Indian Army Artillery

[notinlove]

I hope we go for the BAE Howitzers, in many ways they are much better than the ones USA is offering, especially after gifting them for free to Pakistan.

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/pakistan-requests-115-m109a5-selfpropelled-howitzers-01645/

HeHe LF sir ................The ones that pakistan got are also manufactured by BAE ..

 

[LETHALFORCE]

M109A5s is American made, it is not made by BAE. M109 PALADIN are the BAE howitzers.FH77 B05 are the ones we are looking at getting from BAE.

 

[notinlove]

M109A5s is American made, it is not made by BAE. M109 PALADIN are the BAE howitzers.

One and the same thing
http://www.baesystems.com/ProductsServices/l_and_a_gs_paladin_m109a5.html

 

[LETHALFORCE]

FH77 B05 has better range, I guess we can't be choosy about the supplier but US embassy was involved in the transaction so it was most likely 100% financed by USA, dropping the HAWK trainers was a good move.

 

[Maverick007]

We should take the BAE howitzer for even a conventional towed artillery...........It is still the best artillery system there is especially with the excalibur shells to add additional oomph

 

[Sridhar]

Army postpones howitzer trial after gun accident

BY : THE HINDU
The Indian Army has postponed the winter trials for procuring 155 mm towed howitzers after St. Kinetics expressed inability to bring its gun for field testing due to an accident in Singapore.
“The winter trials will now be held in October as one of the two contenders, St. Kinetics, said its gun was damaged in an accident in Singapore, and would be able to arrive in India only after March,” Army officials said here.
St. Kinetics senior executive Brig Gen Patrick Choy said the accident occurred when the gun was being transported to India.
“We have to cut some parts on the gun which were damaged in the accident. We will definitely have the guns in India by April and it will take part in the summer trials,” he said.
The Indian Army is planning to procure 400 towed howitzers, and BAE Systems and the Singapore-based St. Kinetics are the two contenders offering their platforms.
The field trials have already been delayed as they were put on hold after St. Kinetics’ name surfaced in a CBI case for allegedly bribing Ordinance Factory Board officials.
After the government decided to allow tainted firms to participate in defence contracts till the time the probe was on, the Army decided to hold the winter trials in Leh in February and March.
In view of the mishap involving the St. Kinetics gun, the trials are now expected to be held in October-November.
Commenting on the other tenders where St. Kinetics is participating, Choy said the company’s SAR-21 assault rifles were undergoing trials for meeting the requirements of the Home Ministry tender for procuring around 40,000 guns.


http://idrw.org/?p=561

 

[ppgj]

Modernizing Artillery

Retrospect and Prospect

By Brig Vinod Anand (Retd) Published :February 2010

New Delhi. No one can dispute the fact that in a fast moving conventional battle the artillery arm provides both firepower and maneuver and is an essential combat arm rather than a supporting arm which it had been viewed as for sometime.

The images of field guns firing in Kargil in 1999 with a devastating effect at the target end are still afresh in the mind of the Indian public. That was also the time when India was recovering from the economic crisis of the early 1990s when the foreign exchange reserves had dwindled to dangerous lows to even think of acquiring defence equipment through imports. The Kargil crisis compelled the politico-military establishment to reassess the country’s defence and security policies, not just to replace the Soviet vintage equipment with the Armed Forces but in terms of their modernization.

In the subsequent years as part of its overall modernization effort, a Field Artillery Rationalisation Plan was introduced; the same also formed basis for the Artillery modernization plans.

Consequent to the experience in Operation Parakaram, the Indian army revised its doctrine in 2004 to respond to the realities of a tough neighbourhood. As a result, a Cold Start doctrine was articulated which had several premises. Evidently, a doctrine draws from experiences of previous wars and can be aspirational as it defines the objectives that should be chosen for the future and the operational concepts to be followed to attain goals. In this mode, a doctrine drives the nature of organization, force structure and training.

The Cold Start doctrine enunciated by the Indian Army rests on rapid mobilization, concentration and launch of operations in a seamless continuum. The other planks of the doctrine are:

* Multiple thrusts with divisional sized integrated battle groups.
* Broad front, shallow depth, limited objectives.
* Pivot corps offensives supplemented with available Integrated Battle Groups from Strike Corps resources.
* Strike reserve largely uncommitted.
* Aims at attrition and capture of territory.
* Cognizant of possible nuclear thresholds.
* All weather, day night operations; air drops and heliborne operations; IW and EW; massed firepower (‘100 guns’ concept); operational fires.

Massing of accurate and heavy volume of firepower, coordinated with combined arms operations including the air support would be a necessary condition for achieving the objectives of a Cold Start doctrine in real-time. The Artillery doctrine no doubt will flow out of the conceptual and doctrinal issues for combined arms operations emanating from the Cold Start precepts.

Lack of adequate artillery firepower would definitely restrict the freedom and movement of own forces whereas enhanced enemy artillery fire power will also add to difficulties of own forces’ manoeuvre. The Cold Start doctrine requires a massive artillery support ab initio to neutralise the enemy defences in the shortest possible time without giving him much reaction time.

Further, the India Army Chief has recently talked about the changing geo-political and strategic environment and the need to be prepared for a range of security threats and challenges including the possibilities of a need to deal with two fronts. He also reflected upon the Out of Area Contingencies which may necessitate employment of forces. Therefore the gaping voids in our field artillery need to be filled up in a hurry to meet the likely threats to the defence of the realm.

The artillery rationalization plan’s key objective was to standardize the equipment profile from a multitude of caliber of guns to a single caliber.

There are advantages to be gained in terms of streamlined logistics, easy maintenance and repairs including standardization of ammunition.

While, this plan was outlined at the turn of the century with ambitious goal of implementing it in three to four plan periods of Five Year Defence Plans, no progress could be made due to several contextual factors. The major factor being the ghost of Bofors (payoff allegations in their mid-1980s deal) exacerbated further by allegations of corruption in some of the subsequent potential artillery acquisition deals.

However, as a first step towards modernization of field artillery almost over a decade after enunciation of FARP, there is silver lining on the cloud. Finally, the government has decided to buy 145 M777 ultralight howitzers from the US-based entity of the BAE Systems through the government-to-government Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route. The FMS route avoids all the ills and impediments associated with India’s Defence Procurement Procedure which has been continually revised but has not delivered especially on the artillery procurement.

A Fast Track Procedure is also part of the DPP but that has also not helped meet India’s burgeoning defence acquisition needs.

An indication that the above deal of 145 light Howitzers may be clinched was a notification by the Pentagon to the US Congress in the second half of January 2010 of a possible sale of 145 state-of-the-art lightweight towed Howitzers to India.

The Defence Security Cooperation Agency rationalized to the Congress, “India intends to use the howitzers to modernise its armed forces and enhance its ability to operate in hazardous conditions. The howitzers will assist the Indian Army to develop and enhance standardisation and to improve interoperability with US Soldiers and Marines who use the M777 as their primary means of indirect fire. India will have no difficulty in absorbing these weapons into its armed forces.”

That it also makes a good commercial sense and an important breakthrough in the Indian defence bazaar can not be mentioned in the solemn note to the Congress.

There are reports however, on another level, that the deal may not come through as a result of the recent strategic side-lining of India in the London Conference on the Afghanistan imbroglio. There are unconfirmed reports that the Indian policy establishment is considering as to what strategic leverages India has to ensure its meaningful role in unfolding scenarios in Afghanistan where the dominant discourse is being dictated by the US, notably the Pentagon.

Some years back, before the Indo- US defence Framework Agreement was signed in 2005 and the Ministry of Defence had drawn out ambitious defence acquisition plans, a retiring Defence Secretary had remarked that defence purchases from abroad should be used a strategic leverages in consonance with our policy objectives. If such recourse is adopted it would further delay the process of procurement.

But then this is not the end of the massive requirements of Indian field artillery for either ultra light howitzers or for that matter other type of guns.

There are four other types of 155 mm guns which are to be acquired as part of the long-term artillery modernization plans.

While the acquisition of 145 Howitzers would be sufficient only to equip seven artillery regiments after catering for General staff reserves and would fill existing voids or provide replacements for mountain artillery units to be converted to 155 mm caliber as part of FARP, additional requirements have also arisen because of the governments decision to raise two mountain divisions and a fourth artillery division to support operations in the mountainous areas.

This would translate into a requirement of ultra light howitzers for four mountain artillery brigades which would mean acquisition of additional 290 pieces that would have to be spread over 12th, 13th and 14th Five Year Defence Plans.

As part of the first phase of FARP, besides the 145 pieces, a requirement of 158 Towed and wheeled guns, 100 tracked guns to support the mechanized formations and 180 wheeled guns with armour protection has been spelt out. Hopefully, these guns would be acquired in the current 11th Five Year Plan (2007-2012). Last year, the Defence Acquisition Council had included a fifth category classified as Mounted Gun Systems.

These howitzers, mounted on wheeled chassis, would have a shoot and scoot capability with the crew remaining mounted on the vehicle.

Looking at the overall requirements the estimates of the number of guns to be inducted to complete the rationalization plan range from 2700 to 3600 guns in the long term perspective of 15 to 20 years costing between Rs 22,000 crores to Rs 30,000 crores.

These demands are based on the total number of artillery regiments which are 200 or so, and the additional artillery units planned to be raised. Such mammoth requirements also predicate that India has to indigenize the production of 155 mm guns as it can remain an importer if it has any pretensions of becoming a major power.

Defence Minister A K Antony though has already stated that the policy now was to acquire every important system with Transfer of Technology (ToT).

Indian artillery immediately needs 400 towed 155 mm guns as no such guns have been acquired since the Bofors were inducted in 1987. Induction of these guns would be followed by indigenous production of 1580 guns of this type.

The acquisition process was suspended after dealings with Singapore’s ST Kinetics (and six other companies) were put on hold due to allegations of corruption involving Ordnance Factories Board (OFB)’s top executive. That in fact led to a single vendor situation, and that is best avoided, according to the procurement manual.

The results of the investigations (by India’s Central Bureau of Investigation, or CBI) are not known but till the companies involved are not cleared of the allegations or suspicions, no contracts would be signed by them. However, pending the completion of the process, the procedural system has okayed that the trials of equipment offered by these companies could go on so as not to cause further delay. A deal could and would be signed only after these companies are cleared of any charges of wrong-doing.

Accordingly, the government has approved the trials of the Towed guns from SK Kinetics and BAE Systems with the caveat that trials are subject to clearance of allegations of corruption (in the case of SK Kinetics). Indian Army Chief Gen Deepak Kapoor (a gunner himself) had admitted the development to be of a particular concern as the Army has not been able to purchase a single gun in the last 23 years. Earlier Denel of South Africa was blacklisted on similar charges which led to the current re-tendering process.

The second category is of Tracked guns mounted on tank chassis for supporting the mechanized formations for five artillery regiments to be acquired to the extent of 100 155mm/52 caliber guns to replace the existing 130mm Catapult and 105 mm Abbot Guns.

There is the third category of wheeled 155 mm guns mounted on a six-wheeled vehicle with armour protection to the extent of 180 (as mentioned earlier). The fourth category of ultralight howitzers has already been discussed above.

And the last and the fifth category is the mounted gun system, The artillery modernization includes off-the-shelf purchase of 200 155mm/52-calibre mounted gun systems to be followed by indigenous manufacture of another 614 such howitzers under transfer of technology. The 17-tonne motorized howitzers will arm 40 regiments. A rough glance would suggest that the overall requirement would easily surpass a figure of 3000 guns.

Concerned about fast depleting stocks including war wastage reserves of field artillery, the Army Headquarters has mooted a proposal for the induction of 80-100 pieces of 130 mm medium guns from old stocks lying with former Soviet Republics, as a desperate last resort, to have something at least ASAP.

Though of World War II vintage, the 130 mm gun was imported and inducted into the Indian artillery in the 19060s. It is a rugged and a reliable gun which has seen action in all the terrains as obtaining in India including the Sia Chen Glacier base, high altitude areas and deserts.

However, it lacks the sophistication and mobility of the modern artillery guns, and has a limited range of the types of ammunitions it can fire.

The Army headquarters is being forced to adopt such a measure for earliest making up of critical deficiencies and building already depleted war wastage stocks. It needs to be underscored that except for upgradation of a limited number of 130 mm guns to 155mm by Soltam of Israel, a project that received mixed reviews, the Indian army has not inducted or upgraded an artillery gun for nearly three decades.

In fact, OFB tried to sell the upgunned 130mm to the Gulf countries, but there was no interest in an old system here.

With indigenous production at standstill, in the Artillery faces a real precarious situation and hence this desperate and some say counterproductive measure. It is learned that the issue was discussed in recent Defence Acquisition Council meeting with final decision still pending.

Enunciation of the Cold Start doctrine could not have served its purpose of strategic communication to our potential adversaries unless the voids in fire power are made up in double quick time. The acquisition decisions on procurement of 155 mm 52 caliber towed howitzers, SP tracked and wheeled guns, and mounted gun systems as also ultralight howitzers must be taken on priority for the Artillery to play its role in a future war imposed on India.

The author is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation, United Service Institution of India, New Delhi.

© India Strategic

http://indiastrategic.in/topstories483.htm

 

[ppgj]

Its time to have

Admiral of the Fleet

By Premvir Das Published :February 2010

New Delhi. In a piece published in a national daily recently, Lt Gen SK Sinha (retd), a former Governor of Assam and Jammu and Kashmir, has written of how on January 1, 1973, Gen SHFJ (Sam) Manekshaw was promoted to the rank of Field Marshal.

The images of field guns firing in Kargil in 1999 with a devastating effect at the target end are still afresh in the mind of the Indian public. That was also the time when India was recovering from the economic crisis of the early 1990s when the foreign exchange reserves had dwindled to dangerous lows to even think of acquiring defence equipment through imports. The Kargil crisis compelled the politico-military establishment to reassess the country’s defence and security policies, not just to replace the Soviet vintage equipment with the Armed Forces but in terms of their modernization.

In the subsequent years as part of its overall modernization effort, a Field Artillery Rationalisation Plan was introduced; the same also formed basis for the Artillery modernization plans.

Consequent to the experience in Operation Parakaram, the Indian army revised its doctrine in 2004 to respond to the realities of a tough neighbourhood. As a result, a Cold Start doctrine was articulated which had several premises. Evidently, a doctrine draws from experiences of previous wars and can be aspirational as it defines the objectives that should be chosen for the future and the operational concepts to be followed to attain goals. In this mode, a doctrine drives the nature of organization, force structure and training.

The Cold Start doctrine enunciated by the Indian Army rests on rapid mobilization, concentration and launch of operations in a seamless continuum. The other planks of the doctrine are:

* Multiple thrusts with divisional sized integrated battle groups.
* Broad front, shallow depth, limited objectives.
* Pivot corps offensives supplemented with available Integrated Battle Groups from Strike Corps resources.
* Strike reserve largely uncommitted.
* Aims at attrition and capture of territory.
* Cognizant of possible nuclear thresholds.
* All weather, day night operations; air drops and heliborne operations; IW and EW; massed firepower (‘100 guns’ concept); operational fires.

Massing of accurate and heavy volume of firepower, coordinated with combined arms operations including the air support would be a necessary condition for achieving the objectives of a Cold Start doctrine in real-time. The Artillery doctrine no doubt will flow out of the conceptual and doctrinal issues for combined arms operations emanating from the Cold Start precepts.

Lack of adequate artillery firepower would definitely restrict the freedom and movement of own forces whereas enhanced enemy artillery fire power will also add to difficulties of own forces’ manoeuvre. The Cold Start doctrine requires a massive artillery support ab initio to neutralise the enemy defences in the shortest possible time without giving him much reaction time.

Further, the India Army Chief has recently talked about the changing geo-political and strategic environment and the need to be prepared for a range of security threats and challenges including the possibilities of a need to deal with two fronts. He also reflected upon the Out of Area Contingencies which may necessitate employment of forces. Therefore the gaping voids in our field artillery need to be filled up in a hurry to meet the likely threats to the defence of the realm.

The artillery rationalization plan’s key objective was to standardize the equipment profile from a multitude of caliber of guns to a single caliber.

There are advantages to be gained in terms of streamlined logistics, easy maintenance and repairs including standardization of ammunition.

While, this plan was outlined at the turn of the century with ambitious goal of implementing it in three to four plan periods of Five Year Defence Plans, no progress could be made due to several contextual factors. The major factor being the ghost of Bofors (payoff allegations in their mid-1980s deal) exacerbated further by allegations of corruption in some of the subsequent potential artillery acquisition deals.

However, as a first step towards modernization of field artillery almost over a decade after enunciation of FARP, there is silver lining on the cloud. Finally, the government has decided to buy 145 M777 ultralight howitzers from the US-based entity of the BAE Systems through the government-to-government Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route. The FMS route avoids all the ills and impediments associated with India’s Defence Procurement Procedure which has been continually revised but has not delivered especially on the artillery procurement.

A Fast Track Procedure is also part of the DPP but that has also not helped meet India’s burgeoning defence acquisition needs.

An indication that the above deal of 145 light Howitzers may be clinched was a notification by the Pentagon to the US Congress in the second half of January 2010 of a possible sale of 145 state-of-the-art lightweight towed Howitzers to India.

The Defence Security Cooperation Agency rationalized to the Congress, “India intends to use the howitzers to modernise its armed forces and enhance its ability to operate in hazardous conditions. The howitzers will assist the Indian Army to develop and enhance standardisation and to improve interoperability with US Soldiers and Marines who use the M777 as their primary means of indirect fire. India will have no difficulty in absorbing these weapons into its armed forces.”

That it also makes a good commercial sense and an important breakthrough in the Indian defence bazaar can not be mentioned in the solemn note to the Congress.

There are reports however, on another level, that the deal may not come through as a result of the recent strategic side-lining of India in the London Conference on the Afghanistan imbroglio. There are unconfirmed reports that the Indian policy establishment is considering as to what strategic leverages India has to ensure its meaningful role in unfolding scenarios in Afghanistan where the dominant discourse is being dictated by the US, notably the Pentagon.

Some years back, before the Indo- US defence Framework Agreement was signed in 2005 and the Ministry of Defence had drawn out ambitious defence acquisition plans, a retiring Defence Secretary had remarked that defence purchases from abroad should be used a strategic leverages in consonance with our policy objectives. If such recourse is adopted it would further delay the process of procurement.

But then this is not the end of the massive requirements of Indian field artillery for either ultra light howitzers or for that matter other type of guns.

There are four other types of 155 mm guns which are to be acquired as part of the long-term artillery modernization plans.

While the acquisition of 145 Howitzers would be sufficient only to equip seven artillery regiments after catering for General staff reserves and would fill existing voids or provide replacements for mountain artillery units to be converted to 155 mm caliber as part of FARP, additional requirements have also arisen because of the governments decision to raise two mountain divisions and a fourth artillery division to support operations in the mountainous areas.

This would translate into a requirement of ultra light howitzers for four mountain artillery brigades which would mean acquisition of additional 290 pieces that would have to be spread over 12th, 13th and 14th Five Year Defence Plans.

As part of the first phase of FARP, besides the 145 pieces, a requirement of 158 Towed and wheeled guns, 100 tracked guns to support the mechanized formations and 180 wheeled guns with armour protection has been spelt out. Hopefully, these guns would be acquired in the current 11th Five Year Plan (2007-2012). Last year, the Defence Acquisition Council had included a fifth category classified as Mounted Gun Systems.

These howitzers, mounted on wheeled chassis, would have a shoot and scoot capability with the crew remaining mounted on the vehicle.

Looking at the overall requirements the estimates of the number of guns to be inducted to complete the rationalization plan range from 2700 to 3600 guns in the long term perspective of 15 to 20 years costing between Rs 22,000 crores to Rs 30,000 crores.

These demands are based on the total number of artillery regiments which are 200 or so, and the additional artillery units planned to be raised. Such mammoth requirements also predicate that India has to indigenize the production of 155 mm guns as it can remain an importer if it has any pretensions of becoming a major power.

Defence Minister A K Antony though has already stated that the policy now was to acquire every important system with Transfer of Technology (ToT).

Indian artillery immediately needs 400 towed 155 mm guns as no such guns have been acquired since the Bofors were inducted in 1987. Induction of these guns would be followed by indigenous production of 1580 guns of this type.

The acquisition process was suspended after dealings with Singapore’s ST Kinetics (and six other companies) were put on hold due to allegations of corruption involving Ordnance Factories Board (OFB)’s top executive. That in fact led to a single vendor situation, and that is best avoided, according to the procurement manual.

The results of the investigations (by India’s Central Bureau of Investigation, or CBI) are not known but till the companies involved are not cleared of the allegations or suspicions, no contracts would be signed by them. However, pending the completion of the process, the procedural system has okayed that the trials of equipment offered by these companies could go on so as not to cause further delay. A deal could and would be signed only after these companies are cleared of any charges of wrong-doing.

Accordingly, the government has approved the trials of the Towed guns from SK Kinetics and BAE Systems with the caveat that trials are subject to clearance of allegations of corruption (in the case of SK Kinetics). Indian Army Chief Gen Deepak Kapoor (a gunner himself) had admitted the development to be of a particular concern as the Army has not been able to purchase a single gun in the last 23 years. Earlier Denel of South Africa was blacklisted on similar charges which led to the current re-tendering process.

The second category is of Tracked guns mounted on tank chassis for supporting the mechanized formations for five artillery regiments to be acquired to the extent of 100 155mm/52 caliber guns to replace the existing 130mm Catapult and 105 mm Abbot Guns.

There is the third category of wheeled 155 mm guns mounted on a six-wheeled vehicle with armour protection to the extent of 180 (as mentioned earlier). The fourth category of ultralight howitzers has already been discussed above.

And the last and the fifth category is the mounted gun system, The artillery modernization includes off-the-shelf purchase of 200 155mm/52-calibre mounted gun systems to be followed by indigenous manufacture of another 614 such howitzers under transfer of technology. The 17-tonne motorized howitzers will arm 40 regiments. A rough glance would suggest that the overall requirement would easily surpass a figure of 3000 guns.

Concerned about fast depleting stocks including war wastage reserves of field artillery, the Army Headquarters has mooted a proposal for the induction of 80-100 pieces of 130 mm medium guns from old stocks lying with former Soviet Republics, as a desperate last resort, to have something at least ASAP.

Though of World War II vintage, the 130 mm gun was imported and inducted into the Indian artillery in the 19060s. It is a rugged and a reliable gun which has seen action in all the terrains as obtaining in India including the Sia Chen Glacier base, high altitude areas and deserts.

However, it lacks the sophistication and mobility of the modern artillery guns, and has a limited range of the types of ammunitions it can fire.

The Army headquarters is being forced to adopt such a measure for earliest making up of critical deficiencies and building already depleted war wastage stocks. It needs to be underscored that except for upgradation of a limited number of 130 mm guns to 155mm by Soltam of Israel, a project that received mixed reviews, the Indian army has not inducted or upgraded an artillery gun for nearly three decades.

In fact, OFB tried to sell the upgunned 130mm to the Gulf countries, but there was no interest in an old system here.

With indigenous production at standstill, in the Artillery faces a real precarious situation and hence this desperate and some say counterproductive measure. It is learned that the issue was discussed in recent Defence Acquisition Council meeting with final decision still pending.

Enunciation of the Cold Start doctrine could not have served its purpose of strategic communication to our potential adversaries unless the voids in fire power are made up in double quick time. The acquisition decisions on procurement of 155 mm 52 caliber towed howitzers, SP tracked and wheeled guns, and mounted gun systems as also ultralight howitzers must be taken on priority for the Artillery to play its role in a future war imposed on India.

The author is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation, United Service Institution of India, New Delhi.

© India Strategic

http://indiastrategic.in/topstories484.htm

 

[prajapati]

Winter trials of Howitzers' postponed after accident

NEW DELHI (PTI): The Indian Army has postponed the winter trials for procuring 155 mm towed howitzers after St Kinetics expressed inability to bring its gun for field- testing due to an accident in Singapore.

"The winter trials will now be held in October as one of the two contenders, St Kinetics, said its gun was damaged in an accident in Singapore and would be able to arrive in India only after March," Army officials said here.

St Kinetics senior executive Brig Gen Patrick Choy said the accident occurred when the gun was being transported to India.

"We have to cut some parts on the gun which were damaged in the accident. We will definitely have the guns in India by April and it will take part in the summer trials," he said.

Facing obsolescence in Artillery, the Indian Army is planning to procure 400 towed howitzers and BAE Systems and the Singaporean St Kinetics are the two contenders offering their platforms.

The field trials have already been delayed as they were put on hold after St Kinetics' name surfaced in a CBI case for allegedly bribing Ordnance Factory Board officials.

After the government decided to allow tainted firms to participate in defence contracts till the time the probe was on, the Army decided to hold the winter trials in Leh in February and March.

In view of the mishap involving the St Kinetics gun, the trials are now expected to be held in October-November.

Commenting on the other tenders where ST Kinetics is participating, Choy said the company’s SAR-21 assault rifles were undergoing trials for meeting the requirements of the Home Ministry tender for procuring around 40,000 guns.

MOD EDIT : Prajapati Triton - post the link

 

[prateikf]

wonder if the trials would ever start and if the guns would be ever bought. considering China's and Pakistan's recent acquisition of powerful and modern artillery the Indian army would find it very difficult to face it's adversary on the field of battle

 

[bengalraider]

The Good news from DEFEXPO is that BHIM is back officially back, now the only thing is which gun is selected for it, as per the DRDO official i talked to they are planning to integrate any 155mm 52cal weapon system with the arjun hull that can meet the army's requirement i.e BHIM is back but he's in a new avatar.

 

[Yusuf]

BAE has already tied up with Mahindra to make arty guns at home. Looks like they are confident of the B05. Anyways its predecessor is a hit in india in spite of all the controversies.

 

[bengalraider]

Here's the models of the wheeled and tracked version of the pzh2000, both are on offer to india got it from rheinmetall officials

 

[bengalraider]

For reference this is a smerch rocket

Smerch

Some others

 

[bengalraider]

One more good choice for a Lighter heavy SPG would be the KMW DONAR, at only 31.5 tons it is air transportable while retaining the sheer badass firepower of the Pzh 2000.i.e we could hit the chinese with the firepower of a Pzh while retaining air portability.Pic below

 

[gb009]

One more good choice for a Lighter heavy SPG would be the KMW DONAR, at only 31.5 tons it is air transportable while retaining the sheer badass firepower of the Pzh 2000.i.e we could hit the chinese with the firepower of a Pzh while retaining air portability.Pic below

Looks like a good option. In a war when the enemy (as would we) has WLR, towed artillary would be very hard to move around. This and similar options like Bhim & archer would be a good buy. Does Bhim have an autoloader?

 

[Rage]

Does Bhim have an autoloader?

Bhim has an autoloader. Twenty rounds are stow-able in the autoloader's 'magazine' with total onboard ammunition between 40-50 rounds. Other than that, the turret has ammunition-loading hatches on the right and left (with two additional on the roof) and a conveyor belt extendable from either side for ammunition loading from the ground.

I also quote the following post from 'manish' of BharatRaxak:

While everyone is caught up in the Bhim/Denel T6 heavy SPG mess, looks like OFB has gone ahead and made its own little 105mm tracked SPG.
They had brochures of a an SPG that brings together a turret mounted version of the old 105mm LFG and the BMP II chassis.

As per the brochure, the SPG has a crew of 5, weighs 16T, and can carry 42 rounds internally. It has a max speed of 65kmph and has options like an autoloader, composite armour turret, FCS and increased ammo carrying capacity (92 vs 42) among others.

The gun has a range of 19km and can fire HE, HEAT, HESH, APDS, Smoke and Colour rounds.

And the following, relatedly:

I wouldn't be surprised if the whole OFB 105mm SPG costs less than the T6 on Bhim. The plant and eqpt needed to mfr the LFG and the BMP II have been around forever and probably have depreciated to an extent where the costs are negligible except for the materials/variable costs. Maintenance infra and logistics chain for both have been in place and in use for decades. And factor in the speed of induction - we do need SP arty, in numbers and NOW.

I do understand that Bhim and OFB 105mm are not comparable, but I am sure there are enough theaters of war where the OFB machine would actually turn out to be useful enough. Add to this the fact that this would be easily air transportable even with the current transport assets in the IAF unlike Bhim.

Perhaps there are places high in the mountains like Leh where they may need SPG arty that is air transportable and targets are <20km? Gurulog, can some more light be thrown on these? What were the typical engagement ranges in Kargil, anyone has any ideas?

Thanks in advance.

No access to the 'brochure', so can't verify the details. But I'll take his word for now.

 

[dineshchaturvedi]

It is sad that our priorities were not right and never had the right focus for defense need. To add to misery corrupt army officials have not helped us, the delay was mostly due to past problems and things will get better in future, however we cannot just buy the guns off the shelf, we need t wait but it will happen for sure, I am positive we will decide on something by end of 2010. If war does not break out in next 2 years (which is 99% possible) we will be fine so do not worry too much.

 

[notinlove]

Bhim has an autoloader. Twenty rounds are stow-able in the autoloader's 'magazine' with total onboard ammunition between 40-50 rounds. Other than that, the turret has ammunition-loading hatches on the right and left (with two additional on the roof) and a conveyor belt extendable from either side for ammunition loading from the ground.

I also quote the following post from 'manish' of BharatRaxak:






And the following, relatedly:



No access to the 'brochure', so can't verify the details. But I'll take his word for now.

Sayare and bengalraider have lots of info on this thing ... they also have a pic of the brochure ..this thing sure looks impressive

 

[F-14]

Rage ji i hope you find this link helpful

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/vi...=a&sid=f4ed016108608cdc9b21863bbd23d1a9&start