http://http://www.telesurtv.net/english/opinion/The-Iron-Dome-Paradox-20141014-0069.html
The rocket defence system is not as effective as Israel has said, and proof of this is that its manufacturer has faced problems selling it.
'Extraordinary,' 'amazing,' 'a game-changer' – these are just a few of the superlatives used by media commentators to describe Israel's Iron Dome rocket defence system during Operation Protective Edge. The media hyperbole was accompanied by claims, attributed to the IDF that the Iron Dome batteries had intercepted upwards of eighty-five percent of the rockets launched by Hamas and other Palestinian paramilitary groups during the conflict. One might imagine that given that the system has been successfully battle-tested the Israeli manufacturer, Rafael, would have little trouble in exporting the system to other nations threatened by adversaries well versed in asymmetrical warfare. However, a recent report from Reuters notes that, in spite of Iron Dome's apparently impressive performance on the battlefield, Rafael continues to struggle to find buyers for the system abroad. Thus far only one, presently unknown, country has acquired the technology. Even the United States, which has substantially underwritten the costs of the development of Iron Dome, has declined to purchase the system in spite of the asymmetric threats it faces in Afghanistan and elsewhere. It cannot be known with certainty why Rafael is failing to find buyers for the system, but it is not difficult to suggest some plausible reasons.
Those who remember the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91 might be instinctively sceptical regarding the remarkable claims made and unquestioningly relayed by Western journalists, regarding Iron Dome. During the Gulf War, similarly impressive numbers were proffered by the U.S. military and political establishment regarding the Patriot missile system. The Patriot batteries were ostensibly deployed by the United States to intercept Iraqi Scuds launched by Saddam Hussein against Israel and Saudi Arabia. The western media widely reported that Patriot was intercepting more than ninety percent of Iraqi scuds. In a visit to the manufacturers, Raytheon, George H.W. Bush excitedly declaimed "Patriot is 41 for 42: 42 Scuds engaged, 41 intercepted!"
Subsequently Theodore Postal, a leading analyst of missile defence at MIT, debunked the data used by George Bush Senior and other U.S. officials. Postal found that the figures were wildly inaccurate and that it was quite possible that the Patriot system had failed to take down a single Scud. In the wake of Operation Protective Edge Postal and other experts on the topic quickly offered a corrective to the inflated claims of journalists and Israeli officials. Postal found that the claims of Iron Dome's advocates were radically overstated and that the real figure for successful destruction of incoming rockets was likely to be much lower. He further noted that video evidence of apparently successful interceptions were misleading since the videos showed rockets being intercepted but did not show warheads being destroyed. The Jewish American scholar Norman Finkelstein pointed out that Israeli casualties from rocket fire during Operation Cast Lead in 2008, prior to the deployment of the Iron Dome system, were comparable to the casualty rate in 2014. As Finkelstein noted this is all the more striking when one considers that in 2008 Hamas was able to deploy a number of more sophisticated weapons, such as Grad missiles acquired from Iran. By contrast in 2014, Hamas was almost entirely reliant on rudimentary projectiles constructed within the Gaza strip.
Many commentators have pointed out that the low Israeli casualty rate should more accurately be attributed to the crude nature of Hamas rockets, that carry very lightweight warheads, and to the highly effective Israeli shelter system. Comparison of the IDF's series of apocalyptic propaganda images targeted at Western nations with video recordings of actual Hamas missile strikes shows the comical disconnect between the claimed effects of Hamas rockets and the actuality.
Another factor likely putting off potential buyers is that Iron Dome was developed for a very specific strategic situation. To the extent that it is effective at all, Iron Dome has shown itself to be of value against weak non-state actors, deploying a limited number of rudimentary sub-atmospheric projectiles. There are not many places in the world where Iron Dome would seem to be a relevant defence system. Rafael has been aggressively marketing the system to the Republic of Korea – continually declaring, without any apparent corroboration from the South Korean military, that the ROK is interested in acquiring Iron Dome. There is a certain degree of logic in Rafael's hard sell to the South Koreans. In recent years, the ROK military has paid close attention to Israel's conflicts with Hamas and Hezbollah as the North Korean military has gradually shifted towards an asymmetrical military doctrine. This shift in doctrine has been forced upon it as its failing economy has foreclosed the option of a conventional arms race with its enemy in the south. However, the North Korean military is a vastly more capable adversary than Hamas. North Korea has an impressive arsenal of missiles, rockets, and artillery pieces that most defence experts believe would be able to do enormous damage to metropolitan Seoul were war to break out on the Korean peninsula. Iron Dome would be unlikely to be of much use against North Korean missiles or artillery in a full-scale conflict. Even if Iron Dome is far more efficient than supposed it would simply be overwhelmed by the sheer number of incoming targets. In spite of the system's lack of relevance to the ROK's strategic environment, there remains the possibility that South Korea might buy the system if Israel were to return the favour by purchasing Korean arms. This possibility points to the way in which weapons deals are sometimes only very tangentially related to the defence needs of a given country.
Alongside the ROK India is also frequently mentioned as a possible buyer of Iron Dome. However, as in the case of Korea, it is unlikely that Iron Dome would be of much use against the very capable, and nuclear-armed, Pakistan military. In 2013, the Indian military decided not to buy the system but there have been subsequent reports that the Indians might reconsider were Israel to provide India with full access to the technology behind the system. In this scenario, India would acquire a system that was of little actual value to its current defence needs, but which might enable it to further develop its indigenous missile defence capabilities. The Indian defence establishment is certainly very interested in developing such capacities since neutralisation of Pakistan's missile force might allow India's conventional superiority to prove decisive in a conflict between the two South Asian states. Indeed it may well be that India is the anonymous buyer of the system.
Aside from the ROK and India however it is hard to see who else Rafael might sell the technology to. The Pentagon, hardly averse to spending vast sums on unproven technology, has declined to purchase the system – citing the cost of the missile batteries, as well as their ineffectiveness against low-trajectory mortars. It has been suggested that the Gulf states might conceivably be interested in the technology for possible use against Iranian missiles. However, in spite of the tacit alliance between Israel and some of the Gulf Cooperation Council states – the official policy of non-recognition of Israel forecloses the possibility of selling the technology in the Middle East.
***
If Iron Dome is a relative failure both in terms of protecting Israeli civilians and as an export technology, the question arises as to what actual value the system has to Israel. There are a number of reasons why Iron Dome, in spite of its serious flaws, remains an asset to Israel and its American sponsor. Notwithstanding its technical failings Iron Dome does represent a partial advance in missile defence technology. Although critics have demonstrated that the system has, thus far, failed to destroy rocket warheads in sufficient numbers to justify the praise heaped upon the technology, the rate of interception is nonetheless impressive. The American-Israeli alliance continues in part because the Palestinian territories represent a useful testing groundfor cutting edge technologies that are of value to the United States. Israel's regular conflicts with its regional adversaries gradually improves the prospects of viable missile defence. For both Israel and the United States missile defence holds out the, possibly chimerical prospect of launching attacks on militarily capable enemies without suffering from severe retaliation.
As the first Gulf War showed, a missile system does not need to be effective to be of value. The patriot system was almost entirely ineffective against Iraqi scuds, but the widespread belief,propagated by the mass media that the technology was working helped to ensure that Israel did not intervene in the conflict. Had it not been for the Patriot it is possible that Saddam might have succeeded in provoking a wider Arab-Israeli conflict – his aim in targeting Israel. Similarly, in spite of its apparent technical defects, Iron Dome has significant psychological value. The deployment of Iron Dome and the inflated claims regarding its effectiveness allows Israel to maintain the pretence that Hamas is a far more fearsome adversary than it really is and provides Israel a degree of international cover for its operations in the Gaza strip. As well as helping to maintain its international image Iron Dome also helps to support the Israeli economy by demonstrating that Israel remains open for business. During Operation Protective Edge, the Israeli establishment was extremely concerned by the temporary closure of Ben Gurion airport due to the perceived threat from Hamas rockets. Even if the system is largely ineffective the mere presence of the trumpeted missile batteries serves to partially mollify fears regarding aviation and the safety of the country more generally.
Finally, Iron Dome has an important role to play regarding the Israeli population. The perception of improved security provided by the system serves to enhance Israeli confidence in the Israeli military and public support for Israeli operations in Gaza and elsewhere. Public support for Israel's continued brutal occupation of Gaza and the West Bank depends substantially on maintaining low casualties against what must by necessity be portrayed as an extremely fearsome enemy. Iron Dome helps to square the circle for the Israeli public by making it possible for Israelis to feel simultaneously hostile towards an apparently formidable enemy and yet also feel relatively secure. Furthermore, the deployment of Iron Dome batteries has served to make the Israeli public relatively sanguine about a potential conflict with Iran.
Critics of the effectiveness of Iron Dome are probably somewhat overstating their case - it is arguable whether Postal is correct to say that a deflected, but not destroyed, warhead represents a complete failure of the system. Nonetheless, it seems clear that Iron Dome is far less efficient than its partisan supporters pretend. However, the value of weapons systems does not depend solely on their technical capabilities – the broader political and social context is also relevant to determining the real value of military assets. Hence, the paradox of Iron Dome - a weapons system that is of dubious value regarding its primary objective and yet highly valuable to the Israeli state.
