Historical Fighter Planes of India.
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shom
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The Folland Gnats were flown by many squadrons,,, they were as follows:-
No.2 Squadron
No.9 Squadron
No.15 Squadron
No.18 Squadron
No.21 Squadron
No.22 Squadron
No.23 Squadron
No.24 Squadron
of the Indian Air Force (IAF)
If anybody Insists I can give details of the squadron as it is mentioned in wikipidia,,,,,,
Data Courtesy:- Wikipidia
Image courtesy:- Bharat Rakshak
No.2 Squadron
No.9 Squadron
No.15 Squadron
No.18 Squadron
No.21 Squadron
No.22 Squadron
No.23 Squadron
No.24 Squadron
of the Indian Air Force (IAF)
If anybody Insists I can give details of the squadron as it is mentioned in wikipidia,,,,,,
Data Courtesy:- Wikipidia
Image courtesy:- Bharat Rakshak
shom
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The Folland Gnats saw extensive action during the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak conflicts,,, One name must be taken that is Nirmal Jeet Singh Sekhon (the sole receiver of Param veer Chakra in IAF). I will come to the story of his valor and bravery ,,, but before that i am posting some other great dog fights and combats in the history of IAF with the help of Gnat.
Folland Gnats of the Indian Air Force engaged in multiple air combats during the 1965 and 1971 Wars. Ten air combat kills have been made by this diminutive fighter in both wars and the story of one such combat is narrated in this article.
Shooting down a Sabre : 14 Sept 1965
Written below is my actual experience in combat with a Sabre in the 1965 war. This happened exactly 43 years ago on September 14th, 1965. Today incidentally is September 14th 2008. I am reliving the event blow by blow as it occurred. This is the inner story.
On September 14th 1965, I led a formation of four Gnats to escort four Canberras on a secret bombing mission to an undisclosed target in Lahore sector. The mission details were even kept secret from me. The Canberra formation had a scheduled rendezvous with my formation over our base, at an exact specified time and under strict radio silence. The Canberra's arrived on the dot and made two orbits over the airfield. Our formation of four Gnats took off and We placed our selves 500 yards behind and 50 feet below the four Canberra's who were flying low at 500 feet above ground level. Since the down wash of the Canberra's jet wake was creating turbulence, I moved my Gnats 100 feet above them.
After entering Pak. Territory The Canberra's inched lower down to 200 feet and built up their speed presumably for the final run in to the target. Suddenly they pulled up in a climb for their bombing run. We too pulled up behind them. All hell broke loose, suddenly the sky become full of heavy anti aircraft fire. The sky was peppered with exploding shells. The Gnat is a "tin can" with high density engineering, in other words one hit could be fatal. Realizing the intensity of flak I continued my pull up to 10,000 feet allowing the Canberra's to do their " work", on their own. We had no role in the bombing attack. Our job was to provide air cover up to and over the target and then recover them back to Indian Territory. From the height of 10,000 feet my Gnats were safe and I was still able to keep an eye on the Canberras. The last minute decision to pull up to 10,000 feet was necessary because the Pak. 40 mm anti aircraft shells were fused to "self destruct" at around 9,000 feet. At this height we were safe and were yet able to keep an eye out for any enemy fighters threatening our "wards".
Wg Cdr Bharat Singh (CO) (Standing 6th from Right) along with pilots of No.2 Squadron. This Photograph was taken sometime in 1965 before the September War.
Every thing worked out perfect. After the din and smoke created by exploding of heavy bombs, I saw the Canberra's escaping at low level towards the Indian border. I positioned my formation of Gnats behind them, but kept my height till I had cleared the exploding anti aircraft shells. Since the Canberra's were at a very low height, my formation of Gnats were now the only visible targets for the enemy ack ack. Their 40 mm anti aircraft shells were now exploding directly below us. After clearing the exploding shells I commenced a slow decent keeping an eye on the Canberra's, and at the same time intensely scanned the sky for "enemy air"
I had hardly descended to about 6000 feet when I spotted four PAF Sabres, on our left, low at 11 o'clock, at a distance of about 5 miles. They were busy carrying out rocket attacks on Indian ground positions near Amritsar. I observed that they were flying a left hand orbit, which placed the Canberra formation in their blind spot, or so I presumed!
There was a great temptation on my part to go in for an attack right away, but discipline prevailed. My primary duty was to protect and escort the Canberras safely and in this case, without attracting enemy attention. Since the enemy fighters seemed of no direct threat to the Canberras I continued with my duty of "sneaking" the Canberra's safely across the border; with the remote possibility of returning and engaging the enemy Fighters.
Suddenly one Sabre turned sharply towards the Canberra's and positioned himself for an attack. It seemed that the enemy pilot had failed to spot the four "tiny birds of prey" at 6000 feet above them. I reacted fast and breaking the Radio silence, ordered the Canberra formation to turn, "Hard Starboard - GO," there was no response from the Canberra's. To my horror the Sabre closing in fast had now opened fire, I saw gun smoke puffs from the Sabres nose. Seconds count in Fighter operation. I called again, this time there was immediate reaction, the Canberra's whipped around hard to the right and I simultaneously went in to a semi half roll dive to cut off and intercept the attacking Sabre, that was the last I saw of them, which however included my own three Gnats, who, having received no instructions from me, quite rightly remained with the Canberra's giving them continued cover. There was a tactical mistake how ever, my No, 2 should have followed me unless ordered otherwise. In Air Combat our operating procedures and practices clearly define No. 2's duties. He is "gun fodder" his primary duty is to hang on behind his leader, to observe and keep the leaders tail clear from enemy threat, thus allowing the Leader to concentrate on the task at hand; the destruction of the enemy aircraft.
I sensed at the back of my mind that I was now alone. As I pulling hard out of the dive, I realized that, now single handed, I was facing four enemy Sabres, one ahead of me climbing vertically, having broken off his attack, and the other three some were ahead and to my left. During the process of executing the attack on the lead Sabre I had realized that, to position my self for the attack on the lead Sabre, I would have to deliberately maneuver my Gnat in a manner which would put me between the lead Sabre and his formation of three other Sabres, the latter, now not visible, were some were some were behind and on my left. I realised that under the circumstances I could easily be sandwiched in between and possibly shot down. This tactical air situation was sending shivers up my spine. How ever it was imperative for me to take this risk to press home my attack and at the same time, act as a decoy, to divert the attention of the three Sabres on to me; this would minimize the possibility of a concentrated attack by the three other Sabres, on the escaping Canberra's.
Any way I was so angry and indignant, that I threw caution to the wind and concentrated all my skills towards the destruction of the offending enemy Fighter.
Pulling hard out of my high speed dive, hitting 7g, I positioned my self behind the escaping Sabre. We were now both climbing in the vertical plain, I behind him, with vengeance in my heart, thirsting for his blood. I was boiling with anger, both, at the Canberra's, for their sluggish response which could have very easily ended in disaster and the rude shock at my own complacence for allowing the enemy Fighter to close in to a range from where he could open fire on one of my "chicks" and, very nearly getting away with it. Later I came to know that the tail end Canberra had five or six five bullet holes, but made it safely back to his base.
In retrospect, I must confess that I misjudged the distance and the closing in speed of the Sabre. He got in to firing range very quickly and I was slow in my reaction. Candidly I should have warned the Canberra's earlier, as soon as I had spotted the Sabres attacking our troops and ordered them to "buster" (accelerate to full power) the Canberra's being fast, the Sabre would have no chance of catch up with them. As a bonus, this would have provided the unobserved Gnats a "turkey shoot". Even after 45 years I have never been able to reconcile my self with this serious error of judgment. All I can say; so many things happened so fast "¦hell, I am human!
Pulling out of my high "G"dive and now in the vertical plain I got the enemy Sabre squarely on my gun sight. Having broken off his attack the Pakistani pilot was trying to escape in the vertical plain. In the process of pulling out of my dive I had built up speed of over 500 knots. With this speed in the vertical climb I had serious problems slowing down in spite of closing my throttle fully and opening my air brakes. I realized that if I continued in this manner, with the enemy fighter visible through my front wind shield I would have rammed the Pakistani Sabre. I turned a few degrees to the right and came out parallel to the enemy air craft on my left, I was very close and saw the pilot turn his head and look at me. I was still over shooting him in the vertical plane. I realized immediately that I was in eminent danger because any further acceleration of my Gnat upwards would place the Sabre behind me in a position to get in to my blind spot and then on to my tail and shoot me out of the sky. I had run out of options, and waited for his next move.
This is where the Pakistani pilot, a Squadron Leader, (PAF Sabre Squadrons were Commanded by Squadron Leaders and therefore he was perhaps a Squadron Commander,) signed his own death warrant. He turned to the left, away from me, there by allowing me to easily position my self on his tail. You can not afford mistakes in Air Combat, if you do; you are "a dead duck"!! This one cardinal mistake cost the Pakistani Pilot his life!
I, like most pilots, used three simple techniques in a Dog Fight.
(1) Get on to the enemy tail quickly and at all costs.
(2) Hang on to this position with all your might and wits.
(3) Keep this position and shoot when the opportunity is just right.
(4) Gnats have limited ammo on board and we cannot afford to waste it.
That, as most Fighter pilots would do in Air Combat, was the simple technique I applied in this Dog Fight, except for the preplanned and much discussed tactic of fighting a Sabre in the vertical plain. The Sabre would leave a Gnat "sitting" if the Gnat pilot tried to fight the Sabre on his terms, in the horizontal plain.
The combat now started in earnest. I remember even now 43 years later, that I was icy sober all the anger was gone, replaced by intense concentration and the cold blooded application of my 16 years of training and the thought, "if you don't kill him, he will", kept racing through my mind. Every thing else was blanked off, no Papa no Mama or wife and children, just intense concentration and quivering reflexes.
A fighter pilot after gaining flying experience over the years subconsciously allows his reflexes to take over his normal brain signals. In combat this is vital because reflexes work much faster than brain generated activity. A fighter pilot with high reflexes has a great advantage over others with slower reflexes especially when things are happening very fast.
Right from the start the Sabre pilot was in the defensive mode. Psychologically this placed me in a "win win" mind set. Frankly, if I had been the Sabre pilot I would have taken a very aggressive posture by using continuous and violent maneuvers to shake the Gnat off my tail and continuously jink around preventing the Gnat pilot from placing his gun sight on me. In such a situation it is vital that the pilot under attack takes his fighter to the very edge of its capability hoping that the attacking Fighter would be out maneuvered or if he crosses the edge, (the limiting aerodynamic parameters,) beyond which the attacking Fighter plane would go out of control, or outmaneuvered and fall prey to the Sabres guns. After all what else had he to lose, death is terminal and final.
In our dog fight the Sabre pilot was taking only passive evasive action to avoid my gun fire. I went in to my first attack, a perfect text book pattern and totally missed the Sabre who at the exact moment pulled in to a high "G" turn, shaking me off in to a uncontrollable skid . I quickly went up to my "safe" perch position, high up and behind the Sabre. In each subsequent attack I fired on the Sabre in the horizontal plain and zoomed up to my perch position. In every such attack the Sabre pilot had the uncanny ability to turn hard, exactly when I came in to firing range, he must have had a rubber neck!! This way my Gnat, unable to hold the tight turn, skidded out every time, creating serious problems keeping my Gyro gun sight on the enemy plane.
The Gnat gun sight was highly sensitive to high "G" maneuvers, and the controlling gyro would "topple" in a tight turn.. I wasted a lot of my ammo under these conditions. Now desperate, with low fuel, short of ammunition and probably three Sabres some were behind, possibly on my tail, caused my spinal temperature to fall to freezing point. I had only one last chance, I switched my sights to the Fixed Ring position cutting out the gyro sight and planned to manually apply the good old fashioned one and a half "rad". deflection angle and when the Gnat started skidding out, to use the old fashioned "fly through" method. I did just that. On this, my last and final attack, I laid off one and a half rad and as soon I got into firing range pressed my trigger, as my Gnat started skidding out I held the fixed sight as long as I could, ahead and slightly above the line of flight of the enemy Fighter and then allowed the enemy plane to fly through my long burst of 30 mm shells. Half way through my cannon fire the Sabre dipped its wing to the right and then to the left, dropped its nose and headed toward the ground in a shallow dive. It looked out of control. My guns were now silent, I had run out of ammunition!! I waited for thirty seconds or so, as the Sabre going down disappeared from my line of vision. Then I shot off to home sweet home and as fast as possible. It certainly would not have been very healthy for me to hang around, perhaps with three very angry Sabre pilots on my tail and I, with very little fuel and no ammunition. This is my second principal "He who runs, lives to fight another day."
As an honest Indian, when submitting my mission report, I did not claim this kill because I did not see the tell tale signs of hits normally claimed by other Pilots. There was no smoke, no flames no explosion nor did I see the aircraft hit the ground. How could I, in all honesty claim the "kill"?
How ever the next day my kill was confirmed by the District Commissioner Amritsar. I received information that the District Commissioner Amritsar, Mr. Bedi, had watched the Dog Fight between one Gnat and a Sabre close to Amritsar town and saw the Sabre crash with in Indian Territory, the pilot did not eject and a PAF. Squadron Leaders body was recovered from the crashed aircraft. This information was conveyed by Mr.Bedi to Headquarters Western Air Command, who officially confirmed my kill after receiving Mr. Bedi's report.
This month 43 years ago a lot of nice and capable Fighter pilots from both sides got killed in action. May their souls rest in peace.
A fighter sweep over Pakistan : PAF 104 Starfighters Vs. No.2 Squadron Gnats.
Indian Air Force, after gaining Air Superiority over Pakistan in the Punjab area, the top Indian Air Force planners decided to lure the PAF fighters out of their airfields and engage them using Gnats. The decision was made on the realization that PAF Fighters were conspicuously absent in the Punjab area in the last few days.
I was ordered to select three other pilots and in coordination with the Air Defence staff, plan a "leisurely" Fighter sweep over Pakistan territory. The Patrol height and area was carefully selected where the Pakistan radar and our own radar would have definite pick up on our Fighters. Our Fighters were to maintain radio contact with our Air Defense unit who would maintain a continuous surveillance on our Fighter by tracking us on their Radar scope. I was specifically warned by our Air Defense Fighter Controller that there was a "window" at a point on our flight path were there would be a loss of radar pick up for about a minute or a minute and a half. We were briefed that when this occurred I would be warned. It was understood that the Indian Radar Fighter controller would warn us of any approaching enemy Fighter and give us a running commentary of their position in relation to our Fighters. The discretion to engage the enemy fighters was left to my decision.
After a detailed aircrew briefing along with the ATC (Air Traffic Controller) the Air Defence controller and other sections involved in this operation, we took off in to the clear blue skies and steered a course for our run in point in Pakistan territory. We climbed rapidly to 10,000 feet as we entered Pak air space
It was a nice September morning typical to Punjab. There was no visible sign of deadly war on the ground, it looked so peaceful and quite and the only noise was the lazy drone from my Gnats engine, the sight of the other three Gnats was the only evidence that we were out there to invite Pakistan Fighters to mortal combat.
I ordered the formation in to Battle formation followed by an order"clear your guns" This is a a very short burst to double check that our two 30mm cannons were working.
Reaching our run in point I turned North East parallel to the Indo/Pak border. We started scanning the Western Sky, maintaining a strict look out to our port, the side we expected the enemy threat. We continued a straight and level flight at 10,000 feet, monitoring our fighter controllers commentary for air activity. We were aware that Pak radar and our own radar must have a good pick up on us. Nothing happened; our radar had no pick up of any enemy air activity in that area. At that moment we reached the "null" zone where our Radar would lose pick up on us and also any fighter activity by Pak aircraft. We were warned as we entered the null zone that our radar had lost contact with us. I kept checking the time, one minute then one and a half minute went by yet there was no pick up. I accelerated our planes to combat speed around 450 kts. I warned our Fighter controller that I would turn around if the pick up did not occur very soon. Prolonged loss of radar coverage leaves a formation blind and vulnerable to enemy air attack. The controller insisted that I continue for another one minute, I agreed. Suddenly I started feeling a chill going up and down my spine and an unexplainable sense of danger with an overpowering urge to take evasive action. With the sixth sense of a fox I abruptly ordered my formation "Hard Port, Hard port Go".This is an emergency maneuver to turn round at the maximum rate of turn on ones own axis, maintaining Battle formation. I over rode the Fighter controllers instructions, which is a prerogative of the leader of a Fighter formation.
This maneuver was so fast that we faced the other way with in 30 seconds. The object of this max rate turn is to very quickly turn around because during the turn we have minimum visual scanning ability and a time most vulnerable to an enemy attack.
It seemed that we had, in the nick of time, caught a pair of F-104 Starfighters napping, they were closing in fast, drooling for a kill, It was obvious that the Starfighters were trying to sneak in to a firing position close behind us. As we straightened out facing the way we had come, I received a warning call from my sub section leader who was on my starboard side, "enemy below you crossing from starboard to port". I quickly scanned to my starboard and then to my port! Lo and behold, I saw a dark and a large cigar shaped plane with swept back wings passing under the belly of my Fighter. I was positioned for a perfect kill. He was a dead duck, I was probably 500 to 1000 feet above and three hundred yards behind him positioned just right for a perfect attack from above. I knew I could easily blow him to bits with my gun sight centered on the cockpit. I commenced to roll over to get my 30 mms cannons to bear on to him. I was ready to pump every thing I had in one single continuous burst in to the Starfighter from my two 30 mm cannons, knowing that I would not get a second chance once he cut in his afterburner.
After the war : Wg Cdr Bharat Singh (right) with Air Marshal Arjan Singh during his visit to Halwara.
Suddenly my sub section leader sent a chill up my spine, he called urgently, "Negative, it is a Hunter ". I froze in horror I was just about ready to kill one of our own Fighters! Not believing my eyes I again looked carefully at the cigar shaped plane. It certainly was a Pakistani Starfighter. That hesitation for a couple of seconds was enough to save the PAF Starfighter. Realizing the fatal error I quickly rolled in to the attack. It was too late, the Starfighter was observed by me emitting a large trail of flame from its jet exhaust, he had cut in his after burner and accelerated to a very high speed, leaving me standing, so to speak. It was no use, I had him for a while in my sights, the amber light was glowing on my gun sight, meaning that my gun radar was locked on but his range was around 1500 yard, well out of firing range now. In hind sight I should have given him a good long burst from my canons, if for no other reason, just in retaliation for sending that horrible chill up and down my spine. It seems that this F 104 had a "number 2" with him who escaped breaking west, straight to mama's lap.
The horror of this incident slowly downed on me. Far from being the aggressor we nearly became the victims. I could have very easily lost two Gnats and two good pilots. Thank you my Guardian angel for that "chilly" warning. A couple of seconds delay on my part would have been disastrous and a disgrace on me, the leader of the formation and the Squadron Commander to boot. For no obvious reason the over powering compulsion to turn around fast was so compelling, a feeling I had never experienced in my life.
It seemed that the Starfighters were closing in ready to use their deadly "Vulcan guns" which would have pulverized a Gnat in a second. I was numb and humbled by this uncanny urge which saved two lives and two Gnats. In a few more seconds at least two of us would have been dead.
A detailed discussion during the debriefing clarified the scenario. Just before our Fighters went off our Air Defense radar screen, two Pak Starfighters were scrambled by Pakistani Air Defense to intercept us, thereby falling straight in to our preplanned trap as anticipated. Since our radar had no pick up on us at that very moment it was obvious that our Fighter controller also had no pick up on the scrambled Pak Fighters either. We concluded that once the Starfighters were vectored on to us by Pak radar, on sighting us, the Pak fighters approached us stealthily from behind for the "kill". Fighters are vulnerable at the back, which is their blind spot.
It was surprising that they did not use their Sidewinder missiles, as a matter of fact I was close enough to notice that they were not carrying missiles, which can be fired from a much greater distance. Sidewinders are heat seeking weapons and lock on to a heat source like the Jet wake heat emission from an aircraft. These missiles had a history of failing to lock on and hit the target. This we understood was due to internal malfunctions and confusion caused by their inbuilt sensors sensing multiple heat sources. This was true in our case; we had four heat sources emitted by four different aircraft in battle formation, spread far apart.
What ever the reason, the Pak fighters decided to attack us using their deadly six barreled rotating 20 mm Vulcan gun. The volume of fire from these guns is so intense they could cut an aeroplane in to two or pulverize it in seconds. If my guardian angel had not warned me to turn around at the exact moment, at least two Gnats along with their pilots would have been blown to pieces. To use their deadly guns, it was necessary for them to close in, to firing range of 700 to 800 yards. The standard procedure in the front gun attack mode requires a good over taking speed which is required for breaking away after the attack. Because of our very timely and unexpected emergency turn around maneuver, the Starfighters were caught napping and could not decelerate in time and telescoped in to us, passing directly below us in confusion and disarray. I believe they carried out a defensive split and broke off the engagement. They wisely abandoned their attack and escaped home at very high speed.. They did the right thing, because if they had been foolish enough to take us on in combat, on our terms, there were good chances of them being shot down to the guns of four Gnats. The Gnat is superior to the F-104, in a dog fight except in speed and fire power; missiles are unusable in close air combat involving high "G" maneuvers.
This, much discussed, no frills, mini Fighter proved its worth as the finest Air Combat aircraft on both side of the fence, during the 1965 war with Pakistan. It was more than a match to the Sabre and a serious deterrent to the Starfighter. Its performance, with in its flight envelope parameters, was limited only by the superior ability of the pilot who was flying it.
If one was foolish enough to fly the Gnat in air combat on the terms of, for example, the Sabre, he is asking to be shot down. This happened to one of my experienced flight Commanders in No.2 Squadron, he was lucky to land safely with three or four bullet holes in the rear fuselage section. Thank God the Sabre was using solid ammunition. He made the cardinal mistake of fighting the Sabre in the horizontal plain and was out maneuvered. The same applied to the Starfighter, if the Starfighter pilots chose to engage the Gnat on the Gnats terms the Starfighter was asking for serious trouble. It seemed that the Pakistan Air Force High Command had issued orders to its Starfighters to refuse engagements with IAF Gnats.
During the 1965 War I led a formation of four Gnats on a fighter sweep, with the mission to "seek and destroy enemy Fighters" We had an opportunity to engage two Pak Starfighters. After the initial engagement with our four Gnats, the Starfighters, finding them selves in a critical position, broke off the engagement and returned, full afterburner, to home sweet home. If the Starfighters had not carried out a defensive split in the nick of time, followed by a full after burner escape we would have bagged at least one of them with ease.
This was a classic example of a supersonic fighters choice of fighting the Gnat in the horizontal plain and the choice of engaging the Gnats, using their Vulcan gun instead of missiles. As a matter of fact I was close enough to notice that they were not carrying any missiles at all !! The fact that they had closed in to gun firing range suggests that they were going to use their Vulcan gun and thus placed themselves on equal term with the Gnat in the choice of weapon and combat environment in terms of speed and the choice of engaging in combat in the horizontal plane. at which the Gnat was far superior. They of course had the advantage of speed to break off the engagement and escape.
Yes the Gnat had many teething problems some serious ones which cost us valuable lives. The blame, if any, lies with the high powered team and their advisors for prematurely pulling out and adopting a "raw" Gnat with out insisting on a full post production test flying and evaluation and the follow up necessary modifications directly by Follands, and their supporting engineering and design staff, before accepting the Gnat, blindly.
I am aware of the compulsions which forced this radical process. At that time the Follands were keen to get rid of the Gnat as soon as possible, having been rejected by the Royal Air Force and because of shortage of funds, while the Indians, were desperately seeking to fill the dangerous void in our Fighter Inventory. There also seemed an undue haste on the part of the Indian Government and the Indian fledgling Aviation industry to adopt this "toy" for the further development of the industry in India. Probably they did not realize that this "gnat with a scorpion's sting" was going to get difficult, dangerous and comparatively more expensive in terms of time, accidents and loss of lives, before becoming an efficient weapon of war.
Most accidents at the user end were not pilot error or the lack of ability of the pilots but irreversible malfunctions over which the pilot had little or no control. In fact serious post production testing and evaluation was first carried by a team of experienced pilots at the Air craft and Armament Testing Unit at Kanpur in coordination with Follands far away at Chilbolten resulting in slow development and modifications incorporated in the Gnats under test. Since the Gnat was still in the raw, the final teething problems were identified and corrected at the Squadron in coordination with HAL, resulting in flying accidents killing, mostly young inexperienced pilots some of who had no ways to reverse the problem once it occurred.
I respectfully disagree that the front line Gnats, as available to us, were difficult or dangerous to fly. It was certainly different from other conventional Fighters and the pilot needed to get used to its unconventional aerodynamic characteristics and adopt flying techniques unique to this light weight fighter. What startled me most on my first solo, was the excessive change of trim after take off. Its flying controls were smooth but sensitive at high speed, but the pilots soon learnt to appreciate this and modified the manner of handling the controls with out the loss or reduction of the aircraft maneuverability or performance.
During a training "1 v 1" exercise, I went out of phase in the fore and aft axis in to an uncontrollable short wave oscillation probably due to being rough with the controls. My Gnat immediately reacted like a bucking bronco and shook me to the core of my body. I was so startled that I left the stick; she immediately steadied down purring like a cat having "frightened a mouse under the chair". I never experienced this phenomenon ever again; I had learnt my lesson!
As a gun platform she clearly proved her ability as an effective weapon of war by the number of kills in air combat during the 1965 war. Selected pilots from No.2 Squadron scored over 50% hits on the drogue during its Jamnagar Armament Training. Probably 5 to 10 hits from the deadly 30 mm cannons would be enough to destroy an enemy Fighter. You certainly have to be very precise in your aim because of the narrow cone of fire of the Gnats twin 30 mm cannons. We certainly had a big problem with the Gyro gun sight as it toppled easily under high G combat maneuvers.
In my own case I had to revert to the good old fashioned ring and bead sight and laid off the traditional "one and a half rad" to hit the Sabre. I can vouch for the performance of the Gnat in my fight with this Sabre. He was always on the defensive and never got the chance to make any aggressive moves towards me. I fought him in the vertical plane, and after each pass pulled up to my safe perch position, up and behind the Sabre. During this engagement I never even dreamt of jettisoning my drop tanks which speaks well of the Gnats superior performance.
I fully agree with the pilots having experience on the Gnat, that it was the most exhilarating Fighter to fly and handle in all its three dimensions. Who wouldn't!! A tiny fighter which can climb from wheels roll to 40,000 feet in three and a half minutes; Which can keep up with a MiG-21 in full afterburner, up to 40.000 feet, and scare the pants off a Starfighter in combat. One has to face the enemy in mortal combat to appreciate this mini angel of death.
Let me dwell a bit more on the "unstable gun platform syndrome. Those few of us who have flown the Supermarine Spitfire Mk 14 and the five bladed Mk 18 and stayed long enough to fly the Gnat, will understand clearly what unstability really is. The Spit used to suffer from three factors causing instability. Torque effect from its giant 18 cylinder Griffin engine, gyroscopic and slip stream effect from its giant propellors. Any change in the power, speed and RPM setting would immediately effect your rudder and elevator trim . Therefore you have to fly the Spit by the seat of your pants to keep the "ball" in the center position by using leg power or adjust the manually operated trim tabs. In short you are continuously moving your left hand between your elevator trim tab, the rudder trim tab and the throttle, and using the other hand to use the stick"permanently in manual" to rotate the beast on its three axis to keep your ring and bead centered on your target. Yet the Spitfire shot down hundreds of German fighters in WW II. And so did the Gnat in relative terms. People talk of a stable gun platform fly the Spit and then the Gnat and observe the difference.
Allow me to move a little deeper in to the essentials or the luxury of a so called "stable gun platform. Let those fighter pilots who were lucky to engage the enemy in air combat, tell how many seconds did they use there Fighter as a "Stable gun platform" to aim and fire the guns; For how long did the, enemy pilot, fighting for his life, allow you the luxury of using your Fighter as a steady or stable gun platform. In combat you are not shooting at a benign drogue, allowing you the luxury of obtaining a perfect thirty degrees angle off, then open fire at 700 yds upto 300 hundred yards and then break off. You are in combat man, flying a Fighting machine while your opponent is another Fighter pilot trying all the tricks of the trade to insure that he remains an elusive jinking jelly fish to avoid the lead you are spraying at him from your extremely unstable combat flight conditions. The question of a stable gun platform does not arise as a major issue unless it is radically out of whack, be it a Gnat, a Hunter or even a Spitfire. It is the man behind the machine that matters.
Never the less the Gnat in the hands of an average experienced Gnat Pilot is as stable as required to meet its prime mandate to shoot down the enemy. The Gnat met this criteria with flying colours.
Full marks to Bobby Dey, for who I have very high regards, on insisting and proving the over sensitive slab tail of the Gnat and the resultant lateral instability . I never felt it, perhaps because the modification to the system had already been carried out. As I have said earlier the flying characteristics and the "feel" of the Gnat was different than other conventional aero planes, but once the pilot got used to it, the problem did not exist any more.
I have led the Fighter Block on two Republic day fly past using two sections of Gnats with four aircraft in each section, with at least three to four rehearsals each year, no pilot during any debriefing complained of any problems in station keeping in close formation. It was probably much nicer to fly the Gnat after the modification, thanks to Bobby Dey's insistence and the subsequent modification. Close formation is more of a bonus but not priority one in the primary role of Gnat or any other Fighter.
We learnt quickly in the '65 war that we were best off to fly a loose finger four at low level and perhaps a high level tactical formation when exposed to enemy radar or when expecting enemy air interception by aircraft possibly carrying missiles. The use of close formation has no practical value in the primary role of a fighter. It remains a necessary bonus to have any way.
It may be interesting to regurgitate that during the 1965 war HAL had placed a bounty on the first Gnat shooting down a Starfighter. He would receive a gift of Rs.20,000 collected by contributions from the 20,000 HAL employees. I was inches away from shooting down a Starfighter but for a last minute call from my subsection leader incorrectly identifying the Starfighter as a Hunter. The saying "He who hesitates loses" applied perfectly in my case.
A tragedy! I was flat broke at that time of my life!!!!
Let us now allow this unique , radical and controversial Light Fighter to rest in peace on its 50th year with HAL and be generous in praise as the savior of the Indian sky during the two wars in the 20th Century.
Copyright © Gp Capt Bharat Singh (Retd). All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part in any form or medium without express written permission of © Gp Capt Bharat Singh (Retd) is prohibited.
Gnat Line up - An enemy pilots nightmare.
Data Courtesy:- Group Captain Bharat Singh : Folland Gnat Experiences in the 1965 War [www.bharat-rakshak.com]
Image COurtesy:- Bharat Rakshak
Folland Gnats of the Indian Air Force engaged in multiple air combats during the 1965 and 1971 Wars. Ten air combat kills have been made by this diminutive fighter in both wars and the story of one such combat is narrated in this article.
Shooting down a Sabre : 14 Sept 1965
Written below is my actual experience in combat with a Sabre in the 1965 war. This happened exactly 43 years ago on September 14th, 1965. Today incidentally is September 14th 2008. I am reliving the event blow by blow as it occurred. This is the inner story.
On September 14th 1965, I led a formation of four Gnats to escort four Canberras on a secret bombing mission to an undisclosed target in Lahore sector. The mission details were even kept secret from me. The Canberra formation had a scheduled rendezvous with my formation over our base, at an exact specified time and under strict radio silence. The Canberra's arrived on the dot and made two orbits over the airfield. Our formation of four Gnats took off and We placed our selves 500 yards behind and 50 feet below the four Canberra's who were flying low at 500 feet above ground level. Since the down wash of the Canberra's jet wake was creating turbulence, I moved my Gnats 100 feet above them.
After entering Pak. Territory The Canberra's inched lower down to 200 feet and built up their speed presumably for the final run in to the target. Suddenly they pulled up in a climb for their bombing run. We too pulled up behind them. All hell broke loose, suddenly the sky become full of heavy anti aircraft fire. The sky was peppered with exploding shells. The Gnat is a "tin can" with high density engineering, in other words one hit could be fatal. Realizing the intensity of flak I continued my pull up to 10,000 feet allowing the Canberra's to do their " work", on their own. We had no role in the bombing attack. Our job was to provide air cover up to and over the target and then recover them back to Indian Territory. From the height of 10,000 feet my Gnats were safe and I was still able to keep an eye on the Canberras. The last minute decision to pull up to 10,000 feet was necessary because the Pak. 40 mm anti aircraft shells were fused to "self destruct" at around 9,000 feet. At this height we were safe and were yet able to keep an eye out for any enemy fighters threatening our "wards".
Wg Cdr Bharat Singh (CO) (Standing 6th from Right) along with pilots of No.2 Squadron. This Photograph was taken sometime in 1965 before the September War.
Every thing worked out perfect. After the din and smoke created by exploding of heavy bombs, I saw the Canberra's escaping at low level towards the Indian border. I positioned my formation of Gnats behind them, but kept my height till I had cleared the exploding anti aircraft shells. Since the Canberra's were at a very low height, my formation of Gnats were now the only visible targets for the enemy ack ack. Their 40 mm anti aircraft shells were now exploding directly below us. After clearing the exploding shells I commenced a slow decent keeping an eye on the Canberra's, and at the same time intensely scanned the sky for "enemy air"
I had hardly descended to about 6000 feet when I spotted four PAF Sabres, on our left, low at 11 o'clock, at a distance of about 5 miles. They were busy carrying out rocket attacks on Indian ground positions near Amritsar. I observed that they were flying a left hand orbit, which placed the Canberra formation in their blind spot, or so I presumed!
There was a great temptation on my part to go in for an attack right away, but discipline prevailed. My primary duty was to protect and escort the Canberras safely and in this case, without attracting enemy attention. Since the enemy fighters seemed of no direct threat to the Canberras I continued with my duty of "sneaking" the Canberra's safely across the border; with the remote possibility of returning and engaging the enemy Fighters.
Suddenly one Sabre turned sharply towards the Canberra's and positioned himself for an attack. It seemed that the enemy pilot had failed to spot the four "tiny birds of prey" at 6000 feet above them. I reacted fast and breaking the Radio silence, ordered the Canberra formation to turn, "Hard Starboard - GO," there was no response from the Canberra's. To my horror the Sabre closing in fast had now opened fire, I saw gun smoke puffs from the Sabres nose. Seconds count in Fighter operation. I called again, this time there was immediate reaction, the Canberra's whipped around hard to the right and I simultaneously went in to a semi half roll dive to cut off and intercept the attacking Sabre, that was the last I saw of them, which however included my own three Gnats, who, having received no instructions from me, quite rightly remained with the Canberra's giving them continued cover. There was a tactical mistake how ever, my No, 2 should have followed me unless ordered otherwise. In Air Combat our operating procedures and practices clearly define No. 2's duties. He is "gun fodder" his primary duty is to hang on behind his leader, to observe and keep the leaders tail clear from enemy threat, thus allowing the Leader to concentrate on the task at hand; the destruction of the enemy aircraft.
I sensed at the back of my mind that I was now alone. As I pulling hard out of the dive, I realized that, now single handed, I was facing four enemy Sabres, one ahead of me climbing vertically, having broken off his attack, and the other three some were ahead and to my left. During the process of executing the attack on the lead Sabre I had realized that, to position my self for the attack on the lead Sabre, I would have to deliberately maneuver my Gnat in a manner which would put me between the lead Sabre and his formation of three other Sabres, the latter, now not visible, were some were some were behind and on my left. I realised that under the circumstances I could easily be sandwiched in between and possibly shot down. This tactical air situation was sending shivers up my spine. How ever it was imperative for me to take this risk to press home my attack and at the same time, act as a decoy, to divert the attention of the three Sabres on to me; this would minimize the possibility of a concentrated attack by the three other Sabres, on the escaping Canberra's.
Any way I was so angry and indignant, that I threw caution to the wind and concentrated all my skills towards the destruction of the offending enemy Fighter.
Pulling hard out of my high speed dive, hitting 7g, I positioned my self behind the escaping Sabre. We were now both climbing in the vertical plain, I behind him, with vengeance in my heart, thirsting for his blood. I was boiling with anger, both, at the Canberra's, for their sluggish response which could have very easily ended in disaster and the rude shock at my own complacence for allowing the enemy Fighter to close in to a range from where he could open fire on one of my "chicks" and, very nearly getting away with it. Later I came to know that the tail end Canberra had five or six five bullet holes, but made it safely back to his base.
In retrospect, I must confess that I misjudged the distance and the closing in speed of the Sabre. He got in to firing range very quickly and I was slow in my reaction. Candidly I should have warned the Canberra's earlier, as soon as I had spotted the Sabres attacking our troops and ordered them to "buster" (accelerate to full power) the Canberra's being fast, the Sabre would have no chance of catch up with them. As a bonus, this would have provided the unobserved Gnats a "turkey shoot". Even after 45 years I have never been able to reconcile my self with this serious error of judgment. All I can say; so many things happened so fast "¦hell, I am human!
Pulling out of my high "G"dive and now in the vertical plain I got the enemy Sabre squarely on my gun sight. Having broken off his attack the Pakistani pilot was trying to escape in the vertical plain. In the process of pulling out of my dive I had built up speed of over 500 knots. With this speed in the vertical climb I had serious problems slowing down in spite of closing my throttle fully and opening my air brakes. I realized that if I continued in this manner, with the enemy fighter visible through my front wind shield I would have rammed the Pakistani Sabre. I turned a few degrees to the right and came out parallel to the enemy air craft on my left, I was very close and saw the pilot turn his head and look at me. I was still over shooting him in the vertical plane. I realized immediately that I was in eminent danger because any further acceleration of my Gnat upwards would place the Sabre behind me in a position to get in to my blind spot and then on to my tail and shoot me out of the sky. I had run out of options, and waited for his next move.
This is where the Pakistani pilot, a Squadron Leader, (PAF Sabre Squadrons were Commanded by Squadron Leaders and therefore he was perhaps a Squadron Commander,) signed his own death warrant. He turned to the left, away from me, there by allowing me to easily position my self on his tail. You can not afford mistakes in Air Combat, if you do; you are "a dead duck"!! This one cardinal mistake cost the Pakistani Pilot his life!
I, like most pilots, used three simple techniques in a Dog Fight.
(1) Get on to the enemy tail quickly and at all costs.
(2) Hang on to this position with all your might and wits.
(3) Keep this position and shoot when the opportunity is just right.
(4) Gnats have limited ammo on board and we cannot afford to waste it.
That, as most Fighter pilots would do in Air Combat, was the simple technique I applied in this Dog Fight, except for the preplanned and much discussed tactic of fighting a Sabre in the vertical plain. The Sabre would leave a Gnat "sitting" if the Gnat pilot tried to fight the Sabre on his terms, in the horizontal plain.
The combat now started in earnest. I remember even now 43 years later, that I was icy sober all the anger was gone, replaced by intense concentration and the cold blooded application of my 16 years of training and the thought, "if you don't kill him, he will", kept racing through my mind. Every thing else was blanked off, no Papa no Mama or wife and children, just intense concentration and quivering reflexes.
A fighter pilot after gaining flying experience over the years subconsciously allows his reflexes to take over his normal brain signals. In combat this is vital because reflexes work much faster than brain generated activity. A fighter pilot with high reflexes has a great advantage over others with slower reflexes especially when things are happening very fast.
Right from the start the Sabre pilot was in the defensive mode. Psychologically this placed me in a "win win" mind set. Frankly, if I had been the Sabre pilot I would have taken a very aggressive posture by using continuous and violent maneuvers to shake the Gnat off my tail and continuously jink around preventing the Gnat pilot from placing his gun sight on me. In such a situation it is vital that the pilot under attack takes his fighter to the very edge of its capability hoping that the attacking Fighter would be out maneuvered or if he crosses the edge, (the limiting aerodynamic parameters,) beyond which the attacking Fighter plane would go out of control, or outmaneuvered and fall prey to the Sabres guns. After all what else had he to lose, death is terminal and final.
In our dog fight the Sabre pilot was taking only passive evasive action to avoid my gun fire. I went in to my first attack, a perfect text book pattern and totally missed the Sabre who at the exact moment pulled in to a high "G" turn, shaking me off in to a uncontrollable skid . I quickly went up to my "safe" perch position, high up and behind the Sabre. In each subsequent attack I fired on the Sabre in the horizontal plain and zoomed up to my perch position. In every such attack the Sabre pilot had the uncanny ability to turn hard, exactly when I came in to firing range, he must have had a rubber neck!! This way my Gnat, unable to hold the tight turn, skidded out every time, creating serious problems keeping my Gyro gun sight on the enemy plane.
The Gnat gun sight was highly sensitive to high "G" maneuvers, and the controlling gyro would "topple" in a tight turn.. I wasted a lot of my ammo under these conditions. Now desperate, with low fuel, short of ammunition and probably three Sabres some were behind, possibly on my tail, caused my spinal temperature to fall to freezing point. I had only one last chance, I switched my sights to the Fixed Ring position cutting out the gyro sight and planned to manually apply the good old fashioned one and a half "rad". deflection angle and when the Gnat started skidding out, to use the old fashioned "fly through" method. I did just that. On this, my last and final attack, I laid off one and a half rad and as soon I got into firing range pressed my trigger, as my Gnat started skidding out I held the fixed sight as long as I could, ahead and slightly above the line of flight of the enemy Fighter and then allowed the enemy plane to fly through my long burst of 30 mm shells. Half way through my cannon fire the Sabre dipped its wing to the right and then to the left, dropped its nose and headed toward the ground in a shallow dive. It looked out of control. My guns were now silent, I had run out of ammunition!! I waited for thirty seconds or so, as the Sabre going down disappeared from my line of vision. Then I shot off to home sweet home and as fast as possible. It certainly would not have been very healthy for me to hang around, perhaps with three very angry Sabre pilots on my tail and I, with very little fuel and no ammunition. This is my second principal "He who runs, lives to fight another day."
As an honest Indian, when submitting my mission report, I did not claim this kill because I did not see the tell tale signs of hits normally claimed by other Pilots. There was no smoke, no flames no explosion nor did I see the aircraft hit the ground. How could I, in all honesty claim the "kill"?
How ever the next day my kill was confirmed by the District Commissioner Amritsar. I received information that the District Commissioner Amritsar, Mr. Bedi, had watched the Dog Fight between one Gnat and a Sabre close to Amritsar town and saw the Sabre crash with in Indian Territory, the pilot did not eject and a PAF. Squadron Leaders body was recovered from the crashed aircraft. This information was conveyed by Mr.Bedi to Headquarters Western Air Command, who officially confirmed my kill after receiving Mr. Bedi's report.
This month 43 years ago a lot of nice and capable Fighter pilots from both sides got killed in action. May their souls rest in peace.
A fighter sweep over Pakistan : PAF 104 Starfighters Vs. No.2 Squadron Gnats.
Indian Air Force, after gaining Air Superiority over Pakistan in the Punjab area, the top Indian Air Force planners decided to lure the PAF fighters out of their airfields and engage them using Gnats. The decision was made on the realization that PAF Fighters were conspicuously absent in the Punjab area in the last few days.
I was ordered to select three other pilots and in coordination with the Air Defence staff, plan a "leisurely" Fighter sweep over Pakistan territory. The Patrol height and area was carefully selected where the Pakistan radar and our own radar would have definite pick up on our Fighters. Our Fighters were to maintain radio contact with our Air Defense unit who would maintain a continuous surveillance on our Fighter by tracking us on their Radar scope. I was specifically warned by our Air Defense Fighter Controller that there was a "window" at a point on our flight path were there would be a loss of radar pick up for about a minute or a minute and a half. We were briefed that when this occurred I would be warned. It was understood that the Indian Radar Fighter controller would warn us of any approaching enemy Fighter and give us a running commentary of their position in relation to our Fighters. The discretion to engage the enemy fighters was left to my decision.
After a detailed aircrew briefing along with the ATC (Air Traffic Controller) the Air Defence controller and other sections involved in this operation, we took off in to the clear blue skies and steered a course for our run in point in Pakistan territory. We climbed rapidly to 10,000 feet as we entered Pak air space
It was a nice September morning typical to Punjab. There was no visible sign of deadly war on the ground, it looked so peaceful and quite and the only noise was the lazy drone from my Gnats engine, the sight of the other three Gnats was the only evidence that we were out there to invite Pakistan Fighters to mortal combat.
I ordered the formation in to Battle formation followed by an order"clear your guns" This is a a very short burst to double check that our two 30mm cannons were working.
Reaching our run in point I turned North East parallel to the Indo/Pak border. We started scanning the Western Sky, maintaining a strict look out to our port, the side we expected the enemy threat. We continued a straight and level flight at 10,000 feet, monitoring our fighter controllers commentary for air activity. We were aware that Pak radar and our own radar must have a good pick up on us. Nothing happened; our radar had no pick up of any enemy air activity in that area. At that moment we reached the "null" zone where our Radar would lose pick up on us and also any fighter activity by Pak aircraft. We were warned as we entered the null zone that our radar had lost contact with us. I kept checking the time, one minute then one and a half minute went by yet there was no pick up. I accelerated our planes to combat speed around 450 kts. I warned our Fighter controller that I would turn around if the pick up did not occur very soon. Prolonged loss of radar coverage leaves a formation blind and vulnerable to enemy air attack. The controller insisted that I continue for another one minute, I agreed. Suddenly I started feeling a chill going up and down my spine and an unexplainable sense of danger with an overpowering urge to take evasive action. With the sixth sense of a fox I abruptly ordered my formation "Hard Port, Hard port Go".This is an emergency maneuver to turn round at the maximum rate of turn on ones own axis, maintaining Battle formation. I over rode the Fighter controllers instructions, which is a prerogative of the leader of a Fighter formation.
This maneuver was so fast that we faced the other way with in 30 seconds. The object of this max rate turn is to very quickly turn around because during the turn we have minimum visual scanning ability and a time most vulnerable to an enemy attack.
It seemed that we had, in the nick of time, caught a pair of F-104 Starfighters napping, they were closing in fast, drooling for a kill, It was obvious that the Starfighters were trying to sneak in to a firing position close behind us. As we straightened out facing the way we had come, I received a warning call from my sub section leader who was on my starboard side, "enemy below you crossing from starboard to port". I quickly scanned to my starboard and then to my port! Lo and behold, I saw a dark and a large cigar shaped plane with swept back wings passing under the belly of my Fighter. I was positioned for a perfect kill. He was a dead duck, I was probably 500 to 1000 feet above and three hundred yards behind him positioned just right for a perfect attack from above. I knew I could easily blow him to bits with my gun sight centered on the cockpit. I commenced to roll over to get my 30 mms cannons to bear on to him. I was ready to pump every thing I had in one single continuous burst in to the Starfighter from my two 30 mm cannons, knowing that I would not get a second chance once he cut in his afterburner.
After the war : Wg Cdr Bharat Singh (right) with Air Marshal Arjan Singh during his visit to Halwara.
Suddenly my sub section leader sent a chill up my spine, he called urgently, "Negative, it is a Hunter ". I froze in horror I was just about ready to kill one of our own Fighters! Not believing my eyes I again looked carefully at the cigar shaped plane. It certainly was a Pakistani Starfighter. That hesitation for a couple of seconds was enough to save the PAF Starfighter. Realizing the fatal error I quickly rolled in to the attack. It was too late, the Starfighter was observed by me emitting a large trail of flame from its jet exhaust, he had cut in his after burner and accelerated to a very high speed, leaving me standing, so to speak. It was no use, I had him for a while in my sights, the amber light was glowing on my gun sight, meaning that my gun radar was locked on but his range was around 1500 yard, well out of firing range now. In hind sight I should have given him a good long burst from my canons, if for no other reason, just in retaliation for sending that horrible chill up and down my spine. It seems that this F 104 had a "number 2" with him who escaped breaking west, straight to mama's lap.
The horror of this incident slowly downed on me. Far from being the aggressor we nearly became the victims. I could have very easily lost two Gnats and two good pilots. Thank you my Guardian angel for that "chilly" warning. A couple of seconds delay on my part would have been disastrous and a disgrace on me, the leader of the formation and the Squadron Commander to boot. For no obvious reason the over powering compulsion to turn around fast was so compelling, a feeling I had never experienced in my life.
It seemed that the Starfighters were closing in ready to use their deadly "Vulcan guns" which would have pulverized a Gnat in a second. I was numb and humbled by this uncanny urge which saved two lives and two Gnats. In a few more seconds at least two of us would have been dead.
A detailed discussion during the debriefing clarified the scenario. Just before our Fighters went off our Air Defense radar screen, two Pak Starfighters were scrambled by Pakistani Air Defense to intercept us, thereby falling straight in to our preplanned trap as anticipated. Since our radar had no pick up on us at that very moment it was obvious that our Fighter controller also had no pick up on the scrambled Pak Fighters either. We concluded that once the Starfighters were vectored on to us by Pak radar, on sighting us, the Pak fighters approached us stealthily from behind for the "kill". Fighters are vulnerable at the back, which is their blind spot.
It was surprising that they did not use their Sidewinder missiles, as a matter of fact I was close enough to notice that they were not carrying missiles, which can be fired from a much greater distance. Sidewinders are heat seeking weapons and lock on to a heat source like the Jet wake heat emission from an aircraft. These missiles had a history of failing to lock on and hit the target. This we understood was due to internal malfunctions and confusion caused by their inbuilt sensors sensing multiple heat sources. This was true in our case; we had four heat sources emitted by four different aircraft in battle formation, spread far apart.
What ever the reason, the Pak fighters decided to attack us using their deadly six barreled rotating 20 mm Vulcan gun. The volume of fire from these guns is so intense they could cut an aeroplane in to two or pulverize it in seconds. If my guardian angel had not warned me to turn around at the exact moment, at least two Gnats along with their pilots would have been blown to pieces. To use their deadly guns, it was necessary for them to close in, to firing range of 700 to 800 yards. The standard procedure in the front gun attack mode requires a good over taking speed which is required for breaking away after the attack. Because of our very timely and unexpected emergency turn around maneuver, the Starfighters were caught napping and could not decelerate in time and telescoped in to us, passing directly below us in confusion and disarray. I believe they carried out a defensive split and broke off the engagement. They wisely abandoned their attack and escaped home at very high speed.. They did the right thing, because if they had been foolish enough to take us on in combat, on our terms, there were good chances of them being shot down to the guns of four Gnats. The Gnat is superior to the F-104, in a dog fight except in speed and fire power; missiles are unusable in close air combat involving high "G" maneuvers.
This, much discussed, no frills, mini Fighter proved its worth as the finest Air Combat aircraft on both side of the fence, during the 1965 war with Pakistan. It was more than a match to the Sabre and a serious deterrent to the Starfighter. Its performance, with in its flight envelope parameters, was limited only by the superior ability of the pilot who was flying it.
If one was foolish enough to fly the Gnat in air combat on the terms of, for example, the Sabre, he is asking to be shot down. This happened to one of my experienced flight Commanders in No.2 Squadron, he was lucky to land safely with three or four bullet holes in the rear fuselage section. Thank God the Sabre was using solid ammunition. He made the cardinal mistake of fighting the Sabre in the horizontal plain and was out maneuvered. The same applied to the Starfighter, if the Starfighter pilots chose to engage the Gnat on the Gnats terms the Starfighter was asking for serious trouble. It seemed that the Pakistan Air Force High Command had issued orders to its Starfighters to refuse engagements with IAF Gnats.
During the 1965 War I led a formation of four Gnats on a fighter sweep, with the mission to "seek and destroy enemy Fighters" We had an opportunity to engage two Pak Starfighters. After the initial engagement with our four Gnats, the Starfighters, finding them selves in a critical position, broke off the engagement and returned, full afterburner, to home sweet home. If the Starfighters had not carried out a defensive split in the nick of time, followed by a full after burner escape we would have bagged at least one of them with ease.
This was a classic example of a supersonic fighters choice of fighting the Gnat in the horizontal plain and the choice of engaging the Gnats, using their Vulcan gun instead of missiles. As a matter of fact I was close enough to notice that they were not carrying any missiles at all !! The fact that they had closed in to gun firing range suggests that they were going to use their Vulcan gun and thus placed themselves on equal term with the Gnat in the choice of weapon and combat environment in terms of speed and the choice of engaging in combat in the horizontal plane. at which the Gnat was far superior. They of course had the advantage of speed to break off the engagement and escape.
Yes the Gnat had many teething problems some serious ones which cost us valuable lives. The blame, if any, lies with the high powered team and their advisors for prematurely pulling out and adopting a "raw" Gnat with out insisting on a full post production test flying and evaluation and the follow up necessary modifications directly by Follands, and their supporting engineering and design staff, before accepting the Gnat, blindly.
I am aware of the compulsions which forced this radical process. At that time the Follands were keen to get rid of the Gnat as soon as possible, having been rejected by the Royal Air Force and because of shortage of funds, while the Indians, were desperately seeking to fill the dangerous void in our Fighter Inventory. There also seemed an undue haste on the part of the Indian Government and the Indian fledgling Aviation industry to adopt this "toy" for the further development of the industry in India. Probably they did not realize that this "gnat with a scorpion's sting" was going to get difficult, dangerous and comparatively more expensive in terms of time, accidents and loss of lives, before becoming an efficient weapon of war.
Most accidents at the user end were not pilot error or the lack of ability of the pilots but irreversible malfunctions over which the pilot had little or no control. In fact serious post production testing and evaluation was first carried by a team of experienced pilots at the Air craft and Armament Testing Unit at Kanpur in coordination with Follands far away at Chilbolten resulting in slow development and modifications incorporated in the Gnats under test. Since the Gnat was still in the raw, the final teething problems were identified and corrected at the Squadron in coordination with HAL, resulting in flying accidents killing, mostly young inexperienced pilots some of who had no ways to reverse the problem once it occurred.
I respectfully disagree that the front line Gnats, as available to us, were difficult or dangerous to fly. It was certainly different from other conventional Fighters and the pilot needed to get used to its unconventional aerodynamic characteristics and adopt flying techniques unique to this light weight fighter. What startled me most on my first solo, was the excessive change of trim after take off. Its flying controls were smooth but sensitive at high speed, but the pilots soon learnt to appreciate this and modified the manner of handling the controls with out the loss or reduction of the aircraft maneuverability or performance.
During a training "1 v 1" exercise, I went out of phase in the fore and aft axis in to an uncontrollable short wave oscillation probably due to being rough with the controls. My Gnat immediately reacted like a bucking bronco and shook me to the core of my body. I was so startled that I left the stick; she immediately steadied down purring like a cat having "frightened a mouse under the chair". I never experienced this phenomenon ever again; I had learnt my lesson!
As a gun platform she clearly proved her ability as an effective weapon of war by the number of kills in air combat during the 1965 war. Selected pilots from No.2 Squadron scored over 50% hits on the drogue during its Jamnagar Armament Training. Probably 5 to 10 hits from the deadly 30 mm cannons would be enough to destroy an enemy Fighter. You certainly have to be very precise in your aim because of the narrow cone of fire of the Gnats twin 30 mm cannons. We certainly had a big problem with the Gyro gun sight as it toppled easily under high G combat maneuvers.
In my own case I had to revert to the good old fashioned ring and bead sight and laid off the traditional "one and a half rad" to hit the Sabre. I can vouch for the performance of the Gnat in my fight with this Sabre. He was always on the defensive and never got the chance to make any aggressive moves towards me. I fought him in the vertical plane, and after each pass pulled up to my safe perch position, up and behind the Sabre. During this engagement I never even dreamt of jettisoning my drop tanks which speaks well of the Gnats superior performance.
I fully agree with the pilots having experience on the Gnat, that it was the most exhilarating Fighter to fly and handle in all its three dimensions. Who wouldn't!! A tiny fighter which can climb from wheels roll to 40,000 feet in three and a half minutes; Which can keep up with a MiG-21 in full afterburner, up to 40.000 feet, and scare the pants off a Starfighter in combat. One has to face the enemy in mortal combat to appreciate this mini angel of death.
Let me dwell a bit more on the "unstable gun platform syndrome. Those few of us who have flown the Supermarine Spitfire Mk 14 and the five bladed Mk 18 and stayed long enough to fly the Gnat, will understand clearly what unstability really is. The Spit used to suffer from three factors causing instability. Torque effect from its giant 18 cylinder Griffin engine, gyroscopic and slip stream effect from its giant propellors. Any change in the power, speed and RPM setting would immediately effect your rudder and elevator trim . Therefore you have to fly the Spit by the seat of your pants to keep the "ball" in the center position by using leg power or adjust the manually operated trim tabs. In short you are continuously moving your left hand between your elevator trim tab, the rudder trim tab and the throttle, and using the other hand to use the stick"permanently in manual" to rotate the beast on its three axis to keep your ring and bead centered on your target. Yet the Spitfire shot down hundreds of German fighters in WW II. And so did the Gnat in relative terms. People talk of a stable gun platform fly the Spit and then the Gnat and observe the difference.
Allow me to move a little deeper in to the essentials or the luxury of a so called "stable gun platform. Let those fighter pilots who were lucky to engage the enemy in air combat, tell how many seconds did they use there Fighter as a "Stable gun platform" to aim and fire the guns; For how long did the, enemy pilot, fighting for his life, allow you the luxury of using your Fighter as a steady or stable gun platform. In combat you are not shooting at a benign drogue, allowing you the luxury of obtaining a perfect thirty degrees angle off, then open fire at 700 yds upto 300 hundred yards and then break off. You are in combat man, flying a Fighting machine while your opponent is another Fighter pilot trying all the tricks of the trade to insure that he remains an elusive jinking jelly fish to avoid the lead you are spraying at him from your extremely unstable combat flight conditions. The question of a stable gun platform does not arise as a major issue unless it is radically out of whack, be it a Gnat, a Hunter or even a Spitfire. It is the man behind the machine that matters.
Never the less the Gnat in the hands of an average experienced Gnat Pilot is as stable as required to meet its prime mandate to shoot down the enemy. The Gnat met this criteria with flying colours.
Full marks to Bobby Dey, for who I have very high regards, on insisting and proving the over sensitive slab tail of the Gnat and the resultant lateral instability . I never felt it, perhaps because the modification to the system had already been carried out. As I have said earlier the flying characteristics and the "feel" of the Gnat was different than other conventional aero planes, but once the pilot got used to it, the problem did not exist any more.
I have led the Fighter Block on two Republic day fly past using two sections of Gnats with four aircraft in each section, with at least three to four rehearsals each year, no pilot during any debriefing complained of any problems in station keeping in close formation. It was probably much nicer to fly the Gnat after the modification, thanks to Bobby Dey's insistence and the subsequent modification. Close formation is more of a bonus but not priority one in the primary role of Gnat or any other Fighter.
We learnt quickly in the '65 war that we were best off to fly a loose finger four at low level and perhaps a high level tactical formation when exposed to enemy radar or when expecting enemy air interception by aircraft possibly carrying missiles. The use of close formation has no practical value in the primary role of a fighter. It remains a necessary bonus to have any way.
It may be interesting to regurgitate that during the 1965 war HAL had placed a bounty on the first Gnat shooting down a Starfighter. He would receive a gift of Rs.20,000 collected by contributions from the 20,000 HAL employees. I was inches away from shooting down a Starfighter but for a last minute call from my subsection leader incorrectly identifying the Starfighter as a Hunter. The saying "He who hesitates loses" applied perfectly in my case.
A tragedy! I was flat broke at that time of my life!!!!
Let us now allow this unique , radical and controversial Light Fighter to rest in peace on its 50th year with HAL and be generous in praise as the savior of the Indian sky during the two wars in the 20th Century.
Copyright © Gp Capt Bharat Singh (Retd). All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part in any form or medium without express written permission of © Gp Capt Bharat Singh (Retd) is prohibited.
Gnat Line up - An enemy pilots nightmare.
Data Courtesy:- Group Captain Bharat Singh : Folland Gnat Experiences in the 1965 War [www.bharat-rakshak.com]
Image COurtesy:- Bharat Rakshak
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Now The greatest dog fight in the History of Indian Air Force.
Early on the morning of 14 Dec 71, just three days before Pakistan surrendered to Indian forces, six Sabres of 26 sqn PAF set out from Peshawar for the Indian airfield of Srinagar in the picturesque valley of Kashmir. Four aircraft carried two 500 lbs Mk 84 bombs each and two aircraft acted as escorts with only cannon ammunition. Whilst all carried 200 gal tanks. The formation was lead by the CO, Wg Cdr SA Changezi, and the escort pair consisted of Flt Lts Salim Baig and A. Rahim Yousefzai. At Srinagar two Folland Gnats of 18 sqn 'the Flying Bullets' sat at the Operational Readiness Platform (ORP). The peculiar location of the airfield in the Srinagar bowl prevented adequate radar warning and the only warning available was from observation posts situated on the mountain tops. Two pilots waited at the ORP, one was Sqn Ldr AS Ghuman and the other - young Fg Offr Nirmal Jit Singh Sekhon. The Sabres flew south east of the airfield and pulled up to roll in to the dive along runway 31, while the escort pair set up a CAP pattern overhead. On the ground, with last minute warnings from the OPs the two Gnats scrambled from their pens (a Gnat could start up and be airborne in 45 secs) but were held up as the ATC could not see the runway traffic crossing point in the poor visibility. Peculiarly at Srinagar, take offs were not permitted until the vehicular traffic (if any) had crossed at the runway crossing and not the reverse. As the two Gnats came out into the open (Sekhon in E-257), one Sabre had already released its bombs overhead. Not being able to wait anymore, the Gnats took off through the debris and smoke into 800m visibility. The two Gnats were ordered to exit the area as it was too late to intercept the enemy overhead and to allow the ack-ack to engage the Sabres. Even as Ghuman ducked to low level and exited south, Sekhon turned behind a Sabre(No 2 of the Sabre formation) just pulling out from his dive. Closing in rapidly he started firing out of range. The Sabre leader saw this danger and ordered his No 2 to break left, whilst the No 3 (Flt Lt Amjad Endrabi) maneuvered behind Sekhon. Fortunately for Sekhon, The No 4 didn't make contact with the mêlée and was ordered to get away to the west. As the three aircraft turned behind each other at 200 ft, with Sekhon firing at Sabre No 2 and Sabre No 3 and 1 firing at him, the No 3 ran out of ammo. Sensing a reduction in the danger, Sekhon got a brief respite to roll out, jettison his tanks and build up some badly needed energy. With renewed effort he closed into the Sabre behind him and began to fire. At this moment the Sabre leader realized the great danger that he was in and desperately asked the escort overhead to intervene. Flt Lt Salim Baig already maneuvering to position above Sekhon, dived down unbeknownst to Sekhon and within secs had achieved hits on the Gnat. Sekhon called out that he was hit, and was called overhead by the CAP controller so as to at last allow the ack-ack to take on the Sabres. But Sekhon's time was up. Salim Baig remembers seeing the canopy of Sekhon's aircraft flying off and the aircraft rolling over and diving into the ground less than 100 ft below. For choosing to get airborne even as the airfield was under attack and refusing to exit the battle even when ordered to, and then taking on six Sabres (although he must have only known there were four) Sekhon was awarded the country's highest honour, the 'Param Vir Chakra' (bravest of the brave) equivalent to the American Medal of Honour. He thus became the only air force officer to be so honored.
Data and image courtesy:- Bharat Rakshak,,,
Early on the morning of 14 Dec 71, just three days before Pakistan surrendered to Indian forces, six Sabres of 26 sqn PAF set out from Peshawar for the Indian airfield of Srinagar in the picturesque valley of Kashmir. Four aircraft carried two 500 lbs Mk 84 bombs each and two aircraft acted as escorts with only cannon ammunition. Whilst all carried 200 gal tanks. The formation was lead by the CO, Wg Cdr SA Changezi, and the escort pair consisted of Flt Lts Salim Baig and A. Rahim Yousefzai. At Srinagar two Folland Gnats of 18 sqn 'the Flying Bullets' sat at the Operational Readiness Platform (ORP). The peculiar location of the airfield in the Srinagar bowl prevented adequate radar warning and the only warning available was from observation posts situated on the mountain tops. Two pilots waited at the ORP, one was Sqn Ldr AS Ghuman and the other - young Fg Offr Nirmal Jit Singh Sekhon. The Sabres flew south east of the airfield and pulled up to roll in to the dive along runway 31, while the escort pair set up a CAP pattern overhead. On the ground, with last minute warnings from the OPs the two Gnats scrambled from their pens (a Gnat could start up and be airborne in 45 secs) but were held up as the ATC could not see the runway traffic crossing point in the poor visibility. Peculiarly at Srinagar, take offs were not permitted until the vehicular traffic (if any) had crossed at the runway crossing and not the reverse. As the two Gnats came out into the open (Sekhon in E-257), one Sabre had already released its bombs overhead. Not being able to wait anymore, the Gnats took off through the debris and smoke into 800m visibility. The two Gnats were ordered to exit the area as it was too late to intercept the enemy overhead and to allow the ack-ack to engage the Sabres. Even as Ghuman ducked to low level and exited south, Sekhon turned behind a Sabre(No 2 of the Sabre formation) just pulling out from his dive. Closing in rapidly he started firing out of range. The Sabre leader saw this danger and ordered his No 2 to break left, whilst the No 3 (Flt Lt Amjad Endrabi) maneuvered behind Sekhon. Fortunately for Sekhon, The No 4 didn't make contact with the mêlée and was ordered to get away to the west. As the three aircraft turned behind each other at 200 ft, with Sekhon firing at Sabre No 2 and Sabre No 3 and 1 firing at him, the No 3 ran out of ammo. Sensing a reduction in the danger, Sekhon got a brief respite to roll out, jettison his tanks and build up some badly needed energy. With renewed effort he closed into the Sabre behind him and began to fire. At this moment the Sabre leader realized the great danger that he was in and desperately asked the escort overhead to intervene. Flt Lt Salim Baig already maneuvering to position above Sekhon, dived down unbeknownst to Sekhon and within secs had achieved hits on the Gnat. Sekhon called out that he was hit, and was called overhead by the CAP controller so as to at last allow the ack-ack to take on the Sabres. But Sekhon's time was up. Salim Baig remembers seeing the canopy of Sekhon's aircraft flying off and the aircraft rolling over and diving into the ground less than 100 ft below. For choosing to get airborne even as the airfield was under attack and refusing to exit the battle even when ordered to, and then taking on six Sabres (although he must have only known there were four) Sekhon was awarded the country's highest honour, the 'Param Vir Chakra' (bravest of the brave) equivalent to the American Medal of Honour. He thus became the only air force officer to be so honored.
Data and image courtesy:- Bharat Rakshak,,,
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Nirmal Jit Singh Shekhon:-
upload photos
Flying Officer Nirmal Jit Singh Sekhon, PVC (17 July 1943 - 14 December 1971) was an officer of the Indian Air Force. He was posthumously awarded the Param Vir Chakra, India's highest military decoration, in recognition of his lone defence of Srinagar Air Base against a Pakistani air raid during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. He is the only member of the Indian Air Force to be so honoured.
Early life
Romi, a Jatt Sikh,[2] was born on July 17, 1943 in the village of ISEWAL DAKHA in Ludhiana District, Punjab. He was the son of Warrant Officer Hon. Flight Lieutenant Tarlochan Singh Sekhon. He was commissioned into the Indian Air Force on June 4, 1967 as a Flying Officer.
The Valor:-
During the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, he was assigned to the No. 18 Squadron, "The Flying Bullets", flying the Folland Gnat fighter aircraft based at Srinagar. On 14 December 1971, Srinagar airfield was attacked by six Pakistan Air Force F-86 jets. Flying Officer Sekhon was on readiness duty at that time. Soon the enemy aircraft attacked the airfield, strafing ground targets. Under heavy fire, he was able to take off in his Gnat and engage the Sabres. Despite many search efforts by army and airforce his corpse was never found due to the mountainous terrain of where his fighter went down, much to the disappointment of his wife and family.
In the ensuing air battle, Sekhon scored a direct hit on one Sabre[citation needed] and set another ablaze.[citation needed] The latter was seen heading away towards Rajauri, trailing smoke.[citation needed] The four remaining Sabres pressed the attack, and after a lengthy dog-fight at tree-top level, Sekhon's aircraft was hit, and he was killed. The remaining Pakistani aircraft returned to Pakistan without pressing the attack.
The bravery, flying skill and determination displayed by Flying Officer Sekhon earned him India's highest wartime medal for gallantry, the Param Vir Chakra. His skill was later praised in an article by Salim Baig Mirza, the pilot who shot him down.
His Param Veer Chakra Citation:-
Fg Offr Nirmal Jit Singh Sekhon
18 Squadron 10877 F(P)
Flying Officer Nirmal Jit Singh Sekhon was a pilot of a Folland Gnat detachment based at Srinagar for the air defence of the valley against Pakistani air attacks. In accordance with the international agreement dating back to 1948, no air defence aircraft were based at Sirinagar, until the outbreak of hostilities with Pakistan. Flying Officer Sekhon was, therefore, unfamiliar with the terrain and was not acclimatised to the altitude of Srinagar, especially with the bitter cold and biting winds of the Kashmir winter. Nevertheless, from the outset of the war, he and his colleagues fought successive waves of intruding Pakistani aircraft with valour and determination, maintaining the high reputation of the Folland Gnat aircraft. On 14 December 1971, Srinagar Airfield was attacked by a wave of six enemy Sabre aircraft. Flying Officer Sekhon was on readiness duty at the time. However, he could not take off at once because of the clouds of dust raised by another aircraft which had just taken off. By the time the runway was fit for take-off, no fewer than six enemy aircraft were overhead, and strafing of the airfield was in progress. Nevertheless, in spite of the mortal danger of attempting to take off during an attack, and in spite of the odds against him. Flying Officer Sekhon took off and immediately engaged a pair of the attacking Sabres. In the fight that followed, at tree top height, he all but held his own, but was eventually overcome by sheer weight of numbers. His aircraft crashed and he was killed. In thus, sacrificing himself for the defence of Srinagar, Flying Officer Sekhon achieved his object, for the enemy aircraft fled from the scene of the battle without pressing home their attack against the town and the airfield. The sublime heroism, supreme gallantry, flying skill and determination, above and beyond the call of duty, displayed by Flying Officer Sekhon in the face of certain death, set new heights to Air Force traditions.
Data Courtesy:- Wikipidia, Bhrat Rakshak
Image Courtesy:- Bharat Rakshak
upload photos
Flying Officer Nirmal Jit Singh Sekhon, PVC (17 July 1943 - 14 December 1971) was an officer of the Indian Air Force. He was posthumously awarded the Param Vir Chakra, India's highest military decoration, in recognition of his lone defence of Srinagar Air Base against a Pakistani air raid during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. He is the only member of the Indian Air Force to be so honoured.
Early life
Romi, a Jatt Sikh,[2] was born on July 17, 1943 in the village of ISEWAL DAKHA in Ludhiana District, Punjab. He was the son of Warrant Officer Hon. Flight Lieutenant Tarlochan Singh Sekhon. He was commissioned into the Indian Air Force on June 4, 1967 as a Flying Officer.
The Valor:-
During the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, he was assigned to the No. 18 Squadron, "The Flying Bullets", flying the Folland Gnat fighter aircraft based at Srinagar. On 14 December 1971, Srinagar airfield was attacked by six Pakistan Air Force F-86 jets. Flying Officer Sekhon was on readiness duty at that time. Soon the enemy aircraft attacked the airfield, strafing ground targets. Under heavy fire, he was able to take off in his Gnat and engage the Sabres. Despite many search efforts by army and airforce his corpse was never found due to the mountainous terrain of where his fighter went down, much to the disappointment of his wife and family.
In the ensuing air battle, Sekhon scored a direct hit on one Sabre[citation needed] and set another ablaze.[citation needed] The latter was seen heading away towards Rajauri, trailing smoke.[citation needed] The four remaining Sabres pressed the attack, and after a lengthy dog-fight at tree-top level, Sekhon's aircraft was hit, and he was killed. The remaining Pakistani aircraft returned to Pakistan without pressing the attack.
The bravery, flying skill and determination displayed by Flying Officer Sekhon earned him India's highest wartime medal for gallantry, the Param Vir Chakra. His skill was later praised in an article by Salim Baig Mirza, the pilot who shot him down.
His Param Veer Chakra Citation:-
Fg Offr Nirmal Jit Singh Sekhon
18 Squadron 10877 F(P)
Flying Officer Nirmal Jit Singh Sekhon was a pilot of a Folland Gnat detachment based at Srinagar for the air defence of the valley against Pakistani air attacks. In accordance with the international agreement dating back to 1948, no air defence aircraft were based at Sirinagar, until the outbreak of hostilities with Pakistan. Flying Officer Sekhon was, therefore, unfamiliar with the terrain and was not acclimatised to the altitude of Srinagar, especially with the bitter cold and biting winds of the Kashmir winter. Nevertheless, from the outset of the war, he and his colleagues fought successive waves of intruding Pakistani aircraft with valour and determination, maintaining the high reputation of the Folland Gnat aircraft. On 14 December 1971, Srinagar Airfield was attacked by a wave of six enemy Sabre aircraft. Flying Officer Sekhon was on readiness duty at the time. However, he could not take off at once because of the clouds of dust raised by another aircraft which had just taken off. By the time the runway was fit for take-off, no fewer than six enemy aircraft were overhead, and strafing of the airfield was in progress. Nevertheless, in spite of the mortal danger of attempting to take off during an attack, and in spite of the odds against him. Flying Officer Sekhon took off and immediately engaged a pair of the attacking Sabres. In the fight that followed, at tree top height, he all but held his own, but was eventually overcome by sheer weight of numbers. His aircraft crashed and he was killed. In thus, sacrificing himself for the defence of Srinagar, Flying Officer Sekhon achieved his object, for the enemy aircraft fled from the scene of the battle without pressing home their attack against the town and the airfield. The sublime heroism, supreme gallantry, flying skill and determination, above and beyond the call of duty, displayed by Flying Officer Sekhon in the face of certain death, set new heights to Air Force traditions.
Data Courtesy:- Wikipidia, Bhrat Rakshak
Image Courtesy:- Bharat Rakshak
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Now the 6th,,,,, the 1st Fighter Aircraft to be produced in India in with an Indian name,,,,
6) HAL Ajeet:- The HAL Ajeet was a development of the British Folland Gnat fighter that was built under licence in India by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited.
Design and development
The Indian Air Force (IAF) operated the Folland Gnat light jet fighter from 1958, with over 200 aircraft being license built by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). The aircraft proved successful in combat in both the 1965 and the 1971 War with Pakistan, both in the low-level air superiority role and for short range ground attack missions, while being cheap to build and operate. It had unreliable systems, particularly the control system, however, and was difficult to maintain.[1] The Indian Air Force therefore issued a requirement for an improved Gnat in 1972. Although the original requirement called for an interceptor, it was later modified to include a secondary ground-attack role.[2] The aircraft was given the name "Ajeet", Sanskrit for "Invincible" or "Unconquered".
The changes from the original Gnat were considerable. They included:
Improvements to the hydraulics and control systems (these had been a source of difficulties in the Gnat).[3]
Fitting of improved Martin-Baker GF4 ejection seats.[4]
Upgraded avionics.[4]
The addition of slab tail control surfaces.
Improvements to the landing gear.[4]
Additional internal fuel capacity, with wet wings to free the underwing pylons normally carried by the Gnat for weapons.[5]
Installation of two more underwing hardpoints.[5]
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited modified the final two Gnats on the production line as prototypes for the Ajeet, with the first one flying on 6 March 1975, with the second following on 5 November. Testing proved successful, and the first production aircraft flew on 30 September 1976.[4] Visually, the Ajeet appeared similar to the Gnat, with the presence of two extra hardpoints being the only obvious distinguishing features from the older aircraft.
The Ajeet entered service with the IAF in 1977 and was retired in 1991. It never saw combat.
A HAL project for a trainer based on the Ajeet was begun, leading to the initial flight of a prototype in 1982. Unfortunately this aircraft was lost in a crash later that year. A second prototype flew the following year, followed by a third. But a lack of government interest and the imminent phaseout of the aircraft meant no more examples were produced. The two surviving aircraft were sent to the only unit in the IAF operating the Ajeet, No.2 Squadron. The aircraft served with the Squadron until the phaseout of the Ajeet in 1991.
General characteristics
Crew: 1
Length: 9.04 m (29 ft 8 in)
Wingspan: 6.73 m (22 ft 1 in)
Height: 2.46 m (8 ft 1 in)
Wing area: 12.69 m² (136.6 ft²)
Aspect ratio: 3.56
Empty weight: 2,307 kg (5,086 lb)
Loaded weight: 3,539 kg (7,803 lb) clean take-off weight
Max. takeoff weight: 4,173 kg (9,200 lb)
Powerplant: 1 × TJE HAL/Bristol Siddeley Orpheus 701-01 turbojet, 20.0 kN (4,500 lbf)
Performance
Maximum speed: 1,152 km/h (622 knots, 716 mph) at sea level
Combat radius: 172 km (93 nmi, 107 mi) low level, with two 250 kg bombs
Service ceiling: 45,000 ft (13,720 m)
Wing loading: lb/ft² (kg/m²)
Climb to 12,000 m (39,375 ft): 6 min 2 s
Armament
Guns: 2× 30 mm ADEN cannons with 90 rounds each
Bombs: Up to 1985 lb (900 kg) of external stores on four underwing hardpoints
The Second HAL Ajeet Prototype is displayed showcasing the variety of armament it can carry.
HAL's prototype Ajeet (E1083) in flight. This aircraft can currently be seen at Cubbon Road in Bangalore
Winged Arrow.....
Data Courtesy:- Wiki
Image courtesy:- Bhrata Rakshak
6) HAL Ajeet:- The HAL Ajeet was a development of the British Folland Gnat fighter that was built under licence in India by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited.
Design and development
The Indian Air Force (IAF) operated the Folland Gnat light jet fighter from 1958, with over 200 aircraft being license built by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). The aircraft proved successful in combat in both the 1965 and the 1971 War with Pakistan, both in the low-level air superiority role and for short range ground attack missions, while being cheap to build and operate. It had unreliable systems, particularly the control system, however, and was difficult to maintain.[1] The Indian Air Force therefore issued a requirement for an improved Gnat in 1972. Although the original requirement called for an interceptor, it was later modified to include a secondary ground-attack role.[2] The aircraft was given the name "Ajeet", Sanskrit for "Invincible" or "Unconquered".
The changes from the original Gnat were considerable. They included:
Improvements to the hydraulics and control systems (these had been a source of difficulties in the Gnat).[3]
Fitting of improved Martin-Baker GF4 ejection seats.[4]
Upgraded avionics.[4]
The addition of slab tail control surfaces.
Improvements to the landing gear.[4]
Additional internal fuel capacity, with wet wings to free the underwing pylons normally carried by the Gnat for weapons.[5]
Installation of two more underwing hardpoints.[5]
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited modified the final two Gnats on the production line as prototypes for the Ajeet, with the first one flying on 6 March 1975, with the second following on 5 November. Testing proved successful, and the first production aircraft flew on 30 September 1976.[4] Visually, the Ajeet appeared similar to the Gnat, with the presence of two extra hardpoints being the only obvious distinguishing features from the older aircraft.
The Ajeet entered service with the IAF in 1977 and was retired in 1991. It never saw combat.
A HAL project for a trainer based on the Ajeet was begun, leading to the initial flight of a prototype in 1982. Unfortunately this aircraft was lost in a crash later that year. A second prototype flew the following year, followed by a third. But a lack of government interest and the imminent phaseout of the aircraft meant no more examples were produced. The two surviving aircraft were sent to the only unit in the IAF operating the Ajeet, No.2 Squadron. The aircraft served with the Squadron until the phaseout of the Ajeet in 1991.
General characteristics
Crew: 1
Length: 9.04 m (29 ft 8 in)
Wingspan: 6.73 m (22 ft 1 in)
Height: 2.46 m (8 ft 1 in)
Wing area: 12.69 m² (136.6 ft²)
Aspect ratio: 3.56
Empty weight: 2,307 kg (5,086 lb)
Loaded weight: 3,539 kg (7,803 lb) clean take-off weight
Max. takeoff weight: 4,173 kg (9,200 lb)
Powerplant: 1 × TJE HAL/Bristol Siddeley Orpheus 701-01 turbojet, 20.0 kN (4,500 lbf)
Performance
Maximum speed: 1,152 km/h (622 knots, 716 mph) at sea level
Combat radius: 172 km (93 nmi, 107 mi) low level, with two 250 kg bombs
Service ceiling: 45,000 ft (13,720 m)
Wing loading: lb/ft² (kg/m²)
Climb to 12,000 m (39,375 ft): 6 min 2 s
Armament
Guns: 2× 30 mm ADEN cannons with 90 rounds each
Bombs: Up to 1985 lb (900 kg) of external stores on four underwing hardpoints
The Second HAL Ajeet Prototype is displayed showcasing the variety of armament it can carry.
HAL's prototype Ajeet (E1083) in flight. This aircraft can currently be seen at Cubbon Road in Bangalore
Winged Arrow.....
Data Courtesy:- Wiki
Image courtesy:- Bhrata Rakshak
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HAL Ajeet was flown by Squadron 2 of Indian Airforce ,,, they are also known as Winged Arrows. While I was searching about them I got the details from Bharat Rakshak which I am going to share,,,,
No.2 Squadron
"Winged Arrows"
Amogh Lakshya - True to Aim
Birth and the Second World War
Though the Indian Air Force was born with the raising of No.1 Squadron in 1933, it was to take another eight years before the second squadron could be raised. The outbreak of the second world war and the rapid influx of trained pilots and personnel saw to the availability of enough aircrew to equip a second squadron. Accordingly on 1st April 1941, No.2 Squadron, IAF was raised at Peshawar under the command of Flt Lt AB Awan.
Equipped with the Westland Wapiti, the same aircraft on which No.1 was raised, it had a unit establishment of 20 officers and 164 men. Six officers from No.1 were seconded to the squadron and another seven arrived from No.1 SFTS Ambala. Flt Lt SN Goyal and Flt Lt MK Janjua were the flight commanders of 'A' and 'B' flights respectively. the Adjutant was Flt Lt HU 'Bulbul' Khan. Flt Lt Aspy Engineer took over command of the squadron in Jun 41 and soon a detachment was sent to Miranshah to provide operations in the Tochi Valley in the NWFP. The remaining part of the squadron continued training at Peshawar before moving to Kohat in September 41, where they were joined by the Miranshah Detachment which has completed its tour of operations. Meanwhile the Squadron has given up its Wapitis to the Coastal Defence Flights and requipped with Audax aircraft.
Towards the end of 1941, No.2 received relatively modern aircraft in the form of the Westland Lysander, which was also the equipment of No.1 Squadron. For the whole of 1942 the unit was involved in Army Cooperation exercises and moved over parts of Southern India over the course of its operations. In Sep 42, the unit was tasked to move to Risalpur to convert itself to the Hawker Hurricane IIc aircraft. The conversion being finished by December and the unit proceeded to Ranchi for advanced fighter tactics.
Meanwhile the command of the unit has passed onto Sqn Ldr HU Khan, under whose command the unit flew to Bhopal for Operational Training Wing. About this time, the Winged Arrows saw their first taste of action. A detachment of Seven Hurricanes were sent under Flt Lt Nazirullah to the Imphal sector to provide recce and support missions to the Chindits. The detachment distinguished itself during its stay until May 43. On one occasion, a pilot flying over Chindwin successfully attacked a small Japanese army patrol and saved a wounded Gorkha soldier who was lying helplessly at a river bank. During this tour, the Squadron had two casualties. Flt Lt Latif and Pt Off JS Bhullar both had to forceland behind enemy lines and were taken POW by the Japanese.
However back at Ranchi, on 26th April 43, the Squadron lost its CO when Sqn Ldr HU Khan crashed in his Hurricane while ferrying a Hurricane from Imphal to Ranchi. His engine cut out during the flight and the Hurricane toppled over when Khan tried to attempt a Wheels down landing in a field to save the aircraft. Sqn Ldr Dunsford Wood, an RAF Officer was posted to take over command of the squadron, but things were not quite hunky dory. Fg Off Murkot Ramunny who was just then posted to the squadron observed "I served with an RAF Squadron before No.2 and that was quite alright, but an RAF CO in an IAF Squadron with a few RAF NCOs and men is not always the best combination - especially when the CO had a high opinion of his race and color". Not soon after, Sqn Ldr Surjit Singh Majithia took over command of the Squadron.
A Hurricane of No.2 Squadron flown by the Flt Cdr, F/L H Ratnagar over the forests of the Burma front.
A detachment of the squadron was attached with the Indian Air Force Exhibition unit in mid 1944 at Peshawar. Most of the activity was in frontier duties from Kohat. In October 44, whilst under the command of Sqn Ldr K Jaswant Singh, the unit received orders to move to Burma for Operations. From 23rd November 44, when they arrived at Mambur airstrip, till 17 May 45, when their tour ended, the squadron was involved in flying fighter recce missions. The task being to collect info on Japanese activity by either visual observation or photographic means. The unit took part in the third Arakan campaign and in operations in Kangaw Valley. The rate of sorties put out by the squadron was phenomenal. For example, the month of January 1945 saw the unit putting up 548 sorties by its pilots. The next month saw an effort of 866 flying hours! earning it a congratulatory message from the GOC 26 Indian division who sent it to the AOC HQ, 224 Group RAF. On 17th May 45, the squadron was stood down and bought to Samungli. Over the course of its raising upto Independence, the unit had lost Fourteen of its gallant pilots to operations and accidents. One of the tragic losses included Fg Off BBK Rao DFC, who came in from No.1 Squadron.
The unit was once again moved to Kohat in the NWFP in 1946 where it re-equipped with the Spitfire VIII and was still based there in Sep 47, by which time it had converted to the Hawker Tempest II under the command of Sqn Ldr A Murat Singh. Due to the division of assets during partition after independence, the Squadron left its assets to the newly born Pakistan Air Force and was promptly number-plated in Dec 1947. It was ironic that No.2 Squadron would join No.1 in being disbanded leaving the Indian Air Force without its two senior most units!
Rebirth 1951
No.2 was re raised again at Palam on 15 Jul 51 under the command of Sqn Ldr Randhir Singh VrC. The unit was now equipped with Spitfire XVIIIs and a Harvard trainer. For about two years, the activity was run of the mill, flying normal sorties, including dive bombing with 250 pounders. Lot of photo work was done by the unit. Several young pilots were posted about this time to convert to operational flying. Plt Offr NC Suri being one of them. In October 1953, the unit converted to the De Havilland Vampire FB52 single seater jet fighter. At that time Sqn Ldr Rointon Engineer DFC was the CO. The Vampires were with the squadron for a short period. Another three years later in May 1956, the Winged Arrows converted to the Dassault Ouragan fighter, also known as the Toofani in the IAF service.
The unit pioneered the aerobatics flying of the Ouragan. One particular maneuver it was called repeatedly to perform was the Tricolor Loop, which was done for the first time on 1 April 58. There onwards, it was a frequent display over the skies of Delhi on every republic day parade. The last such performance was on the Republic Day Parade in 62. In that year, the unit also won the coveted Mukherjee Trophy for best gunnery at the Squadron Gunnery meet. In April, the Squadron received its first Folland Gnat fighter. The unit now shed its Ouragans to become the 'real fighter' squadron.
Wg Cdr Bharat Singh took over as the CO in Sep 63 and soon after, the Squadron took part in Exercise SHIKSHA, in which IAF fighters exercised with the USAF and RAF fighters. No.2 in particular mounted sorties from Ambala against USAF F-100 Super Sabres operating from Palam. The unit gave a good account of itself.
Conversion to the Gnat was beset with the problems that were occurring during the course of operations. In one freak occurrence on 7th April 64, a Gnat undergoing engine run tests jumped its chocks and slammed into a hangar wall writing itself off! April 64 proved a bad month with one of the pilots being killed in a Gnat crash on 15-Apr-64. 17 Oct 64 resulted in another aircraft being lost. On 13th May 65, a Gnat coming into land overshot the runway, the pilot ejecting safely for the first time using the 0-0 Mk-2G seat.
1965 War
When the outbreak of the 1965 conflict was imminent, the Squadron was distributed between Ambala and Agra. A detachment under Wg Cdr Bharat Singh soon moved to Halwara airbase on the flare-up of the hostilities. Another detachment was flown to Adampur while a third was maintained at Ambala under Sqn Ldr Jit Dhawan. Throughout the war, the Squadron was involved in not only flying escort missions to Canberra and Hunter raids, but also in close support missions in the aid of the army.
Pilots of No.2 Squadron with their Gnats at Ambala just before the 1965 War. The CO Wg Cdr Bharat Singh is standing sixth from right.
The first encounter with the enemy was on 13th September, when a section of Gnats were bounced by Sabres. Flt Lt AN Kale found himself behind a Sabre, but his guns jammed at the right moment. His aircraft was badly damaged in aircombat and he had to eject near Ferozepur. The very next day, the Squadron suffered its first fatality in conflict, when Sqn Ldr NK Malik crashed during recovery to base due to a technical malfunction. His aircraft was supposed to have sufferred a 'Trim Override'.
The Winged arrows drew first blood on Sept 14th, when a Canberra formation being escorted by the Gnats were bounced by Sabres. Wg Cdr Bharat Singh chased one Sabre at low level. The Sabre pilot tried various maneuvers in trying to escape the Gnat, but crashed in his attempt to do so. This chalked up the first combat kill for No.2 Squadron.
Several escort missions were flown by the Gnats of No.2. These included Hunters of No.7 as well as Canberras of No.5 Squadron undertaking day light raids over the Lahore Kasur front.
This was followed by a major action on Sept 20th. Flt Lt AK Majumdar and Fg Offr K C Khanna took off with a mixed formation of Hunters over the Lahore sector. In the ensuing aircombat with Sabres, two of the Hunters were hit and shot down. However, Mazumdar scored against the Sabres by shooting down one aircraft flown by Flt Lt AH Malik of the PAF.
The 1965 War earned the first laurels for No.2 Squadron. Both Wg Cdr Bharat Singh and Flt Lt AK Mazumdar were awarded the Vir Chakra medals. The Flight commander, Sqn Ldr R Dhawan was awarded the VSM for his contribution.
After the war the squadron reverted back to its regular duties at Agra and Barielly after the war. Wg Cdr Bharat Singh was succeeded by Wg Cdr KK Malik. He inturn was succeeded by Wg Cdr Johnny Greene VrC in Nov 69. The Squadron took part in various Fire Power Displays and Weapons meet during this period. The Squadron also sent a detachment to operate from Amritsar airfield.
1971 India Pakistan War
When the 1971 War broke out on 3rd Dec 71, the entire squadron was moved to Amritsar airfield. The task being to defend the airfield which has become a major launching pad for Ground Attack and Counter Air Missions. The PAF fighters on many occasions refused to put up a fight against the doughty little fighters of No.2. The first interception occurred on 4 Dec, when Wg Cdr Johnny Green on a dawn patrol at 0645 Hours intercepted an incoming F-104. The F-104 punched its tanks and sped away with afterburner with Greene chasing it futilely. Only thing that Greene could do was film the fast disappearing Starfighter.
On 7 Dec , Fg Off Rana and Fg Off AK Singh intercepted two Mirage IIIs coming in to attack. Both the Mirages declined combat , engaging reheat and flying away. There were no further interceptions at Amritsar. The only action was for the Squadron's aircraft to conduct high altitude CAPs deliberately allowing them to be noticed by the enemy radar. This deterred the enemy from sending in B-57s.
When the war ended, No.2 had flown 279 sorties. For its efforts two Vayusena Medals and four Mentions in Dispatches were awarded. The CO Johnny Greene being one of the VM recipients.
After the war : The 1970s and the Presidents Colors
The unit maintained a regular detachment at Amritsar and a number of detachments at other places including Srinagar, Nal, Gorakhpur and Palam. Johnny Greene carried out high altitude landing trials of the Gnat from Leh airfield for the first time. In Feb 75, the Squadron made its first major move and shifted permanently to Srinagar. This was a unique and novel experience for the squadron. flying in primitive conditions and adverse weather, the Winged Daggers took up their task cheerfully and happily. The Gnat aircraft were modified in 1977 and fitted with the Ajeet Phase 1 conversion kits. For sometime briefly the Squadron operated from Awantipur airfield further south in the Kashmir valley while Srinagar runway was being resurfaced. The facilities at Awantipur were limited. Most of the officers and crew operated from makeshift Tents.
The Squadron was tasked to move to Kalaikunda in 1979, a move which was completed by October of the same year. On arrival at Kalaikunda hectic preparations were made for the presentation of colors ceremony. In Dec 79, in recognition of the outstanding service to the country, the Winged Arrows were presented with the coveted 'Presidents colors' by Mr Neelam Sanjeev Reddy, the President of the Republic of India. The CO at that time was Wg Cdr Menezes VM.
The advent of the eighties saw the squadron based at Kalaikunda but carrying out various gunnery sorties at Dhudkundi Range, flypast sorties over Gauhati, Tezpur, Barrackpore and Gangtok.
In Feb 83, the Gnats of the squadron flew their lost sorties. The aircraft were due to be replaced by the Ajeet which were the upgraded version of the Gnat. However the Ajeets did not arrive until nine months later in November 83. The whole squadron was excited at resuming flying after a long period of nine months. More Ajeets followed in the month of December. The squadron had a friendly rivalry with the adjoining 22 Squadron who also flew the Ajeets. In 1985, the unit carried out the first Air to Air firing by the Ajeet aircraft at Chabua.
When the AOC Kalaikunda , Air Cmde TK Sen challenged the squadron to fly 300 sorties in Jan 86, the squadron did it with gusto. Flying Ajeets extensively, the 300th sortie was clocked on Jan 29th, with a day to spare!. They accumulated nearly 310 hours in the effort. The next month, the squadron again participated with their arch rivals, No.22 in the EKALAVYA gunnery meet. During the flying , the AOC, Air Cmde Sen whilst flying one of No.2's Ajeet had a flameout over DDK Range. He ejected with a fracture to his leg. This was the first Ajeet lost by the squadron after its induction.
More exercises followed and No.2 notched up several firsts, including the first night flying sorties by the Ajeet. The Ajeet being a heavier cousin of the Gnat had all the nuances and problems of it. The squadron suffered its first fatality on 30 Sep 86. The next year during landing approach, Fg Offr R Radhish had to eject as the aircraft suffered severe control problems and started rolling to the right. Fg Offr TJA Khan had to eject after his Ajeet flamed out during a sortie in March 88. One of the Naval pilots attached to the squadron for conversion training, Lt Uday Kumar Sondhi had to crash land his aircraft outside Kalaikunda. He was awarded the Shaurya Chakra for deciding to stick to the aircraft and not ejecting over a populated area. Two civilians who helped him on the ground out of the burning wreckage were also awarded the Shaurya Chakra. 11th May 89 saw another sad loss when Fg Offr Shivraj crashed and was killed during a low level sortie by four aircraft.
In Oct 88, the unit flew two Ajeets to Ambala to form the 'Mammoth' formation. The formation consisted of all the combat aircraft of the IAF . The photographs of which were published in many coffee table books and aviation magazines. Noted Aviation photographer Peter Steinmann was involved in the photography along with other IAF photographers. Stienmann was also involved in separate shoots with the Ajeets of No.2 and many of his excellent photographs are now popularly circulated in various circles.
This was not the only media exposure for the squadron, It participated in the widely televised Fire Power display at Tilpat in May 89. In October 1990, a TV Crew arrived at Kalaikunda to film the final episode of the series 'Param Vir Chakra' . The filming centered on the PVC won by Fg Offr NS Sekhon in the 71 war and as by that time No.2 was the only squadron flying the Ajeet which externally resembled the Gnat, it was chosen to provide the aircraft for the filming. The enemy 'Sabres' were played by the Hunters of No.20 Squadron.
About this time, the squadron received two 2-seater Ajeet Conversion Trainers from HAL. However these aircraft could not be utilised fully as the twilight of the Gnat/Ajeet fighter was fast approaching. On 31 Mar 91, the last Ajeet to be phased out was flown by Wg Cdr R Rajaram, the CO to the IAF Museum in Palam and handed over to the AOC Palam. The Squadron was now slated to be converted to the MiG-27 ML Ground attack fighter aircraft.
Flogger Era:
Wg Cdr DN Ganesh took over the squadron in Apr 91 and soon a core team of 7 pilots and 2 engineering officers joined the unit. The first MiG-27s arrived in Jun 91, fresh from HAL Ozhar. These consisted of four MiG-27s and one two seater MiG-23UB trainer. The arrival of the MiG-27s was slow because of their turnover from HAL. four more fighters were collected from HAL in Sep 91, but one aircraft was lost when Fg Offr HRP Sharma during a conversion sortie had to eject from a spin. The induction of the MiG-27s was not completed till Feb 92,when the 16th aircraft arrived. The conversion to the MiG-27s now completed, the Squadron was now fully geared up to provide the teeth to the Eastern Air Command's offensive component.
During the nineties, the Squadron lost five MiG-27s in three different accidents during the course of its flying. The worst accident was on 31 August 98, when the aircraft flown by Fg Off PS Rana crashed on top of two other aircraft on the ground. The pilot as well as two other personnel on the ground were killed in this terrible event.
The Squadron won the best Squadron trophy for the year 1990. The late 90s saw a new role for the Squadron. it was designated to carry out training for Maritime Strike Operations which was the first time that a MiG-27 squadron was tasked to do so. In no time at all, the Squadron's pilots qualified for the specialist Maritime strike role. A Proud moment came at the Air Force Day 2002. Not only was the CO, Wg Cdr RK Mendiratta awarded the VM, but also the Squadron was adjudged the 'Best Fighter Squadron' in the IAF for the year 2002. A Great achievement indeed!
No.2 Squadron was numberplated (for the second time in its existence) sometime in 2003 and it remained in limbo for about six years. In 2009, it was resurrected at Pune on the Sukhoi-30 MKI. The Squadron sent a detachment to Tezpur in June 2009. It was expected to grow to its full complement by October 2009.
TABLES
List of Commanding Officers of No.2 Squadron
Gallantry and Service Awards for No.2 Squadron
Aircraft Types operated by 2 Squadron
Aircraft Type From To
Westland Wapiti Apr 1941 Jul 1941
Hawker Audax Jun 1941 Dec 1941
Westland Lysander Dec 1941 Dec 1942
Hawker Hurricane IIc Dec 1942 Apr 1946
Spitfire LF VIII Apr 1946 Sept 1947
Hawker Tempest II Sep 1947 Dec 1947
Supermarine Spitfire XVIII Jul 1951 Oct 1953
De Havilland Vampire FB 52 Oct 1953 May 1956
Dassault Ouragan May 1956 Apr 1962
HAL Gnat Apr 1962 Feb 1983
HAL Ajeet (Gnat II) Nov 1983 Mar 1991
MiG-27 ML Jun 1991 2003?
Sukhoi-30 MKI Mar 2009 Current
Other Types operated by the Squadron as trainer and hack aircraft: Harvard IIb, Vampire T.55 , HAL Ajeet Trainer , MiG-23UB
Locations of the Squadron
Locations Post 1947 From To
Palam 1951 1962
Ambala 1962 1965
Agra 1965 1965
Bareilly 1965 1965
Ambala 1965 1971
Amritsar 1971 1972
Srinagar , Nal , Gorakhpur, Palam 1972 1975
Srinagar 1975 1977
Awantipur 1977 1977
Srinagar 1977 1979
Kalaikunda 1979 2003
Pune
2009 2009
Tezpur 2009 Current
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Insignia of 2 Squadron
Courtesy:- Bharat Rakshak
No.2 Squadron
"Winged Arrows"
Amogh Lakshya - True to Aim
Birth and the Second World War
Though the Indian Air Force was born with the raising of No.1 Squadron in 1933, it was to take another eight years before the second squadron could be raised. The outbreak of the second world war and the rapid influx of trained pilots and personnel saw to the availability of enough aircrew to equip a second squadron. Accordingly on 1st April 1941, No.2 Squadron, IAF was raised at Peshawar under the command of Flt Lt AB Awan.
Equipped with the Westland Wapiti, the same aircraft on which No.1 was raised, it had a unit establishment of 20 officers and 164 men. Six officers from No.1 were seconded to the squadron and another seven arrived from No.1 SFTS Ambala. Flt Lt SN Goyal and Flt Lt MK Janjua were the flight commanders of 'A' and 'B' flights respectively. the Adjutant was Flt Lt HU 'Bulbul' Khan. Flt Lt Aspy Engineer took over command of the squadron in Jun 41 and soon a detachment was sent to Miranshah to provide operations in the Tochi Valley in the NWFP. The remaining part of the squadron continued training at Peshawar before moving to Kohat in September 41, where they were joined by the Miranshah Detachment which has completed its tour of operations. Meanwhile the Squadron has given up its Wapitis to the Coastal Defence Flights and requipped with Audax aircraft.
Towards the end of 1941, No.2 received relatively modern aircraft in the form of the Westland Lysander, which was also the equipment of No.1 Squadron. For the whole of 1942 the unit was involved in Army Cooperation exercises and moved over parts of Southern India over the course of its operations. In Sep 42, the unit was tasked to move to Risalpur to convert itself to the Hawker Hurricane IIc aircraft. The conversion being finished by December and the unit proceeded to Ranchi for advanced fighter tactics.
Meanwhile the command of the unit has passed onto Sqn Ldr HU Khan, under whose command the unit flew to Bhopal for Operational Training Wing. About this time, the Winged Arrows saw their first taste of action. A detachment of Seven Hurricanes were sent under Flt Lt Nazirullah to the Imphal sector to provide recce and support missions to the Chindits. The detachment distinguished itself during its stay until May 43. On one occasion, a pilot flying over Chindwin successfully attacked a small Japanese army patrol and saved a wounded Gorkha soldier who was lying helplessly at a river bank. During this tour, the Squadron had two casualties. Flt Lt Latif and Pt Off JS Bhullar both had to forceland behind enemy lines and were taken POW by the Japanese.
However back at Ranchi, on 26th April 43, the Squadron lost its CO when Sqn Ldr HU Khan crashed in his Hurricane while ferrying a Hurricane from Imphal to Ranchi. His engine cut out during the flight and the Hurricane toppled over when Khan tried to attempt a Wheels down landing in a field to save the aircraft. Sqn Ldr Dunsford Wood, an RAF Officer was posted to take over command of the squadron, but things were not quite hunky dory. Fg Off Murkot Ramunny who was just then posted to the squadron observed "I served with an RAF Squadron before No.2 and that was quite alright, but an RAF CO in an IAF Squadron with a few RAF NCOs and men is not always the best combination - especially when the CO had a high opinion of his race and color". Not soon after, Sqn Ldr Surjit Singh Majithia took over command of the Squadron.
A Hurricane of No.2 Squadron flown by the Flt Cdr, F/L H Ratnagar over the forests of the Burma front.
A detachment of the squadron was attached with the Indian Air Force Exhibition unit in mid 1944 at Peshawar. Most of the activity was in frontier duties from Kohat. In October 44, whilst under the command of Sqn Ldr K Jaswant Singh, the unit received orders to move to Burma for Operations. From 23rd November 44, when they arrived at Mambur airstrip, till 17 May 45, when their tour ended, the squadron was involved in flying fighter recce missions. The task being to collect info on Japanese activity by either visual observation or photographic means. The unit took part in the third Arakan campaign and in operations in Kangaw Valley. The rate of sorties put out by the squadron was phenomenal. For example, the month of January 1945 saw the unit putting up 548 sorties by its pilots. The next month saw an effort of 866 flying hours! earning it a congratulatory message from the GOC 26 Indian division who sent it to the AOC HQ, 224 Group RAF. On 17th May 45, the squadron was stood down and bought to Samungli. Over the course of its raising upto Independence, the unit had lost Fourteen of its gallant pilots to operations and accidents. One of the tragic losses included Fg Off BBK Rao DFC, who came in from No.1 Squadron.
The unit was once again moved to Kohat in the NWFP in 1946 where it re-equipped with the Spitfire VIII and was still based there in Sep 47, by which time it had converted to the Hawker Tempest II under the command of Sqn Ldr A Murat Singh. Due to the division of assets during partition after independence, the Squadron left its assets to the newly born Pakistan Air Force and was promptly number-plated in Dec 1947. It was ironic that No.2 Squadron would join No.1 in being disbanded leaving the Indian Air Force without its two senior most units!
Rebirth 1951
No.2 was re raised again at Palam on 15 Jul 51 under the command of Sqn Ldr Randhir Singh VrC. The unit was now equipped with Spitfire XVIIIs and a Harvard trainer. For about two years, the activity was run of the mill, flying normal sorties, including dive bombing with 250 pounders. Lot of photo work was done by the unit. Several young pilots were posted about this time to convert to operational flying. Plt Offr NC Suri being one of them. In October 1953, the unit converted to the De Havilland Vampire FB52 single seater jet fighter. At that time Sqn Ldr Rointon Engineer DFC was the CO. The Vampires were with the squadron for a short period. Another three years later in May 1956, the Winged Arrows converted to the Dassault Ouragan fighter, also known as the Toofani in the IAF service.
The unit pioneered the aerobatics flying of the Ouragan. One particular maneuver it was called repeatedly to perform was the Tricolor Loop, which was done for the first time on 1 April 58. There onwards, it was a frequent display over the skies of Delhi on every republic day parade. The last such performance was on the Republic Day Parade in 62. In that year, the unit also won the coveted Mukherjee Trophy for best gunnery at the Squadron Gunnery meet. In April, the Squadron received its first Folland Gnat fighter. The unit now shed its Ouragans to become the 'real fighter' squadron.
Wg Cdr Bharat Singh took over as the CO in Sep 63 and soon after, the Squadron took part in Exercise SHIKSHA, in which IAF fighters exercised with the USAF and RAF fighters. No.2 in particular mounted sorties from Ambala against USAF F-100 Super Sabres operating from Palam. The unit gave a good account of itself.
Conversion to the Gnat was beset with the problems that were occurring during the course of operations. In one freak occurrence on 7th April 64, a Gnat undergoing engine run tests jumped its chocks and slammed into a hangar wall writing itself off! April 64 proved a bad month with one of the pilots being killed in a Gnat crash on 15-Apr-64. 17 Oct 64 resulted in another aircraft being lost. On 13th May 65, a Gnat coming into land overshot the runway, the pilot ejecting safely for the first time using the 0-0 Mk-2G seat.
1965 War
When the outbreak of the 1965 conflict was imminent, the Squadron was distributed between Ambala and Agra. A detachment under Wg Cdr Bharat Singh soon moved to Halwara airbase on the flare-up of the hostilities. Another detachment was flown to Adampur while a third was maintained at Ambala under Sqn Ldr Jit Dhawan. Throughout the war, the Squadron was involved in not only flying escort missions to Canberra and Hunter raids, but also in close support missions in the aid of the army.
Pilots of No.2 Squadron with their Gnats at Ambala just before the 1965 War. The CO Wg Cdr Bharat Singh is standing sixth from right.
The first encounter with the enemy was on 13th September, when a section of Gnats were bounced by Sabres. Flt Lt AN Kale found himself behind a Sabre, but his guns jammed at the right moment. His aircraft was badly damaged in aircombat and he had to eject near Ferozepur. The very next day, the Squadron suffered its first fatality in conflict, when Sqn Ldr NK Malik crashed during recovery to base due to a technical malfunction. His aircraft was supposed to have sufferred a 'Trim Override'.
The Winged arrows drew first blood on Sept 14th, when a Canberra formation being escorted by the Gnats were bounced by Sabres. Wg Cdr Bharat Singh chased one Sabre at low level. The Sabre pilot tried various maneuvers in trying to escape the Gnat, but crashed in his attempt to do so. This chalked up the first combat kill for No.2 Squadron.
Several escort missions were flown by the Gnats of No.2. These included Hunters of No.7 as well as Canberras of No.5 Squadron undertaking day light raids over the Lahore Kasur front.
This was followed by a major action on Sept 20th. Flt Lt AK Majumdar and Fg Offr K C Khanna took off with a mixed formation of Hunters over the Lahore sector. In the ensuing aircombat with Sabres, two of the Hunters were hit and shot down. However, Mazumdar scored against the Sabres by shooting down one aircraft flown by Flt Lt AH Malik of the PAF.
The 1965 War earned the first laurels for No.2 Squadron. Both Wg Cdr Bharat Singh and Flt Lt AK Mazumdar were awarded the Vir Chakra medals. The Flight commander, Sqn Ldr R Dhawan was awarded the VSM for his contribution.
After the war the squadron reverted back to its regular duties at Agra and Barielly after the war. Wg Cdr Bharat Singh was succeeded by Wg Cdr KK Malik. He inturn was succeeded by Wg Cdr Johnny Greene VrC in Nov 69. The Squadron took part in various Fire Power Displays and Weapons meet during this period. The Squadron also sent a detachment to operate from Amritsar airfield.
1971 India Pakistan War
When the 1971 War broke out on 3rd Dec 71, the entire squadron was moved to Amritsar airfield. The task being to defend the airfield which has become a major launching pad for Ground Attack and Counter Air Missions. The PAF fighters on many occasions refused to put up a fight against the doughty little fighters of No.2. The first interception occurred on 4 Dec, when Wg Cdr Johnny Green on a dawn patrol at 0645 Hours intercepted an incoming F-104. The F-104 punched its tanks and sped away with afterburner with Greene chasing it futilely. Only thing that Greene could do was film the fast disappearing Starfighter.
On 7 Dec , Fg Off Rana and Fg Off AK Singh intercepted two Mirage IIIs coming in to attack. Both the Mirages declined combat , engaging reheat and flying away. There were no further interceptions at Amritsar. The only action was for the Squadron's aircraft to conduct high altitude CAPs deliberately allowing them to be noticed by the enemy radar. This deterred the enemy from sending in B-57s.
When the war ended, No.2 had flown 279 sorties. For its efforts two Vayusena Medals and four Mentions in Dispatches were awarded. The CO Johnny Greene being one of the VM recipients.
After the war : The 1970s and the Presidents Colors
The unit maintained a regular detachment at Amritsar and a number of detachments at other places including Srinagar, Nal, Gorakhpur and Palam. Johnny Greene carried out high altitude landing trials of the Gnat from Leh airfield for the first time. In Feb 75, the Squadron made its first major move and shifted permanently to Srinagar. This was a unique and novel experience for the squadron. flying in primitive conditions and adverse weather, the Winged Daggers took up their task cheerfully and happily. The Gnat aircraft were modified in 1977 and fitted with the Ajeet Phase 1 conversion kits. For sometime briefly the Squadron operated from Awantipur airfield further south in the Kashmir valley while Srinagar runway was being resurfaced. The facilities at Awantipur were limited. Most of the officers and crew operated from makeshift Tents.
The Squadron was tasked to move to Kalaikunda in 1979, a move which was completed by October of the same year. On arrival at Kalaikunda hectic preparations were made for the presentation of colors ceremony. In Dec 79, in recognition of the outstanding service to the country, the Winged Arrows were presented with the coveted 'Presidents colors' by Mr Neelam Sanjeev Reddy, the President of the Republic of India. The CO at that time was Wg Cdr Menezes VM.
The advent of the eighties saw the squadron based at Kalaikunda but carrying out various gunnery sorties at Dhudkundi Range, flypast sorties over Gauhati, Tezpur, Barrackpore and Gangtok.
In Feb 83, the Gnats of the squadron flew their lost sorties. The aircraft were due to be replaced by the Ajeet which were the upgraded version of the Gnat. However the Ajeets did not arrive until nine months later in November 83. The whole squadron was excited at resuming flying after a long period of nine months. More Ajeets followed in the month of December. The squadron had a friendly rivalry with the adjoining 22 Squadron who also flew the Ajeets. In 1985, the unit carried out the first Air to Air firing by the Ajeet aircraft at Chabua.
When the AOC Kalaikunda , Air Cmde TK Sen challenged the squadron to fly 300 sorties in Jan 86, the squadron did it with gusto. Flying Ajeets extensively, the 300th sortie was clocked on Jan 29th, with a day to spare!. They accumulated nearly 310 hours in the effort. The next month, the squadron again participated with their arch rivals, No.22 in the EKALAVYA gunnery meet. During the flying , the AOC, Air Cmde Sen whilst flying one of No.2's Ajeet had a flameout over DDK Range. He ejected with a fracture to his leg. This was the first Ajeet lost by the squadron after its induction.
More exercises followed and No.2 notched up several firsts, including the first night flying sorties by the Ajeet. The Ajeet being a heavier cousin of the Gnat had all the nuances and problems of it. The squadron suffered its first fatality on 30 Sep 86. The next year during landing approach, Fg Offr R Radhish had to eject as the aircraft suffered severe control problems and started rolling to the right. Fg Offr TJA Khan had to eject after his Ajeet flamed out during a sortie in March 88. One of the Naval pilots attached to the squadron for conversion training, Lt Uday Kumar Sondhi had to crash land his aircraft outside Kalaikunda. He was awarded the Shaurya Chakra for deciding to stick to the aircraft and not ejecting over a populated area. Two civilians who helped him on the ground out of the burning wreckage were also awarded the Shaurya Chakra. 11th May 89 saw another sad loss when Fg Offr Shivraj crashed and was killed during a low level sortie by four aircraft.
In Oct 88, the unit flew two Ajeets to Ambala to form the 'Mammoth' formation. The formation consisted of all the combat aircraft of the IAF . The photographs of which were published in many coffee table books and aviation magazines. Noted Aviation photographer Peter Steinmann was involved in the photography along with other IAF photographers. Stienmann was also involved in separate shoots with the Ajeets of No.2 and many of his excellent photographs are now popularly circulated in various circles.
This was not the only media exposure for the squadron, It participated in the widely televised Fire Power display at Tilpat in May 89. In October 1990, a TV Crew arrived at Kalaikunda to film the final episode of the series 'Param Vir Chakra' . The filming centered on the PVC won by Fg Offr NS Sekhon in the 71 war and as by that time No.2 was the only squadron flying the Ajeet which externally resembled the Gnat, it was chosen to provide the aircraft for the filming. The enemy 'Sabres' were played by the Hunters of No.20 Squadron.
About this time, the squadron received two 2-seater Ajeet Conversion Trainers from HAL. However these aircraft could not be utilised fully as the twilight of the Gnat/Ajeet fighter was fast approaching. On 31 Mar 91, the last Ajeet to be phased out was flown by Wg Cdr R Rajaram, the CO to the IAF Museum in Palam and handed over to the AOC Palam. The Squadron was now slated to be converted to the MiG-27 ML Ground attack fighter aircraft.
Flogger Era:
Wg Cdr DN Ganesh took over the squadron in Apr 91 and soon a core team of 7 pilots and 2 engineering officers joined the unit. The first MiG-27s arrived in Jun 91, fresh from HAL Ozhar. These consisted of four MiG-27s and one two seater MiG-23UB trainer. The arrival of the MiG-27s was slow because of their turnover from HAL. four more fighters were collected from HAL in Sep 91, but one aircraft was lost when Fg Offr HRP Sharma during a conversion sortie had to eject from a spin. The induction of the MiG-27s was not completed till Feb 92,when the 16th aircraft arrived. The conversion to the MiG-27s now completed, the Squadron was now fully geared up to provide the teeth to the Eastern Air Command's offensive component.
During the nineties, the Squadron lost five MiG-27s in three different accidents during the course of its flying. The worst accident was on 31 August 98, when the aircraft flown by Fg Off PS Rana crashed on top of two other aircraft on the ground. The pilot as well as two other personnel on the ground were killed in this terrible event.
The Squadron won the best Squadron trophy for the year 1990. The late 90s saw a new role for the Squadron. it was designated to carry out training for Maritime Strike Operations which was the first time that a MiG-27 squadron was tasked to do so. In no time at all, the Squadron's pilots qualified for the specialist Maritime strike role. A Proud moment came at the Air Force Day 2002. Not only was the CO, Wg Cdr RK Mendiratta awarded the VM, but also the Squadron was adjudged the 'Best Fighter Squadron' in the IAF for the year 2002. A Great achievement indeed!
No.2 Squadron was numberplated (for the second time in its existence) sometime in 2003 and it remained in limbo for about six years. In 2009, it was resurrected at Pune on the Sukhoi-30 MKI. The Squadron sent a detachment to Tezpur in June 2009. It was expected to grow to its full complement by October 2009.
TABLES
List of Commanding Officers of No.2 Squadron
Gallantry and Service Awards for No.2 Squadron
Aircraft Types operated by 2 Squadron
Aircraft Type From To
Westland Wapiti Apr 1941 Jul 1941
Hawker Audax Jun 1941 Dec 1941
Westland Lysander Dec 1941 Dec 1942
Hawker Hurricane IIc Dec 1942 Apr 1946
Spitfire LF VIII Apr 1946 Sept 1947
Hawker Tempest II Sep 1947 Dec 1947
Supermarine Spitfire XVIII Jul 1951 Oct 1953
De Havilland Vampire FB 52 Oct 1953 May 1956
Dassault Ouragan May 1956 Apr 1962
HAL Gnat Apr 1962 Feb 1983
HAL Ajeet (Gnat II) Nov 1983 Mar 1991
MiG-27 ML Jun 1991 2003?
Sukhoi-30 MKI Mar 2009 Current
Other Types operated by the Squadron as trainer and hack aircraft: Harvard IIb, Vampire T.55 , HAL Ajeet Trainer , MiG-23UB
Locations of the Squadron
Locations Post 1947 From To
Palam 1951 1962
Ambala 1962 1965
Agra 1965 1965
Bareilly 1965 1965
Ambala 1965 1971
Amritsar 1971 1972
Srinagar , Nal , Gorakhpur, Palam 1972 1975
Srinagar 1975 1977
Awantipur 1977 1977
Srinagar 1977 1979
Kalaikunda 1979 2003
Pune
2009 2009
Tezpur 2009 Current
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Insignia of 2 Squadron
Courtesy:- Bharat Rakshak
shom
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Now the 8th one
8) Mikoyan-Gurevich Mig 23:-40 purchased for 2 squadrons, in service from 1982 to 2007.The Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-23 (Russian: МикоÑн и Гуревич МиГ-23; NATO reporting name: Flogger) is a variable-geometry fighter aircraft, designed by the Mikoyan-Gurevich design bureau in the Soviet Union. It is considered to belong to the Soviet third generation jet fighter category, along with similarly aged Soviet fighters such as the MiG-25 "Foxbat". It was the first attempt by the Soviet Union to design look-down/shoot-down radar and one of the first to be armed with beyond visual range missiles, and the first MiG production fighter aircraft to have intakes at the sides of the fuselage. Production started in 1970 and reached large numbers with over 5,000 aircraft built. Today the MiG-23 remains in limited service with various export customers.
Combat History:- Though it has a very brief combat history ,,, it is one of the very best aircraft we had.
It was extensively used in the Kargil War. The Airforce called it Operation Safed Sagar
Safed Sagar:- Operation Safed Sagar was the codename assigned to the Indian Air Force's strike to support the Ground troops during Operation Vijay that was aimed to flush out Regular and Irregular troops of the Pakistani Army from vacated Indian Positions in the Kargil sector along the Line of Control. It was the first large scale use of air power in the Jammu and Kashmir region since the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971.
The Indian Air Force (IAF) was first approached to provide air support on 11 May with the use of helicopters. On 21 May a Canberra on a reconnaissance mission, flown by Sqn Ldr A Perumal and Sqn Ldr UK Jha, was hit by ground fire. The flight was however, recovered safely, and returned to base on one engine. On 25 May, the Cabinet Committee on Security authorized the IAF to mount attacks on the infiltrators without crossing the LoC. Initial indications from the government to the IAF was to operate only Attack helicopters. However, the Chief of Air Staff put forth the argument that in order to create a suitable environment for the helicopters, fighter action was required. On 26 May, the go-ahead was given and the IAF started its strike role . Flying from the Indian airfields of Srinagar, Avantipur and Adampur, ground attack aircraft MiG-21s, MiG-23s, MiG-27s, Jaguars and the Mirage 2000 struck insurgent positions.Of note, although the MiG-21 is built mainly for air interception with a secondary role of ground attack, it is capable of operating in restricted spaces which was of importance in the Kargil terrain.
The first strikes were launched on the 26 May, when the Indian Air Force struck infiltrator positions with fighter aircraft and helicopter gunships.[2] The initial strikes saw MiG-27s carrying out offensive sorties, with MiG-21s and (later) MiG-29s providing fighter cover. Mil Mi-17 gunships were also deployed in the Tololing sector.[3] Srinagar Airport was at this time closed to civilian air-traffic and dedicated to the Indian Air Force.[2]
However, on 27 May, the first fatalities were suffered when a MiG-21 and a MiG-27 jets were shot down over Batalik Sector by Pakistan Army.[4][5] The following day, a Mi-17 was lost- with the loss of all four of the crew- when it was hit by three Stinger missiles while on an offensive sortie.[3] These losses forced the Indian Air Force to reassess its strategy. The helicopters were immediately withdrawn from offensive roles as a measure against the man-portable missiles in possession of the infiltrators.
On 30 May, the Indian Air Force called into operation the Mirage 2000 which was deemed the best aircraft capable of optimum performance under the conditions of high-altitude seen in the zone of conflict. Armed initially with 250 kg "dumb" bombs, No. 7 Squadron over three days, struck infiltrator positions in Muntho Dhalo, Tiger Hill and Point 4388 in the Drass Sector. The strikes on Muntho Dhalo on 17 June also destroyed logistics and re-supply capabilities of the infiltrators in the Batalik Sector.[3] Through the last weeks of June, the Mirages, armed with LGBs as well as with "dumbs", repeatedly struck the heavily defended Tiger Hill. The first of these missions were observed by the (then) Chief of Air Staff, ACM AY Tipnis[3]
The choppers used were Mi-8 and the Mi-17. The transport planes were Avro, An-32 and IL-76. On May 27, the IAF had sent a MiG-27 on a photo reconnaissance mission over the Indian side of the Line of Control in Kashmir. Piloted by Flt Lt K Nachiketa, he ejected from his MiG-27 after an engine flameout due to Pakistani retaliation. Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja, who was in his MiG-21 tried to trace the downed MiG despite a blatant threat in the form of enemy Anti-Aircraft Guns. Within minutes his plane was shot at by a Stinger shoulder fired missile. Having crashed, it is believed by the Indian military that he survived the crash but was killed by Pakistan Army soldiers or irregulars. The body of Ahuja bore two point-blank bullet wounds as per the postmortem done by the Indian authorities. The point-blank injuries clearly indicate the intent of the enemy and a treatment in violation of Geneva conventions. Flt Lt Nachiketa was later paraded on Pakistan TV, this prompted India to accuse Pakistan of violating the Geneva convention on the treatment of Prisoners of War.The next day the air force lost an Mi-17 Helicopter to a shoulder fired missile near Tololing, killing the crew of four. This resulted in a change in strategy and technology. With the Israelis providing around 100 Laser-guided bomb kits to the Indian Military, the air force chose to make maximum use of this and retaliated with regular sorties on Pakistani occupied bunkers. The aircraft operated at 10,000 meters AGL (33,000 feet above sea level), well out of MANPADs range, leading to a drop in the accuracy rate of the bombs. The low number of airstrips for take off and landing of the flights also constrained the efficiency of the attacks. Despite this, there were hundreds of sorties on the intruders with no further material or personnel casualties enabling a gradual takeover of the mountain posts by Indian troops. According to IAF the "air strikes against the Pakistani infiltrators, supply camps and other targets yielded rich dividends."
By July all the remaining intruders had withdrawn and the operation was ended, being declared a success by the IAF in having achieved its primary objectives. However there has also been criticism of the methods initially used and the type of planes being unsuitable to the terrain that resulted in early losses. [1] This is believed by many in the air force as coming as a wake up call to upgrade the aging fleet of craft (especially the attack aircraft and helicopters) to better enable them to fight in the mountainous region. But, in the context of the war and in light of the poor information available on the infiltrations, the Indian Air Force was able to coordinate well with the Army and provide air support to the recapture of most the posts before Pakistan decided to withdraw its remaining troops.
Data Courtesy Wikipidia
image Courtesy:- Bharat Rakshak
8) Mikoyan-Gurevich Mig 23:-40 purchased for 2 squadrons, in service from 1982 to 2007.The Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-23 (Russian: МикоÑн и Гуревич МиГ-23; NATO reporting name: Flogger) is a variable-geometry fighter aircraft, designed by the Mikoyan-Gurevich design bureau in the Soviet Union. It is considered to belong to the Soviet third generation jet fighter category, along with similarly aged Soviet fighters such as the MiG-25 "Foxbat". It was the first attempt by the Soviet Union to design look-down/shoot-down radar and one of the first to be armed with beyond visual range missiles, and the first MiG production fighter aircraft to have intakes at the sides of the fuselage. Production started in 1970 and reached large numbers with over 5,000 aircraft built. Today the MiG-23 remains in limited service with various export customers.
Combat History:- Though it has a very brief combat history ,,, it is one of the very best aircraft we had.
It was extensively used in the Kargil War. The Airforce called it Operation Safed Sagar
Safed Sagar:- Operation Safed Sagar was the codename assigned to the Indian Air Force's strike to support the Ground troops during Operation Vijay that was aimed to flush out Regular and Irregular troops of the Pakistani Army from vacated Indian Positions in the Kargil sector along the Line of Control. It was the first large scale use of air power in the Jammu and Kashmir region since the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971.
The Indian Air Force (IAF) was first approached to provide air support on 11 May with the use of helicopters. On 21 May a Canberra on a reconnaissance mission, flown by Sqn Ldr A Perumal and Sqn Ldr UK Jha, was hit by ground fire. The flight was however, recovered safely, and returned to base on one engine. On 25 May, the Cabinet Committee on Security authorized the IAF to mount attacks on the infiltrators without crossing the LoC. Initial indications from the government to the IAF was to operate only Attack helicopters. However, the Chief of Air Staff put forth the argument that in order to create a suitable environment for the helicopters, fighter action was required. On 26 May, the go-ahead was given and the IAF started its strike role . Flying from the Indian airfields of Srinagar, Avantipur and Adampur, ground attack aircraft MiG-21s, MiG-23s, MiG-27s, Jaguars and the Mirage 2000 struck insurgent positions.Of note, although the MiG-21 is built mainly for air interception with a secondary role of ground attack, it is capable of operating in restricted spaces which was of importance in the Kargil terrain.
The first strikes were launched on the 26 May, when the Indian Air Force struck infiltrator positions with fighter aircraft and helicopter gunships.[2] The initial strikes saw MiG-27s carrying out offensive sorties, with MiG-21s and (later) MiG-29s providing fighter cover. Mil Mi-17 gunships were also deployed in the Tololing sector.[3] Srinagar Airport was at this time closed to civilian air-traffic and dedicated to the Indian Air Force.[2]
However, on 27 May, the first fatalities were suffered when a MiG-21 and a MiG-27 jets were shot down over Batalik Sector by Pakistan Army.[4][5] The following day, a Mi-17 was lost- with the loss of all four of the crew- when it was hit by three Stinger missiles while on an offensive sortie.[3] These losses forced the Indian Air Force to reassess its strategy. The helicopters were immediately withdrawn from offensive roles as a measure against the man-portable missiles in possession of the infiltrators.
On 30 May, the Indian Air Force called into operation the Mirage 2000 which was deemed the best aircraft capable of optimum performance under the conditions of high-altitude seen in the zone of conflict. Armed initially with 250 kg "dumb" bombs, No. 7 Squadron over three days, struck infiltrator positions in Muntho Dhalo, Tiger Hill and Point 4388 in the Drass Sector. The strikes on Muntho Dhalo on 17 June also destroyed logistics and re-supply capabilities of the infiltrators in the Batalik Sector.[3] Through the last weeks of June, the Mirages, armed with LGBs as well as with "dumbs", repeatedly struck the heavily defended Tiger Hill. The first of these missions were observed by the (then) Chief of Air Staff, ACM AY Tipnis[3]
The choppers used were Mi-8 and the Mi-17. The transport planes were Avro, An-32 and IL-76. On May 27, the IAF had sent a MiG-27 on a photo reconnaissance mission over the Indian side of the Line of Control in Kashmir. Piloted by Flt Lt K Nachiketa, he ejected from his MiG-27 after an engine flameout due to Pakistani retaliation. Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja, who was in his MiG-21 tried to trace the downed MiG despite a blatant threat in the form of enemy Anti-Aircraft Guns. Within minutes his plane was shot at by a Stinger shoulder fired missile. Having crashed, it is believed by the Indian military that he survived the crash but was killed by Pakistan Army soldiers or irregulars. The body of Ahuja bore two point-blank bullet wounds as per the postmortem done by the Indian authorities. The point-blank injuries clearly indicate the intent of the enemy and a treatment in violation of Geneva conventions. Flt Lt Nachiketa was later paraded on Pakistan TV, this prompted India to accuse Pakistan of violating the Geneva convention on the treatment of Prisoners of War.The next day the air force lost an Mi-17 Helicopter to a shoulder fired missile near Tololing, killing the crew of four. This resulted in a change in strategy and technology. With the Israelis providing around 100 Laser-guided bomb kits to the Indian Military, the air force chose to make maximum use of this and retaliated with regular sorties on Pakistani occupied bunkers. The aircraft operated at 10,000 meters AGL (33,000 feet above sea level), well out of MANPADs range, leading to a drop in the accuracy rate of the bombs. The low number of airstrips for take off and landing of the flights also constrained the efficiency of the attacks. Despite this, there were hundreds of sorties on the intruders with no further material or personnel casualties enabling a gradual takeover of the mountain posts by Indian troops. According to IAF the "air strikes against the Pakistani infiltrators, supply camps and other targets yielded rich dividends."
By July all the remaining intruders had withdrawn and the operation was ended, being declared a success by the IAF in having achieved its primary objectives. However there has also been criticism of the methods initially used and the type of planes being unsuitable to the terrain that resulted in early losses. [1] This is believed by many in the air force as coming as a wake up call to upgrade the aging fleet of craft (especially the attack aircraft and helicopters) to better enable them to fight in the mountainous region. But, in the context of the war and in light of the poor information available on the infiltrations, the Indian Air Force was able to coordinate well with the Army and provide air support to the recapture of most the posts before Pakistan decided to withdraw its remaining troops.
Data Courtesy Wikipidia
image Courtesy:- Bharat Rakshak
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Squadrons for Mig-23:-
Squadron 224:-The Crest
No.224 Sqn crest depicts a warrior on a chariot proceeding to war. The chariot signifies the weapon platforms which are highly lethal and flexible, the horse signifying the power and strength and the warrior is at high state of readiness and aiming his weapons on the enemies.
[edit]History
No. 224 Sqn, IAF was raised on 4 July 1983 at Airforce Station Adampur under the command of Wg Cdr RA Massey, Vr C, as a part of Western Air Command. The unit was equipped with the Mig 23MF and assigned the Air defence role, and later the Target Towing Tug role. Later it moved to Jamnagar, its MiG-23s modified to tow targets.
No.224 Sqn was the last operator of the MiG-23MF before their retirement from the Indian Air Force in 2007. The final fly past of the closing ceremony was done by Wg. Cdr. M. K. Singh, Wg. Cdr T. R. Sahu and Flt. Lt. V. T. Shelke in a three a/c victory formation and Wing Commander Rajendra Singh Jamdar flew the Banner modified aircraft with 'Adieu MiG 23 MF' painted on it before the guests. Later one aircraft was flown to the Indian Air Force Museum, Palam for preservation and a few to Pune for display.[2]
[edit]Operations
Operation Meghdoot from 1985 to 1986.[3]
Operation Safed Sagar during May 1999.[4]
[edit]Awards and honours
No 224 Sqn was adjudged the best over all fighter squardon in Western Air Command during 1986-1987[5]
Wg Cdr Radhakrishnan Radhish Vayusena Medal 2006 [6]
Sqn Ldr SV Bal Vayusena Medal 1991 [7]
WO L Jha Commendation by CAS 1997
WO HS Saini Commendation by CAS 1989
Sgt Tanwar RS Commendation by CAS 1988
Sgt K Damodaran Commendation by CAS 1988
WO Ravi Nandan Commendation by CAS 1987
Sgt Sagar SC Commendation by CAS 1986
data Courtesy:- Wikipidia
Image Courtesy:- Bharat rakshak
Squadron 224:-The Crest
No.224 Sqn crest depicts a warrior on a chariot proceeding to war. The chariot signifies the weapon platforms which are highly lethal and flexible, the horse signifying the power and strength and the warrior is at high state of readiness and aiming his weapons on the enemies.
[edit]History
No. 224 Sqn, IAF was raised on 4 July 1983 at Airforce Station Adampur under the command of Wg Cdr RA Massey, Vr C, as a part of Western Air Command. The unit was equipped with the Mig 23MF and assigned the Air defence role, and later the Target Towing Tug role. Later it moved to Jamnagar, its MiG-23s modified to tow targets.
No.224 Sqn was the last operator of the MiG-23MF before their retirement from the Indian Air Force in 2007. The final fly past of the closing ceremony was done by Wg. Cdr. M. K. Singh, Wg. Cdr T. R. Sahu and Flt. Lt. V. T. Shelke in a three a/c victory formation and Wing Commander Rajendra Singh Jamdar flew the Banner modified aircraft with 'Adieu MiG 23 MF' painted on it before the guests. Later one aircraft was flown to the Indian Air Force Museum, Palam for preservation and a few to Pune for display.[2]
[edit]Operations
Operation Meghdoot from 1985 to 1986.[3]
Operation Safed Sagar during May 1999.[4]
[edit]Awards and honours
No 224 Sqn was adjudged the best over all fighter squardon in Western Air Command during 1986-1987[5]
Wg Cdr Radhakrishnan Radhish Vayusena Medal 2006 [6]
Sqn Ldr SV Bal Vayusena Medal 1991 [7]
WO L Jha Commendation by CAS 1997
WO HS Saini Commendation by CAS 1989
Sgt Tanwar RS Commendation by CAS 1988
Sgt K Damodaran Commendation by CAS 1988
WO Ravi Nandan Commendation by CAS 1987
Sgt Sagar SC Commendation by CAS 1986
data Courtesy:- Wikipidia
Image Courtesy:- Bharat rakshak
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Be patient.
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Sir trying to be ,,, I am basically very impatient guy,, that is the worst part of me I think,,,,Be patient.
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Now The Bombers
1) Consolidated B-24 Liberator:- The Consolidated B-24 Liberator was an American heavy bomber, designed by Consolidated Aircraft of San Diego, California. It was known within the company as the Model 32, and a small number of early models were sold under the name LB-30, for Land Bomber. The B-24 was used in World War II by several Allied air forces and navies, and by every branch of the American armed forces during the war, attaining a distinguished war record with its operations in the Western European, Pacific, Mediterranean, and China-Burma-India Theaters.
Often compared with the better-known Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress, the B-24 was a more modern design with a higher top speed, greater range, and a heavier bomb load; however, it was also more difficult to fly, with heavy control forces and poor formation-flying characteristics. Popular opinion among aircrews and general staffs tended to favor the B-17's rugged qualities above all other considerations in the European Theater.[3] The placement of the B-24's fuel tanks throughout the upper fuselage and its lightweight construction, designed to increase range and optimize assembly line production, made the aircraft vulnerable to battle damage.[4] The B-24 was notorious among American aircrews for its tendency to catch fire. Moreover, its high fuselage-mounted "Davis wing" also meant it was dangerous to ditch or belly land, since the fuselage tended to break apart.[5] Nevertheless, the B-24 provided excellent service in a variety of roles thanks to its large payload and long range, and was the only bomber to operationally deploy the United States' first forerunner to precision-guided munitions during the war, the 1,000 lb. Azon guided bomb.
The B-24's most infamous mission was the low-level strike against the Ploiești oil fields, in Romania on 1 August 1943, which turned into a disaster because the enemy was underestimated, fully alerted and attackers disorganized.[5]
The B-24 ended World War II as the most produced heavy bomber in history. At over 18,400 units,[6] half by Ford Motor Company, it still holds the distinction as the most-produced American military aircraft.
A total of 42 B-24s recovered from aircraft dumps and restored by HAL were operational with No.5, No.6 and N.16 Squadrons.
General characteristics
Crew: 11(pilot, co-pilot, navigator, bombardier, radio operator, nose turret, top turret, 2 waist gunners, ball turret, tail gunner)
Length: 67 ft 8 in (20.6 m)
Wingspan: 110 ft 0 in (33.5 m)
Height: 18 ft 0 in (5.5 m)
Wing area: 1,048 ft² (97.4 m²)
Empty weight: 36,500 lb (16,590 kg)
Loaded weight: 55,000 lb (25,000 kg)
Max. takeoff weight: 65,000 lb (29,500 kg)
Powerplant: 4 × Pratt & Whitney R-1830-35 or -41 turbosupercharged radial engines, 1,200 hp (900 kW) each
Zero-lift drag coefficient: 0.0406
Drag area: 42.54 ft² (3.95 m²)
Aspect ratio: 11.55
Performance
Maximum speed: 290 mph (250 kn, 470 km/h)
Cruise speed: 215 mph (187 kn, 346 km/h)
Stall speed: 95 mph (83 kn, 153 km/h)
Range: 2,100 mi (1,800 nmi, 3,400 km)
Ferry range: 3,700 mi (3,200 nmi, 6,000 km)
Service ceiling: 28,000 ft (8,500 m)
Rate of climb: 1,025 ft/min (5.2 m/s)
Wing loading: 52.5 lb/ft² (256 kg/m²)
Power/mass: 0.0873 hp/lb (144 W/kg)
Lift-to-drag ratio: 12.9
Armament
Guns: 10 × .50 caliber (12.7 mm) M2 Browning machine guns in 4 turrets and two waist positions
Bombs:
Short range (˜400 mi): 8,000 lb (3,600 kg)
Long range (˜800 mi): 5,000 lb (2,300 kg)
Very long range (˜1,200 mi): 2,700 lb (1,200 kg)
windows 7 screen shot
data Courtesy:- Wikipidia
Image Courtesy:- Bharat Rakshak
1) Consolidated B-24 Liberator:- The Consolidated B-24 Liberator was an American heavy bomber, designed by Consolidated Aircraft of San Diego, California. It was known within the company as the Model 32, and a small number of early models were sold under the name LB-30, for Land Bomber. The B-24 was used in World War II by several Allied air forces and navies, and by every branch of the American armed forces during the war, attaining a distinguished war record with its operations in the Western European, Pacific, Mediterranean, and China-Burma-India Theaters.
Often compared with the better-known Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress, the B-24 was a more modern design with a higher top speed, greater range, and a heavier bomb load; however, it was also more difficult to fly, with heavy control forces and poor formation-flying characteristics. Popular opinion among aircrews and general staffs tended to favor the B-17's rugged qualities above all other considerations in the European Theater.[3] The placement of the B-24's fuel tanks throughout the upper fuselage and its lightweight construction, designed to increase range and optimize assembly line production, made the aircraft vulnerable to battle damage.[4] The B-24 was notorious among American aircrews for its tendency to catch fire. Moreover, its high fuselage-mounted "Davis wing" also meant it was dangerous to ditch or belly land, since the fuselage tended to break apart.[5] Nevertheless, the B-24 provided excellent service in a variety of roles thanks to its large payload and long range, and was the only bomber to operationally deploy the United States' first forerunner to precision-guided munitions during the war, the 1,000 lb. Azon guided bomb.
The B-24's most infamous mission was the low-level strike against the Ploiești oil fields, in Romania on 1 August 1943, which turned into a disaster because the enemy was underestimated, fully alerted and attackers disorganized.[5]
The B-24 ended World War II as the most produced heavy bomber in history. At over 18,400 units,[6] half by Ford Motor Company, it still holds the distinction as the most-produced American military aircraft.
A total of 42 B-24s recovered from aircraft dumps and restored by HAL were operational with No.5, No.6 and N.16 Squadrons.
General characteristics
Crew: 11(pilot, co-pilot, navigator, bombardier, radio operator, nose turret, top turret, 2 waist gunners, ball turret, tail gunner)
Length: 67 ft 8 in (20.6 m)
Wingspan: 110 ft 0 in (33.5 m)
Height: 18 ft 0 in (5.5 m)
Wing area: 1,048 ft² (97.4 m²)
Empty weight: 36,500 lb (16,590 kg)
Loaded weight: 55,000 lb (25,000 kg)
Max. takeoff weight: 65,000 lb (29,500 kg)
Powerplant: 4 × Pratt & Whitney R-1830-35 or -41 turbosupercharged radial engines, 1,200 hp (900 kW) each
Zero-lift drag coefficient: 0.0406
Drag area: 42.54 ft² (3.95 m²)
Aspect ratio: 11.55
Performance
Maximum speed: 290 mph (250 kn, 470 km/h)
Cruise speed: 215 mph (187 kn, 346 km/h)
Stall speed: 95 mph (83 kn, 153 km/h)
Range: 2,100 mi (1,800 nmi, 3,400 km)
Ferry range: 3,700 mi (3,200 nmi, 6,000 km)
Service ceiling: 28,000 ft (8,500 m)
Rate of climb: 1,025 ft/min (5.2 m/s)
Wing loading: 52.5 lb/ft² (256 kg/m²)
Power/mass: 0.0873 hp/lb (144 W/kg)
Lift-to-drag ratio: 12.9
Armament
Guns: 10 × .50 caliber (12.7 mm) M2 Browning machine guns in 4 turrets and two waist positions
Bombs:
Short range (˜400 mi): 8,000 lb (3,600 kg)
Long range (˜800 mi): 5,000 lb (2,300 kg)
Very long range (˜1,200 mi): 2,700 lb (1,200 kg)
windows 7 screen shot
data Courtesy:- Wikipidia
Image Courtesy:- Bharat Rakshak
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An Article by GP CAPT KAPIL BHARGAVA (RETD) on Bharat rakshak.com
B-24 LIBERATOR
INDIA'S RECLAIMED B-24 BOMBERS
GP CAPT KAPIL BHARGAVA (RETD)
Independent India's First War (1947-48)
During the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan, rulers of over 500 princely states were required to choose to accede to either India or Pakistan. For most of the princes the choice was obvious, one way or the other, but one ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir, delayed choosing, in the hope of becoming an independent country. On October 20, 1947 so-called Pukhtoon tribal raiders, in reality mostly Pakistani army personnel, invaded Kashmir and after much looting and killing reached the outskirts of Srinagar. Only then did Maharaja Hari Singh ask India for help. He got it only after he signed the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India. The Indian Air Force (IAF) went into action and its Douglas Dakotas airlifted much-needed men and materiel into the state. IAF Spitfires and Tempests, and even Harvards, went into action in support of ground forces. Gradually the raiders were pushed back and a large part of Kashmir was recovered by India.
At one stage of the fighting a requirement arose to bomb Pakistani positions. But there was no bomber aircraft in the IAF's inventory. Nothing daunted, the redoubtable Air Commodore Mehar Singh, DSO, the Air Officer Commanding of the operations group in Kashmir, took recourse to his favourite Dakota. Bombs were carried within the fuselage and simply pushed out of the cargo door. With no aids or methods for aiming, the crew had to guess when to roll out the bomb. This was a hit-or-miss technique in every sense, and militarily not particularly effective.
The fighting in Kashmir ended on December 31, 1948 with a UN-brokered ceasefire. But well before then the IAF had started looking for a purpose-designed bomber aircraft. The USA tried to sell B-25 Mitchells, and the UK offered some war-surplus Lancasters, but the IAF considered both types unsuitable.
Senior IAF officers remembered that a large number of Consolidated B-24 Liberators had been abandoned in the scrap yard at Chakeri airfield, Kanpur, at the end of World War II. Most of these were former Royal Air Force (RAF) aircraft, which the USA had provided under Lend-Lease terms, which stipulated that they should not fall into anyone else's hands after the war. Some of the abandoned Liberators may have originally belonged to the US Army Air Force and others to Royal Canadian Air Force. However their eventual disposal, as the huge Allied military establishment in India wound down after World War II, was the responsibility of the RAF.
The disposal approach taken by the RAF was to damage the aircraft to make them unusable. Bulldozers and trucks were rammed into the fuselages, which were also pierced with pickaxes. Instruments were broken and sand poured into engines. But counting the days to their return home, RAF airmen did not have their hearts in the job. IAF officers wondered if the abandoned Liberators could be salvaged to meet the IAF's bomber requirements. Their conclusion was that salvage was possible but needed specialist support. This brought Hindustan Aircraft Limited (HAL), then a large aircraft servicing organisation (and now, as Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, a full-service aircraft design and manufacturing company), into the picture.
During World War II HAL had been pressed into the war effort, overhauling Allied aircraft and assembling some fighters and bombers of US origin. HAL was the first organisation authorised to overhaul Dakotas in Asia. War exigencies had also seen HAL overhaul other aircraft types such as the Consolidated PBY Catalina. These amphibian aircraft would touch down in the waters of Bellendur Tank, a lake near the southern boundary of what today has become HAL's Bangalore airfield. The Catalinas would taxi to the water's edge and then lower their wheels and climb onto cement ramps built on he shoreline. (These ramps used to be visible till the mid-60s but are now sadly buried under mud and overgrowth.) The Catalinas were then towed to the nearby HAL factory for overhaul. After flight-testing and clearance the process was repeated in reverse. At the end of World War II, the RAF handed HAL back to Indian control. At last HAL could control its own destiny. When asked about salvaging B-24s, HAL readily agreed to undertake the job.
A B-24 Liberator in flight after induction into the IAF
The first problem was to get the aircraft from Kanpur, where they had been abandoned, to HAL's factory in Bangalore. The Liberators were too big to be transported by the road or rail links of the time, so the only way was to fly them. Even before undergoing full refurbishment, the Liberators had first to be made flyable enough to undertake a single ferry flight of almost 1500 kilometres. Once they arrived in Bangalore, HAL could undertake definitive refurbishment, making them fully airworthy and fit for long-term service.
HAL sent a team to Kanpur under the leadership of Mr Yelappa. He and his men surveyed the junked hulks, identified those aircraft that could be made flyable, and undertook temporary repairs by cannibalising parts from others. Some help in materials was obtained from the IAF Depot at Kanpur. But the job was done entirely by HAL personnel.
As aircraft were prepared for the ferry, a few B-24 qualified American pilots were contacted to undertake the hazardous ferry flights. They demanded so much money that hiring any of them was out of the question. Finally, the Chief Test Pilot (CTP) of HAL was asked if he would take on the job. He promptly agreed, and was offered a very handsome bonus for each aircraft ferried. When he turned this down the amount was raised even more. This was also turned down. He explained that he was already paid enough by HAL and would do the job for no payment at all in the service of the nation. This intrepid Test Pilot was Jamshed Kaikobad (Jimmy) Munshi.
Jamshed Kaikobad Munshi (1920-1988)
Jimmy Munshi and his younger brother Rustam always had their gaze perpetually turned towards the sky. Their father had gifted them an aircraft of their own. The family lived in Hyderabad, where much of the pioneering flying in India had taken place, as chronicled by Mrs Anuradha Reddy in her excellent book, "Aviation in the Hyderabad Dominions". Jimmy and Rustam lived up to this local tradition. They often flew to Bombay on the pretext of picking up fuel at a lower price. What they did take in was lunch and a movie, before flying back home. They soon built up the hours required to become professional commercial pilots. Unfortunately, Rustam was killed in a flying accident in Tatanagar. But Jimmy went on to join Deccan Airways and flew DC-3s for many years. Some HAL old-timers say that it was Mr Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, then Minister for Commerce, who persuaded Jimmy to give up his lucrative airline job and join post-independence HAL as its first CTP. Apart from flight-testing various types of aircraft after overhaul, Jimmy now had the job of ferrying B-24s, temporarily patched-up by Yelappa's men, from Kanpur to Bangalore.
Far from having flown B-24s, Jimmy probably had no experience of any four-engine aircraft. The Liberators therefore were a real challenge. And he obviously relished it. His first task was to find a manual for the aircraft. In accordance with US and British practice, each aircraft should have carried its own copy of the Flight Manual. But preservation of the manuals had clearly not been a priority, when the aircraft had been abandoned at Kanpur. Jimmy rummaged around in many wrecked cockpits, sometimes finding just a few pages, and gradually assembled a workable manual. When he was ready for flight, the manual was placed in his lap and referred to as required. At take off it was handed over to one of the HAL men, usually the flight engineer, riding in the aircraft to read out checklists for each stage of flight.
Jimmy already had some familiarity with the Pratt & Whitney 1800-43 engines of the Liberators, as they came from the same family as engines of the DC-3s he had flown before. It is said that he would open full power on the four engines, and if nothing blew up, do some fast taxying to check that engines were delivering adequate power and that the brakes functioned properly. He was then off on a direct flight to Bangalore with undercarriage left down throughout. Only one flight is known to have been scary. There was a small fire in the fuselage just behind the pilot's seat. Fortunately the HAL crew was serving coffee at the time. The entire contents of the flasks were poured on the fire, to successfully put it out. A flight was described by two IAF flight cadets who hitched a ride in one of the B-24s, with no understanding of what they were getting into. Their first surprise was that the co-pilot's seat was occupied by Jimmy's wife in a fur coat. She was well prepared for the draughty and cold cabin of the B-34. As the aircraft taxied out a front windshield glass cracked. Jimmy taxied back for quick repairs. HAL's engineers put some dope on the glass, stuck fabric on it and declared the aircraft flyable. Fortunately nothing worse happened and the cadets slept all the way through to Bangalore.
upload foto
Photograph shows the handing over ceremony of the B-24 Liberator to the Royal Air Force Museum in 1975. L to R Wg Cdr Doug Connor DFC RAF (Retd), Gp Capt GC Kharas, The UK High Commission Air Advisor Gp Capt Dennis Barber RAF, Air Marshal SJ Dastur (Chairman HAL) , AVM Rikhye MD, Wg Cdr IM Chopra (Chief Test Pilot HAL) and a Crew Chief from HAL. The aircraft is seen in UK with the Blue-Red Roundels of the Royal Air Force, but still sporting the Dragon emblem of No.6 Squadron IAf.
Jimmy ferried a total of 42 B-24s patched-up for flying by Yelappa and his men. All the ferried B-24s were overhauled and refurbished to long-term flyable standard. Jimmy then tested and cleared them for service. According to some HAL engineers, a visiting American pilot once flew one of these aircraft and complimented HAL on the quality of work done on it. He said that the refurbished aircraft was even better than some he had flown earlier.
When the American's discovered that India had acquired serviceable Liberators there was consternation, and a suspicion that they had been bought clandestinely. They were unhappy that they had no logistic or other control on these fairly potent bombers No one could figure out who had sold them to India. An American team was invited to see what IAF and HAL were up to. The team went away satisfied that there were no underhanded dealings. Soon afterwards, very graciously, the RAF offered any help that India might need in handling the refurbished aircraft. Two experienced teams came to Poona to help convert and train IAF crews in operations on B-24s.
Liberators in Service
The IAF had its bombers at last. No 5 Squadron was equipped on November 2, 1948 with the first six Liberators delivered by HAL. Eventually the Squadron received its full contingent of 16 aircraft. No. 6 Squadron had been raised at Tiruchirapally on 1st December 1942 under the command of Mehar Singh (the same redoubtable officer who had pressed Dakotas into service as bombers in Kashmir), then a Squadron Leader. In January 1951, after having been stood down since Independence and Partition, it was re-raised and equipped with sixteen refurbished Liberators. No 16 Squadron was established with only two or three aircraft on October 15, 1951 as a Liberator-equipped training unit. No Liberators were ever used in anger.
Unknown Liberator after a botched 3 engine practice landing at Poona in the fifties. One crewmember was found missing after the crash, having run a 100 yard dash as fast as he could!
In addition, two recovered C-87 aircraft formed No 102 Survey Flight. C-87s were modified Liberators with most of the external protrusions removed. The cabin area was meant for cargo. The C-87 was aerodynamically cleaner, and therefore about 20 knots faster, than the B-24. It was often called The Liberator Express. The C-87s were used for survey work to update old maps and produce new ones of uncharted areas. One aircraft was also employed for photographing Mount Everest.
No 5 and 16 Squadrons traded in their B-24s for the British Canberra bomber-interdictor aircraft in 1957. But the Liberators of No 6 Squadron continued flying in the task of maritime reconnaissance. Most of their aircraft were fitted with the ASV-15 radar with a retractable radome in the bay where the ball turret had originally been located. Sonobuoys and depth charges were their typical load. No 6 Squadron also participated in the takeover of the Portuguese colonies in India in 1961. It flew reconnaissance missions along the sea-lanes approaching Diu and Daman. On December 18, 1961, Liberators of No 6 Squadron dropped surrender leaflets over Goa. The Squadron also carried out maritime patrols during the 1965 Indo-Pak War. The Liberators retired from IAF service in 1968. Thus the Indian Air Force was the world's last air force to fly the type.
Rocking Parliament and Expedition to Mt Everest
In the spring of 1953, the IAF decided to display its prowess through a public Fire Power Demonstration. The (now abandoned) firing range south of Delhi at Tilpat near Faridabad was the venue. One of the display highlights was to be a demonstration of the awesome power of stick bombing from Liberators. Formations of B-24s were to drop sticks of 500-pound bombs in a show of carpet-bombing. During a rehearsal with live bombs the delivery was perfect. Most of the bombs fell in a straight line. The trouble was that the line pointed straight to Parliament House in Delhi. Although it was several miles away, because of a fortuitous combination of timing and geological factors, the edifice shook as if a major earthquake had hit it. Most of the MPs ran out, displaying a turn of speed not seen during today's walkouts. When the cause was discovered the Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, was livid and wanted the exercise cancelled. The Chief of Air Staff was soon on the mat. But the Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister came to his rescue. He explained to the PM that his staff had studied the event very thoroughly all night. They had concluded that the repetition of a similar occurrence was not possible. Pt Nehru accepted this view and permitted the final Fire Power Demonstration to go ahead. Since high expectations had been raised by the radio and press, large crowds of people tried to see the show. Extensive traffic jams resulted, despite the relatively small number of cars in Delhi at the time. Many people never got anywhere near the Tilpat Range. They had to be content with only hearing the noise of the exploding bombs.
When in the summer of 1953 Edmund Hillary and Tenzing Norgay were about to reach the summit of Mount Everest, it was decided to take aerial pictures of them planting flags on the summit. A Liberator Express of 102 Survey Flight was launched, on the day of Hillary and Tenzing's summit attempt, with several press photographers on board. Since the aircraft would have had to climb to nearly 29,000 feet (8.85 km), oxygen for everyone on board was essential. The C-87s were not designed for passengers. Hence oxygen masks had to be passed from hand to hand among the photographers. This gave each of them a chance to draw a few long breaths and hand them over to the next person. After the C-87 was well on its way, there was a sudden fear that the thunderous noise of its four engines could start a dangerous avalanche. Just in time, the aircraft was recalled, much to the disappointment of the photographers on board. Pictures of Mount Everest were taken on a later flight, once the expedition was clear, and some stunning shots were published around the world. The C-87 variant of the IAF's Liberators was responsible for achieving this.
Everest picture taken by Flt Lt AEW Paul in 1953 (Left) and the same photograph autographed by the President, Rajendra Prasad, the COAS, Gen Rajendra Singhji, Shri Kailash Nath Katju, Smt Vijaylakshmi Pandit, Sir John Hunt, the Expedition Leader, Sir Edmund Hillary and other expedition members.
Surviving Liberators
After their retirement from IAF, many B-24s were sold for scrap. When the news spread round the world, many requests were received for aircraft to be sold or gifted to museums. Today five Liberators resurrected from Kanpur are known to be in museums in the USA, Canada and the UK.
The Liberator HE-809 donated to the RAF Museum at the end of its long ferry flight. The Story of its journey is told by Wg Cdr Chopra in Flypast Magazine's August 98 issue
One of these, at the Collings Foundation of the USA, was operated as a flying museum. But for the hard work and dedication of HAL's Yelappa and his team, the CTP, and its personnel involved in overhauls, the world would have been poorer by more than half the surviving samples of this famous WW II aircraft.
(Left) IAF B-24 in Tucson and a nostalgic pilot , Gp Capt K Advani, who flew the same aircraft in IAF service as a young Pilot Officer (Right) A close up of the Pima Paissano, on display at Tucson.
Data And Photo Courtesy:- Bharat Rakshak
B-24 LIBERATOR
INDIA'S RECLAIMED B-24 BOMBERS
GP CAPT KAPIL BHARGAVA (RETD)
Independent India's First War (1947-48)
During the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan, rulers of over 500 princely states were required to choose to accede to either India or Pakistan. For most of the princes the choice was obvious, one way or the other, but one ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir, delayed choosing, in the hope of becoming an independent country. On October 20, 1947 so-called Pukhtoon tribal raiders, in reality mostly Pakistani army personnel, invaded Kashmir and after much looting and killing reached the outskirts of Srinagar. Only then did Maharaja Hari Singh ask India for help. He got it only after he signed the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India. The Indian Air Force (IAF) went into action and its Douglas Dakotas airlifted much-needed men and materiel into the state. IAF Spitfires and Tempests, and even Harvards, went into action in support of ground forces. Gradually the raiders were pushed back and a large part of Kashmir was recovered by India.
At one stage of the fighting a requirement arose to bomb Pakistani positions. But there was no bomber aircraft in the IAF's inventory. Nothing daunted, the redoubtable Air Commodore Mehar Singh, DSO, the Air Officer Commanding of the operations group in Kashmir, took recourse to his favourite Dakota. Bombs were carried within the fuselage and simply pushed out of the cargo door. With no aids or methods for aiming, the crew had to guess when to roll out the bomb. This was a hit-or-miss technique in every sense, and militarily not particularly effective.
The fighting in Kashmir ended on December 31, 1948 with a UN-brokered ceasefire. But well before then the IAF had started looking for a purpose-designed bomber aircraft. The USA tried to sell B-25 Mitchells, and the UK offered some war-surplus Lancasters, but the IAF considered both types unsuitable.
Senior IAF officers remembered that a large number of Consolidated B-24 Liberators had been abandoned in the scrap yard at Chakeri airfield, Kanpur, at the end of World War II. Most of these were former Royal Air Force (RAF) aircraft, which the USA had provided under Lend-Lease terms, which stipulated that they should not fall into anyone else's hands after the war. Some of the abandoned Liberators may have originally belonged to the US Army Air Force and others to Royal Canadian Air Force. However their eventual disposal, as the huge Allied military establishment in India wound down after World War II, was the responsibility of the RAF.
The disposal approach taken by the RAF was to damage the aircraft to make them unusable. Bulldozers and trucks were rammed into the fuselages, which were also pierced with pickaxes. Instruments were broken and sand poured into engines. But counting the days to their return home, RAF airmen did not have their hearts in the job. IAF officers wondered if the abandoned Liberators could be salvaged to meet the IAF's bomber requirements. Their conclusion was that salvage was possible but needed specialist support. This brought Hindustan Aircraft Limited (HAL), then a large aircraft servicing organisation (and now, as Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, a full-service aircraft design and manufacturing company), into the picture.
During World War II HAL had been pressed into the war effort, overhauling Allied aircraft and assembling some fighters and bombers of US origin. HAL was the first organisation authorised to overhaul Dakotas in Asia. War exigencies had also seen HAL overhaul other aircraft types such as the Consolidated PBY Catalina. These amphibian aircraft would touch down in the waters of Bellendur Tank, a lake near the southern boundary of what today has become HAL's Bangalore airfield. The Catalinas would taxi to the water's edge and then lower their wheels and climb onto cement ramps built on he shoreline. (These ramps used to be visible till the mid-60s but are now sadly buried under mud and overgrowth.) The Catalinas were then towed to the nearby HAL factory for overhaul. After flight-testing and clearance the process was repeated in reverse. At the end of World War II, the RAF handed HAL back to Indian control. At last HAL could control its own destiny. When asked about salvaging B-24s, HAL readily agreed to undertake the job.
A B-24 Liberator in flight after induction into the IAF
The first problem was to get the aircraft from Kanpur, where they had been abandoned, to HAL's factory in Bangalore. The Liberators were too big to be transported by the road or rail links of the time, so the only way was to fly them. Even before undergoing full refurbishment, the Liberators had first to be made flyable enough to undertake a single ferry flight of almost 1500 kilometres. Once they arrived in Bangalore, HAL could undertake definitive refurbishment, making them fully airworthy and fit for long-term service.
HAL sent a team to Kanpur under the leadership of Mr Yelappa. He and his men surveyed the junked hulks, identified those aircraft that could be made flyable, and undertook temporary repairs by cannibalising parts from others. Some help in materials was obtained from the IAF Depot at Kanpur. But the job was done entirely by HAL personnel.
As aircraft were prepared for the ferry, a few B-24 qualified American pilots were contacted to undertake the hazardous ferry flights. They demanded so much money that hiring any of them was out of the question. Finally, the Chief Test Pilot (CTP) of HAL was asked if he would take on the job. He promptly agreed, and was offered a very handsome bonus for each aircraft ferried. When he turned this down the amount was raised even more. This was also turned down. He explained that he was already paid enough by HAL and would do the job for no payment at all in the service of the nation. This intrepid Test Pilot was Jamshed Kaikobad (Jimmy) Munshi.
Jamshed Kaikobad Munshi (1920-1988)
Jimmy Munshi and his younger brother Rustam always had their gaze perpetually turned towards the sky. Their father had gifted them an aircraft of their own. The family lived in Hyderabad, where much of the pioneering flying in India had taken place, as chronicled by Mrs Anuradha Reddy in her excellent book, "Aviation in the Hyderabad Dominions". Jimmy and Rustam lived up to this local tradition. They often flew to Bombay on the pretext of picking up fuel at a lower price. What they did take in was lunch and a movie, before flying back home. They soon built up the hours required to become professional commercial pilots. Unfortunately, Rustam was killed in a flying accident in Tatanagar. But Jimmy went on to join Deccan Airways and flew DC-3s for many years. Some HAL old-timers say that it was Mr Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, then Minister for Commerce, who persuaded Jimmy to give up his lucrative airline job and join post-independence HAL as its first CTP. Apart from flight-testing various types of aircraft after overhaul, Jimmy now had the job of ferrying B-24s, temporarily patched-up by Yelappa's men, from Kanpur to Bangalore.
Far from having flown B-24s, Jimmy probably had no experience of any four-engine aircraft. The Liberators therefore were a real challenge. And he obviously relished it. His first task was to find a manual for the aircraft. In accordance with US and British practice, each aircraft should have carried its own copy of the Flight Manual. But preservation of the manuals had clearly not been a priority, when the aircraft had been abandoned at Kanpur. Jimmy rummaged around in many wrecked cockpits, sometimes finding just a few pages, and gradually assembled a workable manual. When he was ready for flight, the manual was placed in his lap and referred to as required. At take off it was handed over to one of the HAL men, usually the flight engineer, riding in the aircraft to read out checklists for each stage of flight.
Jimmy already had some familiarity with the Pratt & Whitney 1800-43 engines of the Liberators, as they came from the same family as engines of the DC-3s he had flown before. It is said that he would open full power on the four engines, and if nothing blew up, do some fast taxying to check that engines were delivering adequate power and that the brakes functioned properly. He was then off on a direct flight to Bangalore with undercarriage left down throughout. Only one flight is known to have been scary. There was a small fire in the fuselage just behind the pilot's seat. Fortunately the HAL crew was serving coffee at the time. The entire contents of the flasks were poured on the fire, to successfully put it out. A flight was described by two IAF flight cadets who hitched a ride in one of the B-24s, with no understanding of what they were getting into. Their first surprise was that the co-pilot's seat was occupied by Jimmy's wife in a fur coat. She was well prepared for the draughty and cold cabin of the B-34. As the aircraft taxied out a front windshield glass cracked. Jimmy taxied back for quick repairs. HAL's engineers put some dope on the glass, stuck fabric on it and declared the aircraft flyable. Fortunately nothing worse happened and the cadets slept all the way through to Bangalore.
upload foto
Photograph shows the handing over ceremony of the B-24 Liberator to the Royal Air Force Museum in 1975. L to R Wg Cdr Doug Connor DFC RAF (Retd), Gp Capt GC Kharas, The UK High Commission Air Advisor Gp Capt Dennis Barber RAF, Air Marshal SJ Dastur (Chairman HAL) , AVM Rikhye MD, Wg Cdr IM Chopra (Chief Test Pilot HAL) and a Crew Chief from HAL. The aircraft is seen in UK with the Blue-Red Roundels of the Royal Air Force, but still sporting the Dragon emblem of No.6 Squadron IAf.
Jimmy ferried a total of 42 B-24s patched-up for flying by Yelappa and his men. All the ferried B-24s were overhauled and refurbished to long-term flyable standard. Jimmy then tested and cleared them for service. According to some HAL engineers, a visiting American pilot once flew one of these aircraft and complimented HAL on the quality of work done on it. He said that the refurbished aircraft was even better than some he had flown earlier.
When the American's discovered that India had acquired serviceable Liberators there was consternation, and a suspicion that they had been bought clandestinely. They were unhappy that they had no logistic or other control on these fairly potent bombers No one could figure out who had sold them to India. An American team was invited to see what IAF and HAL were up to. The team went away satisfied that there were no underhanded dealings. Soon afterwards, very graciously, the RAF offered any help that India might need in handling the refurbished aircraft. Two experienced teams came to Poona to help convert and train IAF crews in operations on B-24s.
Liberators in Service
The IAF had its bombers at last. No 5 Squadron was equipped on November 2, 1948 with the first six Liberators delivered by HAL. Eventually the Squadron received its full contingent of 16 aircraft. No. 6 Squadron had been raised at Tiruchirapally on 1st December 1942 under the command of Mehar Singh (the same redoubtable officer who had pressed Dakotas into service as bombers in Kashmir), then a Squadron Leader. In January 1951, after having been stood down since Independence and Partition, it was re-raised and equipped with sixteen refurbished Liberators. No 16 Squadron was established with only two or three aircraft on October 15, 1951 as a Liberator-equipped training unit. No Liberators were ever used in anger.
Unknown Liberator after a botched 3 engine practice landing at Poona in the fifties. One crewmember was found missing after the crash, having run a 100 yard dash as fast as he could!
In addition, two recovered C-87 aircraft formed No 102 Survey Flight. C-87s were modified Liberators with most of the external protrusions removed. The cabin area was meant for cargo. The C-87 was aerodynamically cleaner, and therefore about 20 knots faster, than the B-24. It was often called The Liberator Express. The C-87s were used for survey work to update old maps and produce new ones of uncharted areas. One aircraft was also employed for photographing Mount Everest.
No 5 and 16 Squadrons traded in their B-24s for the British Canberra bomber-interdictor aircraft in 1957. But the Liberators of No 6 Squadron continued flying in the task of maritime reconnaissance. Most of their aircraft were fitted with the ASV-15 radar with a retractable radome in the bay where the ball turret had originally been located. Sonobuoys and depth charges were their typical load. No 6 Squadron also participated in the takeover of the Portuguese colonies in India in 1961. It flew reconnaissance missions along the sea-lanes approaching Diu and Daman. On December 18, 1961, Liberators of No 6 Squadron dropped surrender leaflets over Goa. The Squadron also carried out maritime patrols during the 1965 Indo-Pak War. The Liberators retired from IAF service in 1968. Thus the Indian Air Force was the world's last air force to fly the type.
Rocking Parliament and Expedition to Mt Everest
In the spring of 1953, the IAF decided to display its prowess through a public Fire Power Demonstration. The (now abandoned) firing range south of Delhi at Tilpat near Faridabad was the venue. One of the display highlights was to be a demonstration of the awesome power of stick bombing from Liberators. Formations of B-24s were to drop sticks of 500-pound bombs in a show of carpet-bombing. During a rehearsal with live bombs the delivery was perfect. Most of the bombs fell in a straight line. The trouble was that the line pointed straight to Parliament House in Delhi. Although it was several miles away, because of a fortuitous combination of timing and geological factors, the edifice shook as if a major earthquake had hit it. Most of the MPs ran out, displaying a turn of speed not seen during today's walkouts. When the cause was discovered the Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, was livid and wanted the exercise cancelled. The Chief of Air Staff was soon on the mat. But the Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister came to his rescue. He explained to the PM that his staff had studied the event very thoroughly all night. They had concluded that the repetition of a similar occurrence was not possible. Pt Nehru accepted this view and permitted the final Fire Power Demonstration to go ahead. Since high expectations had been raised by the radio and press, large crowds of people tried to see the show. Extensive traffic jams resulted, despite the relatively small number of cars in Delhi at the time. Many people never got anywhere near the Tilpat Range. They had to be content with only hearing the noise of the exploding bombs.
When in the summer of 1953 Edmund Hillary and Tenzing Norgay were about to reach the summit of Mount Everest, it was decided to take aerial pictures of them planting flags on the summit. A Liberator Express of 102 Survey Flight was launched, on the day of Hillary and Tenzing's summit attempt, with several press photographers on board. Since the aircraft would have had to climb to nearly 29,000 feet (8.85 km), oxygen for everyone on board was essential. The C-87s were not designed for passengers. Hence oxygen masks had to be passed from hand to hand among the photographers. This gave each of them a chance to draw a few long breaths and hand them over to the next person. After the C-87 was well on its way, there was a sudden fear that the thunderous noise of its four engines could start a dangerous avalanche. Just in time, the aircraft was recalled, much to the disappointment of the photographers on board. Pictures of Mount Everest were taken on a later flight, once the expedition was clear, and some stunning shots were published around the world. The C-87 variant of the IAF's Liberators was responsible for achieving this.
Everest picture taken by Flt Lt AEW Paul in 1953 (Left) and the same photograph autographed by the President, Rajendra Prasad, the COAS, Gen Rajendra Singhji, Shri Kailash Nath Katju, Smt Vijaylakshmi Pandit, Sir John Hunt, the Expedition Leader, Sir Edmund Hillary and other expedition members.
Surviving Liberators
After their retirement from IAF, many B-24s were sold for scrap. When the news spread round the world, many requests were received for aircraft to be sold or gifted to museums. Today five Liberators resurrected from Kanpur are known to be in museums in the USA, Canada and the UK.
The Liberator HE-809 donated to the RAF Museum at the end of its long ferry flight. The Story of its journey is told by Wg Cdr Chopra in Flypast Magazine's August 98 issue
One of these, at the Collings Foundation of the USA, was operated as a flying museum. But for the hard work and dedication of HAL's Yelappa and his team, the CTP, and its personnel involved in overhauls, the world would have been poorer by more than half the surviving samples of this famous WW II aircraft.
(Left) IAF B-24 in Tucson and a nostalgic pilot , Gp Capt K Advani, who flew the same aircraft in IAF service as a young Pilot Officer (Right) A close up of the Pima Paissano, on display at Tucson.
Data And Photo Courtesy:- Bharat Rakshak
shom
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shom
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The Bomber Squadrons of Indian Air Force:-
the IAF had its bombers squadrons ready. No 5 and No 6 Squadron were soon equipped with the liberators. They had 16 aircraft each on strength. No 16 Squadron was established with only two or three aircraft on October 15, 1951 as a Liberator- training unit.
In addition, two recovered C-87(Modified Liberators) aircraft formed No 102 Survey Flight. They were used for survey work and one aircraft was also employed for photographing Mount Everest.
No 5 and 16 Squadrons were re equipped with Canberra's in 1957, but the liberators of 6 squadron continued flying till 1968. They were used for sea surveillance and also dropped surrender leaflets over Goa in 1961. They also carried out maritime patrols during the 1965 war with Pakistan
upload foto
Image Courtesy:- Bharat rakshak
the IAF had its bombers squadrons ready. No 5 and No 6 Squadron were soon equipped with the liberators. They had 16 aircraft each on strength. No 16 Squadron was established with only two or three aircraft on October 15, 1951 as a Liberator- training unit.
In addition, two recovered C-87(Modified Liberators) aircraft formed No 102 Survey Flight. They were used for survey work and one aircraft was also employed for photographing Mount Everest.
No 5 and 16 Squadrons were re equipped with Canberra's in 1957, but the liberators of 6 squadron continued flying till 1968. They were used for sea surveillance and also dropped surrender leaflets over Goa in 1961. They also carried out maritime patrols during the 1965 war with Pakistan
upload foto
Image Courtesy:- Bharat rakshak
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I thought most of our historical fighters are still inducted and flying!!
shom
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No Mate ,, there are 5 retired Bomber and ground attack planes which are retired from Indian Air Force,,,,I thought most of our historical fighters are still inducted and flying!!
