Indian Army: News and Discussion

[Screambowl]

I wonder who pays for the shells. Last we heard they fire atleast 2000 rounds in trails.

Assuming each round costs atleast 60-70 thousand, that’s 14 crore on one gun.

MOD pays
............................................................................................................

 

[Vinod DX9]

Please don't scrap this time too

 

[WolfPack86]

My favorite light machine gun is Israel Negev 7 light machine gun.:bounce:

 

[12arya]

http://www.theweekendleader.com/Headlines/12273/indian-army-chief-in-nepal-visits-temple.html

Indian Army chief in Nepal, visits temple
Kathmandu

Visiting Indian Army chief General Bipin Rawat offered prayers at the Bindhyabasini temple in Nepal's Pokhara city on Tuesday, a day after he arrived here to participate in the Nepal Army Day celebrations.

General Rawat and several Nepal Army officers were welcomed by the temple's development committee. "He was happy to offer prayers in the temple. We were amazed he spoke Nepali language so well," committee secretary Tirtha Shrestha was quoted as saying by the Kathmandu Post.

The Indian Chief of Army Staff arrived in Kathmandu on Monday at the invitation of his Nepali counterpart Rajendra Chhetri to witness the Army Day Parade on Tuesday in Tundhikhel in the heart of Kathmandu.

"General Rawat is also the honorary chief of the Nepal Army, and hence he has been invited this year as a special guest," Nepal Army spokesperson Brigadier General Gokul Bhandari had said earlier.

Apart from meeting Chhetri, General Rawat will call on President Bidhya Devi Bhandari, Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba, Defence Minister Bhimsen Das Pradhan and other leaders.

The two sides will discuss various aspects of military-to-military cooperation during General Rawat's visit, which comes at a time when Nepal is getting ready for the formation of a new government led by K.P. Oli, chairman of the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist. - IANS

 

[12arya]

http://www.news18.com/news/india/wh...-to-avenge-sunjwan-terror-attack-1659311.html

What Are India's Military Options to Avenge Sunjwan Terror Attack?
Can India respond to the Sunjwan attack like it did after Uri? Are there military operations available to India, short of launching a full-scale war? According to experts, the answer is yes.


New Delhi: The terror attack on Sunjwan Army camp left six Army men, one civilian dead and 11 others injured. The two-day gun battle ended with three Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) terrorists being killed.

The attack reminds one of the September 2016 Uri terror attack, to which India retaliated by launching a surgical strike on terror havens in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) a week later.

Can India respond to the Sunjwan attack like it did after Uri? Are there military operations available to India, short of launching a full-scale war? According to experts, the answer is yes.

“There are a range of options available to the Indian Army. We could respond with ceasefire violations of our own by firing with heavy artillery guns at Pakistan Army posts across the Line of Control (LoC). This, in my opinion, should continue since constant pressure is required to keep Pakistan in check,” said Major General (retired) Naresh Badhani.

He added, though, that this wasn’t probably the best plan of action. “There are some limitations to a response like this. For example, it only targets 2-3 Pakistan Army posts at the same time. Also, there is a high chance of civilian casualties on both sides. The Indian Army doesn’t want to hurt innocent people. This is why a more precise escalation is required,” said the ex-serviceman.

What, though, constitutes an “escalation” and how is it different from a full-fledged war? “If there is an airstrike, or if Indian troops cross the LoC, or if there is an overt display of military movement, it could be taken as an indication of war. Instead, we can take lessons from our own surgical strikes of 2016 and repeat something similar, albeit on a larger scale.”

He further explained, “The LoC is over 760 kilometers long with hundreds of Pakistan Army posts along it. What we need is a coordinated artillery response at least 20-30 points along the LoC. We need to destroy the maximum number of Pakistan Army posts along the LoC within a short time span, say, one week.”

He explained there was a reason why local insurgents are not as well trained as Pakistani terrorists. “They (the terrorists) have infrastructure available on that side of the LoC, propped up by the Pakistan Army. Unless their army feels the pain, they will not stop this nonsense. They need to be fearful of their own posts. We need to keep them occupied with their own safety so that they don’t go ahead and train terrorists.”

The Jammu terror attack is the latest in a string of attacks over the last three years on Indian military installations by cross-border terrorists.

This time, however, many believe the terrorists crossed a “Red Line” by targeting families, including women and children, of Indian troops.

According to Badhani, this shows there is a need to ensure that Indian Army Cantonments are made impregnable. “You see, it is very difficult to distinguish the local civilian population and an infiltrating terrorist because Pakistanis look like us, speak like us and dress like us. The advantage is always with the attackers.”

This is the reason that cantonments were equipped with electronic surveillance, explained Badhani. “But I don’t think these have been fully put in place. This is something that the government should look into as a priority,” said the ex-Army officer

 

[12arya]

https://www.newsheads.in/india/news...ndian-army-says-sitharaman/article/12105.html

Modi government will stand by Indian Army, says Nirmala Sitharaman
Jammu : Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman said on Monday that any action performed by the Army in its call of duty has to be seen in the relevant context and the government will stand by the force.

Addressing the media after her visit to Sunjuwan army camp following a terror attack, she, asked several questions about the FIR against Major Aditya Kumar by Jammu and Kashmir Police in civilian killings during a firing incident in the Valley, said that the government was conscious that the Army, trained to tackle the external enemy, was working under duress in an internal security situation.

Sitharaman said the the matter concerning Major Aditya Kumar was in the Supreme Court. "We have to see how it goes. We stand by our proud soldiers and army. And in the call of duty, if they have performed something, it will have to be contextualised," she said.

Modi government will stand by Indian Army, says Nirmala Sitharaman
"The Ministry of Defence, me as Raksha Mantri, and the Government of India under Prime Minister's leadership will stand by the Army. We shall not let anybody down," she said.

She said the state has an elected government led by Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti and the Central and state governments will have to work together to ensure that Army "is taken care of because they are fighting a very, very severe struggle".

Sitharaman said she met Mehbooba Mufti and had a detailed discussion.

On possibility of involvement of Rohingya Muslims in the incident, she said the Army will share all information with the Jammu and Kashmir Police.

 

[12arya]

http://www.news18.com/news/india/in...-mission-in-war-torn-south-sudan-1658541.html

Indian Army’s Garhwal Rifles Sent on UN Peacekeeping Mission in War-torn South Sudan
South Sudan gained independence from Sudan in 2011, making it the newest nation in the world. However, a civil war broke out in the infant nation in 2013.

New Delhi: The Indian Army, one of the largest contributors to United Nations Peacekeeping Missions, is making yet another contribution to the UN’s efforts to maintain stability and negotiate a peace settlement in turbulent regions of the world. On Monday, a unit of the Seventh Battalion of the Garhwal Rifles was dispatched from New Delhi’s Indira Gandhi International Airport for the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in the civil war-torn African nation of South Sudan.

“To support the United Nations’ efforts in bringing peace and normalcy in the war-torn country of South Sudan, Indian Army is contributing approximately 2300 personnel. Seven Garhwal Rifles Infantry battalion group of the Indian Army is currently being inducted to South Sudan from IGI Airport, New Delhi. It is a matter of great pride for the unit and the Garhwal Rifles Regiment, as troops hailing from the Garhwal region have been nominated for the first time to deploy in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS),” an Army spokesperson said.

The statement added, “ The unit will be in operational control of the sensitive Jonglei state with a detachment at Juba, its Headquarter in Bor County and an air maintained company group at Pibor County where armed conflicts and ethnic violence is on the rise. The Indian peacekeepers in South Sudan are deployed under Chapter VII which entails Peace Enforcement.

In November 2017, the UN Commander in South Sudan had commended the efforts of the Maratha Light Infantry for their bravery and professionalism. The Indian Army unit assumed operational responsibility in South Sudan, the newest country in the world, on November 16, 2016. A year after Maratha Light Infantry boots hit the ground, Lieutenant General Frank Mushyo Kamanzi of Rawanda, the UN Force Commander of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) wrote a glowing commendation of the unit. “During the tour of duty, the battalion has assiduously lived up to its motto of ‘Duty, Honour and Courage’ while serving the UNMISS mandate. The professional of the men of the unit facilitated smooth and proficient resolution of various crisis situations in Pibor and Bor. The Battalion ensured incident-free protection of civilians in IDP camps and created favourable situations for delivery of Human Assistance,” Kamanzi wrote in his letter.

He further mentioned several successful operations that Indian Army troops had undertaken on the ground in South Sudan. In July this year, Maratha Infantrymen had extricated 13 civilian workers of Medcins Sans Frontiers (MSF) to a UNMISS compound. The MSF workers were trapped amidst heavy firing in Pibor on July 12 and 13. Earlier, in March, clashes had broken out in Pibor town and the Indian troops were charged with protecting 500 civilians, mostly women and children. It was due to the efforts of the Maratha Light Infantry, Kamanzi said, that a stable environment was created and 80 child soldiers engaged in the civil war laid down their arms. The battalion also protected civilian camps in Bor “without any incident”.

“The Battalion has also fruitfully engaged with the leadership in its Area of Responsibilities and reached out to the people through Medical/Veterinary Camps in inaccessible areas and operating a veterinary clinic in Bor where total of 22,000 cases were treated. The battalion successfully enhanced the image of United Nations Peacekeepers. The Battalion demonstrated a high level of professionalism and is an extremely effective fighting force,” he said.

South Sudan gained independence from Sudan in 2011, making it the newest nation in the world. However, a civil war broke out in the infant nation in 2013. The UN Mission in South Sudan is the newest UN Peacekeeping Mission. India, with 2,237 troops, is the highest contributor in terms of troops to the UNMISS. In addition to India, 53 nations from around the world have contributed troops to the peacekeeping mission.

 

[12arya]

https://thewire.in/223916/keep-off-maldives-yameen-government-tells-indian-military/

Keep Off Maldives, Yameen Government Tells Indian Military

Stating that the demands for intervention were a threat to Maldives’ independence and security, the statement called on all parties to “refrain from such calls”.

 

[12arya]

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com...heck-china-at-gwadar/articleshow/62908230.cms

Access to Omani port to help India check China at Gwadar

 

[12arya]

https://theprint.in/2018/02/08/gene...oldier-mind-rewrote-indias-military-doctrine/

General Krishnaswamy Sundarji, soldier of the mind who rewrote India’s military doctrine

Lt General K Sundarji (centre) with General A.S. Vaidya (right) and Major General K.S. Brar (left) after Operation Bluestar | Photo by INDIA TODAY/India Today Group/Getty Images

Soon after retiring as India’s most talked-about soldier since Sam Manekshaw, General Krishnaswamy Sundarji decided to become a columnist for us, then at India Today magazine. His first few attempts were quite disastrous and we had a problem. How do you tell the great general, with an ego larger than a strike corps, that he could not write to save his life? That he had to teach himself a new skill? I was assigned to carry the bad news to him.

He was then recuperating from heart surgery at Delhi’s military hospital. “So, doc,” he asked, “is there still some hope, or is the patient a write-off?” Before I could figure out a diplomatic answer, he asked more directly, “I believe you think my writing is all bullshit. So where does that leave us?”

“I think, General Sahab,” I said, “you need to be a bit more direct in your writing—just as you are when you speak.” I then added as a smug afterthought, “Just come to the brasstacks quickly.”

His eyes lit up. “That’s it, my friend, that is the name for my column.” His next piece was a great improvement. The column ran for a long time under the title ‘Brasstacks’.

Retiring in the controversial aftermath of Operation Blue Star, Operation Brasstacks, the IPKF and Bofors, this general tried his best not to just fade away like some others. He wrote columns, straddled the security seminar circuit, was painted larger-than-life on the chatterati radar screen, and generally emerged as the most articulate military spokesman for India’s nuclear programme.

We sparred a great deal on the circuit. He never could resist the temptation of pulling my leg over one military detail I got so horribly wrong in my coverage of Operation Blue Star. I thought confusing line-of-sight 25-pounders with larger artillery was not such a big deal. For “Sundar” (as he insisted we all call him, although I never could), it was an outrage. “You hacks can’t tell the difference between bore and caliber, but can still be such big bores with low caliber,” he would rub it in.

He himself had plenty to be defensive about. Both Blue Star and Operation Pawan (Sri Lanka) were tactical disasters. It may be unfair to suggest that you could spin a sequel to Norman Dixon’s On the Psychology of Military Incompetence around these two operations, but you could possibly pen a ‘Psychology of Military Arrogance’.

Sundarji was a grand strategist, a visionary who was better off moving mechanised divisions and field armies in wide open deserts, or better still, on Ops Room maps and sand models. He did himself injustice by getting directly involved in these operations. That is why it is so tragic that the legacy of India’s most brilliant military commander will forever be marred by his record in what were at best battalion-sized operations.

Students of Indian military history will quibble over whether Sundarji was ahead of his time, or behind it. The truth, perhaps, is both. In his approach to technology, mechanisation, mobile warfare, he was way ahead of his time. He did sometimes admit he had over-reached himself with Operation Brasstacks. But, he argued, that was the only way he could get his field commanders to think big. Most of them had no experience of seeing a formation larger than a division move. Brasstacks had an entire field army in manoeuvre—with live ammunition—and so what if it brought India to the brink of an unwanted, unplanned war with Pakistan? That was his outlook.

“You have this typical f…..g cowardly Indian thinking,” he would say. But was he so impatient because politically he was a couple of decades behind his time? This was the beginning of the post-conventional (industrial scale) warfare world, where nations preserved or enhanced their national interest by waging or resisting low intensity conflict rather than Pattonesque set pieces. Where diplomacy, politics, and then, economics became the crucial prongs in strategic thinking. For Sundarji, low intensity conflict was a bore—he dreamed of a heliborne assault division and even designated one (54th, at Hyderabad) to be trained for the role. Almost immediately, he had to endure the embarrassment of seeing this same division’s fighting units trapped under the LTTE’s deadly sniper fire and improvised explosive devices in the jungles of Jaffna.

He had his critics within and outside the army. The friendlier ones dismissed him as a well-meaning romantic with little relevance to his time. For them, Brasstacks was his nostalgia for great old days of set piece “destiny of nations” battles, probably even an effort to create one to test his pet theories on the battlefield, in the genuine Clausewitzian fog of war. For the more vicious, he nurtured a grand political ambition and Brasstacks, with a resultant war and victory against Pakistan, was to be his shortcut to political power. They do the general great disservice. One with such dispositions and careeristic outlook does not question the prime minister of the day on the acquisition of his favourite toys—Bofors in this case—nor does he follow it up with a kiss-and-tell not long after.

Sundarji hated the “dirty little wars”—the Golden Temple, Jaffna, Brahmaputra Valley, and so on. But that is all he was fated to fight, and not very successfully. It was probably a combination of this failure and the belated realisation that the days of conventional warfare were over that brought him in close touch with nuclear warfare. Soon, he became its leading voice.

We spent a week together in the summer of 1994 in Salzburg, with the usual suspects from India and Pakistan on the conflict resolution circuit. I got a chance to get back at Sundarji. Why, I asked, was it so that the most prominent nuclear hawks in India were from the South? Was it a diabolical Tam-Brahm conspiracy to get Punjabis on both sides of the border to incinerate each other so that the kings of Kumbakonam could rule the subcontinent forever? We had a good laugh.

To be fair to him, however, even on the nuclear issue, Sundarji was by now evolving a doctrine of his own—“more is not needed when less is enough”. He wanted India to develop a limited nuclear deterrent, without entering into any nuclear race. It does not matter if the Pakistanis have a hundred weapons and we have ten. This is more than enough to finish Pakistan, or deter China, so why waste money on building a Stalinist arsenal, was his argument. Later, he would have been happy to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), engage in proliferation controls, and develop confidence-building measures and mutual restraint with Pakistan. He would have also wanted a nuclear India to cut conventional force levels, mechanise, computerise, and embrace Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).

If he had lived long enough, who knows, he may have written the strategist’s obituary of the main battle tank, or the concept of a mechanised division, his most visible contribution to his army.

Sundarji had a cutting tongue and little discretion when provoked. At another India-Pakistan seminar, he fidgeted uneasily, visibly irritated as Pakistani participants took turns at giving vastly exaggerated numbers for Indian troops in Kashmir. Then, a former Pakistani army chief put the number at 7 lakh, and Sundarji intervened. “The only way you get to that number, general, is if you count the limbs, multiply by four and divide by two,” he said, deadpan. We took some time decoding this, but his Pakistani counterpart was quiet through the rest of the session.

Much has been said of his peculiar equation with Rajiv Gandhi and Arun Singh, his de facto defence minister. It is possible that one day Arun Singh would throw more light on this, give it a perspective that he owes to the memory and legacy of his favourite general. In one way, however, the general had his timing right. He took over the reins of the army under the political leadership of two young, tech-savvy political leaders. He did the rest. His domineering personality kept the civil servants at bay. He certainly would not have survived a Mulayam Singh Yadav, a George Fernandes, or an A.K. Antony. Or vice-versa.

Sundarji died at just 69, an age when great marshals were leading great armies into battle in the Great Wars. His death did not merit more than a single column mention—below the fold on many front pages—the next morning. His life and work will be analysed by future generations of soldiers and military historians. One question they will ask—or answer—is, what do we remember General Krishnaswamy Sundarji for? Hopefully, the answer would be Brasstacks, rather than Blue Star or Pawan.

Postscript: This takes me to 14 August 1990, Pakistan’s Independence Day in Islamabad, and just a week after the encounter with Sundar at Delhi’s military hospital. At the official reception, I buttonholed General Mirza Aslam Beg, the controversial Pakistani army chief who had just held Exercise Zarb-e-Momin (the strike of the faithful). Or, more accurately, his counter strike to Brasstacks.

The basic premise of the exercise was, that in the next war, Foxland (as India is referred to in Pakistani war games) breaks through initially, and Pakistan then counterattacks and envelopes the invader. It was the first major Pakistani exercise that was so defensive in nature, where survival, rather than an all-out victory, or the “liberation” of Kashmir, was the main objective.

Surely, Brasstacks and the scary and somewhat fictional vision of 3,000 Indian tanks rolling down the desert, threatening to bisect Pakistan, had changed a military mindset rooted in medieval history and thrust-and-parry purposelessness of India’s armoured strike forces in 1965 and 1971.

“So does your publication write a lot about defence and security?” Beg asked, making polite conversation.

“Yes,” I said, “and we are now running Sundarji’s column.”

“What is it called?” Beg asked.

“Brasstacks,” I said.

The temperature dropped a few degrees. This general’s eyes did not exactly light up in delight.

Would you still have any doubts about Sundarji’s real legacy?

 

[12arya]

http://www.thehindu.com/news/nation...esh-village-a-millionaire/article22688747.ece

Army’s land acquisition makes all householders in Arunachal Pradesh village a millionaire

Indian Army personnel keep vigilance at Bumla pass at the India-China border in Arunachal Pradesh in this 2012 photo. | Photo Credit: AFP


Five years ago, 31 familie let the Army acquire their land for setting up key location plan units of theTawang Garrison.
All householders of a village in Arunachal Pradesh’s Tawang district have become millionaires five years after the Army acquired their land for setting up key location plan units of its Tawang Garrison.

On Wednesday, Arunachal Pradesh Chief Minister Pema Khandu handed over cheques worth ₹408.04 million (₹40.8 crore) as land compensation to the heads of 31 families in Bomja, a village of Buddhist Monpas, located about 20 km west of district headquarters Tawang.

The Bomja family that parted with the most land received ₹67.33 million (₹6.73 crore). Another family received ₹24.5 million (₹2.45 crore) while the remaining 29 families were given ₹10.9 million (₹1.09 crore) each.

“More such compensation for land acquired for defence purposes is being worked out with the Centre,” Mr. Khandu said, thanking Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman for clearing the backlog for Bomja.

Arunachal Pradesh Chief Minister Pema Khandu hands over a cheque to one of the Bomja villagers in Tawang on Thursday. | Photo Credit: Special Arrangement

“The Army and local people need each other to survive at 10,000-17,000 feet on the eastern Himalayas. We hope adequate compensation would further strengthen the bond we enjoy in this part of the country,” an officer of the Army’s 190 Mountain Brigade said, declining to be named.

'Richest village in India'
A Facebook group named Tawang Times claimed Bomja has become the richest village in India overnight. “We cannot say for sure unless we have data on other rich villages across the country,” an administrative officer in Tawang said.

The Army's presence in Arunachal Pradesh, specifically the western section leading to Tawang, had been scaled up since the Chinese aggression in 1962. This led to a land acquisition spree.

Many villagers in Tawang and West Kameng resented the non-payment of compensation for vast tracts of land acquired more than 50 years ago. Their anger died down after the Defence Ministry released ₹540 million (₹54 crore) in April last year for 152 families of three villages — Senge, Nyukmadung and Lish.

These villages are close to Sela, a mountain pass at 13,700 feet, where Rifleman Jaswant Singh Rawat of 4 Garhwal Rifles, during the 1962 war, singlehandedly kept 300 Chinese soldiers at bay before being killed. Rifleman Rawat is worshipped as a soldiers’ deity in a temple at Jaswantgarh beyond Sela on the road to Tawang.

 

[12arya]

https://www.indiatoday.in/india/sto...n-to-buy-guns-for-military-1168894-2018-02-13

In big push for defence, government approves Rs 15,935 crore plan to buy guns for military

In a major decision, the defence ministry today approved capital acquisition proposals worth Rs 15,935 crore which included purchase of 7.40 lakh assault rifles, 5,719 sniper rifles and light machine guns to bolster the strength of the armed forces.

The long-pending proposals were cleared at a meeting of the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), the defence ministry's highest decision making body on procurement.

The approval to the proposals come amid increasing hostilities by Pakistan along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir as well as China's aggressive posturing in several sectors along the nearly 4,000-km-long Sino-India border.

The defence ministry said the DAC chaired by Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman cleared capital acquisition proposals which were valued at Rs 15,935 crore.

It said the DAC accorded approval for procurement of 7.4 lakh assault rifles for the three services at an estimated cost of Rs 12,280 crore.

The rifles will be produced in in India under the 'Buy and Make (Indian)' category through both state-run Ordnance Factory Board and private sector.

In a statement, the ministry said "essential quantity" of Light Machine Guns (LMGs) will be through the "fast track" route at an estimated cost of over Rs 1,819 crore, primarily to meet the operational requirement of the troops deployed on the borders.

"A concurrent proposal is being processed for the balance quantity to be procured under the 'Buy and Make (Indian)' categorisation," the ministry said.

In the last one month, the DAC has fast tracked procurement of rifles, carbines and LMGs to equip the soldiers on the border with modern and more effective equipment.

The DAC also approved procurement of 5,719 sniper rifles for the Indian Army and Indian Air Force at an estimated cost of Rs 982 crore, the ministry said.

The sniper rifles will be bought under the 'Buy Global' category, the ammunition for these weapons will be initially procured and subsequently manufactured in India.

The ministry said to enhance the anti-submarine warfare capabilities of Indian Navy, the DAC also approved the procurement of Advanced Torpedo Decoy Systems (ATDS) for the Indian Navy at a cost of Rs 850 crore.

The 'Mareech' system has been developed indigenously by Defence Research and Development Organisation and has successfully completed extensive trial evaluations.

"The 'Mareech' systems will be produced by Bharat Electronics Limited, Bengaluru at an estimated cost of Rs 850 crore," the ministry said.

 

[12arya]

http://www.theweek.in/news/india/isi-closely-observing-indian-defence-officials-internet-habits.html

HONEYTRAP
How ISI monitors Indian defence men's internet habits

It was a group of 300 ISI cyber 'jihadis' led by the Rana brothers of Karachi who honeytrapped and blackmailed Group Captain Arun Marwaha to extract Indian defence secrets from the IAF officer who once trained intelligence officers and naval commandos, police said on Friday.

A Delhi Police officer, part of the team investigating the case, said that Indian Air Force (IAF) officer Marwaha —posted at the Air Headquarters in Delhi — was lured by Sajid and Abid Rana and their group members, including some women, who used to chat with Marwaha on social media by posing as sex models.

According to the police officer, Marwaha, 51, shared information and documents with two Pakistani agents who chatted with him on Facebook, pretending to be women. The fake accounts, in the names of 'Kiran Randhawa' and 'Mahima Patel', were used to lure him.

During sex chats, Marwaha passed on the secret information to the group run by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

The police officer said the Rana brothers had earlier targeted thousands of Indian officers by sending them chat requests through Trojan malware disguised as legitimate software to hack and gain access to the users' systems.

Users are typically tricked by some form of social engineering into loading and executing the malware on their systems.

A similar application was also used by Pakistani terrorists to access Indian troop's movement before and after the terror attack on the IAF base in Pathankot in January 2016, the officer said.

"Rana brothers used this application, which is basically a data-stealing software, to take control of the user's phone," he said.

The Karachi-based cyber unit observes the Internet habits of Indian defence officials by tracking their social media activities.

"The officers using smartphones of Chinese origin are particularly under their radar. Those visiting porn sites or befriending women using various social media and clicking on links on these sites are being monitored closely," he said.

The police officer said many other hacking softwares are used by the members of this cyber unit. Some of the commonly used are free proxy, squid, java anon proxy, shadowsoc, tiny proxy, nginx, stunnel, internet junkbuster, proxomitron, safe squid, ghost proxy, steady proxy and others.

These softwares help hackers dodge the investigation agency by re-routing their IP addresses, making the origin of a cybercrime almost untraceable.

The Group Captain was first detained by the IAF on January 31 after his activities were found "suspicious".

The Air Force later approached the Delhi Police to investigate.

He allegedly used his smartphone to click pictures of classified documents pertaining to the IAF headquarters and then sent them via WhatsApp.

According to a Special Cell officer, the defence officer befriended the ISI agents posing as women models and chatted with them regularly on WhatsApp, exchanging intimate messages.

The ISI agents also blackmailed him after he sent them his nude pictures and videos, the officer said.

"The documents which Marwaha shared mostly dealt with training and combat-related air exercises. We also found he shared documents of the exercise 'Gagan Shakti'," the officer added.

The IAF officer had a good track record so far and had trained officers of the Marine Commandos (Marcos) of the Navy and intelligence wing of the IAF.

—IANS

 

[12arya]

http://www.dnaindia.com/india/repor...-s-stern-rebuttal-on-owaisi-s-remarks-2584610

'We do not communalise our martyrs,' Indian Army's stern rebuttal on Owaisi's remarks

Indian Army PTI

The Indian Army on Wednesday indirectly rejected claims made by All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM) Chief Asaduddin Owaisi over the terror attack at the Sunjuwan army camp, saying the army does not communalise when it comes to the death of its soldiers.

‘We don't communalise martyrs, those making statements (Owaisi) don't know the Army well,’ Lt Gen. Devraj Anbu, the Northern Army commander, said at a press conference here.

‘Enemy is frustrated and is trying softer targets. When they fail at borders they attack on camps. Yes, the youth joining terrorism is a concern, we need to address this trend. In 2017, we focused on leadership and eliminated it,’ he added while flagging the concern about youth joining terrorist outfits.

Lt Gen Anbu rebuttal came a day after Owaisi had slammed those questioning the patriotism of Muslims, while making a reference to the fact that five army soldiers killed by terrorists at the Sunjuwan army camp were Kashmiri Muslims.

Owaisi’s comment invited immediate and widespread condemnation.

Meanwhile, Lt Gen Anbu warned that anyone who picks up arms against the state will be dealt with sternly.

‘All three groups, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammed or Lashkar-e-Toiba - are hands in glove, whether it's in Valley or here (Jammu). There's no differentiation, they keep jumping from one tanzim to other. Anyone who picks up an arm and is against the state, is a terrorist and we'll deal with him,’ the senior army officer said.

‘Social media is also responsible for increase in terror activities. It is engaging the youth at a large scale, and I think we need to focus on this issue,’ he added.

 

[12arya]

https://swarajyamag.com/politics/those-asking-for-dialogue-with-pakistan-better-read-this-first

Those Asking For ‘Dialogue With Pakistan’ Better Read This First


The history of the Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry can be traced back to the Pakistani invasion of Kashmir in the winter of 1947. In the face of a determined onslaught by the ostensibly ‘tribal’ invaders, the people of the Kashmir Valley organised themselves into militias in order to mount what was ultimately to be an eminently successful resistance. The birth of these militias was midwifed by cadres of the National Conference, including but not limited to the redoubtable Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, who later went on to serve as the prime minister of Kashmir after Sheikh Abdullah was deposed following the Kashmir conspiracy case of 1953.

The said militias were initially deployed as a paramilitary force on the Line of Control or LoC (then known as the Ceasefire Line) before they were promoted to the status of a full regiment of the Indian Army in 1976. Like most other regiments of the Indian Army, it draws its rank and file from fixed ethnicities. Almost 50 per cent of its personnel are recruited from amongst the Muslim populace of the Kashmir Valley, while the rest are drawn from the other ethnic groups of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

The Sujuwan Army camp, which came under attack by the Pakistan-based terror outfit-the Jaish-e-Mohammed, on 10 February 2018, was being occupied by personnel of the regiment and their families at the relevant time. The details of the attack and whether it could be prevented with better preparation and intelligence gathering, need not concern us at the moment and an analysis of the same is best left to defence experts. Having said that, the attack is merely a link in the larger chain of events whereby ethnic Kashmiri Muslims who have chosen to serve their country thereby refusing to act as foot-soldiers for Pakistan’s jihad project, have been targeted. The lynchings of Lt Umer Fayyaz (March 2017) and Ayub Pandith (July 2017) are cases in point and are still relatively fresh in public memory.

The worrying part here though is not that these attacks are taking place. The same are to be expected for the simple reason that since Narendra Modi’s ascent to power in 2014 and Ram Madhav’s appointment as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) general secretary in charge of Kashmir and North East affairs, a concerted policy of elimination of high profile militant targets like Burhan Wani has been adopted and effectuated with more than a fair measure of success. As a matter of fact, what should concern us is that no less a personage than the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir is making noises about how talks with Pakistan are the only solution to the problem. A visitor from Mars who has but a passing acquaintance with the Indian Constitution and the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir as well as the Instrument of Accession would be tempted to ask as to what the ‘talks’ are going to achieve and whether after 70 years of talks, India and Pakistan have ever come close to agreeing upon a working solution to the problem, even in theory, leaving aside the question of implementation.

The answer to this question is likely to differ depending upon who it is put to. The average ‘nationalist’ who is likely to be labelled as ‘communal’ would tell you that there is absolutely no point in talking peace with Pakistan given their perfidious record. The garden variety bleeding heart would tell you that the Kashmiris should be given aazaadi. As a matter of fact, a prominent columnist and editor went so far as to advocate secession for Kashmir in 2008 inter alia because India need not concern itself with a region which was not even half as populous as the National Capital Territory of Delhi.

Ostensibly, enlightened travellers on the strategic and Track II circuit from both India and Pakistan would tell you that the solution lies in the ‘Four Point Formula’ that was agreed upon between then Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh and the Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf before the latter was deposed in December 2007. Both, the former Indian premier and the Pakistani military dictator later went on record to state that the formula had been agreed upon in principle at the highest level and it was only the modalities that were left to be worked out before the Lawyers’ Agitation in the winter of 2007 unseated Musharraf. Sanjaya Baru-the former editor of the Financial Express who served as the media advisor to Dr Manmohan Singh during the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) I years, has also attested to the veracity of the assertion in his book The Accidental Prime Minister. He has also gone on record to say that if ever the Kashmir dispute is to be resolved, the template has to be the aforementioned formula. Similar claims have been made by Khurshid Ahmed Kasuri in 2015 in the run up to the launch of his memoirs titled Neither a Hawk or a Dove.

However, in the opinion of the author, the fact of the matter is that if the Four Point Formula, which is something that is bandied about as a concrete outcome of talks in the past, was actually ever acted upon, it would have been a recipe for disaster with respect to India. As for Pakistan, it would merely have been a first in a series of salami tactics that they would have then surely employed in order to sever Kashmir from India. As far as the brave sons and daughters of Jammu and Kashmir who are serving in the Indian security forces and have been targeted in a series of dastardly terrorist attacks of late are concerned, the same would have amounted to nothing less than a shameless sellout. The devil-so to speak-lies in the details!

The Four Point Formula is as follows:

1. Demilitarisation or phased withdrawal of troops
   2. There will be no change to the borders. However, people of Jammu & Kashmir will be allowed to move freely across the Line of Control.
   3. Self-governance without independence
   4. A joint supervision mechanism in Jammu and Kashmir involving India, Pakistan and Kashmir

In the subsequent paragraphs, we shall try and show as to how each and every one of these clauses is a recipe for unqualified disaster and from an Indian point of view, these points could have only been agreed upon by a dispensation that did not have the best interests of the country at heart.

1. Demilitarisation or phased withdrawal of troops: Although this sounds fine in principle, it does not take into account the possibility that in a situation where India scales down its military presence in the Valley, the local administration might be rendered sitting ducks in a situation where militants with the tacit and surreptitious backing of the Pakistani establishment foment trouble. The law enforcement machinery in such a case would be unable to take the action required to bring an expedient situation under control without the assistance of the military and the para military apparatus. Also, it would effectively imply that illegal arms and ammunition would be allowed to flow into Kashmir unabated.

2. Open borders: The second ‘point’ in this Four Point Formula is also as unsustainable and disastrous as the first ‘point’. If there is free movement of people and goods across the LoC then again it would be problematic for India. It is tough for us even now to prevent young Kashmiris from going across the border where they are brainwashed by radical Islamist propaganda. The formula itself does not enjoin any legally binding obligations upon Pakistan to ensure that the aforementioned propaganda is not disseminated in madrassas across the LoC. In this view of the matter, it is difficult to appreciate how this point would be in our interest.

3. Self-governance without independence: Like the other two points, this sounds quite enticing at first blush. However, it would decidedly fall afoul of the principles enshrined under the Basic Structure doctrine of the Indian Constitution. Also, unlike the other two points, the contours of this provision are quite nebulous. It could mean either a reversion to the 1951 position whereby apart from foreign affairs, defence and telecommunications, the writ of the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly reigned supreme over even other matters specified under the Union and Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule. Equally, it could also mean a new normal which has been described by Mehbooba Mufti of the Peoples Democratic Party as ‘self rule’. Having said all of this, the question that we need to somewhere ask is if it is prudent on our part to allow Islamists, like Akbar Lone (An MLA and a member of the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference) who recently stated on the floor of the assembly that he found the slogan of ‘Pakistan Zindabad’ unpalatable, as he was a ‘Muslim’ first, to take charge of the affairs of Jammu and Kashmir, which in turn have ramifications that transcend the borders of the state itself. Does this not sound suspiciously like allowing the lunatics to take charge of the asylum? We also need to keep in mind that even mainstream politicians of the Kashmir Valley have in the past shown a propensity towards Islamism and thinly veiled majoritarian bigotry. Former governor Jagmohan has quite eloquently described a few of these instances where anti-Hindu bigotry was allowed a free run on the floor of the House in his account of his tenure as the governor of Jammu and Kashmir.

4. The Joint Supervision Mechanism again is constitutionally unsustainable for no other reason but the vastly divergent provisions in the respective constitutions of India and Pakistan. The Constitution of India envisages no such joint governance mechanism with any neighbouring country. It very clearly states that sovereign powers are vested in the people of India who have agreed to abide by the said Constitution. Various entries qua which the state and central government can respectively makes laws have been enumerated in the State List, Union List and the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule. There is absolutely no provision for the sharing of these sovereign powers to make laws and to implement the same with Pakistan. If this point were to be implemented, it would require an amendment to the Constitution. Now, the Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution is not at all unbridled and is subject to the judicial discipline of being tested on the touchstone of the doctrine of Basic Structure. It is extremely unlikely, if not impossible for this last point to be implemented as well.

To conclude, it may be fairly stated that ‘talks’ to solve the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan have miserably failed in the past. The crowning achievement of these 70 years of needless discussion with a rogue Islamist neighbour is a constitutionally untenable Four Point Formula that is not only thoroughly inimical to India’s interests but also something that has been rejected by the separatist lobby in the Valley.

To somehow assume that just because talks are taking place, there would be a cessation of violence sounds quite suspiciously like the doctrine of appeasement adopted by the much reviled Right Honourable Neville Chamberlain who was the prime minister of Great Britain around the time Hitler embarked upon his ascent to power. Furthermore, by initiating talks with the Pakistani Establishment, when they are trying to shore up their flagging popularity by hitting us through these terrorist attacks, we would be betraying the memories of the brave Kashmiri men and women, including but not limited to the martyrs of the Sujuwan attack, who have sacrificed their lives for the sake of the founding principles of our country enshrined in our Constitution.

The only manner in which they can be honoured is if we assiduously cultivate and expand the pro-India constituency by directly talking to our people in the Valley. Even if we must have local interlocutors, they need not necessarily be drawn from the ranks of the mainstream parties. There are many common people, verily the silent majority of the Kashmir Valley, especially in the smaller towns and villages who would still be receptive to the idea of India given that many of their compatriots continue to risk their lives for the same. Let us speak to them and until then, talks of ‘dialogue with Pakistan’ ought to be dismissed summarily.

Raghav Awasthi is a lawyer based in Delhi.

 

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Honey trap, again!!!! whats happening?

http://www.timesnownews.com/india/a...er-services-intelligence-isi-terrorism/198568

Another officer honeytrapped? Army's Lt Colonel posted in Jabalpur detained by counter intelligence wing
Updated: Feb 14, 2018 | 17:21 IST | Times Now Digital

Representative image | Photo Credit: BCCL

New Delhi/Jabalpur: Days after an IAF group captain was arrested for leaking defence secrets allegedly to Pakistan after he was honeytrapped, an Army officer of a Lt Colonel rank was on Wednesday detained in Jabalpur in another honeytrap case.

The officer is working in the Jabalpur workshop and has been detained by the counter intelligence wing of the Army.

Sources have told Times of India that the officer's residence was raided by officials reportedly on the suspicion that he might have fallen prey to a honey trap set up by Pakistan’s Inter-services Intelligence (ISI).

The TOI report adds that the officer was questioned for a few hours at the Army Central Command Headquarters and was then taken to Lucknow for further investigation. Certain crucial intelligence documents were collected from the Lt Colonel’s office.

Delhi Police last week arrested Indian Air Force (IAF) Group Captain Arun Marwaha on charges of espionage for passing secret information to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency.

Marwaha, 51, was arrested by Special Cell's northern range on Wednesday after a case was registered against him under the Official Secrets Act (OSA). Marwaha was arrested after being interrogated for nearly 10 days by the counter intelligence wing of the IAF.

The IAF had detained Marwaha for investigation on January 31 after his activities were found "suspicious", said Delhi Police Special Cell's Special Commissioner MM Oberoi. The Air Force had then approached the Delhi Police to investigate the case. He was produced before a Delhi court on Thursday that sent him to police custody for five days.

 

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http://www.uniindia.com/indian-army-celebrates-107th-raising-day/states/news/1138228.html

Indian Army celebrates 107th Raising Day
The Corps of Signals of the Indian Army celebrated its 107th Raising Day on Wednesday.

 

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https://economictimes.indiatimes.co...-to-enter-india-army/articleshow/62916554.cms

300 militants in Pakistan ready to enter India: Army

 

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http://www.newindianexpress.com/nat...l-rises-to-10-with-recovery-of-s-1772828.html

Army calls off operation in Sunjuwan camp after four days; death toll rises to 10 with recovery of soldier’s body

SRINAGAR: Army on Tuesday called off combing and search operation in 36 Brigade military station in Sunjwan, Jammu, four days after Jaish-e-Mohammad fidayeen stormed the heavily fortified camp.

The death toll in the fidayeen attack rose to 10 with the recovery of body of a soldier from the camp.

Defence spokesman Lt Colonel Devender Anand told New Indian Express that the combing and search operation in the Sunjwan army camp was called off today.

He said the clearance operation took time because the camp was spread over many acres of land and there were over 200 residential quarters.

Anand said during the clearance operation, army men recovered bullet-ridden body of a soldier from the residential quarter yesterday evening.

The deceased soldier was identified as Havaldar Rakesh Chandra of 6 Mahar R/o Sankar, Paurigarwal in Uttarakhand.

The defence spokesman said the soldier might have been killed in the gunfight on the second day of fidayeen attack on Sunday. The third militant was killed on Sunday and since then army men were conducting searches and sanitisation operation.

With the recovery of body of the jawan, the death toll in the fidayeen attack on army camp rose to 10. Among the dead include six soldiers, a civilian and three militants.

At least 11 people including two officers were also injured in the gunfight. One the officer was hit by bullet in army but he is stable now in army hospital in Jammu.

The heavily fortified army camp was stormed by three fidayeen of Afzal Guru Squad of Jaish-e-Mohammad on Saturday morning.

After forcing their entry into the camp from the rear side, the militants had split and forced their entry into the residential quarters, where the soldiers and officers and their families were living.

The Army’s Quick Reaction Teams (QRTs), para-commandos and specially trained commandos rushed to the spot from Udhampur and Himachal Pradesh had battled the militants for two days, killing all the three attackers.

Meanwhile, police and army launched combing operation in Domana area of Jammu after some suspected persons were seen roaming around the military camp on Jammu-Poonch highway.

Sources said the army men manning the posts at the main gate of the army camp in Domana fired some rounds in air after observing some suspicious movement.

They said immediately army and police men launched combing and search operation in the area and adjoining areas.

“The security personnel conducted thorough searches. However, no contact was established with the militants. Later the operation was called off,” sources said.

Inspector General of Police (IGP) Jammu, S D Singh Jamwal told New Indian Express that nothing has come out.

“It might have been a speculative fire by the army men,” he said.

The army and police are on high alert in Jammu after the Saturday’s fidayeen attack on army camp at Sunjwan.

 

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http://indianexpress.com/article/ex...y-army-camps-in-jammu-are-vulnerable-5061379/
Where they are, what’s in them: Why Army camps in Jammu are vulnerable
It is easy to see inside several military camps, and the holes in the perimeter walls of many are plugged with iron-sheet jugaad.

On the periphery of the Sunjuwan Army camp in Jammu, as a terror attack is under way on Saturday. It is easy to see inside several military camps, and the holes in the perimeter walls of many are plugged with iron-sheet jugaad. (AP Photo)
The February 10-11 attack was not the first time the Sunjuwan Army camp in Jammu was targeted. In June 2003, two fidayeen had entered the camp about 4.30 am and attacked sleeping soldiers. They were said to have cut a wire fence on their way in; this time, at least three terrorists are said to have entered through a nullah. In 2003, 12 soldiers were killed. Then Army Chief Gen N C Vij had visited the camp and ordered more fortifications there and at other camps that were protected by only barbed wire. This time, five soldiers and a civilian have been killed. On February 10, as the attack was under way, the government sanctioned Rs 1,487.27 crore for perimeter fortification at military installations across India.

Old story, new question

Over the last 15 years or so, Army camps in the Jammu region have been particularly vulnerable to militant attacks. In November 2016, fidayeen targeted an Army camp in Nagrota in Jammu district, killing seven soldiers. Earlier, in March 2015, two Army personnel were killed in an attack on a camp on the Jammu-Pathankot National Highway in Samba district. Only the day before, militants had stormed a police station in Kathua, killing seven people. Back in 2003, less than a month after the attack on Sunjuwan, fidayeen had entered the Army camp in Tanda, north of Jammu, and killed eight men, including a Brigadier. The biggest attack came in 2002 in Kaluchak, where terrorists targeted a tourist bus and an Army camp, killing 38.

The Sunjuwan attack over the weekend has raised new questions. How to secure a camp that is in the middle of a civilian area without turning it into a fortress? Is technology the answer? Is there more to be done, and should the Army make a long-term plan to secure such camps?

Too many, located mid-city

Former and serving Army officers said any plan must be multi-pronged, of which camp security is one part, and consolidation — squeezing of smaller camps into bigger ones — another. But the plan must also extend to bringing down the levels of infiltration from across the border.

Jammu city alone has five major Army camps under the Western Command — Chatha, Ratnuchak, Kaluchak, Satwari and Sunjuwan — besides a couple of smaller camps. Each of these small and large bases is crowded in by civilian residential neighbourhoods on all sides. Sunjuwan, spread over an area of 7 sq km, is a classic example. The Jammu-Srinagar Highway, lined with hotels and shopping malls, lies to one side of the camp; on the other three sides, and especially at the back, are bustling civilian settlements. The land around Army camps is much sought after, and the demand drives up prices.

“When a camp is bang in the middle of a civilian area, it’s difficult to monitor who is coming, who is seeing what. It makes it very easy to recce and scope out the place for an attack, plan the routes to take, etc.,” Lt Gen Deependra Singh Hooda (retd), whose last posting was as GoC-in-C of the Udhampur-based Northern Command, said.

Over the last 15 years or so, Army camps in the Jammu region have been particularly vulnerable to militant attacks (Express photo by Praveen Khanna)

Open access, holes in walls

The chain of Army camps in Jammu city came up before the onset of militancy, and although Jammu is close to the International Border, all the camps are family stations. The family quarters, with women and children, are visible from tall buildings outside the garrison. The militants clearly planned to target these more vulnerable structures.

Sunjuwan also has two schools — the Army Public School and a Kendriya Vidyalaya — that admit children living both inside the camp, as well as outside.

The camps are typically massive sprawls; some offer civilians easy access, and public thoroughfares sometimes cut across them. All have perimeter walls, but their maintenance is a major challenge. After the January 2016 Pathankot attack, a committee headed by Lt Gen Philip Campose had recommended strengthening the fortifications, including “smart” access control, and fencing with sensors and alarm systems to detect intrusions in real time.

But nearly two years after the Campose report was submitted, Army camps typically still use jugaad to secure themselves, a former Western Command officer said. What this usually means is to use Corrugated Galvanised Iron sheets to plug gaps in the wall.

“For two years we have had a plan in place for securing the garrisons. Detailed plans were made as to what was required for each garrison, the boundary walls, some sort of smart fencing, senors, a control room where someone can monitor the perimeter,” Lt Gen Hooda said.

Sensible, dynamic solutions

Plans, in fact, started to be drawn up after the March 2015 Samba attack, and all they have required is funds. The money has now been allocated, but it could take a year or more to put systems in place.

But even so, said the former Western Command officer, security plans for camps must remain “dynamic” — and keep in view the constantly changing environments around them due to the civilian push. It was important to bear in mind also, that it would be impossible to convert camps in the middle of thickly populated urban areas into permanent fortresses, the officer said.

Relocating the camps, or asking civilian populations to move out, are not options. In Pathankot, even before the January 2016 attack, the district administration had served notices to people who had built properties within 100 m of the base, asking them to vacate the land. After the attack, there was a serious attempt to evict them, but the owners of the properties went to court, and the matter has remained there ever since.

In the long term, Gen Hooda said, the Army would have to “seriously look at how its garrisons are spread out, try and squeeze in, consolidate, just so that just the guarding of it becomes a little easier”. Nagrota is divided into multiple pockets, interspersed with civilian areas. But land is as sensitive an issue in the Army as elsewhere, and the idea is unlikely to get traction, unless there is a big shift in thinking.

But first, shut the tap

The first step, however, say Hooda and other serving and retired officers, is to bring down infiltration. In almost all cases where camps have been hit, there has been recent infiltration. While zero infiltration is impossible to achieve, the idea must be to minimise them. The measures need to be a healthy combination of manpower and smart technology, say officers. And it should not take forever to implement a plan that has been made.