Total operational complement is set by the manufacturer at 31 (including officers). There may be some minor difference in the IN boats due to differing operational procedures but will never exceed 40. Considering that under normal conditions, crew works in shift basis, the submarine can thus be operated by a working crew of around 12 people + 3-5 ancilliary crew (such as cooks, medical staff etc) with the balance being off shift / resting. Almost all civil ships in modern day are operated by small crews ( the Maersk Triple-E ships which are 400m long is be manned by crew of only 21) so the degree of process automation has developed to a highly advanced stage. It also makes life on-board much easier given the restricted space available on subs. There can be arguments made about combat effectiveness of small crews if say there is battle damage or system failure but by and large there is little to find fault in
IN Scorpene Submarines - News & Discussions
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Samar Rathi
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Submarines: Indian Scorpene Scandal Sizzles
India's effort to build six French Scorpene submarines under license has been delayed once again. That previous delay was in late 2014 when India said the first Scorpene would enter service in late 2016. Before that (2012) it was announced that the first Scorpene sub would not be ready until 2015. The most recent delays (caused by problems procuring components) will delay the first Scorpene until 2017, or later. The problem is mainly poor management by the Indian firms building the Scorpenes. One of the worst examples of this occurred in 2013 with the departure of ten Spanish technical advisors for the Scorpenes. Their contract expired at the end of March 2013 and, despite the expiration date being well known, Indian bureaucrats were unable to get a new contract in place on time. Similar avoidable delays have occurred several times already and the price has gone up with each delay.
Building the subs in India is very important because it will leave India with thousands of workers and specialists experienced in building modern submarines. But it appears that all this will be wasted because the defense procurement bureaucrats seem to have learned nothing. These officials already caused numerous delays and cost overruns during negotiations to build these diesel-electric submarines. The bureaucrats mismanaged this deal to the extent that it is now more than five years behind schedule. But it is even more behind schedule if you count the several years the Indian bureaucrats delayed it even getting started. The purchase contract was finally signed in 2005. The delays and mismanagement have so far increased the cost of the $4 billion project by 25 percent (to $834 million per sub).
In contrast Malaysia ordered two Scorpenes in 2002. These were built in Spain and France and delivered seven years later. The original plan was to have the first Indian built Scorpene delivered at the end of 2012. But now, because of problems getting the construction facilities and skilled workmen ready, the first Scorpene won't be delivered until 2017 (at the earliest), with one each year after that until all six are delivered. That schedule is subject to change and probably will, for the worse.
After the bureaucrats and politicians dithered for nearly a decade India finally signed a deal to buy the Scorpene in 2005, The delays led to the French increasing prices on some key components and India has problems in getting production going on their end. The first Scorpene was to be built in France, with the other five built in India. While some problems were expected (India has been doing license manufacturing of complex weapons for decades), the defense ministry procurement bureaucrats never ceased to amaze when it came to delaying work or just getting in the way.
The Scorpenes are similar to the Agosta 90B subs (also French) that Pakistan recently bought. The first of the Agostas was built in France, but the other two were built in Pakistan. The Scorpenes purchase was seen as a response to the Pakistani Agostas. The Scorpene are a more recent design, the result of cooperation between French and Spanish sub builders. The Agosta is a 1,500 ton (surface displacement) diesel-electric sub with a 36 man crew and four 533mm (21 inch) torpedo tubes (with 20 torpedoes and/or anti-ship missiles carried). The Scorpene is a little heavier (1,700 tons), has a smaller crew (32), and is a little faster. It has six 533mm torpedo tubes and carries 18 torpedoes and/or missiles. Both models can be equipped with an AIP (air independent propulsion) system. This enables the sub to stay under longer, thus making the sub harder to find. AIP allows the sub to travel under water for more than a week, at low speed (5-10 kilometers an hour). Two of the Indian Scorpenes are to have Indian made AIP installed.
All this ineffective urgency is in play because India's submarine fleet is dying of old age and new boats are not going to arrive in time. It's not like this was a surprise, but the Indian defense procurement bureaucracy has long been noted as slow, sloppy, and stubborn, especially in the face of demands that it speed up. The twisted tale of the tardy submarines is particularly painful.
The plan was to have a dozen new subs in service by the end of the decade. At present, there will be (with a bit of luck) three or four of them in service by then. The procurement bureaucracy is still seeking a supplier for the second batch of six diesel-electric subs. This second six probably won't even begin arriving by the end of the decade. It's hard to say, although the defense procurement nabobs speak of "fast tracking" this project, but long-time observers are not expecting speed.
Because of the Scorpene delays, some of the elderly Type 209s are being kept in service (but not allowed out to sea much) for several more years. Meanwhile several of the older Kilos have reached retirement age. Thus, by the time the first Scorpene arrives in 2017, India will only have five or six working subs. India believes it needs at least 18 non-nuclear subs in service to deal with Pakistan and China.
The hulls of all six Scorpenes have been completed, but filling those subs up with all the necessary equipment is an even more difficult task. Moreover, India insists that some of that equipment be manufactured in India, and that introduces even more complications and delays. Indian firms have a spotty track record in this area.
India is also building and buying nuclear subs. India received a Russian Akula nuclear attack (SSN) sub last year. This one is on lease with the option to buy. Indian SSNs and SSBNs (missile carrying boats) are under development, as they have been for decades.
While India was largely concerned with the Pakistani navy when the Scorpene contract was negotiated and signed, China is now seen as the primary adversary. The Chinese subs are not as effective as the Pakistani boats, both because of less advanced technology and less well trained crews. Pakistan noted this and recently ordered eight late-model Chinese subs. India could use their Scorpenes to confront any Chinese attempt to expand their naval presence into the Indian Ocean. Thus the delays and cost overruns with the Scorpenes are causing quite a lot of commotion in India. But at the rate India is going, it will take some 15 years of construction before all six of the Scorpenes are in service. At that point, India would have about a dozen subs (including nuclear powered models under construction). China will have over 60 boats, about 20 percent of them nuclear. China does have a lot for its warships to deal with off its coasts and in the Western Pacific but it does retain the capability of putting more subs off the Indian coast than can the Indian Navy.
India's effort to build six French Scorpene submarines under license has been delayed once again. That previous delay was in late 2014 when India said the first Scorpene would enter service in late 2016. Before that (2012) it was announced that the first Scorpene sub would not be ready until 2015. The most recent delays (caused by problems procuring components) will delay the first Scorpene until 2017, or later. The problem is mainly poor management by the Indian firms building the Scorpenes. One of the worst examples of this occurred in 2013 with the departure of ten Spanish technical advisors for the Scorpenes. Their contract expired at the end of March 2013 and, despite the expiration date being well known, Indian bureaucrats were unable to get a new contract in place on time. Similar avoidable delays have occurred several times already and the price has gone up with each delay.
Building the subs in India is very important because it will leave India with thousands of workers and specialists experienced in building modern submarines. But it appears that all this will be wasted because the defense procurement bureaucrats seem to have learned nothing. These officials already caused numerous delays and cost overruns during negotiations to build these diesel-electric submarines. The bureaucrats mismanaged this deal to the extent that it is now more than five years behind schedule. But it is even more behind schedule if you count the several years the Indian bureaucrats delayed it even getting started. The purchase contract was finally signed in 2005. The delays and mismanagement have so far increased the cost of the $4 billion project by 25 percent (to $834 million per sub).
In contrast Malaysia ordered two Scorpenes in 2002. These were built in Spain and France and delivered seven years later. The original plan was to have the first Indian built Scorpene delivered at the end of 2012. But now, because of problems getting the construction facilities and skilled workmen ready, the first Scorpene won't be delivered until 2017 (at the earliest), with one each year after that until all six are delivered. That schedule is subject to change and probably will, for the worse.
After the bureaucrats and politicians dithered for nearly a decade India finally signed a deal to buy the Scorpene in 2005, The delays led to the French increasing prices on some key components and India has problems in getting production going on their end. The first Scorpene was to be built in France, with the other five built in India. While some problems were expected (India has been doing license manufacturing of complex weapons for decades), the defense ministry procurement bureaucrats never ceased to amaze when it came to delaying work or just getting in the way.
The Scorpenes are similar to the Agosta 90B subs (also French) that Pakistan recently bought. The first of the Agostas was built in France, but the other two were built in Pakistan. The Scorpenes purchase was seen as a response to the Pakistani Agostas. The Scorpene are a more recent design, the result of cooperation between French and Spanish sub builders. The Agosta is a 1,500 ton (surface displacement) diesel-electric sub with a 36 man crew and four 533mm (21 inch) torpedo tubes (with 20 torpedoes and/or anti-ship missiles carried). The Scorpene is a little heavier (1,700 tons), has a smaller crew (32), and is a little faster. It has six 533mm torpedo tubes and carries 18 torpedoes and/or missiles. Both models can be equipped with an AIP (air independent propulsion) system. This enables the sub to stay under longer, thus making the sub harder to find. AIP allows the sub to travel under water for more than a week, at low speed (5-10 kilometers an hour). Two of the Indian Scorpenes are to have Indian made AIP installed.
All this ineffective urgency is in play because India's submarine fleet is dying of old age and new boats are not going to arrive in time. It's not like this was a surprise, but the Indian defense procurement bureaucracy has long been noted as slow, sloppy, and stubborn, especially in the face of demands that it speed up. The twisted tale of the tardy submarines is particularly painful.
The plan was to have a dozen new subs in service by the end of the decade. At present, there will be (with a bit of luck) three or four of them in service by then. The procurement bureaucracy is still seeking a supplier for the second batch of six diesel-electric subs. This second six probably won't even begin arriving by the end of the decade. It's hard to say, although the defense procurement nabobs speak of "fast tracking" this project, but long-time observers are not expecting speed.
Because of the Scorpene delays, some of the elderly Type 209s are being kept in service (but not allowed out to sea much) for several more years. Meanwhile several of the older Kilos have reached retirement age. Thus, by the time the first Scorpene arrives in 2017, India will only have five or six working subs. India believes it needs at least 18 non-nuclear subs in service to deal with Pakistan and China.
The hulls of all six Scorpenes have been completed, but filling those subs up with all the necessary equipment is an even more difficult task. Moreover, India insists that some of that equipment be manufactured in India, and that introduces even more complications and delays. Indian firms have a spotty track record in this area.
India is also building and buying nuclear subs. India received a Russian Akula nuclear attack (SSN) sub last year. This one is on lease with the option to buy. Indian SSNs and SSBNs (missile carrying boats) are under development, as they have been for decades.
While India was largely concerned with the Pakistani navy when the Scorpene contract was negotiated and signed, China is now seen as the primary adversary. The Chinese subs are not as effective as the Pakistani boats, both because of less advanced technology and less well trained crews. Pakistan noted this and recently ordered eight late-model Chinese subs. India could use their Scorpenes to confront any Chinese attempt to expand their naval presence into the Indian Ocean. Thus the delays and cost overruns with the Scorpenes are causing quite a lot of commotion in India. But at the rate India is going, it will take some 15 years of construction before all six of the Scorpenes are in service. At that point, India would have about a dozen subs (including nuclear powered models under construction). China will have over 60 boats, about 20 percent of them nuclear. China does have a lot for its warships to deal with off its coasts and in the Western Pacific but it does retain the capability of putting more subs off the Indian coast than can the Indian Navy.
@Samar Rathi, can you provide link for your article?
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Samar Rathi
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The licensed production route has not worked for India due to inefficiency in government run factories. I believe Modi's 'Make in India' program is sound in theory BUT private companies are afraid of bureaucracy. Steady small steps and strings of successes will encourage private players.
All Scorpene subs will be in the navy by 2020. Two SSBN and one more Akula will also be inducted by then. So navy will have 8-9 kilo, 4 209, 6 scorpene, 2 Akula class, 2 arihant class subs by 2020. This scene is not ideal, but still adequate in view of quick accretion of anti-sub capability of IN.
All Scorpene subs will be in the navy by 2020. Two SSBN and one more Akula will also be inducted by then. So navy will have 8-9 kilo, 4 209, 6 scorpene, 2 Akula class, 2 arihant class subs by 2020. This scene is not ideal, but still adequate in view of quick accretion of anti-sub capability of IN.
Bheeshma
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Why are we quoting a nonsensical website like strategypage? The article like the website is complete rubbish.
LETHALFORCE
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http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/india-france-relations-look-to-the-indian-ocean/
Image Credit: REUTERS/Charles Platiau
India-France Relations: Look to the Indian Ocean
“At a grand strategic level, France and India’s interests in the Indian Ocean are closely aligned.”
Since his investiture last year, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has startled many observers with the hyperactive nature of his foreign policy. Inevitably, journalistic commentary tends to focus primarily on the Modi administration’s diplomatic engagement with established great powers, such as the United States, or withemerging behemoths such as China. In contrast, when India’s relations with European nations are discussed, it is almost invariably through the softer, blurrier, lens of economic and trade-related issues.
There is, however, a “hard” aspect to India’s ties with certain industrialized middle powers in Europe – and all too often the strategic dimension of these relationships is overlooked. This is particularly true with regard to the French Republic. There has always been a rather unique quality to the Franco-Indian relationship. Even at the height of the Cold War, when India’s rapport with NATO was frequently colored by mistrust, relations between Paris and New Delhi remained relatively cordial. Although French security elites were discomforted by India’s rapprochement with the Soviet Union in the 1970s, their own cherished concept of strategic autonomy provided them with a degree of empathy for India’s quest for maneuverability within a polarized international system. France was one of the first Western countries to lift the arms embargo that hit both India and Pakistan in the aftermath of the 1965 conflict. Similarly, during the 1971 war, Paris was one of the only Western capitals to comment on the legitimacy of India’s concerns vis-à-vis the refugee crisis in its border regions with Bangladesh. Perhaps most importantly, France refused to sermonize India after the 1998 nuclear tests, and publicly opposed U.S. sanctions.
Since 1998, the Franco-Indian relationship has become increasingly strategic, even as one could argue that it has yet to realize its full economic potential. The Indo-French strategic dialogue is now broad and wide-ranging, and the annual joint military exercises have each year grown more elaborate. When Modi and French President Francois Hollande met earlier this spring, they succeeded in injecting new energy into Franco-Indian security ties. Building on this renewed momentum, both leaders should recognize that it is in the Indian Ocean region that both countries’ strategic interactions have the potential to prove the most transformational.
It is easy, sometimes, for foreign observers to forget that France is an Indian Ocean power, with a medium-sized military presence but avast exclusive economic zone (EEZ), as well as a longstanding sphere of influence in the southwestern quadrant of the Indian Ocean. La Reunion and Mayotte account for about one million French citizens, and when combined, France’s EEZ in the Indian Ocean amounts to more than 2.6 million square km.
In terms of cultural influence, there is a certain overlap with regard to French and Indian soft power in the Southwestern Indian Ocean. For example, Madagascar, with its strategic location astride the Mozambique Channel, is a former French colony, where French is still widely spoken, but where for a long time ethnic Indians of Gujarati origin controlled a large chunk of the local economy. Similarly, 25 percent of the population of la Reunion is of Indian origin.
At a grand strategic level, France and India’s interests in the Indian Ocean are closely aligned. Both countries have historically played an active custodial and humanitarian role throughout the region. They share concerns over the risks of sea-borne nuclear proliferation, and with regard to malevolent non-state actors. The two republics uphold similar core values when it comes to freedom of navigation, and closely monitor the threats posed by certain revisionist actors to the security of sea lines of communication.
Preserving Stability
France’s interest in helping preserve stability in the Indian Ocean is aptly summarized in the 2013 French White Paper, which describes the Indian Ocean as a transit region for international trade, and “at the heart of world strategic challenges.” France maintains a military presence in the Persian Gulf region, with air, naval, and ground forces in Abu Dhabi, as well as in the Horn of Africa, in Djibouti. In addition to the basing of these military assets, Paris recognizes that the Indian Ocean Region’s strategic equilibrium can only be truly maintained once India has emerged as a more powerful naval actor, with a greater capacity for sustained operations at sea and power projection. The annual Varuna naval exercises between India and France should therefore not solely be viewed through the prism of military diplomacy, but also as a deliberate French effort in regional capacity building.
Over the past few years, these exercises have grown in scale and complexity, involving high-end platforms such as nuclear powered submarines and aircraft carriers. Through the regular conduct of such joint exercises, both countries have increased their interoperability and general proficiency. French sales of Scorpene class submarines, and naval surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems will strengthen India’s naval capacity, and if fitted with conformal fuel tanks and Exocetanti-ship cruise missiles, the Rafale could potentially play an important maritime strike role. In the years ahead, there are opportunities for France and India to enhance their cooperation in space-based maritime surveillance, unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) technology, amphibious special forces training, and in precision targeting in clustered littoral environments.
In the future, the Persian Gulf is likely to become a region of increased military competition – whether conventional, nuclear or sub-conventional. Despite reported progress in the nuclear negotiations with Iran, there are growing doubts, both in Paris and New Delhi, over the ability of the Obama administration to stem the flow of sectarian violence currently wracking the region, or to durably prevent further nuclear proliferation. In light of these shared uncertainties over Washington’s staying power in the Middle East, it might prove judicious for second-tier democratic powers to begin to more effectively coordinate their strategies and policies. A more institutionalized strategic dialogue between India and France with regard to Persian Gulf security might provide a good first step.
Finally, Paris and New Delhi should seek to enhance their cooperation in the field of maritime domain awareness and intelligence gathering. Over the past few years, a dual-use infrastructure competition has been emerging across the Indo-Pacific. This low-level, almost subterranean, contest is unfolding in Southeast Asian archipelagic regions, where both the U.S. and China have competed to provide countries such as Indonesia with coastal radar systems under dual management, or throughout the Indian Ocean basin, where both India and China have vied for access and surveillance amongst smaller littoral and island nations.
Under the guise of regional capacity building, revisionist powers such as China can slowly expand their influence and develop the intelligence and support infrastructure needed to sustain military operations at sea. By spreading coastal radar chains, or shore-based electronic sensors in places such as the Seychelles, or by discreetly laying undersea acoustic arrays along portions of the Indian Ocean seabed, China can increase its operational awareness of the maritime environs of both Indian and French partners. Similarly, squadrons of unarmed Chinese drones pre-positioned in certain littoral states – ostensibly for assistance in anti-piracy and anti-smuggling efforts – could provide Chinese forces with low-end intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) in certain contested maritime regions, and deliver additional discrimination and targeting information to Chinese military assets.
There is clearly scope for both France and India’s diplomatic and intelligence communities to better coordinate on the challenge posed by dual-use infrastructure, particularly in Eastern Africa and the Southwestern Indian Ocean. Winning this competition will require the kind of holistic approach the Modi government has shown most recently in the Indian Ocean, using different kinds of tools – economic and developmental – to win over smaller littoral and archipelagic states, which, one must not forget, have their own agency and have proven adept throughout history at playing off one great power against another.
Iskander Rehman is a non-resident Fellow in the South Asia Program at the Atlantic Council. He can be followed on twitter at @IskanderRehman
Image Credit: REUTERS/Charles Platiau
India-France Relations: Look to the Indian Ocean
“At a grand strategic level, France and India’s interests in the Indian Ocean are closely aligned.”
Since his investiture last year, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has startled many observers with the hyperactive nature of his foreign policy. Inevitably, journalistic commentary tends to focus primarily on the Modi administration’s diplomatic engagement with established great powers, such as the United States, or withemerging behemoths such as China. In contrast, when India’s relations with European nations are discussed, it is almost invariably through the softer, blurrier, lens of economic and trade-related issues.
There is, however, a “hard” aspect to India’s ties with certain industrialized middle powers in Europe – and all too often the strategic dimension of these relationships is overlooked. This is particularly true with regard to the French Republic. There has always been a rather unique quality to the Franco-Indian relationship. Even at the height of the Cold War, when India’s rapport with NATO was frequently colored by mistrust, relations between Paris and New Delhi remained relatively cordial. Although French security elites were discomforted by India’s rapprochement with the Soviet Union in the 1970s, their own cherished concept of strategic autonomy provided them with a degree of empathy for India’s quest for maneuverability within a polarized international system. France was one of the first Western countries to lift the arms embargo that hit both India and Pakistan in the aftermath of the 1965 conflict. Similarly, during the 1971 war, Paris was one of the only Western capitals to comment on the legitimacy of India’s concerns vis-à-vis the refugee crisis in its border regions with Bangladesh. Perhaps most importantly, France refused to sermonize India after the 1998 nuclear tests, and publicly opposed U.S. sanctions.
Since 1998, the Franco-Indian relationship has become increasingly strategic, even as one could argue that it has yet to realize its full economic potential. The Indo-French strategic dialogue is now broad and wide-ranging, and the annual joint military exercises have each year grown more elaborate. When Modi and French President Francois Hollande met earlier this spring, they succeeded in injecting new energy into Franco-Indian security ties. Building on this renewed momentum, both leaders should recognize that it is in the Indian Ocean region that both countries’ strategic interactions have the potential to prove the most transformational.
It is easy, sometimes, for foreign observers to forget that France is an Indian Ocean power, with a medium-sized military presence but avast exclusive economic zone (EEZ), as well as a longstanding sphere of influence in the southwestern quadrant of the Indian Ocean. La Reunion and Mayotte account for about one million French citizens, and when combined, France’s EEZ in the Indian Ocean amounts to more than 2.6 million square km.
In terms of cultural influence, there is a certain overlap with regard to French and Indian soft power in the Southwestern Indian Ocean. For example, Madagascar, with its strategic location astride the Mozambique Channel, is a former French colony, where French is still widely spoken, but where for a long time ethnic Indians of Gujarati origin controlled a large chunk of the local economy. Similarly, 25 percent of the population of la Reunion is of Indian origin.
At a grand strategic level, France and India’s interests in the Indian Ocean are closely aligned. Both countries have historically played an active custodial and humanitarian role throughout the region. They share concerns over the risks of sea-borne nuclear proliferation, and with regard to malevolent non-state actors. The two republics uphold similar core values when it comes to freedom of navigation, and closely monitor the threats posed by certain revisionist actors to the security of sea lines of communication.
Preserving Stability
France’s interest in helping preserve stability in the Indian Ocean is aptly summarized in the 2013 French White Paper, which describes the Indian Ocean as a transit region for international trade, and “at the heart of world strategic challenges.” France maintains a military presence in the Persian Gulf region, with air, naval, and ground forces in Abu Dhabi, as well as in the Horn of Africa, in Djibouti. In addition to the basing of these military assets, Paris recognizes that the Indian Ocean Region’s strategic equilibrium can only be truly maintained once India has emerged as a more powerful naval actor, with a greater capacity for sustained operations at sea and power projection. The annual Varuna naval exercises between India and France should therefore not solely be viewed through the prism of military diplomacy, but also as a deliberate French effort in regional capacity building.
Over the past few years, these exercises have grown in scale and complexity, involving high-end platforms such as nuclear powered submarines and aircraft carriers. Through the regular conduct of such joint exercises, both countries have increased their interoperability and general proficiency. French sales of Scorpene class submarines, and naval surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems will strengthen India’s naval capacity, and if fitted with conformal fuel tanks and Exocetanti-ship cruise missiles, the Rafale could potentially play an important maritime strike role. In the years ahead, there are opportunities for France and India to enhance their cooperation in space-based maritime surveillance, unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) technology, amphibious special forces training, and in precision targeting in clustered littoral environments.
In the future, the Persian Gulf is likely to become a region of increased military competition – whether conventional, nuclear or sub-conventional. Despite reported progress in the nuclear negotiations with Iran, there are growing doubts, both in Paris and New Delhi, over the ability of the Obama administration to stem the flow of sectarian violence currently wracking the region, or to durably prevent further nuclear proliferation. In light of these shared uncertainties over Washington’s staying power in the Middle East, it might prove judicious for second-tier democratic powers to begin to more effectively coordinate their strategies and policies. A more institutionalized strategic dialogue between India and France with regard to Persian Gulf security might provide a good first step.
Finally, Paris and New Delhi should seek to enhance their cooperation in the field of maritime domain awareness and intelligence gathering. Over the past few years, a dual-use infrastructure competition has been emerging across the Indo-Pacific. This low-level, almost subterranean, contest is unfolding in Southeast Asian archipelagic regions, where both the U.S. and China have competed to provide countries such as Indonesia with coastal radar systems under dual management, or throughout the Indian Ocean basin, where both India and China have vied for access and surveillance amongst smaller littoral and island nations.
Under the guise of regional capacity building, revisionist powers such as China can slowly expand their influence and develop the intelligence and support infrastructure needed to sustain military operations at sea. By spreading coastal radar chains, or shore-based electronic sensors in places such as the Seychelles, or by discreetly laying undersea acoustic arrays along portions of the Indian Ocean seabed, China can increase its operational awareness of the maritime environs of both Indian and French partners. Similarly, squadrons of unarmed Chinese drones pre-positioned in certain littoral states – ostensibly for assistance in anti-piracy and anti-smuggling efforts – could provide Chinese forces with low-end intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) in certain contested maritime regions, and deliver additional discrimination and targeting information to Chinese military assets.
There is clearly scope for both France and India’s diplomatic and intelligence communities to better coordinate on the challenge posed by dual-use infrastructure, particularly in Eastern Africa and the Southwestern Indian Ocean. Winning this competition will require the kind of holistic approach the Modi government has shown most recently in the Indian Ocean, using different kinds of tools – economic and developmental – to win over smaller littoral and archipelagic states, which, one must not forget, have their own agency and have proven adept throughout history at playing off one great power against another.
Iskander Rehman is a non-resident Fellow in the South Asia Program at the Atlantic Council. He can be followed on twitter at @IskanderRehman
@LETHALFORCE, thanks for the article. Finally someone touched Indo-French relations in detail.
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Kalvari, the first of six French- designed Scorpene diesel-electric attack submarines, is likely to leave the construction yard in Mumbai for rigorous sea trials from September 30, bringing it a step closer to induction into the Navy. The submarines are being built under licence at the Mazagon Dock Ltd (MDL) in Mumbai under the Rs 23,562-crore Project-75. “People are working round-the- clock to complete last-minute preparations. If all goes well, sea trials will begin on September 30,” a top official told HT. Kalvari was floated out of her building dock on April 6. Some systems and equipment have been validated during basic dock trials in the months leading up to the start of complex sea trials, including weapon testing in June 2016. “Joint teams of the Navy and MDL will now conduct specific tests related to systems, equipment, acoustics, safety, and survivability under different conditions of operation in the coming months before declaring Kalvari fit for induction by next September,” said another official.The remaining five boats will be delivered to the Navy by 2020. The 66-metre submarine can accommodate a crew of 31 and dive up to a depth of 300 metres to elude enemy detection. The Scorpene project, plagued by cost overruns and missed deadlines, is important to the Navy as its underwater attack capabilities have blunted over time. India operates 13 ageing conventional submarines and an Akula-II nuclear-powered attack boat leased from Russia.
Read more:
India’s Scorpene programme set to enter its most crucial phase
Read more:
India’s Scorpene programme set to enter its most crucial phase
LETHALFORCE
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http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahom...new-Indian-Navy-submarines-complete-2016.html
First of six new Indian Navy submarines to be complete by 2016
After much delay, the process for constructing six new submarines for the Indian Navy can finally begin now after the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) accepted a confidential report on the capacity of domestic shipyards to carry out the mammoth task.
The DAC meeting on Friday was scheduled to take up the issue but it could not come up for discussion as Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar had to leave mid-way.
Sources said the subject would be taken up at the DAC meeting scheduled to be held on Tuesday.
+3
The first of the six Scorpene submarines will be ready for induction by 2016 after the Defence Acquisition Council accepted a confidential report on the capacity of domestic shipyards
It will be a crucial decision for the Navy which is running critically short of submarines and the process of constructing new under-water boats under Project 75 India has been languishing for years.
The feasibility and capacity study report of the domestic shipyards was submitted on March 31. Sources said once the report is studied by the DAC, the defence ministry can invite bids from the shipyards capable of tying up with foreign vendors for going ahead with construction.
The estimated cost of the project is over Rs 50,000 crore which will go up significantly.
Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar had to leave mid-way through the Defence Acquisition Council meeting
The Ministry of Defence had set up a high-level committee to examine the strength of domestic shipyards.
These included Mazgaon Dock Limited (Mumbai), Hindustan Shipyard Limited (Vishakhapatnam), Cochin Shipyard Limited and two private shipyards — Larsen and Toubro (Tamil Nadu) and Pipavav Shipyard (Gujarat). Under the plan, these shipyards can tie up with a foreign submarine maker. India’s submarine building capacity is limited at the moment with only Mazgaon Dock Limited having some know-how as it is constructing the French Scorpene submarine.
Private player Larsen and Toubro has made significant contributions in the construction of India’s only nuclear-powered submarine Arihant.
The new line of conventional submarines will have air independent propulsion to increase its underwater endurance.
The Navy’s current submarine strength is down to 13 though it had planned to have 24 boats by 2024.
It is nowhere near reaching the target thought plan to have six nuclear powered attack submarines was cleared in February this year.
The first of the six Scorpene submarines under construction at MDL will be ready for induction only in 2016.
Apart from the Navy’s submarine plan, the Indian Air Force will get 48 new Mi-17V5 helicopters.
These helicopters, which have become a lifeline for IAF’s search and rescue activities, will cost Rs 6,700 crore.
The IAF’s air defence capability will also get boost as it is getting 14 new firing units of home-built surface to air missile Akash.
The acquisition is worth Rs 4,500 crore.
Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahom...y-submarines-complete-2016.html#ixzz3la3ilDGe
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First of six new Indian Navy submarines to be complete by 2016
After much delay, the process for constructing six new submarines for the Indian Navy can finally begin now after the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) accepted a confidential report on the capacity of domestic shipyards to carry out the mammoth task.
The DAC meeting on Friday was scheduled to take up the issue but it could not come up for discussion as Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar had to leave mid-way.
Sources said the subject would be taken up at the DAC meeting scheduled to be held on Tuesday.
+3
The first of the six Scorpene submarines will be ready for induction by 2016 after the Defence Acquisition Council accepted a confidential report on the capacity of domestic shipyards
It will be a crucial decision for the Navy which is running critically short of submarines and the process of constructing new under-water boats under Project 75 India has been languishing for years.
The feasibility and capacity study report of the domestic shipyards was submitted on March 31. Sources said once the report is studied by the DAC, the defence ministry can invite bids from the shipyards capable of tying up with foreign vendors for going ahead with construction.
The estimated cost of the project is over Rs 50,000 crore which will go up significantly.
Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar had to leave mid-way through the Defence Acquisition Council meeting
The Ministry of Defence had set up a high-level committee to examine the strength of domestic shipyards.
These included Mazgaon Dock Limited (Mumbai), Hindustan Shipyard Limited (Vishakhapatnam), Cochin Shipyard Limited and two private shipyards — Larsen and Toubro (Tamil Nadu) and Pipavav Shipyard (Gujarat). Under the plan, these shipyards can tie up with a foreign submarine maker. India’s submarine building capacity is limited at the moment with only Mazgaon Dock Limited having some know-how as it is constructing the French Scorpene submarine.
Private player Larsen and Toubro has made significant contributions in the construction of India’s only nuclear-powered submarine Arihant.
The new line of conventional submarines will have air independent propulsion to increase its underwater endurance.
The Navy’s current submarine strength is down to 13 though it had planned to have 24 boats by 2024.
It is nowhere near reaching the target thought plan to have six nuclear powered attack submarines was cleared in February this year.
The first of the six Scorpene submarines under construction at MDL will be ready for induction only in 2016.
Apart from the Navy’s submarine plan, the Indian Air Force will get 48 new Mi-17V5 helicopters.
These helicopters, which have become a lifeline for IAF’s search and rescue activities, will cost Rs 6,700 crore.
The IAF’s air defence capability will also get boost as it is getting 14 new firing units of home-built surface to air missile Akash.
The acquisition is worth Rs 4,500 crore.
Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahom...y-submarines-complete-2016.html#ixzz3la3ilDGe
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Mazagon Dock Ltd likely to get fresh orders after Scorpene
Mumbai-based Mazagon Dock Ltd, which is building six Scorpene submarines, is likely to get a follow-on order for "some more" of these vessels.
The first Scorpene class submarine -- Kalvari, that was undocked in April -- will shortly proceed for sea trials.
It is likely to be commissioned in September next year and, thereafter, the remaining five submarines will follow every nine months as per a revised schedule.
The sources said that MDL is likely to order for more as the government does not want to waste the skill and infrastructure that has developed at the shipyard.
While the first four are conventional submarines, the last two are to be equipped with Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system, which will enable the vessels to stay underwater for a longer duration.
Sources said that any additional submarines are likely to have AIP technology.
Scorpene submarines are being built in partnership with French firm, DCNS.
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com...rders-after-scorpene/articleshow/49232595.cms
Mumbai-based Mazagon Dock Ltd, which is building six Scorpene submarines, is likely to get a follow-on order for "some more" of these vessels.
The first Scorpene class submarine -- Kalvari, that was undocked in April -- will shortly proceed for sea trials.
It is likely to be commissioned in September next year and, thereafter, the remaining five submarines will follow every nine months as per a revised schedule.
The sources said that MDL is likely to order for more as the government does not want to waste the skill and infrastructure that has developed at the shipyard.
While the first four are conventional submarines, the last two are to be equipped with Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system, which will enable the vessels to stay underwater for a longer duration.
Sources said that any additional submarines are likely to have AIP technology.
Scorpene submarines are being built in partnership with French firm, DCNS.
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com...rders-after-scorpene/articleshow/49232595.cms
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4 More French Submarines to Meet Indian Navy’s Requirement
France may get further orders to supply conventional submarines, in order to meet the Indian Navy’s critical requirement of underwater capability. According to sources in South Block, the French firm DCNS, which is already building six Scorpene submarines in partnership with Mumbai-based Mazagaon Dock Limited, is likely to get a follow-on order for more such submarines. The Indian Navy has been struggling to maintain its depleting submarine fleet, especially after a spate of accidents last year.
India’s submarine strength is now officially down to 15, which includes nine Kilo class (EKMs), four German-designed HDWs (SSKs) and one Akula class nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) on lease from Russia (since 2012) and the INS Arihant, the country’s first indigenous nuclear-powered submarine, which is undergoing various levels of sea trials.
The defence PSU MDL, which is developing the Scorpene-class submarine Kalvari, undocked in April this year, is carrying out sea trials. It is likely to be commissioned in September next year and thereafter, the remaining five submarines will follow every nine months, as per the revised schedule. The remaining five boats of Project 75 would be delivered to the Navy by 2020 and would form the core of the Navy’s submarine arm for the next two decades.
While the first four are conventional submarines, the last two are to be equipped with the Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system, which will enable the vessel to stay underwater for longer. The process of acquiring six more submarines under Project 75 is yet to kick off, as the government is still in the process of finalising the shipyard.
http://www.newindianexpress.com/nat...y’s-Requirement/2015/10/06/article3064871.ece
France may get further orders to supply conventional submarines, in order to meet the Indian Navy’s critical requirement of underwater capability. According to sources in South Block, the French firm DCNS, which is already building six Scorpene submarines in partnership with Mumbai-based Mazagaon Dock Limited, is likely to get a follow-on order for more such submarines. The Indian Navy has been struggling to maintain its depleting submarine fleet, especially after a spate of accidents last year.
India’s submarine strength is now officially down to 15, which includes nine Kilo class (EKMs), four German-designed HDWs (SSKs) and one Akula class nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) on lease from Russia (since 2012) and the INS Arihant, the country’s first indigenous nuclear-powered submarine, which is undergoing various levels of sea trials.
The defence PSU MDL, which is developing the Scorpene-class submarine Kalvari, undocked in April this year, is carrying out sea trials. It is likely to be commissioned in September next year and thereafter, the remaining five submarines will follow every nine months, as per the revised schedule. The remaining five boats of Project 75 would be delivered to the Navy by 2020 and would form the core of the Navy’s submarine arm for the next two decades.
While the first four are conventional submarines, the last two are to be equipped with the Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system, which will enable the vessel to stay underwater for longer. The process of acquiring six more submarines under Project 75 is yet to kick off, as the government is still in the process of finalising the shipyard.
http://www.newindianexpress.com/nat...y’s-Requirement/2015/10/06/article3064871.ece
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Well 4 Scropene's and last six would be improved version with DRDO AIP
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Abhijat
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Assuming it to be true .
Here is the datasheet for the same :
Propulsion • Encapsulated missile with two-stage solid propellant motors
Navigation • Inertial navigation
Terminal guidance during cruise phase • Active RF homing
Warhead • Insensitive warhead • Optimised HE blast and pre-fragmented effects • Impact fuze and proximity function
Missile characteristics • Weight: 655 kg • Length: 4.69 m • Diameter: 350 mm • Speed: high subsonic
Also , the missile has a range of 50 km
Source: http://www.mbda-systems.com/mediagallery/files/exocet-sm39_datasheet-1424428401.pdf
We are looking at Submarine launched BrahMos and BrahMos-|| . Whatever version of Exocet it may be , its still no match.
Scorpene itself was a desperate but quick measure to increase the submarine strength till 2020. It is well inferior to any modern submarine that has entered service post 2010.
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Scorpion will not support such a big missile ... well the Amur offered it's Amur 950 with Brahmos VLS cells, but Navy Chooses the scorpene
