Deterrence from Denial to Punishment
A typical Security Dilemma (SD) exists between India and China along the borders and on high seas. SD is a state when action taken by one side to increase its security invites a counter reaction from the other thereby further leading to decrease in its the security. For example a Road construction by India near LAC to increase its security has lead to Chinese inching closer on LAC thereby further decreasing security of India. Or the Chinese moves in Doklam to increase its security lead to Indian deployment there which has decreased security of China.
The security regime works on the doctrines of deterrence . If deterrence is “manipulation” of adversary’s behavior by threatening “harm,” “denial” and “punishment” are the two ways through which harm is inflicted.
Earlier Indian military strategy against China was “Deterrence by Denial” which has changed to “ Deterrence by Punishment”. Over the last decade, India’s military strategy shows a major shift to “deterrence by punishment”: Indian military now intends to take the battle into Chinese territory or target Chinese assets in the high-seas.
A deterrent strategy premised on denial “deters chiefly” by negatively affecting the adversary’s “estimate of the probability of gaining his objective” by creating a “capacity to deny territorial gains to the enemy.”
On the other hand, “deterrence by punishment” entails raising the costs for the adversary by taking the offensive to the enemy: to take the battle to its own territory, destroy resources dear to the enemy, or reduce its war-making potential. Denial works on manipulating the adversary’s calculation of the likelihood of victory; punishment, on the other hand, manipulates the adversary’s calculations of costs involved in perpetrating aggression.