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Re: ADA LCA Tejas Mark-II
From the inception Tejas was modelled to exceed Mirage-2000 specs and even in mk1 it does. it is a stupid thing to straight jacket it into Mig-21 replacement.
while Matheswaran and many retired and retiring worthies of IAF call for stopping the program and saying Tejas mk1 is inferior to Mig-21 , IAF group captain and mirage pilot Suneth krishna who has flown both Mirage-2000 and Tejas mk1 says plainly that ,"even in mk1 tejas equals mirage-2000 with 45 million dollar per plane upgrade".
Who is right?
Import lobby tries to fool people by comparing the top speeds of mig-21 with tejas mk1 and saying since tejas has a top speed of mach ( tested till now)1.6 which is lower than that of mig-21 top speed of mach 2 , it is inferior.
Then how come they plump for rafale which has a certified top speed lessed than that of mirage-2000 and mig-21?
the devil is as often in the detail. No fighter plane can clear even hundred Kms in its topspeed fuel will run out immediately. And to evade missile or gun fire what is more important is not top speed but higher Instantaneous turn rate, higher TWR , lower wing loading , in all departments tejas mk1 scores better than Mirage-2000 , gripen C and far far better than mig-21.
It has the lowest clean config RCS of less than a third of a sq meter in entire IAF fleet , with a radar dia bigger than that of rafale.
Since no one pays our guys to talk and write about this , these details were never highlighted.
So no one is losing the plot, only the writer of the piece who is losing his reputation by splurging out such garbage. In empty weight ,max take off , radar dia meter , Tejas mk1 is almost similar in comparison to gripen C(which has the same GE 404 engine ). Did any one ever accuse SAAB of losing the plot or blasted Sweedish air force with MIG_21 replacement fixation.
Tejas has the radius of action of 500 Km , which is more than double that of mig-21, what BS piece of an article is this?
So the course correction needed here is for the author of the piece not the tejas program. He should consult IAF serving group captain Suneeth Krishna to know why he rates it equal to Mirage-2000 even after 45 million dollar per plane upgrade. And read the notes of the departed NTSE chief Khokar(who was murdered for no apparent reason) to know what are the correct specs of tejas mk1.
HAL chief and Air marshal MSD Woolen has written an authoritative account of the decisions and concepts behind tejas program in the following piece,
http://tejas.gov.in/featured_articles/air_marshal_msd_wollen/page02.html
It was clearly explained in that article that program was about developing a fighter with techs above that of mirage-2000 not as a replacement of mig-21 tech. In squadron numbers tejas replaces mig-21 , not in capabilities. In capabilities tejas is far above mig-21 even within the lesser opened flight envelope of IOC config.
And they will try to fool people that all the imaginary ailments of Tejas mk1 were due to lack of canards!!!!! This I have heard hundred times from tech illiterates!!!
Ask these guys why did Russians drop the canards on SU-35 , and FGFA which were there in SU-30 MKI, these guys will be tongue tied for ever!!!
canards are a control surface. tejas has a far larger area control surface behind wings to get the desired turn rates even without canards, in the same way like SU-35. Su-30 MKI does a cobra with canard. SU-35 does that without a canard.
As they the tiger can never change its spots a few people will never change their opinions on tejas and continue to lie that a fly by wire fighter with a half fuel weight TWR of 1.07 and lowest wing loading along with lowest clean config radar reflection area of less than a third of a meter in clean config is lower than the pre historic Mig-21 come hell or high water. No cure for such ailments can ever be found!!!!
The HF-24 with "under powered engines" was never shot down by US made F-104 in Indo pak war and instead it shot down the F-104. And IAF pilots themselves have said that in speeds above 400 knots HF 24 can out fly a mig-21 comfortably. But such things can all be swept under the carpet by calling HF-24 under powered!!!!, because people who have no engineering back ground can not make out these finer detailed points.
Even F-35 was first tested with canard arrangement and then later it was rejected . the canards on SU-30 MKI was dropped in SU-35 and FGFA. No one cribs about these decisions !!!!
Most of the MNC fighter makers give their top specs in ISDA temp which is 20 deg less than indian hot summer skies under which tejas mk1 achieved the 1350 km per hour top speed.
Fighter engines loose 12 percent of their thrust and ten percent of their wing lift in indian hot conditions. it would be better if the author takes this factor into account and detail the "so called shortfalls"
Tejas has a better fuel fraction than that of gripen C . Then what is the point of cribbing about radius of action. DOes the author not even know the basic truth that the radius of action with worth while combat load is decided on nothing but fuel fraction alone?
And even the imaginary supersonic drag has no role to play in combat radius calculation , because for more than ninety percent of the time a fighter flies in sub sonic speed, where the so called "super sonic" drag does not exist.
providing canards will also increase wave drag , then how come it add to the combat radius? A completely stupid suggestion that does not make sense at all.
For a better perspective,
http://ibnlive.in.com/blogs/sauravj...ejas-a-bright-prospect-for-make-in-india.html
Please don't post stratpost garbage here.Light Combat Aircraft: The need for course correction II | StratPost
Air Marshal M Matheshwaran analyzes exactly why the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft will never fully meet the ASR and cannot become the IAF 's frontline fighter in the Lo segment.
Continued from Part I
LCA Concept and Key Decisions
The aircraft project was now called the Light Combat Aircraft in order to create an identity distinct from the Light Weight Fighter concept.
However, it was evident that the concept suffered from the IAF's fixation with the original idea of it replacing the Gnat and MiG-21 FL aircraft. That's why the size and weight limitation of remained close to the original idea. This created a contradiction in the programme, which the IAF failed to notice, at first.
The aircraft was destined to have a Radius of Action no better than the 40-year-old MiG-21 because of its low weight and small size.
While the size was kept small to cater to the primary imperative of low cost, it became impossible to achieve because of the introduction of high technology requirements. The challenges were timeframes, cost and performance. Bringing in high technology development requirements made huge time overruns inevitable. This was either not foreseen or the authorities and agencies concerned refused to acknowledge and recognise it.
The net result is that the relevance of the LCA concept, envisaged more than three decades ago, is now in question in terms of the operational and technical environment of the IAF today.
Although hindsight analysis is always easier than decision-making at a particular time, subsequent analysis of development projects remains important in order to learn the right lessons for the future, particularly when the product developed fails to meet the core objectives.
In that context the following questions/observations need to be answered:
(a) What was the original objective of the programme? Was it to fulfil the operational imperative of the IAF with a suitable indigenous replacement for its obsolete and ageing fleet or was it national imperative that an advanced fighter aircraft is made in India?
The former was an operational and time-sensitive imperative while the latter was a technology-acquisition imperative.
Why were these two contradicting requirements not balanced?
(b) The concept of LCA was to have been based on the successful Light Weight Fighter programme of the USAF.
It is now evident that more in-depth research would have allowed strategic foresight in defining the size and weight limitations of the aircraft with a focus on cost. Misplaced beliefs about the Gnat's invincibility as a low-cost Light Weight Fighter had an unreasonably overarching influence on decisions on the size and weight of the LCA.
The ASR 2/85 was approved in 1985 after more than two years of deliberations. During this period the IAF was fully aware of the performance, technological sophistication and operational relevance of the F-16 and Mirage 2000 fighters. The development of the Lavi by Israel also had significant lessons for us. Better research and analysis could have led to more considered decisions.
(c) When DRDO inserted the need for state-of-the-art technologies to be developed in the LCA programme, why were timelines not estimated with reasonable accuracy?
It was apparent that some of the technologies would take nearly three decades to mature, which became evident, finally. But project managers repeatedly asserted that the LCA would enter service in less than decade!
Scrutiny of these claims in detail could have led to strategically wiser decisions. To say that these assertions were simply errors of judgement would be either a gross understatement or purposely disingenuous.
(d) The IAF did voice its concerns repeatedly but these were overlooked.
Interested parties portrayed the IAF's concerns about the serious impact to its force structure by the long delays in the LCA programme as almost being an obstruction to the national endeavour. As a result, the IAF simply stayed away. This was a serious blunder.
Instead, the IAF should have convinced the government and taken full control of the programme, as is done in other programmes around the world. It was critically important that the User drive the programme in order to balance operational needs and technology development needs.
(e) The LCA began as a programme from scratch. The long development period and the possibility of consequent slippage were inherent in these decisions and that's why, it should have been foreseen naturally. However, periodic statements made by project managers over the last 20 years belie such understanding.
Given the urgency and priority of the air force's requirement it is surprising that the IAF went along with such decisions when alternate courses of action were available.
The HF-24 was a proven airframe but ended prematurely due largely to its underpowered engines. Since the US GE 404 engines were decided and procured for the LCA even before work on the first prototype began, it is surprising that the same engines were not considered as an immediate option to power the revised and upgraded HF-24 airframe.
This could have given the air force a very viable frontline fighter aircraft that could have entered operational service twenty years ago while the LCA continued in its realistic development phase.
Such a derivative based approach would have been the most logical strategy to follow as the two would have complimented and strengthened the development process. Instead we frittered away the lessons, skills and human resources of the HF-24 experience.
LCA Development – Achievements and Shortfalls
The LCA programme became primarily a technology development programme and its operational performance was unintentionally relegated to second priority. That's why, although there are significant achievements in the technology area, there are also serious deficiencies in the performance area.
Development and mastering the digital Fly-By-Wire flight control system is the most significant achievement of the programme. The concept, forming a national control law team for development, its execution and the final result have all been done in an exemplary manner, overcoming enormous challenges.
The LCA has a significantly large share of its structures and surfaces made of carbon composite material. The process of developing the required fibres and converting them into the required structures were mastered over a period of time. This is another significant achievement.
The Composite Manufacturing Division (CMD) of HAL is truly a world-class facility and addresses the requirement of both the LCA and the Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) and its derivatives. There are also private sector players who have established similar facilities that have created increased capacity.
However, there exists vulnerability due to the import dependence on the raw material (Carbon Prepegs). This is an area where research should have commenced at the same time as the LCA programme.
Other significant achievements are in the areas of system integration, glass cockpit and mission computer, components development and engineering such as jet fuel starter, accessory gearbox and indigenisation of imported critical equipment such as the actuator.
Major technology shortfalls have been the non-realisation of the aero-engine and the multi-mode radar. In spite of major achievements in critical technology areas like the FBW and composites, the LCA as a weapons platform is still critically dependent on imported equipment when it comes to the power plant, materials, fire-control radar, EW, sensors and weapons.
Serious shortfalls also lie in the area of operational performance. The lack of an early focus on operational issues has resulted in poor weight management.
As a result, the LCA is significantly overweight and cannot meet the thrust to weight requirement in the air-combat configuration.
It would actually have been prudent to choose a canard-delta design considering the severe size and weight limitations. This was also the recommendation of the consultants in the early phase. It is strange that this was not followed. Instead we chose to rely on a pure tail-less delta design and thought that the combination of unstable platform and digital FBW flight control system would generate enough performance. This was not possible, as subsequent results have shown.
Interestingly the Gripen, which is almost similar to the LCA and uses the same engine, has a canard and delta combination. So do the Rafale and the Eurofighter Typhoon.
It is now clear that one of the reasons as to why the LCA will never fully meet the ASR is due to the basic choice of the platform design.
The aircraft also suffers from high supersonic drag and poor intake efficiency, as well as significant shortfalls in performance related to turn rates, acceleration, top speed and rate of climb.
While the aircraft may have excellent flight controls, good sensors and weapons, these critical deficiencies have a placed a question mark on the operational relevance of the aircraft.
Quite naturally, the IAF would be worried about LCA's ability to provide the necessary operational strength.
Why is India losing the plot?
It appears that history is repeating itself. The HF-24, although an excellent design, failed to meet a significant part of its operational requirement – the air defence role – due to its underpowered engines. A failure to address this critical need was the primary reason why the air force phased it out prematurely. It resulted in discontinuity in the indigenous fighter development capability.
The expertise created from the HF-24 programme was allowed to decay. Work on the LCA began from scratch.
Given the serious shortfall in the performance of the LCA, a focus on its inability to meet the ASR would result in a repetition of the HF-24 story. That's why, it is important to recognise the larger strategic need, which is consolidation of the indigenous fighter aircraft development capability.
For this, the LCA needs to be audited appropriately, taking into consideration its strengths and deficiencies. Here the original Light Weight Fighter programme offers the right lessons. This programme focused on developing a Light Weight Fighter at a low cost but with the performance parameters of a frontline fighter that could compliment the more expensive, larger and technically far superior F-15. This is how the Hi-Lo mix evolved.
In a similar manner if the LCA had met the ASR, it would have complimented the higher and expensive mix of Su-30 and MMRCA. The crux is in performance.
But since there are serious deficiencies in performance, the LCA cannot become the IAF 's frontline fighter in the Lo segment. Neither can the LCA fill the slot of the MMRCA or its equivalent role. More importantly, the IAF cannot afford to look for a one-to-one replacement of its ageing MiG-21.
India's profile and its environment of the 1970s and early 80s may have sufficed with a one-to-one replacement for the MiG-21. India's increasing stature and global role, its threat environment and rapid technological developments in the world mandates an aircraft with better performance and radius of action in this segment.
One can see this in the Chinese case. The JF-17, similar to the LCA, is developed for export customers and has no place in the PLAAF's inventory.
What is the solution?
The solution is to re-strategise the LCA's slot in the IAF's operational force structure, while keeping the need to continue, consolidate and stabilise India's fighter aircraft industry.
This will call for a realistic assessment of the LCA's operational role.
More importantly, the need to develop the next version as the first main frontline indigenous fighter aircraft should be realised quickly. A broader strategy will need to be put in place for this to happen.
The LCA MK II should be seen as the vehicle that will address the requirements of larger operational radius, better performance and greater indigenisation.
It could either be a single-engine aircraft with a redesigned airframe and a larger fuel capacity on the lines of the Gripen NG or it could be a twin-engine version of the LCA with just incremental technology.
A cost-benefit-performance analysis of the two needs to be deliberated seriously.
This can only be achieved if industry is allowed to take full charge, with private industry playing a major role and a foreign OEM is brought in as a risk-sharing partner and technology provider.
This would also have the advantage of providing continuity further on to the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) programme.
From the inception Tejas was modelled to exceed Mirage-2000 specs and even in mk1 it does. it is a stupid thing to straight jacket it into Mig-21 replacement.
while Matheswaran and many retired and retiring worthies of IAF call for stopping the program and saying Tejas mk1 is inferior to Mig-21 , IAF group captain and mirage pilot Suneth krishna who has flown both Mirage-2000 and Tejas mk1 says plainly that ,"even in mk1 tejas equals mirage-2000 with 45 million dollar per plane upgrade".
Who is right?
Import lobby tries to fool people by comparing the top speeds of mig-21 with tejas mk1 and saying since tejas has a top speed of mach ( tested till now)1.6 which is lower than that of mig-21 top speed of mach 2 , it is inferior.
Then how come they plump for rafale which has a certified top speed lessed than that of mirage-2000 and mig-21?
the devil is as often in the detail. No fighter plane can clear even hundred Kms in its topspeed fuel will run out immediately. And to evade missile or gun fire what is more important is not top speed but higher Instantaneous turn rate, higher TWR , lower wing loading , in all departments tejas mk1 scores better than Mirage-2000 , gripen C and far far better than mig-21.
It has the lowest clean config RCS of less than a third of a sq meter in entire IAF fleet , with a radar dia bigger than that of rafale.
Since no one pays our guys to talk and write about this , these details were never highlighted.
So no one is losing the plot, only the writer of the piece who is losing his reputation by splurging out such garbage. In empty weight ,max take off , radar dia meter , Tejas mk1 is almost similar in comparison to gripen C(which has the same GE 404 engine ). Did any one ever accuse SAAB of losing the plot or blasted Sweedish air force with MIG_21 replacement fixation.
Tejas has the radius of action of 500 Km , which is more than double that of mig-21, what BS piece of an article is this?
So the course correction needed here is for the author of the piece not the tejas program. He should consult IAF serving group captain Suneeth Krishna to know why he rates it equal to Mirage-2000 even after 45 million dollar per plane upgrade. And read the notes of the departed NTSE chief Khokar(who was murdered for no apparent reason) to know what are the correct specs of tejas mk1.
HAL chief and Air marshal MSD Woolen has written an authoritative account of the decisions and concepts behind tejas program in the following piece,
http://tejas.gov.in/featured_articles/air_marshal_msd_wollen/page02.html
It was clearly explained in that article that program was about developing a fighter with techs above that of mirage-2000 not as a replacement of mig-21 tech. In squadron numbers tejas replaces mig-21 , not in capabilities. In capabilities tejas is far above mig-21 even within the lesser opened flight envelope of IOC config.
And they will try to fool people that all the imaginary ailments of Tejas mk1 were due to lack of canards!!!!! This I have heard hundred times from tech illiterates!!!
Ask these guys why did Russians drop the canards on SU-35 , and FGFA which were there in SU-30 MKI, these guys will be tongue tied for ever!!!
canards are a control surface. tejas has a far larger area control surface behind wings to get the desired turn rates even without canards, in the same way like SU-35. Su-30 MKI does a cobra with canard. SU-35 does that without a canard.
As they the tiger can never change its spots a few people will never change their opinions on tejas and continue to lie that a fly by wire fighter with a half fuel weight TWR of 1.07 and lowest wing loading along with lowest clean config radar reflection area of less than a third of a meter in clean config is lower than the pre historic Mig-21 come hell or high water. No cure for such ailments can ever be found!!!!
The HF-24 with "under powered engines" was never shot down by US made F-104 in Indo pak war and instead it shot down the F-104. And IAF pilots themselves have said that in speeds above 400 knots HF 24 can out fly a mig-21 comfortably. But such things can all be swept under the carpet by calling HF-24 under powered!!!!, because people who have no engineering back ground can not make out these finer detailed points.
this configuration of Tejas with canard delta arrangements was tested for efficiency in wind tunnel and found to give no particular advantage given the weight and other drag penalties it imposed . It was officially disclosed by ADA long back.t would actually have been prudent to choose a canard-delta design considering the severe size and weight limitations. This was also the recommendation of the consultants in the early phase. It is strange that this was not followed. Instead we chose to rely on a pure tail-less delta design and thought that the combination of unstable platform and digital FBW flight control system would generate enough performance. This was not possible, as subsequent results have shown.
Even F-35 was first tested with canard arrangement and then later it was rejected . the canards on SU-30 MKI was dropped in SU-35 and FGFA. No one cribs about these decisions !!!!
Then how did Tejas achieve a top speed of 1350 km per hour which is the same as that of Su-30 MKI and Mig-29 at sea level in summer trials over goa?The aircraft also suffers from high supersonic drag and poor intake efficiency, as well as significant shortfalls in performance related to turn rates, acceleration, top speed and rate of climb.
Most of the MNC fighter makers give their top specs in ISDA temp which is 20 deg less than indian hot summer skies under which tejas mk1 achieved the 1350 km per hour top speed.
Fighter engines loose 12 percent of their thrust and ten percent of their wing lift in indian hot conditions. it would be better if the author takes this factor into account and detail the "so called shortfalls"
So this judgement is completely subjective and if it was based on the "facts" explained in the article by the author it is completely wrong as well.While the aircraft may have excellent flight controls, good sensors and weapons, these critical deficiencies have a placed a question mark on the operational relevance of the aircraft.
Quite naturally, the IAF would be worried about LCA's ability to provide the necessary operational strength.
Tejas has a better fuel fraction than that of gripen C . Then what is the point of cribbing about radius of action. DOes the author not even know the basic truth that the radius of action with worth while combat load is decided on nothing but fuel fraction alone?
And even the imaginary supersonic drag has no role to play in combat radius calculation , because for more than ninety percent of the time a fighter flies in sub sonic speed, where the so called "super sonic" drag does not exist.
providing canards will also increase wave drag , then how come it add to the combat radius? A completely stupid suggestion that does not make sense at all.
For a better perspective,
http://ibnlive.in.com/blogs/sauravj...ejas-a-bright-prospect-for-make-in-india.html
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