pulled him away.

He was later admonished by his seniors who told him that the humiliating punch could have provoked the Chinese more. But they also lauded him in private.

Those who know the young Lieutenant would realise that he did what his father had done way back in 1986 at Sumdorong Chu in western Arunachal Pradesh.His father, Colonel (retired) Ashish Das had, in the early winter of that year, also given the Chinese a bloody nose there.

The Colonel, who was a young Captain then, had led a fierce attack on the Chinese who had transgressed into Indian territory and built permanent structures at Zemithang in Arunachal Pradesh.

That operation was part of the legendary ‘Operation Falcon’ masterminded by then Army Chief General Krishnaswamy Sundarji.
The bravery of Das, who was commissioned into the Assam Regiment, led to the recapturing of a strategically important ridgetop, which was subsequently named after him as ‘Ashish Top’.

Ashish Das’ father, Master Warrant Officer (MWO) B.B. Das, served in the Royal Air Force and then the Indian Air Force. He was stationed in Lahore during World War I and also saw action in the Bangladesh War of 1971. He retired from a Signals unit in Barrackpur.

There is an interesting story about how Colonel Das’ daughter, also an Army officer (in the Judge Advocate General Branch, which is the legal arm of the Army), discovered that the ridgetop in Arunachal Pradesh is named after her father. As a young Lieutenant posted at Tenga (on the way to Tawang in western Arunachal Pradesh) in early 2018, she was on an initiation tour to forward posts. One such post she visited was ‘Ashish Top’. She wondered how the post got its name and was told about the valour of a young captain by the name of Ashish Das who captured it from the Chinese. She realised it was her father whose valour had been commemorated by naming the strategic feature after him. She broke down and the commanding officer of the unit manning the post called up Colonel Das at home in Kolkata’s Kalighat area.

Incidentally, the retired Colonel’s son, a technical graduate from Bengaluru, was also commissioned into the Assam Regiment. Colonel Das also served in the IPKF at Jaffna in Sri Lanka, and in the Poonch sector in Kashmir from 1988 to 1990 when terrorism had just started there. He retired from the army in 2009.

The Das’ family home in Kolkata proudly displays many gallantry medals won by MWO Das and his son Colonel Ashish Das. The young lieutenant grew up admiring those and fervently wishing to add to the proud collection. He may have just won one on Saturday.

After all, it takes a lot of courage to punch a mightier adversary on his nose and send him sprawling to the ground

 

[WolfPack86]

ATMA NIRBHARTA AND DEFENCE PROCUREMENT By LT GEN P R SHANKAR
Views of CDS
To attain great power status India must strengthen its internationally identified weak link - defense procurement. In the current environment we either indigenize or remain a soft power. The CDS recently made statements to the effect - Boost ‘Make in India’. Give opportunity and hand-hold domestic industry to deliver cutting edge technology. Initially accept weapons with 70% GSQRs. Formulate GSQRS on acceptable and desirable requirements, give a plus minus leeway. Be flexible while not compromising on performance. Need to promote domestic defense manufacturing and reduce imports. All this was later emphasized by our FM. It appeared that GSQRs are the main culprits and Armed Forces do not hold the hand of indigenous defense industry.
GSQRS
Let us examine GSQRs first. There are 15 -30 layers to penetrate before a GSQR/JSQR/PSQR is finalized. Each layer gives its input to justify its existence. It complicates and stiffens GSQRs to kill flexibility and enhance unattainability. Further, vested interests attempt to modify QRs to suit their ends or eliminate competition like in the Augusta Westland case. Vendors make tall claims during post RFI interactions. Later they cannot deliver. Weapons based on a new QR get finally acquired after a decade. Hence, vision and knowledge are important. That is not institutionally available in India. Overambition is normal like the QR of a replaceable barrel for a rifle. Sufficient leeway and flexibility in QRs are available only in the developmental route via the DRDO. However that route has many pitfalls despite best potential. The whole thing needs greater thought. There is no doubt about that.
Hand Holding Indigenization Efforts


Development of Pinaka MBRL commenced in 1987 with a QR of 45 km range, based on 60s vintage technology of USSR. After meandering for 23 years, Army, DRDO, OFB, L&T and TATAs came up with a system. It was inducted into the Army in 2010. Range – 37.5 km! What if the range was 7.5 KM short? It was indigenous, fully supported and accepted. The system stabilized. An extended range (55 km) version was quickly developed. It was inaccurate. Hence in an out of the box solution a guidance system was incorporated in 2016. Within a year initial trials were carried out successfully with a range of 70 km and outstanding accuracy. The investment paid off. As further trials continued, production facilities should have been set up in parallel. If parallel production had been set up, by now some of the critical Chinese facilities in Ladakh would be in reach including parts of the Western Highway. The Guided Pinaka increases range and precision. It enhances firepower tremendously. It has potential for 30% range enhancement. It has a plethora of warheads. It offsets the gap in depletion of aircraft in the IAF. Completely indigenous. It has deterrent value. This is what Pakistan says “Pinaka is an artillery missile system capable of destroying 900 square metres at a 20-80 kilometre range by firing a salvo of 12 rockets within 48 seconds. The Pinaka Mk-II rocket is modified as a missile by integrating with the navigation, control, and guidance system to improve the end accuracy and enhance the range. It is believed that the guided version of the Pinaka system is being developed to deliver nuclear warheads at short ranges” Clearly worried! However, four years back, we halved the number of regiments which were originally visualized. Even for the number of regiments sanctioned, orders are hanging fire. Force multiplication or force division?

The Dhanush 45 cal 155mm gun started off as a reverse engineered and upgraded Bofors. We realized more could be achieved, took the risk, and went big. A Weapon Development Team under a Brigadier was placed at GCF Jabalpur for constant interaction, input, and monitoring. The first gun was developed and fired. It went well. The OFB team kept asking for the QRs. I constantly refused. My logic - develop the gun, establish all parameters, and then make the QRs. The gun was put through all trials internally by Artillery. Once satisfied, the QRs were made. It could not fail. Ultimately Dhanush met all parameters during actual trials barring some minor ones. It was still cleared with some provisos but not stopped. Afterall this was the first modern gun India was making in 30 years. Despite a major accident which rattled everyone, invoked widespread skepticism and vested interest calls to shut the project and go in for a reliable foreign gun, we continued. All hurdles were crossed. Uniquely, Dhanush was put through special trials with three guns in high altitude and three in plains. Thereafter six guns were used as a subunit. Literally speaking, Dhanush went through a trial by fire when cleared for production. Finally! India had a topline 155 mm Gun. Our future. However, the Government started negotiating for a foreign gun! Dhanush was sidelined after 10 years of hard work! Even the OFB which had quoted Dhanush as a shining example of success dumped its own baby. Atma Samman and Atma Nirbharta go hand in hand.

In 2000 it was decided that all new Guns would be 155mm guns. Existing 130mm guns were first upgraded to 155mm. Simultaneously indigenous manufacture of ammunition commenced. It included modern Bi Modular Charge Systems (BMCS) as the propellant. We bought some BMCS through a global tender when a plant was being established at Nalanda through TOT. Scandals surfaced. Firms were blacklisted. The plant never got commissioned. Our stocks started depleting. We went in for a global tender with the old GSQR. Not a single OEM met the QRs! Ammunition levels continued dipping. It was suggested to dilute QRs to ensure we got some ammunition at least. I put my foot down. Inaccurate heavy artillery ammunition will invariably miss the target, fall short in range, and endanger own troops apart from wasted expenditures. Taboo! We retendered with the same QRs. An indigenous route was also opened. DRDO by new development and OFB by reverse engineering. The second-round tender and trials were successful. In the meanwhile OFB and DRDO came up with BMCS which were 80% ok. 20 % missing with one was available with the other. Due to internecine animosity they would not share technology. We stepped in and virtually read out the riot act. The then Member OFB, Dir HEMRL and I, finally came to a mature understanding. An Artillery officer led committee forged a way forward. However the Nalanda Factory was still non-operational. So with some dedicated DRDO and OFB officers a hybrid solution to start producing BMCS at Nalanda evolved. That process has now stabilized. I understand that for the present, adequate amount of BMCS are available for the new 155mm guns being inducted. However the main plant remains dysfunctional even now. It needs to be operationalized. Otherwise it will impinge on operational effectiveness as more new guns are inducted. Ammunition!

I could give half a dozen more examples. However, analyze these cases. There are many sides to this story. The sides differ for each story. They also reinforce the views of the FM and CDS and disprove them at the same time. The government needs to do a lot more if we are to truly indigenize. It will be argued that all these cases pertain to Artillery only. Agreed. In fact the Navy has a better model. So has Air Defense. Should successful models not be replicated elsewhere? Incompetent leadership or lack of knowledge or both? To further elucidate, all Artillery programs, if aggregated, and prioritized as per current operational requirements, and appropriated equitably to defense industry as per capability and capacity, all indigenous defense majors(public and private) will have assured orders for the next three decades and beyond. India will not be ever short of firepower. If this concept is expanded sensibly and transparently in a consultative manner, it will lead to a major revival to propel India to strategic Independence. Extend this concept to identified, measurable and benchmarked Import Substitution, Reverse Engineering and Upgradation projects and India will be at a different level. It needs Vision, Knowledge, and Innovation. Financial issues can be worked out if a virtuous cycle of confidence is injected. The government must get its act together if it means business. Holistic thinking needed. Professional integrity and a Nationalist outlook is required.

Fundamental Shifts and Ground Realities
Some fundamental overarching shifts have occurred in this pandemic period. These will be constants hereafter.
India’s role in world affairs is expanding. Its weight will increase only if it can indigenize defense.
Our rise is a direct threat to our adversaries. They will act in concert to put us down. Atma Nirbharta is the only answer.
Amidst the economic squeeze which is likely to last at least 5 years, imports are unaffordable.
India’s bureaucratic process-oriented procurement needs an overhaul to promote timely outcomes. Our situation demands extraordinary responses.
There is an ongoing ‘Disruption in Military Affairs’ through concepts like ‘Multi Domain Operations’ and ‘Unrestricted Warfare’.
Manpower preponderance of Indian Armed Forces inhibits modernization.
There are some ground realities. Armed Forces who face the enemy and the Politicians who face the country need Weapons not Bureaucracy or OFB or DRDO or Industry. They need cases, indents, projects, and orders, respectively. Hence Forces must assume leadership and control their destiny. Insist on it from the MOD. Everyone responds when Generals know their beans.
The CDS says “You have to see what your threat and what kind of a weapon you should need…. Very correct. We need a national threat perception and a strategy to develop requisite capabilities. Hence a prioritized strategy based on threats, affordability, availability, alternate means, technology trendline, alliances, jointness and operational concepts is mandatory. Import Substitution, Reverse Engineering, Upgrading, and Innovation are part of the deal. The ‘Ideal’ will never happen. Examine how Iran has done it. Eyeopener.
The DPP has been amended a greater number of times than the weapon systems procured. The DPP is only a GO TO reference for procedure and rules. It has enough leeway to go around all hurdles. Let me confess. I never took the DPP seriously.
Civil-military fusion in cyberspace, AI, telecom, space, nuclear, ISR, and Robotics should be the watchword. There is adequate technology and knowledge available in India. Microsoft, Amazon, Google, and many multinationals are tapping this knowledge daily. That knowledge will not come to South Block. It must be harnessed and harvested from grass roots. Do not treat the knowledge centers as another DRDO or OFB or DPSU. AI is one of the priority programs of US Army Futures Command. It is being executed from Carnegie Mellon University and not Pentagon. There is a 3 bn USD lesson there.
Conclusion
After the recent reforms were announced, I attended a few webinars by Industry Bodies. I heard people saying the same old things. It did not bear results earlier. It cannot deliver under the current extraordinary times. Is the defense establishment reinforcing failure? India needs to do something different. Time for talking is over.

ATMA NIRBHARTA AND DEFENCE PROCUREMENT By LT GEN P R SHANKAR

‘Atma Nirbharta (Self Sufficiency) is the only route to Strategic Independence’ Views of CDS To attain great power status India…

www.gunnersshot.com

 

[ladder]

Opinion.


Booze Brigadier’ to egg & tent scams: Indian military must check falling standards in ethics

by LT GEN H S PANAG (RETD)

'Booze Brigadier' to egg & tent scams: Indian military must check falling standards in ethics

Abuse of privileges by senior officers in the form of misuse of vehicles, use of soldiers as domestic help and fudging electricity bills is rampant.

theprint.in

posting it here just for the record.

 

[12arya]

 

[WolfPack86]

Indian Army to get 100 per cent Made In India 'Sarvatra Kavach' body armour

New Delhi: The Indian Army is on the verge of inducting 'Sarvatra Kavach', a full body armour suit, for its soldiers which will not carry any Chinese raw material and is designed, developed and manufactured in India, said sources on Friday.


The complete research and development of this armour suit was undertaken by the Indian Army itself. Major Anoop Mishra, a serving Army officer, who has faced bullets during military operations, is the man behind 'Sarvatra Kavach’. It provides protection to the neck, torso, upper arms, groin and thighs from all kinds of small arms ammunition.






“Indian Army is at an advanced stage of procurement of Sarvatra Kavach for field trials,” said sources.


The material for Sarvatra Kavach is the most advanced in the world, is lighter, water and UV rays-resistant and lasts longer than other comparable products in the world, said sources. The 'Sarvatra Kavach', when compared with similar products developed worldwide, is lighter, costs almost 50 per cent lesser and offers far superior protection.


“The 'Sarvatra Kavach' is production-ready and will be completely 'Made in India'. It has minimal requirement of imported raw material, none of it coming from China,” said sources in the Indian Army. They said that once indigenous manufacturing commences, the entire range of raw material will also be procured from India.

“There are only handful countries in the world that have indigenously developed full body armour suit,” said a senior official.


The official said that room intervention and ensuing close quarter gunfights are the most dangerous anti-terrorist operations. Major Mishra's innovation has been recognised with an award of Vishisht Seva Medal by Army and a Letter of Appreciation from the Prime Minister.


A controversy had erupted last year after Indian companies contracted for 1.8 lakh bulletproof jackets for the Army came under the scanner for importing up to 40 per cent Chinese raw material. These companies had initially said that the jackets contained raw material from western Europe and the US.

Indian Army to get 100 per cent Made In India -'Sarvatra Kavach-' body armour

The material for Sarvatra Kavach is the most advanced in the world, sources said.

www.deccanchronicle.com

 

[WolfPack86]

India-China faceoff: Centre grants armed forces emergency funds, can buy any weapon system under Rs 500 crore
Preparing for any and every circumstance amid the ongoing border dispute with China, Centre has granted a big financial power to the defence forces enabling them to buy any weapon system under Rs 500 crore. “The three services have been granted the financial powers by the Narendra Modi government to buy weapon systems under an emergency requirement procedure. Now they can buy any in inventory or new weapon up to Rs 500 for each project under these powers,” government sources told India Today TV. Under the project, the defence forces, in consultation with the Department of Military Affairs, can go in for buying any weapon which they feel would be required for warfighting or are short of in their inventory,” the sources said.


The three forces have already started preparing a list of weapons and equipment that they need and can procure in the shortest possible time.


The defence forces have so far, in the last four years after the Uri attacks, stocked up several spares and missiles which were short in supply till that time.

India-China faceoff: Centre grants armed forces emergency funds, can buy any weapon system under Rs 500 crore

Preparing for any and every circumstance amid the ongoing border dispute with China, Centre has granted a big financial power to the defence forces enabling them to buy any weapon system under Rs 500 crore.

www.indiatoday.in

 

[indiatester]

Nitpick on MSM pronouncing corps

The word is ' 'Corps' pronounced as कोर. Not कौरपस. It comes from the French phrase 'corps d'armée'.' The French word 'corps' (old cors) in turn comes from the Latin 'corpus'.

 

[WolfPack86]

Indian army weapons.

 

[Bhadra]

Don’t Knock General Bipin Rawat’s ‘Land Centrism’; It Is Exactly What India Needs​

https://swarajyamag.com/defence/don...-land-centrism-it-is-exactly-what-india-needs

“We are not expeditionary forces that have to deploy around the globe. We have to guard and fight only along our borders and, of course, dominate the Indian Ocean Region. I think the Navy needs more submarines rather than aircraft carriers, which themselves require their own individual armadas for protection.” - General Bipin Rawat, Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)

The economic fallout of the Covid-19 pandemic has forced the Indian armed forces to grapple with imminent budget cuts, the pressure to reorganise, and the push to buy locally-built equipment. Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Bipin Rawat has set the proverbial cat amongst the pigeons with his comments calling for a renewed focus on land warfare, the cancellation of the navy’s planned third aircraft carrier, and the deployment of naval assets to India’s land borders.

The CDS’ comments have not gone down well with some sections of India’s strategic community ⁠— in particular, those that put stock in neo-Mahanian ideas. Their designs call for a large, powerful navy to form the bedrock of India’s geopolitical heft; allowing it to dominate its immediate neighbourhood, secure the nation’s oceanic trade routes, and finally, outmanoeuvre the Chinese in their own backyard.

Such a navy is almost always cast in the mould of the US Navy or the Royal Navy: centred around carrier-based air power and supported by a large fleet of surface and sub-surface vessels.

Within this mental model, the army is often viewed as a ‘defensive’ force ⁠— its striking power blunted by nuclear weapons in the west and unfavourable geography in the east.

 

[Bhadra]

Don’t Knock General Bipin Rawat’s ‘Land Centrism’; It Is Exactly What India Needs​

Consequently, the CDS is being seen as perpetuating a defensive and risk-averse mindset, instead of the bold and ambitious one that India deserves.

However, highfalutin vision makes for poor strategy, especially when it neglects the country’s geographical position, threat exposure and resource constraints. The armed forces ought to be organised and equipped to advance national objectives and meet strategic needs, and not set up to pursue ‘capability’ as an end in itself.

Powerful navies and vast ocean-going armadas conjure up images of great power and reach. But they have never existed in a vacuum. The colonial powers of the past and modern nation-states like the US built them for two main reasons.

One is to protect territorial holdings or economic interests at great distances from the homeland.

Two is to prosecute military campaigns in far-flung locations. Neither appears to be an imperative for India — not at present, and not for the foreseeable future.

Instead, the country faces two powerful enemies along its land borders; and in its 70-year history, has faced four significant invasions across those borders (1948, 1962, 1965 and 1999).

The single offensive campaign it undertook — the war to liberate Bangladesh ⁠— also happened to be a land campaign.

In addition, India also has had to defend against smaller incursions and near-constant attempts to infiltrate irregular combatants across contested land borders.

A strong and manpower-heavy land force, backed up by airpower focused on the strike mission, has been necessary to halt and/or contain these offensives.

Conversely, the navy has seen action only twice, the first time in 1965 and then again in 1971.

In both instances, naval hostilities were mere sideshows to the war being waged on land. In both wars, the crown jewel of India’s naval strength ⁠— the aircraft carrier ⁠— had an unimpressive combat record.

In 1965, the INS Vikrant was in dry dock, and did not launch a single sortie against enemy forces.

In 1971, it spent the initial part of the war avoiding a Pakistani submarine.

Following that submarine’s destruction, it was only committed to a handful of token actions to bomb East Pakistani port facilities.

At the same time, one of the most glorious chapters of independent India’s naval history was being written by more modest platforms: the missile boats that struck Karachi, twice, sinking a multitude of enemy vessels and destroying oil storage facilities.

The future does not appear to hold a major role for the navy either. With the introduction of nuclear weapons in the subcontinent, a total war of conquest has become a thing of the past.

A future conflict that pits India against Pakistan and/or China is more likely to be a short, sharp engagement along a limited axis, with both sides looking to achieve equally limited objectives.

In a confrontation of this sort, it seems unlikely that the navy would be called upon to maintain sustained presence over a wide swathe of ocean.

Instead, it may be tasked with projecting power within India’s immediate neighbourhood, and possibly with locating and degrading an enemy taskforce in the vicinity of the mainland.

To meet these objectives, India would not require an enormous blue-water navy built around multiple aircraft carriers, but a more modest force of surface combatants supported by advanced ISR, shore-based aviation, missile batteries, and submarines capable of denying the sea to the enemy.

Finally, it is useful to remember that neither the Indian economy nor the country’s limited industrial base can support a large army and air force to fight and prevail in a two-front war, while also building a naval armada to dominate the high seas.

As it is, the central government allocates an outsize 15.5 per cent of total government expenditures to the military; and it is in no position to increase that allocation without cutting back on more essential items such as agriculture, healthcare or education.

In configuring the armed forces to tackle present and future threats, the Indian military and political leadership will be forced to make some tough, yet necessary cuts to certain aspects of Indian military strength.

Those force cuts will have to be carefully planned and structured. At the same time, a synergistic effort will have to be made to build (or retain) the capabilities necessary to meet India’s most critical strategic needs while compromising on those deemed less important.

If this is not done in a planned, systematic manner, retrenchments be forced upon the military regardless; fueling another cycle of delayed, ad-hoc, and piecemeal acquisitions that leave it in a weakened state across the board.

Given these circumstances, investing in a powerful, ocean-going navy that will likely sit out the next war seems like a waste.

 

[Sridhar_TN]

Don’t Knock General Bipin Rawat’s ‘Land Centrism’; It Is Exactly What India Needs​

Consequently, the CDS is being seen as perpetuating a defensive and risk-averse mindset, instead of the bold and ambitious one that India deserves.

However, highfalutin vision makes for poor strategy, especially when it neglects the country’s geographical position, threat exposure and resource constraints. The armed forces ought to be organised and equipped to advance national objectives and meet strategic needs, and not set up to pursue ‘capability’ as an end in itself.

Powerful navies and vast ocean-going armadas conjure up images of great power and reach. But they have never existed in a vacuum. The colonial powers of the past and modern nation-states like the US built them for two main reasons.

One is to protect territorial holdings or economic interests at great distances from the homeland.

Two is to prosecute military campaigns in far-flung locations. Neither appears to be an imperative for India — not at present, and not for the foreseeable future.

Instead, the country faces two powerful enemies along its land borders; and in its 70-year history, has faced four significant invasions across those borders (1948, 1962, 1965 and 1999).

The single offensive campaign it undertook — the war to liberate Bangladesh ⁠— also happened to be a land campaign.

In addition, India also has had to defend against smaller incursions and near-constant attempts to infiltrate irregular combatants across contested land borders.

A strong and manpower-heavy land force, backed up by airpower focused on the strike mission, has been necessary to halt and/or contain these offensives.

Conversely, the navy has seen action only twice, the first time in 1965 and then again in 1971.

In both instances, naval hostilities were mere sideshows to the war being waged on land. In both wars, the crown jewel of India’s naval strength ⁠— the aircraft carrier ⁠— had an unimpressive combat record.

In 1965, the INS Vikrant was in dry dock, and did not launch a single sortie against enemy forces.

In 1971, it spent the initial part of the war avoiding a Pakistani submarine.

Following that submarine’s destruction, it was only committed to a handful of token actions to bomb East Pakistani port facilities.

At the same time, one of the most glorious chapters of independent India’s naval history was being written by more modest platforms: the missile boats that struck Karachi, twice, sinking a multitude of enemy vessels and destroying oil storage facilities.

The future does not appear to hold a major role for the navy either. With the introduction of nuclear weapons in the subcontinent, a total war of conquest has become a thing of the past.

A future conflict that pits India against Pakistan and/or China is more likely to be a short, sharp engagement along a limited axis, with both sides looking to achieve equally limited objectives.

In a confrontation of this sort, it seems unlikely that the navy would be called upon to maintain sustained presence over a wide swathe of ocean.

Instead, it may be tasked with projecting power within India’s immediate neighbourhood, and possibly with locating and degrading an enemy taskforce in the vicinity of the mainland.

To meet these objectives, India would not require an enormous blue-water navy built around multiple aircraft carriers, but a more modest force of surface combatants supported by advanced ISR, shore-based aviation, missile batteries, and submarines capable of denying the sea to the enemy.

Finally, it is useful to remember that neither the Indian economy nor the country’s limited industrial base can support a large army and air force to fight and prevail in a two-front war, while also building a naval armada to dominate the high seas.

As it is, the central government allocates an outsize 15.5 per cent of total government expenditures to the military; and it is in no position to increase that allocation without cutting back on more essential items such as agriculture, healthcare or education.

In configuring the armed forces to tackle present and future threats, the Indian military and political leadership will be forced to make some tough, yet necessary cuts to certain aspects of Indian military strength.

Those force cuts will have to be carefully planned and structured. At the same time, a synergistic effort will have to be made to build (or retain) the capabilities necessary to meet India’s most critical strategic needs while compromising on those deemed less important.

If this is not done in a planned, systematic manner, retrenchments be forced upon the military regardless; fueling another cycle of delayed, ad-hoc, and piecemeal acquisitions that leave it in a weakened state across the board.

Given these circumstances, investing in a powerful, ocean-going navy that will likely sit out the next war seems like a waste.

Lol

 

[Holy Triad]

Dont miss ParaSF officer taking sharp turn after saluting
@rajnathsingh
at Indian Embassy in #Moscow same way he must be carrying out surgical ops if & when needed
@IndEmbMoscow
#RajnathInRussia

 

[12arya]

The Indian contingent in Russia led by Major Anjum Gorkha and Flt Lt. Shrikant Sharma. Both led the Sikhli contingent and IAF contingent respectively in Republic Day parade 2020.

 

[WolfPack86]

India continues to arm itself and is considering buying Russian Armata tanks
MOSCOW, (BM) – India is considering buying Russian tanks on the basis of the Armata platform, learned BulgarianMilitary.com citing a source in the Russian military-industrial complex.


Read more: New Delhi is asking Moscow to speed up deliveries of the anti-aircraft missile systems


“The product is being prepared for export. India showed interest in him,” said the interlocutor of Zvezda newspaper. According to him, experts decide what of the equipment of the latest tank can be exported and what not.

The fact that India is considering the purchase of Armata tanks is also mentioned in the military-analytical publications of the country. Note that such publications in the Indian media do not appear for the first time. So, in 2018, Indian Defense News reported that India plans to purchase 1,770 modern tanks to replace the obsolete T-72 and T-14. Armata is a candidate for this deal.


The interest of foreign customers in armored vehicles on the Armata platform was reported by CEO of Uralvagonzavod Alexander Potapov in February 2018. According to him, most likely, talk about export deliveries will be conducted only after the tank is acquired by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.


It was previously reported that serial deliveries of promising T-14 tanks on the Armata platform to Russian troops will begin in 2021.


The T-14 Armata is the first tank in the world that implements the concept of network-centric warfare in its design concept, where the T-14 is used primarily as a reconnaissance, target designation and fire adjustment system for self-propelled guns, SAM and T-90 tanks from its tactical support link.

In addition, it is the first tank in the world with an uninhabited tower. The crew of the car is in a sealed armored capsule in front of the hull. This allows you to ensure its safety in the event of an explosion of ammunition. The crew of the tank can operate in a chemical attack or nuclear war.

T-14 is hardly noticeable in the infrared, radio and magnetic ranges. In particular, it reduces the distance of anti-tank guided missiles, including Javelin, by 2.7 times. This means that the calculation of these complexes will be more vulnerable to return fire.


The T-14 was presented to the general public at the Victory Parade in 2015 along with other products based on the “Almaty”. At the Army-2018 forum, Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov announced that more than 100 tanks had been contracted.

India asked Russia to speed up the delivery of the S-400 anti-aircraft missile system


On June 22 India asked Russia to speed up the delivery of the S-400 anti-aircraft missile system [SAM) against the backdrop of worsening relations with China, learned BulgarianMilitary.com citing The Economic Times.


Read more: India purchases 12 new Russian Sukhoi aircraft. Could it be the Su-57 fighter?


The Government of India has begun to fill the gaps in the country’s defenses by stockpiling and completing procurement. The country is preparing for the worst-case scenario, including a war on two fronts, according to the Indian The Economic Times.

India is interested in accelerating the delivery of Russian S-400 Triumph. Defense Minister Rajnath Singh will discuss such an opportunity during a three-day visit to Russia. An urgent need arose due to tensions on the Sino-Indian border.

Moscow has postponed the delivery of air defense systems worth $ 5.4 billion until December 2021 due to the proliferation of COVID-19. India paid for the purchase of the S-400 last year.


China, which has strong strategic cooperation with Russia, has already acquired an air defense system. This fact only adds to the problems for India. According to the sources of the Indian newspaper, the Armed Forces of the country were ordered to be prepared for any surprises.


India seeks to explore the distribution of supplies. An accelerated schedule can be developed taking into account the historical military relations between the two countries.

Another key issue for discussion with Russia is the reliability of supplies. The agenda of the Minister of Defense of India consists of two parts. The first is to speed up the procurement of spare parts for the Sukhoi and MiG aviation formations in the country.

India continues to arm itself and is considering buying Russian Armata tanks

The fact that India is considering the purchase of Armata tanks is also mentioned in the military-analytical publications of the country. Note that such publications in the Indian media do not appear for the first time.

bulgarianmilitary.com