Historical Fighter Planes of India.
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Dassault mystere in flown by squadron 31 (lions).
A brief history of Squadron 31 I got to know while surfing Indian Air force Website.:-
CREST
The squadron crest depicts a mountain lion in a crouching stance, ready to pouch on its prey. The scroll beneath is inscribed with the words "Shatru Chhidrey Prahret" which means "A KILL WITH EVERY BLOW ". The lion signifies strength, poise and valour. Its crouching stance demonstrates the squadron's ever ready preparedeness to undertake missions to destroy the enemy. Like a pride of lions, the Sqn too is committed to achieving its task with perfect blend of cohesiveness and team work. Thus the Sqn crest and motto signifies its ability to strike deep and hard into the enemy territory and cripple him with every blow.
Formation of the Squadron and a short history
Lions, one of the front line fighter Sqns of the Indian Air Force was formed on 01 Sep 1963 at Pathankot. The Sqn was raised as a part of the expansion of Air Force in the aftermath of 1962 Ops. It was designated as 31 Sqn; the unit adopted the proud and majestic LION as its insignia and has been fearlessly living up to the ideal so potrayed, ever since. The LIONS were equipped with the French Mystere jet till 1973, when they converted to the indigenous HAL HF Marut. The Sqn joined the swing wing club with the induction of Mig 23 in 1983 which it operates till date. The basic role of the squadron has remained ground attack.
The War That Lions Fought
1965 Ops
In the 1965 war the Sqn was commanded by Wg Cdr WM Goodman and operated from Pathankot. The LIONS did exceptionally well in the war and destroyed tanks and other armoured vehicles in the very first strikes. The Sqn flew many missions and gave severe blow to the enemy. The Lions were awarded one MVC and VrC for their valour.
1971 Ops
In the 1971 war the Sqn was commanded by Wg Cdr ML Trehan and operated from Sirsa. The squadron provided extensive Close Air Support to the Indian Army. On the very first day the Lions destroyed Pak battalion HQs, four tanks and various other vehicles. The Sqn also flew reconnaissance sorties, providing the required intelligence to own forces. The LIONS were awarded three VrCs and Commendation by Chief of Air Staff and Chief of Army Staff.
Aircrafts Operated by Squadron
Mystere
Inducted in 1957 following IAF's major re-equipment programme, the French Dassault Mystere IVA heralded the flight into transonic regime. In the 1965 Indo Pak conflict, the Mysteres were employed primarily in the ground attack role, in which they proved extremely effective against armoured vehicles using their 55 mm rockets. After serving the IAF loyally for 16 years they were phased out in 1973.
Marut
In 1964 HAL Bangalore developed the first indigenous fighter ac the HF-24 Marut. The Maruts known as the only real low flying aircraft, was a very familiar sight for the inhabitants of the deserts of Rajasthan and of course the camels too. It was also known for having the fastest cruise speed for ferry, all of 0.9 Mach!!. The Marut was phased out in 1983.
MiG 23 BN
The MiG 23 BN was inducted in 1981 to meet the IAF requirement of a tactical air strike ac (TASA). The first swing wing ac of the IAF, this fighter bomber is one of the fastest ac of the world at low levels. It is capable of carrying multiple loads making it a formidable strike ac.
Period, Location & Aircraft operated by the Sqn
Place Aircraft Year
Pathankot Mystere Sep 63 - Jul 71
Hindon Mystere Jul 71 - May 75
Jodhpur Marut May 75 - Apr 83
Halwara MiG-23 BN Apr 83 - Till date
A brief history of Squadron 31 I got to know while surfing Indian Air force Website.:-
CREST
The squadron crest depicts a mountain lion in a crouching stance, ready to pouch on its prey. The scroll beneath is inscribed with the words "Shatru Chhidrey Prahret" which means "A KILL WITH EVERY BLOW ". The lion signifies strength, poise and valour. Its crouching stance demonstrates the squadron's ever ready preparedeness to undertake missions to destroy the enemy. Like a pride of lions, the Sqn too is committed to achieving its task with perfect blend of cohesiveness and team work. Thus the Sqn crest and motto signifies its ability to strike deep and hard into the enemy territory and cripple him with every blow.
Formation of the Squadron and a short history
Lions, one of the front line fighter Sqns of the Indian Air Force was formed on 01 Sep 1963 at Pathankot. The Sqn was raised as a part of the expansion of Air Force in the aftermath of 1962 Ops. It was designated as 31 Sqn; the unit adopted the proud and majestic LION as its insignia and has been fearlessly living up to the ideal so potrayed, ever since. The LIONS were equipped with the French Mystere jet till 1973, when they converted to the indigenous HAL HF Marut. The Sqn joined the swing wing club with the induction of Mig 23 in 1983 which it operates till date. The basic role of the squadron has remained ground attack.
The War That Lions Fought
1965 Ops
In the 1965 war the Sqn was commanded by Wg Cdr WM Goodman and operated from Pathankot. The LIONS did exceptionally well in the war and destroyed tanks and other armoured vehicles in the very first strikes. The Sqn flew many missions and gave severe blow to the enemy. The Lions were awarded one MVC and VrC for their valour.
1971 Ops
In the 1971 war the Sqn was commanded by Wg Cdr ML Trehan and operated from Sirsa. The squadron provided extensive Close Air Support to the Indian Army. On the very first day the Lions destroyed Pak battalion HQs, four tanks and various other vehicles. The Sqn also flew reconnaissance sorties, providing the required intelligence to own forces. The LIONS were awarded three VrCs and Commendation by Chief of Air Staff and Chief of Army Staff.
Aircrafts Operated by Squadron
Mystere
Inducted in 1957 following IAF's major re-equipment programme, the French Dassault Mystere IVA heralded the flight into transonic regime. In the 1965 Indo Pak conflict, the Mysteres were employed primarily in the ground attack role, in which they proved extremely effective against armoured vehicles using their 55 mm rockets. After serving the IAF loyally for 16 years they were phased out in 1973.
Marut
In 1964 HAL Bangalore developed the first indigenous fighter ac the HF-24 Marut. The Maruts known as the only real low flying aircraft, was a very familiar sight for the inhabitants of the deserts of Rajasthan and of course the camels too. It was also known for having the fastest cruise speed for ferry, all of 0.9 Mach!!. The Marut was phased out in 1983.
MiG 23 BN
The MiG 23 BN was inducted in 1981 to meet the IAF requirement of a tactical air strike ac (TASA). The first swing wing ac of the IAF, this fighter bomber is one of the fastest ac of the world at low levels. It is capable of carrying multiple loads making it a formidable strike ac.
Period, Location & Aircraft operated by the Sqn
Place Aircraft Year
Pathankot Mystere Sep 63 - Jul 71
Hindon Mystere Jul 71 - May 75
Jodhpur Marut May 75 - Apr 83
Halwara MiG-23 BN Apr 83 - Till date
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MYSTERE I, II & III
* Even before the Ouragan was delivered to the Armee de l'Air, Dassault was working on a more advanced machine based on it, which would take to the air in early 1951 as the "MD 452 Mystere (Mystery) I".
The first prototype Mystere was essentially an Ouragan with a 30-degree swept wing and modified tail surfaces. Two further prototypes followed, powered by the Rolls-Royce Tay 250 centrifugal-flow turbojet, an improved version of the Nene, built under license by Hispano-Suiza, and rated at 28.0 kN (2,850 kgp / 6,280 lbf) thrust.
These three Mystere I prototypes led to two "Mystere IIA" prototypes, powered by the Tay and armed with four Hispano 20-millimeter cannon, and then four "Mystere IIB" prototypes, which exchanged the four 20-millimeter guns for two 30-millimeter DEFA revolver-type cannon. A Mystere IIA was the first French aircraft to break Mach 1 in controlled flight (in a dive), on 28 October 1951.
The eleven production prototypes that followed were designated "Mystere IIC", nine of which were fitted with the SNECMA Atar 101C axial-flow turbojet, rated at 24.5 kN (2,500 kgp / 5,510 lbf) thrust, while two were experimentally fitted with the afterburning Atar 101F, with afterburning thrust of 37.3 kN (3,800 kgp / 8,380 lbf).
MD 452 MYSTERE IIC:
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
spec metric english
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
wingspan 13.1 meters 42 feet 9 inches
wing area 30.3 sq_meters 326 sq_feet
length 11.7 meters 38 feet 6 inches
height 4.26 meters 14 feet
empty weight 5,225 kilograms 11,495 pounds
max loaded weight 7,475 kilograms 16,480 pounds
maximum speed 1,060 KPH 660 MPH / 575 KT
service ceiling 15,250 meters 50,000 feet
range 885 kilometers 550 MI / 480 NMI
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
The Armee de l'Air ordered 150 Mystere IICs, with the first production item flying in June 1954, and delivered in October of that year. The production aircraft featured the twin 30-millimeter DEFA cannon, an Atar 101D turbojet with 29.4 kN (3,000 kgp / 6,615 lbf) thrust, increased tail sweep, and revised intake trunking and internal fuel tank arrangement. Top speed was 1,030 KPH (640 MPH) at low level. Details of external stores are unclear, but a reasonable assumption would be that they were similar to those of Ouragan.
The last Mystere IIC was delivered in 1957, by which time the type was already being relegated to advanced training duties. Aircraft design was moving at a breakneck pace in the 1950s and even as the Mystere IIC was becoming operational, the better Mystere IVA was flying. The Mystere IIC was very much an interim type, though it did persist in the training role until 1963.
There were no foreign buyers for the Mystere II. As noted, the Israelis wanted to buy 24 of them but changed their minds and bought Mystere IVs instead. Sources do not hint that the Mystere II was ever used in combat.
* There was only a single "Mystere III", or more precisely "Mystere IIIN", derived from experiments with the Ouragan. One of the original Ouragan prototypes had been built as a demonstrator for a night fighter, with a solid nose containing air intercept radar, and the air intakes moved to the side of the aircraft, under the cockpit. It was fitted with twin 30-millimeter DEFA cannon and designated "MD 350-30-L", with the "30" meaning the 30 millimeter guns and the "L" meaning the lateral intakes.
The modified Ouragan retained its single-seat configuration. It was intended to lead to a two-seat night fighter, the "MD 451", but the development of the Mystere II made it more attractive to develop a two-seat version of the Mystere II instead.
The result was the "MD 453 Mystere IIIN", or "Mystere de Nuit". This aircraft had the solid nose and lateral intakes of the Ouragan night fighter variant, and was powered by the Tay. It first flew in July 1952. Two more prototypes were planned, but they were never built as interest had moved on to a night fighter version of the Mystere IV. The sole Mystere IIIN was never fitted with radar and the program was abandoned in December 1953. However, the aircraft was later used for ejection seat trials.
[3] MYSTERE IV
* The "Mystere IV" was essentially a new design, a rethinking of the Mystere II rather than a modification of it. The first prototype was flown in September 1952, and was powered by a Hispano-built Rolls-Royce Tay 250 turbojet, as were the early Mystere IIA prototypes.
While it also featured the twin 30-millimeter DEFA cannon adopted for the Mystere II, the Mystere IV had a new and more robust oval-section fuselage, a thinner wing with greater sweep, and new tail surfaces. The result resembled the Mystere IIC in a general way but had cleaner lines, more in the class of the US F-86 Sabre.
There was apparently only one prototype, leading to a production contract for 225 Mystere IVAs for the Armee de l'Air. Interestingly enough, this batch of aircraft was purchased for the French by the United States as part of the NATO Military Assistance Program, though the French would purchase 100 more Mystere IVAs with their own funds.
The first production Mystere IVA flew in late May 1954, and the type entered service with the Armee de l'Air the next year, being initially deployed as an interceptor. It would also be used as ground-attack fighter in French service.
The first 50 production aircraft used the Tay 250 engine, but all following production was fitted with an uprated Tay, the Hispano-built Verdon 350, with 34.3 kN (3,500 kgp / 7,715 lbf) thrust.
MYSTERE IVA:
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
spec metric english
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
wingspan 11.12 meters 36 feet 6 inches
wing area 32 sq_meters 344.5 sq_feet
length 12.85 meters 42 feet 1 inch
height 4.59 meters 15 feet 1 inch
empty weight 5,870 kilograms 12,950 pounds
max loaded weight 9,500 kilograms 20,950 pounds
maximum speed 1,120 KPH 695 MPH / 605 KT
service ceiling 15,000 meters 49,200 feet
range 920 kilometers 570 MI / 495 NMI
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
The Mystere IVA had four stores pylons, with a total load capacity of 900 kilograms (2,000 pounds) of underwing stores. It appears that in typical flight configurations, two of the pylons were fitted with drop tanks while two others carried bombs or Matra 68-millimeter unguided rocket packs. As with many early jet aircraft, the Mystere IVA's range without drop tanks was pathetic.
The Mystere IVA remained in first-line service with the Armee de l'Air until the early 1960s, when it was replaced by the Mirage IIIC. It remained in service in the ground-attack role until 1975, when replaced by the SEPECAT Jaguar, and as an operational trainer until 1980, when it was replaced by the Dassault-Dornier Alpha Jet.
60 of the Verdon-powered Mystere IVAs that were ordered by the French ended up being sold to Israel, with the first batch of 24 arriving April 1956, just in time for the war over Suez in October. In the hands of skilled IAF pilots, they proved themselves more than a match for Egyptian MiG-15s. French Mystere IVAs also participated in the October 1956 war, operating from Israeli bases with an Israeli squadron number, and French pilots would also fly some of the Israeli Mystere IVAs during that war.
The remaining 36 Mystere IVs in the batch were shipped to Israel after the 1956 war. Two squadrons of Mystere IVAs were still in Israeli service in the Six-Day War in 1967.
The Indian Air Force also bought 110 Verdon-powered Mystere IVAs. These were all new-production aircraft. First delivery was in 1957. The type was used in the close-support role during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, and like its ancestor, the Ouragan, proved robust and able to absorb punishment.
* The Mystere series continued to evolve, with an improved "Mystere IVB" developed to take advantage of the new afterburning engines. The Mystere IVB was almost a new aircraft, with a new fuselage and redesigned vertical stabilizer, and also featured a radar gunsight similar to that used on the F-86 in the upper lip of the intake.
The first prototype flew in December 1953, and was powered by an afterburning Rolls-Royce Avon RA.7R axial-flow turbojet, with a maximum afterburning thrust of 42.5 kN (4,330 kgp / 9,550 lbf). Another Avon-powered prototype flew in June 1954, while a third prototype, powered by the Atar 101F (which, as mentioned, was fitted experimentally to two pre-production Mystere IICs), flew in March 1955.
Seven pre-production Mirage IVB aircraft were also completed. The first two were fitted with a SEPR 66 bi-fuel rocket motor to provide boost thrust, and the last two were powered by the afterburning Atar 101G-2 turbojet with 44.1 kN (4,500 kg / 9,920 lbf) afterburning thrust.
The Mystere IVB was promising, but Dassault was already working on an even better aircraft, the Super Mystere, and so the Mystere IVB did not enter production.
* As mentioned previously, a single night-fighter version of the Mystere IVB, the "Mystere IVN", was completed and flew in 1954. The prototype was powered by an Avon RA.7R, and was stretched 1.4 meters (4 feet 7 inches) to accommodate two tandem seats and additional fuel. It was to be fitted with US-built AN/APG-33 air-intercept radar in a nose radome above the intake, giving it a certain resemblance to the US F-86D "Sabre Dog" interceptor.
It had two 30-millimeter DEFA cannon, and like the F-86D had a retractable tray for unguided air-to-air rockets, in this case accommodating 55 68-millimeter rockets. Some sources claim that this tray was optionally fitted to the standard Mystere IVA, but if so it appears to have been little used.
The project went nowhere because of problems with the radar and the limited endurance of the aircraft. The French were also developing another night fighter that seemed more promising, the "Sud-Ouest Vautour IIN", and the Mystere IVN was cancelled
[4] SUPER MYSTERE
* The last of the Ouragan-Mystere series was the "Super Mystere", which was also largely a new aircraft, with a slight resemblance to the US F-100 Super Sabre and roughly similar in capabilities, though smaller. It was the first "transonic" aircraft of European origin to reach quantity production.
The first prototype, the "Super Mystere B1", flew in March 1955. This initial prototype was powered by the Avon RA.7R engine, and featured wings with a 45-degree sweepback, as well as updated cockpit and F-100-like oval air intake. The prototype broke Mach 1 in level flight the day after it first took to the air.
Five pre-production "Super Mystere B2s" followed, powered by the SNECMA Atar 101G, with the first of the five flying in May 1956, and the first production Super Mystere B2 flying in late February 1957. The production version was powered by improved Atar 101G-2 or G-3 engines, providing 33.1 kN (3,375 kgp / 7,400 lbf) maximum dry thrust and 43.75 kN (4,460 kgp / 9,833 lbf) afterburning thrust.
Armament consisted of twin DEFA 30-millimeter cannon. Early versions also had a rocket pack for 35 68-millimeter unguided rockets, but the rocket pack was quickly abandoned. The aircraft had two stores pylons, and could carry an external load of 900 kilograms (2,000 pounds), including drop tanks, bombs, unguided rocket pods, AS-30 radio-guided air-to-surface missiles, or Sidewinder air-to-air missiles.
SUPER MYSTERE B2:
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
spec metric english
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
wingspan 10.5 meters 34 feet 6 inches
wing area 35 sq_meters 377 sq_feet
length 14.04 meters 46 feet 1 inches
height 4.53 meters 14 feet 11 inches
empty weight 6,985 kilograms 15,400 pounds
maximum loaded weight 10,000 kilograms 22,050 pounds
maximum speed 1,200 KPH 745 MPH / 650 KT
service ceiling 17,000 meters 55,750 feet
range 870 kilometers 540 MI / 470 NMI
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
180 Super Mystere B2s were built for the Armee de l'Air, with the last delivered in 1959. They were relegated to the attack role after the Mach 2 Mirage III came on line, but remained in French service until the fall of 1977, being replaced by the Mirage IIC and Mirage F1C.
In 1958, two examples were completed with Atar 9B engines with 58.9 kN (6,000 kgp / 13,225 lbf) afterburning thrust. They were designated "Super Mystere B4". The type did not enter production because by that time the much superior Mirage III was already entering service.
* 36 of the Super Mystere B2s bought by the French ended up being sold to the Israelis in 1958. The IAF was fond of the aircraft and nicknamed it "Sambad", after its initials ("SMB-Deux"). Israeli pilots found it a match for transonic Arab MiG-19s, and the Sambad generally came out the winner in the intermittent air skirmishes that took place between outright war.
The Sambad served in the ground attack role in the 1967 Six-Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In the early 1970s, the Israelis upgraded their surviving Super Mysteres by retrofitting a non-afterburning Pratt & Whitney J52-P8A turbojet, rated at 41.4 kN (4,220 kgp / 9,300 lbf) thrust. This required airframe modifications, resulting in a longer fuselage.
Updated Israeli avionics were also fitted, and the variety and weight of external stores were increased as well. The first example of the upgrade appeared in May 1973, and participated in the Yom Kippur War. In 1977, 12 of these uprated Super Mysteres were sold to Honduras, with the Hondurans operating the type until 1989, making them the last of the operational Ouragan and Mystere series.
Data Courtesy: The Dassault Ouragan, Mystere, & Super Mystere
Picture Courtesy:- Bharat Rakshak
* Even before the Ouragan was delivered to the Armee de l'Air, Dassault was working on a more advanced machine based on it, which would take to the air in early 1951 as the "MD 452 Mystere (Mystery) I".
The first prototype Mystere was essentially an Ouragan with a 30-degree swept wing and modified tail surfaces. Two further prototypes followed, powered by the Rolls-Royce Tay 250 centrifugal-flow turbojet, an improved version of the Nene, built under license by Hispano-Suiza, and rated at 28.0 kN (2,850 kgp / 6,280 lbf) thrust.
These three Mystere I prototypes led to two "Mystere IIA" prototypes, powered by the Tay and armed with four Hispano 20-millimeter cannon, and then four "Mystere IIB" prototypes, which exchanged the four 20-millimeter guns for two 30-millimeter DEFA revolver-type cannon. A Mystere IIA was the first French aircraft to break Mach 1 in controlled flight (in a dive), on 28 October 1951.
The eleven production prototypes that followed were designated "Mystere IIC", nine of which were fitted with the SNECMA Atar 101C axial-flow turbojet, rated at 24.5 kN (2,500 kgp / 5,510 lbf) thrust, while two were experimentally fitted with the afterburning Atar 101F, with afterburning thrust of 37.3 kN (3,800 kgp / 8,380 lbf).
MD 452 MYSTERE IIC:
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
spec metric english
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
wingspan 13.1 meters 42 feet 9 inches
wing area 30.3 sq_meters 326 sq_feet
length 11.7 meters 38 feet 6 inches
height 4.26 meters 14 feet
empty weight 5,225 kilograms 11,495 pounds
max loaded weight 7,475 kilograms 16,480 pounds
maximum speed 1,060 KPH 660 MPH / 575 KT
service ceiling 15,250 meters 50,000 feet
range 885 kilometers 550 MI / 480 NMI
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
The Armee de l'Air ordered 150 Mystere IICs, with the first production item flying in June 1954, and delivered in October of that year. The production aircraft featured the twin 30-millimeter DEFA cannon, an Atar 101D turbojet with 29.4 kN (3,000 kgp / 6,615 lbf) thrust, increased tail sweep, and revised intake trunking and internal fuel tank arrangement. Top speed was 1,030 KPH (640 MPH) at low level. Details of external stores are unclear, but a reasonable assumption would be that they were similar to those of Ouragan.
The last Mystere IIC was delivered in 1957, by which time the type was already being relegated to advanced training duties. Aircraft design was moving at a breakneck pace in the 1950s and even as the Mystere IIC was becoming operational, the better Mystere IVA was flying. The Mystere IIC was very much an interim type, though it did persist in the training role until 1963.
There were no foreign buyers for the Mystere II. As noted, the Israelis wanted to buy 24 of them but changed their minds and bought Mystere IVs instead. Sources do not hint that the Mystere II was ever used in combat.
* There was only a single "Mystere III", or more precisely "Mystere IIIN", derived from experiments with the Ouragan. One of the original Ouragan prototypes had been built as a demonstrator for a night fighter, with a solid nose containing air intercept radar, and the air intakes moved to the side of the aircraft, under the cockpit. It was fitted with twin 30-millimeter DEFA cannon and designated "MD 350-30-L", with the "30" meaning the 30 millimeter guns and the "L" meaning the lateral intakes.
The modified Ouragan retained its single-seat configuration. It was intended to lead to a two-seat night fighter, the "MD 451", but the development of the Mystere II made it more attractive to develop a two-seat version of the Mystere II instead.
The result was the "MD 453 Mystere IIIN", or "Mystere de Nuit". This aircraft had the solid nose and lateral intakes of the Ouragan night fighter variant, and was powered by the Tay. It first flew in July 1952. Two more prototypes were planned, but they were never built as interest had moved on to a night fighter version of the Mystere IV. The sole Mystere IIIN was never fitted with radar and the program was abandoned in December 1953. However, the aircraft was later used for ejection seat trials.
[3] MYSTERE IV
* The "Mystere IV" was essentially a new design, a rethinking of the Mystere II rather than a modification of it. The first prototype was flown in September 1952, and was powered by a Hispano-built Rolls-Royce Tay 250 turbojet, as were the early Mystere IIA prototypes.
While it also featured the twin 30-millimeter DEFA cannon adopted for the Mystere II, the Mystere IV had a new and more robust oval-section fuselage, a thinner wing with greater sweep, and new tail surfaces. The result resembled the Mystere IIC in a general way but had cleaner lines, more in the class of the US F-86 Sabre.
There was apparently only one prototype, leading to a production contract for 225 Mystere IVAs for the Armee de l'Air. Interestingly enough, this batch of aircraft was purchased for the French by the United States as part of the NATO Military Assistance Program, though the French would purchase 100 more Mystere IVAs with their own funds.
The first production Mystere IVA flew in late May 1954, and the type entered service with the Armee de l'Air the next year, being initially deployed as an interceptor. It would also be used as ground-attack fighter in French service.
The first 50 production aircraft used the Tay 250 engine, but all following production was fitted with an uprated Tay, the Hispano-built Verdon 350, with 34.3 kN (3,500 kgp / 7,715 lbf) thrust.
MYSTERE IVA:
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
spec metric english
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
wingspan 11.12 meters 36 feet 6 inches
wing area 32 sq_meters 344.5 sq_feet
length 12.85 meters 42 feet 1 inch
height 4.59 meters 15 feet 1 inch
empty weight 5,870 kilograms 12,950 pounds
max loaded weight 9,500 kilograms 20,950 pounds
maximum speed 1,120 KPH 695 MPH / 605 KT
service ceiling 15,000 meters 49,200 feet
range 920 kilometers 570 MI / 495 NMI
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
The Mystere IVA had four stores pylons, with a total load capacity of 900 kilograms (2,000 pounds) of underwing stores. It appears that in typical flight configurations, two of the pylons were fitted with drop tanks while two others carried bombs or Matra 68-millimeter unguided rocket packs. As with many early jet aircraft, the Mystere IVA's range without drop tanks was pathetic.
The Mystere IVA remained in first-line service with the Armee de l'Air until the early 1960s, when it was replaced by the Mirage IIIC. It remained in service in the ground-attack role until 1975, when replaced by the SEPECAT Jaguar, and as an operational trainer until 1980, when it was replaced by the Dassault-Dornier Alpha Jet.
60 of the Verdon-powered Mystere IVAs that were ordered by the French ended up being sold to Israel, with the first batch of 24 arriving April 1956, just in time for the war over Suez in October. In the hands of skilled IAF pilots, they proved themselves more than a match for Egyptian MiG-15s. French Mystere IVAs also participated in the October 1956 war, operating from Israeli bases with an Israeli squadron number, and French pilots would also fly some of the Israeli Mystere IVAs during that war.
The remaining 36 Mystere IVs in the batch were shipped to Israel after the 1956 war. Two squadrons of Mystere IVAs were still in Israeli service in the Six-Day War in 1967.
The Indian Air Force also bought 110 Verdon-powered Mystere IVAs. These were all new-production aircraft. First delivery was in 1957. The type was used in the close-support role during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, and like its ancestor, the Ouragan, proved robust and able to absorb punishment.
* The Mystere series continued to evolve, with an improved "Mystere IVB" developed to take advantage of the new afterburning engines. The Mystere IVB was almost a new aircraft, with a new fuselage and redesigned vertical stabilizer, and also featured a radar gunsight similar to that used on the F-86 in the upper lip of the intake.
The first prototype flew in December 1953, and was powered by an afterburning Rolls-Royce Avon RA.7R axial-flow turbojet, with a maximum afterburning thrust of 42.5 kN (4,330 kgp / 9,550 lbf). Another Avon-powered prototype flew in June 1954, while a third prototype, powered by the Atar 101F (which, as mentioned, was fitted experimentally to two pre-production Mystere IICs), flew in March 1955.
Seven pre-production Mirage IVB aircraft were also completed. The first two were fitted with a SEPR 66 bi-fuel rocket motor to provide boost thrust, and the last two were powered by the afterburning Atar 101G-2 turbojet with 44.1 kN (4,500 kg / 9,920 lbf) afterburning thrust.
The Mystere IVB was promising, but Dassault was already working on an even better aircraft, the Super Mystere, and so the Mystere IVB did not enter production.
* As mentioned previously, a single night-fighter version of the Mystere IVB, the "Mystere IVN", was completed and flew in 1954. The prototype was powered by an Avon RA.7R, and was stretched 1.4 meters (4 feet 7 inches) to accommodate two tandem seats and additional fuel. It was to be fitted with US-built AN/APG-33 air-intercept radar in a nose radome above the intake, giving it a certain resemblance to the US F-86D "Sabre Dog" interceptor.
It had two 30-millimeter DEFA cannon, and like the F-86D had a retractable tray for unguided air-to-air rockets, in this case accommodating 55 68-millimeter rockets. Some sources claim that this tray was optionally fitted to the standard Mystere IVA, but if so it appears to have been little used.
The project went nowhere because of problems with the radar and the limited endurance of the aircraft. The French were also developing another night fighter that seemed more promising, the "Sud-Ouest Vautour IIN", and the Mystere IVN was cancelled
[4] SUPER MYSTERE
* The last of the Ouragan-Mystere series was the "Super Mystere", which was also largely a new aircraft, with a slight resemblance to the US F-100 Super Sabre and roughly similar in capabilities, though smaller. It was the first "transonic" aircraft of European origin to reach quantity production.
The first prototype, the "Super Mystere B1", flew in March 1955. This initial prototype was powered by the Avon RA.7R engine, and featured wings with a 45-degree sweepback, as well as updated cockpit and F-100-like oval air intake. The prototype broke Mach 1 in level flight the day after it first took to the air.
Five pre-production "Super Mystere B2s" followed, powered by the SNECMA Atar 101G, with the first of the five flying in May 1956, and the first production Super Mystere B2 flying in late February 1957. The production version was powered by improved Atar 101G-2 or G-3 engines, providing 33.1 kN (3,375 kgp / 7,400 lbf) maximum dry thrust and 43.75 kN (4,460 kgp / 9,833 lbf) afterburning thrust.
Armament consisted of twin DEFA 30-millimeter cannon. Early versions also had a rocket pack for 35 68-millimeter unguided rockets, but the rocket pack was quickly abandoned. The aircraft had two stores pylons, and could carry an external load of 900 kilograms (2,000 pounds), including drop tanks, bombs, unguided rocket pods, AS-30 radio-guided air-to-surface missiles, or Sidewinder air-to-air missiles.
SUPER MYSTERE B2:
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
spec metric english
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
wingspan 10.5 meters 34 feet 6 inches
wing area 35 sq_meters 377 sq_feet
length 14.04 meters 46 feet 1 inches
height 4.53 meters 14 feet 11 inches
empty weight 6,985 kilograms 15,400 pounds
maximum loaded weight 10,000 kilograms 22,050 pounds
maximum speed 1,200 KPH 745 MPH / 650 KT
service ceiling 17,000 meters 55,750 feet
range 870 kilometers 540 MI / 470 NMI
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
180 Super Mystere B2s were built for the Armee de l'Air, with the last delivered in 1959. They were relegated to the attack role after the Mach 2 Mirage III came on line, but remained in French service until the fall of 1977, being replaced by the Mirage IIC and Mirage F1C.
In 1958, two examples were completed with Atar 9B engines with 58.9 kN (6,000 kgp / 13,225 lbf) afterburning thrust. They were designated "Super Mystere B4". The type did not enter production because by that time the much superior Mirage III was already entering service.
* 36 of the Super Mystere B2s bought by the French ended up being sold to the Israelis in 1958. The IAF was fond of the aircraft and nicknamed it "Sambad", after its initials ("SMB-Deux"). Israeli pilots found it a match for transonic Arab MiG-19s, and the Sambad generally came out the winner in the intermittent air skirmishes that took place between outright war.
The Sambad served in the ground attack role in the 1967 Six-Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In the early 1970s, the Israelis upgraded their surviving Super Mysteres by retrofitting a non-afterburning Pratt & Whitney J52-P8A turbojet, rated at 41.4 kN (4,220 kgp / 9,300 lbf) thrust. This required airframe modifications, resulting in a longer fuselage.
Updated Israeli avionics were also fitted, and the variety and weight of external stores were increased as well. The first example of the upgrade appeared in May 1973, and participated in the Yom Kippur War. In 1977, 12 of these uprated Super Mysteres were sold to Honduras, with the Hondurans operating the type until 1989, making them the last of the operational Ouragan and Mystere series.
Data Courtesy: The Dassault Ouragan, Mystere, & Super Mystere
Picture Courtesy:- Bharat Rakshak
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There are many people reading this thread who aren't registered, I imagine.
shom
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Yeah they are ,,,,,, I have seen that,,,,,,
shom
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Thanxx Jagdish,,,,,,
shom
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here comes the 4th one and one of the best in the history of Indian Airforce
4) Hawker Hunter:-
165 F-56 and 22 T-66 trainers introduced since 1957.The Hawker Hunter is a subsonic British jet aircraft developed in the 1950s. The single-seat Hunter entered service as a manoeuvrable fighter aircraft, and later operated in fighter-bomber and reconnaissance roles in numerous conflicts. Two-seat variants remained in use for training and secondary roles with the Royal Air Force (RAF) and Royal Navy until the early 1990s. The Hunter was also widely exported, serving with 21 other air forces; 50 years after its original introduction it is still in active service, operating with the Lebanese Air Force.
On 7 September 1953, the modified first prototype broke the world air speed record, achieving 727.63 mph (1,171.01 km/h). Hunters were also used by two RAF display teams; the "Black Arrows", who on one occasion looped a record-breaking 22 examples in formation, and later the "Blue Diamonds", who flew 16 aircraft. Overall, 1,972 Hunters were produced by Hawker Siddeley and under licence. In British service,
Indian Air Force:-
India arranged for Hunters to be purchased in 1954 as a part of a wider arms deal with Britain, placing an order for 140 Hunter single-seat fighters;[35] simultaneous to an announcement by Pakistan of its own purchase of several North American F-86 Sabre jet fighters.[36] The Indian Air Force (IAF) were the first to operate the Hunter T.66 trainers, placing an initial order in 1957; the more powerful engine was considered beneficial in a hot environment, allowing for greater takeoff weights.[37] During the 1960s, Pakistan investigated the possibility of buying as many as 40 English Electric Lightnings; however, Britain was not enthusiastic about the potential sales opportunity because of the damage it would do to its relations with India, which at the time was still awaiting the delivery of large numbers of ex-RAF Hunters.[38]
During the Sino-Indian War in 1962, the Hunter's superiority over the Chinese MiGs gave India a strategic advantage;[39][N 2] and deterred the use of Ilyushin Il-4 bombers from attacking targets within India.[40] The Hunter would also be a major feature in the escalation of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965;[N 3] along with the Gnat the Hunter was the primary air defence fighter of India, and regularly engaged in dogfights with Pakistani F-86 Sabres.[42] The aerial war saw both sides conducting thousands of sorties in a single month.[43] Despite the intense fighting, the conflict was effectively a stalemate.[44]
Hunters flown by the IAF extensively operated in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971; at the start, India had six combat-ready squadrons of Hunters.[45][N 4] In the aftermath of the conflict, Pakistan claimed to have shot down 32 Indian Hunters overall.[46] Pakistani infantry and armoured forces attacked the Indian outpost of Longewala in an event now known as the Battle of Longewala. Six IAF Hunters stationed at Jaisalmer Air Force Base were able to halt the Pakistani advance at Longewala by conducting non-stop bombing raids. They attacked Pakistani tanks, armoured personnel carriers and gun positions; and created a sense of chaos on the battlefield, resulting in the Pakistani retreat.[47][N 5] Hunters were also used for many ground attack missions and raids into Pakistan, like in the bombing of the Attock Oil refinery, to limit Pakistani fuel supplies during the war.[48]
The Hunters were not used by India in the 1999 Kargil War, and the last IAF Hunter was phased out of service in 1996. The Hunter was replaced by the Sukhoi Su-30MKI.
Newly Delivered Hawker Hunter
The thunderbolts with their pilots and Aircrafts,,,
General characteristics
Crew: One
Length: 45 ft 11 in (14.00 m)
Wingspan: 33 ft 8 in (10.26 m)
Height: 13 ft 2 in (4.01 m)
Wing area: 349 ft² (32.42 m²)
Empty weight: 14,122 lb (6,405 kg)
Loaded weight: 17,750 lb (8,050 kg)
Max. takeoff weight: 24,600 lb (11,158 kg)
Powerplant: 1 × Rolls-Royce Avon 207 turbojet, 10,145 lbf (45.13 kN)
Performance
Maximum speed: Mach 0.94, 620 kn (715 mph, 1,150 km/h) at sea level
Combat range: 385 nmi (445 mi, 715 km)
Ferry range: 1,650 nmi (1,900 mi, 3,060 km) with external fuel
Service ceiling: 50,000 ft (15,240 m)
Rate of climb: 17,200 ft/min (87.4 m/s)
Wing loading: 51.6 lb/ft² (251.9 kg/m²)
Thrust/weight: 0.56
Armament
Guns: 4× 30 mm (1.18 in) ADEN revolver cannons in a removable gun pack with 150 rpg
Hardpoints: 4 underwing (7 hardpoints on Singaporean FGA/FR.74S, essentially refurbished FGA.9 derived from F.6[67]) with a capacity of 7,400 lb (3,400 kg) and provisions to carry combinations of:
Rockets:
4× Matra rocket pods (each with 18 × SNEB 68 mm (2.68 in) rockets) or
32× Hispano SURA R80 80 mm (3.15 in) rockets[106]
Missiles:
4× AIM-9 Sidewinder Air-to-air missiles, mounted on Singaporean FGA/FR.74S[67] (two on Swiss Mk.58[59][60] Dutch F6's and Swedish Mk.50[52])
4× AGM-65 Maverick Air-to-surface missiles, mounted on Singaporean FGA/FR.74S[67] (two on Swiss Mk.58[61])
Bombs: a variety of unguided iron bombs
Other: 2× 230 US gallons (870 l; 190 imp gal) drop tanks for extended range/loitering time
Avionics
Ekco Ranging radar
Data Courtesy:- Wikipidia
Picture COurtesy:- Bhrat Rakshak
4) Hawker Hunter:-
165 F-56 and 22 T-66 trainers introduced since 1957.The Hawker Hunter is a subsonic British jet aircraft developed in the 1950s. The single-seat Hunter entered service as a manoeuvrable fighter aircraft, and later operated in fighter-bomber and reconnaissance roles in numerous conflicts. Two-seat variants remained in use for training and secondary roles with the Royal Air Force (RAF) and Royal Navy until the early 1990s. The Hunter was also widely exported, serving with 21 other air forces; 50 years after its original introduction it is still in active service, operating with the Lebanese Air Force.
On 7 September 1953, the modified first prototype broke the world air speed record, achieving 727.63 mph (1,171.01 km/h). Hunters were also used by two RAF display teams; the "Black Arrows", who on one occasion looped a record-breaking 22 examples in formation, and later the "Blue Diamonds", who flew 16 aircraft. Overall, 1,972 Hunters were produced by Hawker Siddeley and under licence. In British service,
Indian Air Force:-
India arranged for Hunters to be purchased in 1954 as a part of a wider arms deal with Britain, placing an order for 140 Hunter single-seat fighters;[35] simultaneous to an announcement by Pakistan of its own purchase of several North American F-86 Sabre jet fighters.[36] The Indian Air Force (IAF) were the first to operate the Hunter T.66 trainers, placing an initial order in 1957; the more powerful engine was considered beneficial in a hot environment, allowing for greater takeoff weights.[37] During the 1960s, Pakistan investigated the possibility of buying as many as 40 English Electric Lightnings; however, Britain was not enthusiastic about the potential sales opportunity because of the damage it would do to its relations with India, which at the time was still awaiting the delivery of large numbers of ex-RAF Hunters.[38]
During the Sino-Indian War in 1962, the Hunter's superiority over the Chinese MiGs gave India a strategic advantage;[39][N 2] and deterred the use of Ilyushin Il-4 bombers from attacking targets within India.[40] The Hunter would also be a major feature in the escalation of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965;[N 3] along with the Gnat the Hunter was the primary air defence fighter of India, and regularly engaged in dogfights with Pakistani F-86 Sabres.[42] The aerial war saw both sides conducting thousands of sorties in a single month.[43] Despite the intense fighting, the conflict was effectively a stalemate.[44]
Hunters flown by the IAF extensively operated in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971; at the start, India had six combat-ready squadrons of Hunters.[45][N 4] In the aftermath of the conflict, Pakistan claimed to have shot down 32 Indian Hunters overall.[46] Pakistani infantry and armoured forces attacked the Indian outpost of Longewala in an event now known as the Battle of Longewala. Six IAF Hunters stationed at Jaisalmer Air Force Base were able to halt the Pakistani advance at Longewala by conducting non-stop bombing raids. They attacked Pakistani tanks, armoured personnel carriers and gun positions; and created a sense of chaos on the battlefield, resulting in the Pakistani retreat.[47][N 5] Hunters were also used for many ground attack missions and raids into Pakistan, like in the bombing of the Attock Oil refinery, to limit Pakistani fuel supplies during the war.[48]
The Hunters were not used by India in the 1999 Kargil War, and the last IAF Hunter was phased out of service in 1996. The Hunter was replaced by the Sukhoi Su-30MKI.
Newly Delivered Hawker Hunter
The thunderbolts with their pilots and Aircrafts,,,
General characteristics
Crew: One
Length: 45 ft 11 in (14.00 m)
Wingspan: 33 ft 8 in (10.26 m)
Height: 13 ft 2 in (4.01 m)
Wing area: 349 ft² (32.42 m²)
Empty weight: 14,122 lb (6,405 kg)
Loaded weight: 17,750 lb (8,050 kg)
Max. takeoff weight: 24,600 lb (11,158 kg)
Powerplant: 1 × Rolls-Royce Avon 207 turbojet, 10,145 lbf (45.13 kN)
Performance
Maximum speed: Mach 0.94, 620 kn (715 mph, 1,150 km/h) at sea level
Combat range: 385 nmi (445 mi, 715 km)
Ferry range: 1,650 nmi (1,900 mi, 3,060 km) with external fuel
Service ceiling: 50,000 ft (15,240 m)
Rate of climb: 17,200 ft/min (87.4 m/s)
Wing loading: 51.6 lb/ft² (251.9 kg/m²)
Thrust/weight: 0.56
Armament
Guns: 4× 30 mm (1.18 in) ADEN revolver cannons in a removable gun pack with 150 rpg
Hardpoints: 4 underwing (7 hardpoints on Singaporean FGA/FR.74S, essentially refurbished FGA.9 derived from F.6[67]) with a capacity of 7,400 lb (3,400 kg) and provisions to carry combinations of:
Rockets:
4× Matra rocket pods (each with 18 × SNEB 68 mm (2.68 in) rockets) or
32× Hispano SURA R80 80 mm (3.15 in) rockets[106]
Missiles:
4× AIM-9 Sidewinder Air-to-air missiles, mounted on Singaporean FGA/FR.74S[67] (two on Swiss Mk.58[59][60] Dutch F6's and Swedish Mk.50[52])
4× AGM-65 Maverick Air-to-surface missiles, mounted on Singaporean FGA/FR.74S[67] (two on Swiss Mk.58[61])
Bombs: a variety of unguided iron bombs
Other: 2× 230 US gallons (870 l; 190 imp gal) drop tanks for extended range/loitering time
Avionics
Ekco Ranging radar
Data Courtesy:- Wikipidia
Picture COurtesy:- Bhrat Rakshak
shom
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Two Things must be mentioned in the context of Hawker Hunters:-
1) M.S. Bawa :-
online photo storage
2) Batlle of Loungewala
1) M.S. Bawa :-
online photo storage
2) Batlle of Loungewala
shom
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Battle Of Loungewala:-
It has two versions.
1) Wikipidia and other media version:- Battle
one of the three HAL Marut used by the IAF against Pakistani armour at Longewala
During the night of the 4th, Lt. Veer's platoon conducting a patrol detected noises across the border that suggested a large number of armoured vehicles approaching.[12] These were soon confirmed by reports - from the Army's Air Observation Post aircraft flown by Maj. Atma Singh - in the area of a 20 km long armoured column on the track leading to the post advancing in the general direction of the Longewala post.[13] Directing Lt Veer's patrol to trail the advancing armoured column, Chandpuri got in touch with the battalion headquarters requesting urgent reinforcements and armour and artillery support. Battalion HQ gave him the choice of staying put, and containing the attack as much as possible, or carrying out a tactical retreat of the company to Ramgarh, as reinforcements would not be available for at least six hours. Considering that Chandpuri's command had no transportation, and was facing a mobile enemy, he decided to maintain the defensive position of the post where his troops at least had the benefit of prepared defensive works, rather than conducting a withdrawal at night that was a far riskier option.
The Pakistani forces began their attack at 12:30 am.[14] As the offensive approached the lone outpost, Pakistani artillery opened up across the border with medium artillery guns, killing five of the ten camels from the BSF detachment. As the column of 65 tanks neared the post, Indian defences, lacking the time to lay a prepared minefield, laid a hasty anti-tank minefield as the enemy advanced, one infantryman being killed in the process.[15] The Indian infantry held fire until the leading Pakistani tanks had approached to 15–30 metres before firing their PIATs.[15] They accounted for the first two tanks on the track with their Jeep-mounted 106 mm M40 recoilless rifle,[16] with one of its crew being killed during the combat. This weapon proved quite effective because it was able to engage the thinner top armour of the Pakistani tanks from its elevated position, firing at often stationary bogged down vehicles. In all the post defenders claimed 12 tanks destroyed or damaged. The initial Pakistani attack stalled almost immediately when the infantry discovered the barbed wire which was unseen in the night, and interpreted it to signify a minefield. Firing for the Indian RCL crews was made easier by the flames of fires when the spare fuel tanks on the Pakistani tanks, intended to supplement their internal capacity for the advance to Jaisalmer, exploded, at once providing ample light for Indians located on higher ground, and creating a dense acrid smoke screen at ground level for the Pakistani infantry, adding to the confusion. Two hours were lost as Pakistani sappers were brought up, only to discover there was no minefield. However, at this time Pakistani infantry were required to make another attack, from a different direction, but in the dawn light. The Pakistani advance then attempted to surround the post two hours later by vehicles getting off the road, but many vehicles, particularly armoured personnel carriers and tanks, in trying to soften up the Indian defenders before attacking, became bogged in the soft sand of the area surrounding the post. Throughout the engagement Major Chandpuri continued to direct the supporting artillery fire.[15]
Although massively outnumbering the Indian defenders, and having surrounded them, the Pakistani troops were unable to advance over open terrain on a full-moon night,[14] under small arms and mortar fire from the outpost. This encouraged the Indians not to give up their strong defensive position, frustrating the Pakistani commanders. As dawn arrived, the Pakistan forces had still not taken the post, and were now having to do so in full daylight.
In the morning the Indian Air Force was finally able to direct some HF-24 Maruts and Hawker Hunter aircraft to assist the post; they were not outfitted with night vision equipment, and so were delayed from conducting combat missions until dawn.[17] With daylight, however, the IAF was able to operate effectively, with the strike aircraft being guided to the targets by the airborne Forward Air Controller (FAC) Major Atma Singh in a HAL Krishak.[18] The Indian aircraft attacked the Pakistani ground troops with the 16 Matra T-10 rockets and 30 mm cannon fire on each aircraft. Without support from the Pakistan Air Force, which was busy elsewhere, the tanks and other armoured vehicles were easy targets for the IAF's Hunters. The range of the 12.7 mm anti-aircraft heavy machine guns mounted on the tanks was limited and therefore ineffective against the Indian jets. Indian air attacks were made easier by the nature of the barren terrain. Many IAF officers later described the attack as a 'Turkey Shoot' signifying the lopsidedness. By noon the next day, the assault ended completely, having cost Pakistan 22 tanks claimed destroyed by aircraft fire, 12 by ground anti-tank fire, and some captured after being abandoned, with a total of 100 vehicles claimed to have been destroyed or damaged in the desert around the post. The Pakistani attack was first halted, and then Pakistani forces were forced to withdraw when AMX-13 Indian tanks from division's cavalry regiment the 20 Lancers, Commanded by Col Bawa Guruvachan Singh, and the 17th Rajputana Rifles launched their counter-offensive to end the six-hour combat;[15] Longewala had proved to be one of the defining moments in the war.
Very famous pic of the tank wheel prints on the sand after Airforce stormed in.
Another version is little bit Controversial and is given in Tehelka's website
2) Tehelka version:-
The Truth Of Courage
The army picked up a rich haul of gallantry awards for the fable defence of Longewala in the 1971 war. But its own documents concede it was the Air Force that won the battle for India. HARINDER BAWEJA unearths the facts
Triumphant Air Force officers with defence minister Jagjivan Ram (centre) in their hour of victory
THERE IS often a wide chasm between the heat of battle and the calm manoeuvrings of gallantry awards and official retellings. It is in this gap that the facts of true valour dangerously sink. This is a shameful loss that can fester in times of peace and come back to haunt in times of war. Such an unhappy rumble is today being heard across India's famously disciplined armed forces, demanding that the truth of courage be firmly established.
The Battle of Longewala is part of army folklore. Its inspiring tale of courage in the face of insurmountable odds is held out as a shining example to students preparing to graduate from the military academy. The ultimate underdog victory against a vastly superior force ran to packed halls when captured on celluloid. Why wouldn't it have? The film Border, after all, celebrated the grit of the Indian soldier and the steely resolve with which an entire Pakistani brigade, backed by an armoured regiment of 45 tanks, was forced to retreat. It depicted the near-unreal story of how a single Company (120 men) stalled the Pakistani enemy (close to 3000 in number) from its avowed aim of cutting deep into Indian territory.The battle of Longewala is indeed an unbelievable account, one that does not cease to amaze even 37 years after it played out in the sandy terrain of the Thar desert in 1971.
Trouble was not even expected on this Western part of the border. The plausibility of an entire Pakistani tank regiment crossing the line of control and driving into Indian territory was not one that military strategists had been willing to entertain in their war games scenario. On the contrary, India's brass hats had laboured over an extensive counter-offensive plan, according to which they were going to cross the line of control and go all the way up to Rahimyar Khan in Pakistan.That the opposite happened is well documented. That India snatched victory from the jaws of defeat is a story oft told. The badges of honour were distributed soon enough: the army picked up a Maha Vir Chakra and six Vir Chakras; the Indian Air Force, which targeted Pakistani tanks with deadly precision, earned its medals too, picking up an AVSM and 10 Vir Chakras.
THE VERSIONS
The battle of Longewala had many high moments and they have been told and retold in military journals. One of the most narrated is the sheer valour displayed by
Sharpshooters in the skies The IAF's Hunter aircraft were deadly accurate
Major Kuldip Singh Chandpuri — the role played by Sunny Deol in Border — and how he motivated his 100-odd Alpha company, drawn from 23 Punjab, after the Pakistani tanks had advanced right up to the post of Longewala.The thought of being totally run over by the enemy had made Chandpuri's men edgy. For several hours before the Pakistanis arrived at their doorstep, Chandpuri had been calling his seniors at the Brigade and Divisional Headquarters but the response he got was this, "Kuldip, it is simply ridiculous. We are going to advance, not him. They have no offensive capability, just a squadron of rickety, run down, Sherman tanks. You are just scared and hence are having illusions."
The scant moonlight was playing tricks in the darkness of the desert, but Chandpuri was under no illusion. The post had been surrounded and there was no way of escaping, even if the men wanted to. He tried to motivate his colleagues saying, "Anyone who is afraid to face the enemy is free to run away now but remember that it will bring shame to the battalion and remember that I plan to stand and fight to the last." So when a Pakistani soldier shouted in the stillness of the night, "Sikhon, tayyar ho jao, assi aa gaye haan! (Sikhs, get ready, we have come), one of Chandpuri's havaldars responded saying, "We have been waiting for you for two hours, you have been late in coming.'' The Alpha Company apparently had just one recoilless gun, which was used to hit and destroy a Pakistani tank.
THIS IS the exact point at which the famed battle of Longewala starts retreating into the realm of controversy. This is the point at which the Army and the Air Force are now locked in fresh battle, the latter asserting that it was their show all the way, that if India was saved from humiliation, it was because of the four Hunters that flew sortie after sortie, destroying and incapacitating the Pakistani tanks. That there was no ground battle at all.There have been some claim and counterclaim skirmishes between the veterans who fought in 1971 but it has never been taken up seriously by the Chiefs, perhaps because of the "gentlemanly" service code of conduct.
The story the Air Force likes to recall speaks of its valour. It too has been recounted in military journals and Air Marshal MS Bawa (a Wing Commander in 1971 and base commander, Care and Maintenance unit of 122 Squadron, Jaisalmer) is emphatic in his recollection: "The Pakistani thrust was blunted entirely by air action alone. In the early hours of 5th December 1971, a radio called the base commander, "This is Tiger here (Maj Gen Khambata, GOC 12 Div). I suspect that an enemy armoured column is making rapid headway for Ramgarh. Our post at Longewala has heard tank noises throughout the night and seen tanks go past it with full headlights towards Ramgarh. I want your boys to investigate as early as possible." The Division Com mander's voice on the radio was grave with anxiety.
'We were given clearance to shoot anything in sight. If there was any ground battle, we would have known the line where not to shoot our own troops. You can understand why two airloads of air attaches from various countries came to Jaisalmer for a brief on the unique air battle'
GROUP CAPTAIN RN BALI
IN BAWA'S recounting, the situation at Longewala was deteriorating rapidly. Enemy tanks carrying infantry elements had placed a ring around the post and begun shelling it. Severely outnumbered and up against an armoured assault, Chandpuri could at best appraise the Division of the magnitude of the threat and clamour for help. He was advised to await the friendly Air Force at first light. Chandpuri kept low in his trench; a thin veil of darkness separated life from death for all those besieged at this lonely outpost in the desert.
When the first two Hunters of the IAF arrived on the scene, the enemy was still shelling the post, but was yet to hit any worthwhile target. The Hunters came low, scanning the road from Ramgarh; their eyes peeled, guided by an Air Observation Post Aircraft, Flt Lt DK Dass and Flying Officer RC Gosain found the enemy's T-59 tanks. The fight between the IAF and the Pakistani armour began.
THEY PICKED on a tank that was closest to the area, not even 50 metres from Chandpuri's besieged post. '01 Alpha' got into the dive, put his aiming index on the tank and fired half his rockets. The tank lumbered a few meters in the sand and ignited. "Bravo" yelled with joy. "You have got him Alpha! He is burning, the bastard!" He himself was getting into firing range. He had picked on a tank near the helipad close to the post. He pressed the trigger for a short time and...that tank shattered into splinters!
But even as these two aircraft were picking up and making their kills, the enemy on the ground was advancing. A few tanks had already reached the helipad, situated at the base of Longewala post. Mission 01 was running short of fuel and ammunition. If the small, but tactically important, post at Longewala was to be held, the killing would have to continue. The kill could only be made from the air. The Indian armour was nowhere the scene, and Chandpuri had only one RCL shell.
'This is my challenge. There was no contact between the enemy and the army. When I landed at Longewala on December 5, Chandpuri was hiding in the trench. I called out to him and he was relieved to see a Sardar. He thought they were going to be captured. Let us not fake battles to earn medals'
AIR MARSHAL MS BAWA
It was now a race against time. Back at the base (almost 100 km by road, but only a few minutes by air), every available skilled man was released from other duties to help launch aircraft and then turn them around in the shortest time possible. This was the only course of action open to the IAF. As many tanks as possible had to be destroyed during the daylight hours, because if the enemy thrust was not completely foiled in the daytime, the threat could assume menacing proportions at night. If the tanks had gone past Ramgarh, they could have overrun Jaisalmer. There were no ground anti-tank defences provided to the airbase.
Even as Mission 01 was turning towards home, another pair of aircraft flown by Bali and Yadav was on its way to the target area. The first pair claimed two tanks destroyed and five others damaged. The second mission engaged the men on the ground and continued till it had dropped its war load, claiming two tanks destroyed and six damaged. Any tanks set ablaze were claimed as destroyed and those crippled as damaged. The tanks were moving around in circles on the ground, trying mainly to offer a moving target to the enemy fighters and to find protection in the cloud of dust that their movement raised. The effort was futile since the Indian fighter/bombers had complete and unchallenged control of the air. Every pilot had to wait for his turn. "This was the only sore point among the aircrew at Jaisalmer," says Bawa.
Ask Bawa about the Alpha Company and he is fire and brimstone. "They gave a blow by blow account to the defence minister in Longewala — when there was no blow. I landed in Longewala on December 5 after our Hunters had crippled the Pakistani tanks and Chandpuri fell at my feet and thanked us for saving their lives. They were sitting in a trench, heads down."
So, was JP Dutta's Border just a fictionalised account of the famed battle? Is the Army taking more credit than it deserves? Why is the Air Force so sore? Just a trip by Defence Minister AK Antony to the battlefield was enough to rake up the force rivalry over who actually won the three decade-old battle.
Ask Group Captain Bali, the then Squadron Commander, who lost control of his aircraft after it was hit by ground fire, but earned a Vir Chakra for skilfully bringing the Hunter back to base. Ask him and the fighter pilot who led three strike missions on December 5 says, "We were told a few Pakistani tanks had come in but we encountered more than 15 and I thought that, maybe, a tank battle was going on. I immediately contacted the Air Observation Post pilot on the radio and asked him to confirm if our troops were engaging the enemy and if so, what were the lines of battle. He radioed back to say that no Indian troops were engaged. In fact, we were given clearance to shoot anything, clearly implying that there was no army battle." Truth, it is said, is often the first casualty in war. Who then is closer to the truth in this rather unbecoming war of words between the two services? Is the Air Force right in its assertions only because its officers are louder and can be heard more often? Are they right about the Army perpetuating the lie of Longewala?
THE CASE has been made curiouser because joining the controversy is a Major General of the Indian Army. Then a Major with the army's air wing, Atma Singh Hansara has fanned the fire saying that the Army has been teaching military history to future commanders, citing accounts that have no credibility. In an interview to Hindustan Times, Hansara, who directed air support firepower towards the Pakistani tanks (he was a pilot in the Air Observation Post) said, "I dispute the ground battle completely. It is a mockery of army ethos." Like Bawa, he too landed at Longewala by the evening of December 5 and he contests the Army's claim that its men engaged the enemy with recoilless guns and medium machine guns. Is the army, then, guilty of cloaking the truth? Did 100-odd soldiers of the Indian Army put a brave resistance without suffering any losses at Longewala? If they had engaged the enemy — thus giving away their location — would they have survived to tell the tale? In its pursuit to fit together the pieces of an intriguing puzzle, TEHELKA sourced key documents relating to the legendary battle of Longewala.
AIR FORCE WAR DIARY
Political battle Defence Minister AK Antony on a recent visit to Ramgarh near Longewala
The War Diary of the Jaisalmer-based 14 Care and Maintenance Unit (part of 122 Squadron) recounts the details of the crucial days datewise:
December 4, 1971: "¦ When 12 Inf Div was concentrating on their area of advance towards Rahimyar Khan, the enemy sneaked in with one regiment of armour and one brigade strength of troops from Ghabbar via BP 638 towards Longewala. The leading column of tanks bypassed Longewala post and was seen advancing towards Ramgarh past midnight. This suspected movement was passed by the Company Commander at Longewala to the Div HQ, but the same appeared to be discarded.
The column decided to turn about a few km short of Ramgarh when they found their rear not catching up. This was the first fatal mistake committed by the enemy, which subsequently changed the course of the war. Had these tanks carried on, they would have easily run over Ramgarh as there were no defences whatsoever. The return of these leading tanks towards Longewala and the noise of more tanks rolling in compelled the Company Commander to apprise GOC 12 Infantry Division again. On receipt of this message, the GOC tried to get through to the Base Cdr, but to his surprise he found that the Mujahids had already cut the telephone line at Ramgarh. This confirmed his doubts about the enemy armour thrust at Longewala. The radio relay link was established between the GOC and Base Cdr in the early hours of 5 Dec.
December 5, 1971: On receipt of information regarding suspected movement of armour, the Base Cdr ordered missions to stand by at first light. Air OP was also cautioned to carry out reconnaissance in the area and render any assistance required by the Hunters. The repeated telephone calls from the GOC 12 Infantry Div left no doubt in the mind of the Base Cdr about the helplessness of the Army in Longewala, due to their scanty deployment and the preoccupation of the Div with their much planned advance towards Rahimyar Khan. Longewala Post, having come under increasing enemy pressure, made frantic calls for help from Div HQ. Div HQ had no option but to depend on the Air Force to save the day. At about 0715 hours, when the post was about to be overrun, the first Hunter mission arrived"¦ the mission lost no time in engaging the attacks advancing towards the Longewala Post"¦ Missions were launched one behind the other in quick succession to beat and destroy the enemy's armoured thrust.
This turned out to be a clean battle, one of its kind. Never before in history has a more decisive battle been fought between the AIF alone and ARMOUR. With a total of four Hunter aircraft available at the disposal of the Base Cdr, the Base was able to launch 17 sorties, destroying 50 percent of the enemy's armour. An enemy intercept by our army in the evening revealed the sagging morale of the Pakistan Armour indicating casualties in men and material. "Dushman ke hawai fauj ne naak me dam kar diya hai. Ek hawai jahaz aata hai aur bees bees minute oopar naachta hai. Aaage jaana to kya peeche mudna bhi mushkil ho gaya hai. Jaldi hawai fauj madad ke liye bhejo varna vaapas mudna namumkin hai (The enemy's aircraft has made us miserable. Forget advance, even retreat is difficult. Send air support quickly or it'll be impossible to even turn back)."
The War Diary confirms what its officers are saying. A message from Maj Gen RF Khambatta, GOC, 12 Infantry Division, lends credence to the Air Force's claim. This is what the message said: "We had excellent co-operation and support today. Shooting by your boys had been most accurate, resulting in destroying number of enemy tanks and blunting his attack. Please convey my appreciation and that of my troops to pilots. Congratulations on excellent performance."
THE FACT that the Pakistani tanks were turning circles in the sand, some of them kicking up dust to escape direct hits, has been acknowledged in books pertaining to the 1971 war authored by Pakistani officers. In one of these, The History of Pakistan Army (1966-71), by Maj Gen (Retd) Shaukat Raza, Page 207 refers to the Longewala chapter: "18 Division had the mission to defend Karachi Sector. In November, it was given an additional mission ie, 'Capture Jaisalmer'"¦ General Mustafa made the following plan to capture Jaisalmer: a) 51 Brigade with 22 Cavalry capture Ramgarh and b) Jaisalmer 206 Brigade with 38 Cavalry capture Longewala"¦ The perversity of the terrain came as a shock to the troops. At first light, 5 December, they made contact with the enemy at Longewala. At this stage the enemy aircraft appeared on the scene. The tanks were out in the open without aerial protection and without any hope of friendly air cover. The Indian aircraft had a free run."
Another book, Crisis of Leadership in Pakistan by Gen Muqeem, while recounting the Longewala battle says, "Immediately after the attack had been launched, all communication with the Div HQ broke off. One column which was supposed to go elsewhere had succeeded in capturing Longewala, six miles inside the Indian territory but the situation was grim owing to the terrain. A large number of vehicles, guns and tanks got bogged down in sand. The enemy was masters of the skies. It was very active during the day and succeeded in destroying 18 tanks and a number of other vehicles and equipment at his leisure."
Documents and statements of the Air Force, books by Pakistani generals, and even the account of a major in the army's air wing are all clear that it was the IAF that was the master of the skies, its Hunters saving the day for an embattled Army in Longewala. Why then, is the army simulating a very different version?
ARMY DOCUMENTS
Key army documents pertaining to the 1971 war — obtained by TEHELKA — reveal the truth about Longewala. The army may not be willing to acknowledge it today,
Encircled One of the destroyed tanks
but these documents effectively nail the controversy, even as they raise the uncomfortable question of why the army is keeping the lie alive.
This is what the "restricted" document details: "At 0530 hrs on 5 December information was received that six Pak tanks had been seen in the area Kharotar near Longewala. A slipup on the part of 12 Inf Div stands out in bold relief. Although preplanned Tactical Recce was available to it throughout the war, it made no effort to recced the Ghabbar-Longeala axis, trotting out the fallacious plea that there was a paucity of Tac Recce sorties.
Had it detected the Pak thrust on Dec 4, the Division could have met and dissipated it and gone ahead with its offensive, as originally planned. As it turned out, the Divisional offensive (Op Dare Devil) was postponed, till the clouds over Longewala were dispelled. Air strikes were requested for and immediately mounted from Jaisalmer airfield. Fifteen modern Pakistani tanks were attacked in the area Longewala at 0830 hours on Dec 5 and four were effectively destroyed. Air recce reported that the advancing column, which had already crossed into Indian territory, was stretched over a distance of 20 km"¦ The ominous development indicated that an attack on Longewala and subsequently on Ramgarh and Jaisalmer — only about 100 km from Longewala along a motorable road — was in the offing.
All available air effort was diverted to deal with the situation"¦ The armoured columns were broken up. The major credit for this goes, of course, to the air force, which rose to the occasion on very short notice and inflicted crippling losses on the enemy tanks and vehicles. The company defending Longewala also held out tenaciously against heavy odds until reinforcements arrived"¦"
The document only gives credit to Chandpuri's men for "holding out" and, in fact, gives details of how its Army Commander Lt Gen GG Bewoor got irritated with Maj Gen Khambatta, GOC, 12 Infantry Division. It further states, "Many reasons were given for 12 Div's failure to destroy the Pakistani column near Longewala or advance towards Rahimyar Khan. It could not undertake a major thrust across the border, it is said, in the absence of support of an integral medium artillery regiment, which was surely needed for an advance by armour. The AMX tanks of 20 Lancers were not capable of offensive operation over a long distance. The radio communications too were in a poor state." Despite repeated efforts by TEHELKA, Chandpuri was not available for comment.
THE ARMY document is liberal in its praise of the Indian Air Force: "At Longewala that day, the IAF added to its history a glorious new chapter. One Pak infantry brigade, supported by one armoured regiment, launched an attack on the Indian position at Longewala on the night of 4/5 December. The objective, it seems was no less than the capture of Jaisalmer. Their way to Ramgarh and Jaisalmer appeared clear, as the Indian troops were very thin on the ground in that area." "Jaisalmer had a total of only four Hunters available from the temporarily and hastily raised 122 Squadron. But on the SOS being received, the Hunters were over the target area as dawn was breaking. By mid-day, fifteen tanks had been destroyed. The pressure was kept up the next day. This was a straight battle between Pak armour and the IAF Hunters. In spite of the intense small arms fire and the frantic evasive actions of the tanks, the Hunters pressed home their attacks, picking off one tank after another. The Pakistanis abandoned their offensive and started pulling out on 6 December, leaving behind 27 tanks destroyed and another ten damaged on the sand of Longewala, along with scores of trucks. The Pakistani armoured offensive at Longewala was effectively stemmed and ultimately routed by a handful of Hunters. The bulk of Pak armoured regiment was destroyed by air action alone." Destroyed by air action alone.
Little more needs to be said of this famed, controversial battle. Far from describing a ground battle — which is clearly being simulated by commanders in army classrooms — it is the army's own documents that truly nail the lie of Longewala. Should an independent inquiry be recommended? Ask Longewala's air heroes and you'll have the answer.
From Tehelka Magazine, Vol 5, Issue 10, Dated Mar 15, 2008
online photo sharing
It has two versions.
1) Wikipidia and other media version:- Battle
one of the three HAL Marut used by the IAF against Pakistani armour at Longewala
During the night of the 4th, Lt. Veer's platoon conducting a patrol detected noises across the border that suggested a large number of armoured vehicles approaching.[12] These were soon confirmed by reports - from the Army's Air Observation Post aircraft flown by Maj. Atma Singh - in the area of a 20 km long armoured column on the track leading to the post advancing in the general direction of the Longewala post.[13] Directing Lt Veer's patrol to trail the advancing armoured column, Chandpuri got in touch with the battalion headquarters requesting urgent reinforcements and armour and artillery support. Battalion HQ gave him the choice of staying put, and containing the attack as much as possible, or carrying out a tactical retreat of the company to Ramgarh, as reinforcements would not be available for at least six hours. Considering that Chandpuri's command had no transportation, and was facing a mobile enemy, he decided to maintain the defensive position of the post where his troops at least had the benefit of prepared defensive works, rather than conducting a withdrawal at night that was a far riskier option.
The Pakistani forces began their attack at 12:30 am.[14] As the offensive approached the lone outpost, Pakistani artillery opened up across the border with medium artillery guns, killing five of the ten camels from the BSF detachment. As the column of 65 tanks neared the post, Indian defences, lacking the time to lay a prepared minefield, laid a hasty anti-tank minefield as the enemy advanced, one infantryman being killed in the process.[15] The Indian infantry held fire until the leading Pakistani tanks had approached to 15–30 metres before firing their PIATs.[15] They accounted for the first two tanks on the track with their Jeep-mounted 106 mm M40 recoilless rifle,[16] with one of its crew being killed during the combat. This weapon proved quite effective because it was able to engage the thinner top armour of the Pakistani tanks from its elevated position, firing at often stationary bogged down vehicles. In all the post defenders claimed 12 tanks destroyed or damaged. The initial Pakistani attack stalled almost immediately when the infantry discovered the barbed wire which was unseen in the night, and interpreted it to signify a minefield. Firing for the Indian RCL crews was made easier by the flames of fires when the spare fuel tanks on the Pakistani tanks, intended to supplement their internal capacity for the advance to Jaisalmer, exploded, at once providing ample light for Indians located on higher ground, and creating a dense acrid smoke screen at ground level for the Pakistani infantry, adding to the confusion. Two hours were lost as Pakistani sappers were brought up, only to discover there was no minefield. However, at this time Pakistani infantry were required to make another attack, from a different direction, but in the dawn light. The Pakistani advance then attempted to surround the post two hours later by vehicles getting off the road, but many vehicles, particularly armoured personnel carriers and tanks, in trying to soften up the Indian defenders before attacking, became bogged in the soft sand of the area surrounding the post. Throughout the engagement Major Chandpuri continued to direct the supporting artillery fire.[15]
Although massively outnumbering the Indian defenders, and having surrounded them, the Pakistani troops were unable to advance over open terrain on a full-moon night,[14] under small arms and mortar fire from the outpost. This encouraged the Indians not to give up their strong defensive position, frustrating the Pakistani commanders. As dawn arrived, the Pakistan forces had still not taken the post, and were now having to do so in full daylight.
In the morning the Indian Air Force was finally able to direct some HF-24 Maruts and Hawker Hunter aircraft to assist the post; they were not outfitted with night vision equipment, and so were delayed from conducting combat missions until dawn.[17] With daylight, however, the IAF was able to operate effectively, with the strike aircraft being guided to the targets by the airborne Forward Air Controller (FAC) Major Atma Singh in a HAL Krishak.[18] The Indian aircraft attacked the Pakistani ground troops with the 16 Matra T-10 rockets and 30 mm cannon fire on each aircraft. Without support from the Pakistan Air Force, which was busy elsewhere, the tanks and other armoured vehicles were easy targets for the IAF's Hunters. The range of the 12.7 mm anti-aircraft heavy machine guns mounted on the tanks was limited and therefore ineffective against the Indian jets. Indian air attacks were made easier by the nature of the barren terrain. Many IAF officers later described the attack as a 'Turkey Shoot' signifying the lopsidedness. By noon the next day, the assault ended completely, having cost Pakistan 22 tanks claimed destroyed by aircraft fire, 12 by ground anti-tank fire, and some captured after being abandoned, with a total of 100 vehicles claimed to have been destroyed or damaged in the desert around the post. The Pakistani attack was first halted, and then Pakistani forces were forced to withdraw when AMX-13 Indian tanks from division's cavalry regiment the 20 Lancers, Commanded by Col Bawa Guruvachan Singh, and the 17th Rajputana Rifles launched their counter-offensive to end the six-hour combat;[15] Longewala had proved to be one of the defining moments in the war.
Very famous pic of the tank wheel prints on the sand after Airforce stormed in.
Another version is little bit Controversial and is given in Tehelka's website
2) Tehelka version:-
The Truth Of Courage
The army picked up a rich haul of gallantry awards for the fable defence of Longewala in the 1971 war. But its own documents concede it was the Air Force that won the battle for India. HARINDER BAWEJA unearths the facts
Triumphant Air Force officers with defence minister Jagjivan Ram (centre) in their hour of victory
THERE IS often a wide chasm between the heat of battle and the calm manoeuvrings of gallantry awards and official retellings. It is in this gap that the facts of true valour dangerously sink. This is a shameful loss that can fester in times of peace and come back to haunt in times of war. Such an unhappy rumble is today being heard across India's famously disciplined armed forces, demanding that the truth of courage be firmly established.
The Battle of Longewala is part of army folklore. Its inspiring tale of courage in the face of insurmountable odds is held out as a shining example to students preparing to graduate from the military academy. The ultimate underdog victory against a vastly superior force ran to packed halls when captured on celluloid. Why wouldn't it have? The film Border, after all, celebrated the grit of the Indian soldier and the steely resolve with which an entire Pakistani brigade, backed by an armoured regiment of 45 tanks, was forced to retreat. It depicted the near-unreal story of how a single Company (120 men) stalled the Pakistani enemy (close to 3000 in number) from its avowed aim of cutting deep into Indian territory.The battle of Longewala is indeed an unbelievable account, one that does not cease to amaze even 37 years after it played out in the sandy terrain of the Thar desert in 1971.
Trouble was not even expected on this Western part of the border. The plausibility of an entire Pakistani tank regiment crossing the line of control and driving into Indian territory was not one that military strategists had been willing to entertain in their war games scenario. On the contrary, India's brass hats had laboured over an extensive counter-offensive plan, according to which they were going to cross the line of control and go all the way up to Rahimyar Khan in Pakistan.That the opposite happened is well documented. That India snatched victory from the jaws of defeat is a story oft told. The badges of honour were distributed soon enough: the army picked up a Maha Vir Chakra and six Vir Chakras; the Indian Air Force, which targeted Pakistani tanks with deadly precision, earned its medals too, picking up an AVSM and 10 Vir Chakras.
THE VERSIONS
The battle of Longewala had many high moments and they have been told and retold in military journals. One of the most narrated is the sheer valour displayed by
Sharpshooters in the skies The IAF's Hunter aircraft were deadly accurate
Major Kuldip Singh Chandpuri — the role played by Sunny Deol in Border — and how he motivated his 100-odd Alpha company, drawn from 23 Punjab, after the Pakistani tanks had advanced right up to the post of Longewala.The thought of being totally run over by the enemy had made Chandpuri's men edgy. For several hours before the Pakistanis arrived at their doorstep, Chandpuri had been calling his seniors at the Brigade and Divisional Headquarters but the response he got was this, "Kuldip, it is simply ridiculous. We are going to advance, not him. They have no offensive capability, just a squadron of rickety, run down, Sherman tanks. You are just scared and hence are having illusions."
The scant moonlight was playing tricks in the darkness of the desert, but Chandpuri was under no illusion. The post had been surrounded and there was no way of escaping, even if the men wanted to. He tried to motivate his colleagues saying, "Anyone who is afraid to face the enemy is free to run away now but remember that it will bring shame to the battalion and remember that I plan to stand and fight to the last." So when a Pakistani soldier shouted in the stillness of the night, "Sikhon, tayyar ho jao, assi aa gaye haan! (Sikhs, get ready, we have come), one of Chandpuri's havaldars responded saying, "We have been waiting for you for two hours, you have been late in coming.'' The Alpha Company apparently had just one recoilless gun, which was used to hit and destroy a Pakistani tank.
THIS IS the exact point at which the famed battle of Longewala starts retreating into the realm of controversy. This is the point at which the Army and the Air Force are now locked in fresh battle, the latter asserting that it was their show all the way, that if India was saved from humiliation, it was because of the four Hunters that flew sortie after sortie, destroying and incapacitating the Pakistani tanks. That there was no ground battle at all.There have been some claim and counterclaim skirmishes between the veterans who fought in 1971 but it has never been taken up seriously by the Chiefs, perhaps because of the "gentlemanly" service code of conduct.
The story the Air Force likes to recall speaks of its valour. It too has been recounted in military journals and Air Marshal MS Bawa (a Wing Commander in 1971 and base commander, Care and Maintenance unit of 122 Squadron, Jaisalmer) is emphatic in his recollection: "The Pakistani thrust was blunted entirely by air action alone. In the early hours of 5th December 1971, a radio called the base commander, "This is Tiger here (Maj Gen Khambata, GOC 12 Div). I suspect that an enemy armoured column is making rapid headway for Ramgarh. Our post at Longewala has heard tank noises throughout the night and seen tanks go past it with full headlights towards Ramgarh. I want your boys to investigate as early as possible." The Division Com mander's voice on the radio was grave with anxiety.
'We were given clearance to shoot anything in sight. If there was any ground battle, we would have known the line where not to shoot our own troops. You can understand why two airloads of air attaches from various countries came to Jaisalmer for a brief on the unique air battle'
GROUP CAPTAIN RN BALI
IN BAWA'S recounting, the situation at Longewala was deteriorating rapidly. Enemy tanks carrying infantry elements had placed a ring around the post and begun shelling it. Severely outnumbered and up against an armoured assault, Chandpuri could at best appraise the Division of the magnitude of the threat and clamour for help. He was advised to await the friendly Air Force at first light. Chandpuri kept low in his trench; a thin veil of darkness separated life from death for all those besieged at this lonely outpost in the desert.
When the first two Hunters of the IAF arrived on the scene, the enemy was still shelling the post, but was yet to hit any worthwhile target. The Hunters came low, scanning the road from Ramgarh; their eyes peeled, guided by an Air Observation Post Aircraft, Flt Lt DK Dass and Flying Officer RC Gosain found the enemy's T-59 tanks. The fight between the IAF and the Pakistani armour began.
THEY PICKED on a tank that was closest to the area, not even 50 metres from Chandpuri's besieged post. '01 Alpha' got into the dive, put his aiming index on the tank and fired half his rockets. The tank lumbered a few meters in the sand and ignited. "Bravo" yelled with joy. "You have got him Alpha! He is burning, the bastard!" He himself was getting into firing range. He had picked on a tank near the helipad close to the post. He pressed the trigger for a short time and...that tank shattered into splinters!
But even as these two aircraft were picking up and making their kills, the enemy on the ground was advancing. A few tanks had already reached the helipad, situated at the base of Longewala post. Mission 01 was running short of fuel and ammunition. If the small, but tactically important, post at Longewala was to be held, the killing would have to continue. The kill could only be made from the air. The Indian armour was nowhere the scene, and Chandpuri had only one RCL shell.
'This is my challenge. There was no contact between the enemy and the army. When I landed at Longewala on December 5, Chandpuri was hiding in the trench. I called out to him and he was relieved to see a Sardar. He thought they were going to be captured. Let us not fake battles to earn medals'
AIR MARSHAL MS BAWA
It was now a race against time. Back at the base (almost 100 km by road, but only a few minutes by air), every available skilled man was released from other duties to help launch aircraft and then turn them around in the shortest time possible. This was the only course of action open to the IAF. As many tanks as possible had to be destroyed during the daylight hours, because if the enemy thrust was not completely foiled in the daytime, the threat could assume menacing proportions at night. If the tanks had gone past Ramgarh, they could have overrun Jaisalmer. There were no ground anti-tank defences provided to the airbase.
Even as Mission 01 was turning towards home, another pair of aircraft flown by Bali and Yadav was on its way to the target area. The first pair claimed two tanks destroyed and five others damaged. The second mission engaged the men on the ground and continued till it had dropped its war load, claiming two tanks destroyed and six damaged. Any tanks set ablaze were claimed as destroyed and those crippled as damaged. The tanks were moving around in circles on the ground, trying mainly to offer a moving target to the enemy fighters and to find protection in the cloud of dust that their movement raised. The effort was futile since the Indian fighter/bombers had complete and unchallenged control of the air. Every pilot had to wait for his turn. "This was the only sore point among the aircrew at Jaisalmer," says Bawa.
Ask Bawa about the Alpha Company and he is fire and brimstone. "They gave a blow by blow account to the defence minister in Longewala — when there was no blow. I landed in Longewala on December 5 after our Hunters had crippled the Pakistani tanks and Chandpuri fell at my feet and thanked us for saving their lives. They were sitting in a trench, heads down."
So, was JP Dutta's Border just a fictionalised account of the famed battle? Is the Army taking more credit than it deserves? Why is the Air Force so sore? Just a trip by Defence Minister AK Antony to the battlefield was enough to rake up the force rivalry over who actually won the three decade-old battle.
Ask Group Captain Bali, the then Squadron Commander, who lost control of his aircraft after it was hit by ground fire, but earned a Vir Chakra for skilfully bringing the Hunter back to base. Ask him and the fighter pilot who led three strike missions on December 5 says, "We were told a few Pakistani tanks had come in but we encountered more than 15 and I thought that, maybe, a tank battle was going on. I immediately contacted the Air Observation Post pilot on the radio and asked him to confirm if our troops were engaging the enemy and if so, what were the lines of battle. He radioed back to say that no Indian troops were engaged. In fact, we were given clearance to shoot anything, clearly implying that there was no army battle." Truth, it is said, is often the first casualty in war. Who then is closer to the truth in this rather unbecoming war of words between the two services? Is the Air Force right in its assertions only because its officers are louder and can be heard more often? Are they right about the Army perpetuating the lie of Longewala?
THE CASE has been made curiouser because joining the controversy is a Major General of the Indian Army. Then a Major with the army's air wing, Atma Singh Hansara has fanned the fire saying that the Army has been teaching military history to future commanders, citing accounts that have no credibility. In an interview to Hindustan Times, Hansara, who directed air support firepower towards the Pakistani tanks (he was a pilot in the Air Observation Post) said, "I dispute the ground battle completely. It is a mockery of army ethos." Like Bawa, he too landed at Longewala by the evening of December 5 and he contests the Army's claim that its men engaged the enemy with recoilless guns and medium machine guns. Is the army, then, guilty of cloaking the truth? Did 100-odd soldiers of the Indian Army put a brave resistance without suffering any losses at Longewala? If they had engaged the enemy — thus giving away their location — would they have survived to tell the tale? In its pursuit to fit together the pieces of an intriguing puzzle, TEHELKA sourced key documents relating to the legendary battle of Longewala.
AIR FORCE WAR DIARY
Political battle Defence Minister AK Antony on a recent visit to Ramgarh near Longewala
The War Diary of the Jaisalmer-based 14 Care and Maintenance Unit (part of 122 Squadron) recounts the details of the crucial days datewise:
December 4, 1971: "¦ When 12 Inf Div was concentrating on their area of advance towards Rahimyar Khan, the enemy sneaked in with one regiment of armour and one brigade strength of troops from Ghabbar via BP 638 towards Longewala. The leading column of tanks bypassed Longewala post and was seen advancing towards Ramgarh past midnight. This suspected movement was passed by the Company Commander at Longewala to the Div HQ, but the same appeared to be discarded.
The column decided to turn about a few km short of Ramgarh when they found their rear not catching up. This was the first fatal mistake committed by the enemy, which subsequently changed the course of the war. Had these tanks carried on, they would have easily run over Ramgarh as there were no defences whatsoever. The return of these leading tanks towards Longewala and the noise of more tanks rolling in compelled the Company Commander to apprise GOC 12 Infantry Division again. On receipt of this message, the GOC tried to get through to the Base Cdr, but to his surprise he found that the Mujahids had already cut the telephone line at Ramgarh. This confirmed his doubts about the enemy armour thrust at Longewala. The radio relay link was established between the GOC and Base Cdr in the early hours of 5 Dec.
December 5, 1971: On receipt of information regarding suspected movement of armour, the Base Cdr ordered missions to stand by at first light. Air OP was also cautioned to carry out reconnaissance in the area and render any assistance required by the Hunters. The repeated telephone calls from the GOC 12 Infantry Div left no doubt in the mind of the Base Cdr about the helplessness of the Army in Longewala, due to their scanty deployment and the preoccupation of the Div with their much planned advance towards Rahimyar Khan. Longewala Post, having come under increasing enemy pressure, made frantic calls for help from Div HQ. Div HQ had no option but to depend on the Air Force to save the day. At about 0715 hours, when the post was about to be overrun, the first Hunter mission arrived"¦ the mission lost no time in engaging the attacks advancing towards the Longewala Post"¦ Missions were launched one behind the other in quick succession to beat and destroy the enemy's armoured thrust.
This turned out to be a clean battle, one of its kind. Never before in history has a more decisive battle been fought between the AIF alone and ARMOUR. With a total of four Hunter aircraft available at the disposal of the Base Cdr, the Base was able to launch 17 sorties, destroying 50 percent of the enemy's armour. An enemy intercept by our army in the evening revealed the sagging morale of the Pakistan Armour indicating casualties in men and material. "Dushman ke hawai fauj ne naak me dam kar diya hai. Ek hawai jahaz aata hai aur bees bees minute oopar naachta hai. Aaage jaana to kya peeche mudna bhi mushkil ho gaya hai. Jaldi hawai fauj madad ke liye bhejo varna vaapas mudna namumkin hai (The enemy's aircraft has made us miserable. Forget advance, even retreat is difficult. Send air support quickly or it'll be impossible to even turn back)."
The War Diary confirms what its officers are saying. A message from Maj Gen RF Khambatta, GOC, 12 Infantry Division, lends credence to the Air Force's claim. This is what the message said: "We had excellent co-operation and support today. Shooting by your boys had been most accurate, resulting in destroying number of enemy tanks and blunting his attack. Please convey my appreciation and that of my troops to pilots. Congratulations on excellent performance."
THE FACT that the Pakistani tanks were turning circles in the sand, some of them kicking up dust to escape direct hits, has been acknowledged in books pertaining to the 1971 war authored by Pakistani officers. In one of these, The History of Pakistan Army (1966-71), by Maj Gen (Retd) Shaukat Raza, Page 207 refers to the Longewala chapter: "18 Division had the mission to defend Karachi Sector. In November, it was given an additional mission ie, 'Capture Jaisalmer'"¦ General Mustafa made the following plan to capture Jaisalmer: a) 51 Brigade with 22 Cavalry capture Ramgarh and b) Jaisalmer 206 Brigade with 38 Cavalry capture Longewala"¦ The perversity of the terrain came as a shock to the troops. At first light, 5 December, they made contact with the enemy at Longewala. At this stage the enemy aircraft appeared on the scene. The tanks were out in the open without aerial protection and without any hope of friendly air cover. The Indian aircraft had a free run."
Another book, Crisis of Leadership in Pakistan by Gen Muqeem, while recounting the Longewala battle says, "Immediately after the attack had been launched, all communication with the Div HQ broke off. One column which was supposed to go elsewhere had succeeded in capturing Longewala, six miles inside the Indian territory but the situation was grim owing to the terrain. A large number of vehicles, guns and tanks got bogged down in sand. The enemy was masters of the skies. It was very active during the day and succeeded in destroying 18 tanks and a number of other vehicles and equipment at his leisure."
Documents and statements of the Air Force, books by Pakistani generals, and even the account of a major in the army's air wing are all clear that it was the IAF that was the master of the skies, its Hunters saving the day for an embattled Army in Longewala. Why then, is the army simulating a very different version?
ARMY DOCUMENTS
Key army documents pertaining to the 1971 war — obtained by TEHELKA — reveal the truth about Longewala. The army may not be willing to acknowledge it today,
Encircled One of the destroyed tanks
but these documents effectively nail the controversy, even as they raise the uncomfortable question of why the army is keeping the lie alive.
This is what the "restricted" document details: "At 0530 hrs on 5 December information was received that six Pak tanks had been seen in the area Kharotar near Longewala. A slipup on the part of 12 Inf Div stands out in bold relief. Although preplanned Tactical Recce was available to it throughout the war, it made no effort to recced the Ghabbar-Longeala axis, trotting out the fallacious plea that there was a paucity of Tac Recce sorties.
Had it detected the Pak thrust on Dec 4, the Division could have met and dissipated it and gone ahead with its offensive, as originally planned. As it turned out, the Divisional offensive (Op Dare Devil) was postponed, till the clouds over Longewala were dispelled. Air strikes were requested for and immediately mounted from Jaisalmer airfield. Fifteen modern Pakistani tanks were attacked in the area Longewala at 0830 hours on Dec 5 and four were effectively destroyed. Air recce reported that the advancing column, which had already crossed into Indian territory, was stretched over a distance of 20 km"¦ The ominous development indicated that an attack on Longewala and subsequently on Ramgarh and Jaisalmer — only about 100 km from Longewala along a motorable road — was in the offing.
All available air effort was diverted to deal with the situation"¦ The armoured columns were broken up. The major credit for this goes, of course, to the air force, which rose to the occasion on very short notice and inflicted crippling losses on the enemy tanks and vehicles. The company defending Longewala also held out tenaciously against heavy odds until reinforcements arrived"¦"
The document only gives credit to Chandpuri's men for "holding out" and, in fact, gives details of how its Army Commander Lt Gen GG Bewoor got irritated with Maj Gen Khambatta, GOC, 12 Infantry Division. It further states, "Many reasons were given for 12 Div's failure to destroy the Pakistani column near Longewala or advance towards Rahimyar Khan. It could not undertake a major thrust across the border, it is said, in the absence of support of an integral medium artillery regiment, which was surely needed for an advance by armour. The AMX tanks of 20 Lancers were not capable of offensive operation over a long distance. The radio communications too were in a poor state." Despite repeated efforts by TEHELKA, Chandpuri was not available for comment.
THE ARMY document is liberal in its praise of the Indian Air Force: "At Longewala that day, the IAF added to its history a glorious new chapter. One Pak infantry brigade, supported by one armoured regiment, launched an attack on the Indian position at Longewala on the night of 4/5 December. The objective, it seems was no less than the capture of Jaisalmer. Their way to Ramgarh and Jaisalmer appeared clear, as the Indian troops were very thin on the ground in that area." "Jaisalmer had a total of only four Hunters available from the temporarily and hastily raised 122 Squadron. But on the SOS being received, the Hunters were over the target area as dawn was breaking. By mid-day, fifteen tanks had been destroyed. The pressure was kept up the next day. This was a straight battle between Pak armour and the IAF Hunters. In spite of the intense small arms fire and the frantic evasive actions of the tanks, the Hunters pressed home their attacks, picking off one tank after another. The Pakistanis abandoned their offensive and started pulling out on 6 December, leaving behind 27 tanks destroyed and another ten damaged on the sand of Longewala, along with scores of trucks. The Pakistani armoured offensive at Longewala was effectively stemmed and ultimately routed by a handful of Hunters. The bulk of Pak armoured regiment was destroyed by air action alone." Destroyed by air action alone.
Little more needs to be said of this famed, controversial battle. Far from describing a ground battle — which is clearly being simulated by commanders in army classrooms — it is the army's own documents that truly nail the lie of Longewala. Should an independent inquiry be recommended? Ask Longewala's air heroes and you'll have the answer.
From Tehelka Magazine, Vol 5, Issue 10, Dated Mar 15, 2008
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shom
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Battle of Longewala 1971 India Pakistan war - YouTube
Nice video from Youtube on battle of Loungewala
Nice video from Youtube on battle of Loungewala
Thanks for all the info shom, I have enjoyed reading about the history of the IAF. Is there more to come?
I live very close to the toen where the Hawker Hunters were designed and built and it has reminded me that now that I am retired, I must visit the RAF museum in Hendon which is easy for me to get to.
Thanks for the info and keep it coming.
Syd
shom
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Is it so sir???? U stay there?? and r u a defense personnel??? dats gr888,,, becoz I am very much younger to u and I am honored that you have luved this thread,,, and yes there are many to come ,,,, I will post it today only ,,, I was bit busy for exams so cud not post ,,, also Plzzzz visit RAF museum and relive those memories,,, In our IAF museum there is a hawker hunter too but cudnot visit there as it is 1400 km away from my home,,,,,,
shom
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Here comes the 5th one ,,, Best of all the retired Birds in IAF,, this gave the IAF its sole Param Veere Chakra,,,,,, Guessssss!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5)Folland Gnat:- The Folland Gnat was a small, swept-wing British subsonic jet trainer and light fighter aircraft developed by Folland Aircraft for the Royal Air Force, and flown extensively by the Indian Air Force.
The Gnat was designed by W.E.W. Petter as a development of the private venture Folland Midge and first flew in 1955. Its design allowed its construction without specialised tools by countries not highly industrialised.[1][2] Although never used as a fighter by the Royal Air Force (RAF), the Gnat T.1 trainer variant was widely used. The Gnat became well known as the aircraft of the RAF's Red Arrows aerobatic team.
The Gnat was exported to Finland, Yugoslavia and India. The Indian Air Force became the largest operator and eventually manufactured the aircraft under licence. India then developed the HAL Ajeet, a modified and improved variant.
Origin:- Origins
The Gnat was the creation of W.E.W. "Teddy" Petter, a British aircraft designer formerly of Westland Aircraft and English Electric. Designed to meet the 1952 Operational Requirement OR.303 calling for a lightweight fighter, Petter believed that a small, simple fighter would offer the advantages of low purchase and operational costs. New lightweight turbojet engines that were being developed enabled the concept to take shape.[1] Petter's first design resulted in the private venture Folland Midge which had a short lifespan, but served as a proof-of-concept design. It failed to interest the RAF as a combat aircraft, but they encouraged the development of a similar aircraft for training purposes.[3]
Gnat F.1 single seat fighter variant at the 1957 Paris Air Salon
The Midge first flew on 11 August 1954 but was destroyed in a crash on 20 September 1955. The Gnat, being developed in parallel with the Midge, was an improved version of the original fighter design, differentiated by larger air intakes for the Bristol Orpheus engine (the Midge had an Armstrong Siddeley Viper engine), a slightly larger wing, and provision for a 30 mm ADEN cannon in each intake lip.[3][4]
The first prototype Gnat was built as a private venture project by Folland but subsequently six further aircraft were ordered by the British Ministry of Supply for evaluation.[3] The Folland prototype, serial number G-39-2, first flew on 18 July 1955 from Boscombe Down.
Although the evaluation by the British did not end up in an order for the lightweight fighter orders were placed by Finland, Yugoslavia and a large order from India which included licence production by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. Although the Gnat's development was attributed as motivating the Mutual Weapons Development Team to issue a NATO requirement for a low level light fighter, the Gnat was not evaluated in the competition, won by the Fiat G.91.[5] The Gnat was evaluated in 1958 by the Royal Air Force as a de Havilland Venom replacement, as well as other light fighters such as the BAC Jet Provost,[6] the Hawker Hunter was the eventual winner of the fly-off competition.
Operational History In IAF:- The first 13 aircraft for the Indian Air Force were assembled at Hamble, they were followed by partly completed aircraft and then sub-assemblies as Hindustan Aircraft slowly took over at first assembly then production of the aircraft.
The first flight of an Indian Air Force Gnat was in the United Kingdom on the 11 January 1958, it was delivered to India in the hold of a C-119 and accepted by the Air Force on the 30 January 1958. The first Gnat squadron was No. 23 (Cheetah) Squadron which converted from Vampire FB.52 on 18 March 1960 using six Folland-built Gnats. The first aircraft built from Indian-built parts first flew in May 1962. The last Indian-built Gnat F.1 was delivered on 31 January 1974.
Indo-Pakistani War of 1965
Serving primarily with the Indian Air Force, the Gnat is credited by many independent and Indian sources to have shot down seven Pakistani Canadair Sabres[11] in the 1965 war.[12][13] The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) claims only three Gnat victories over F-86s in air to air combat,[14] while two Gnats were downed by PAF fighters. During the initial phase of the 1965 war, an IAF Gnat, piloted by Squadron Leader Brij Pal Singh Sikand, landed at an abandoned Pakistani airstrip at Pasrur and was captured by the PAF. Two Lockheed F-104 Starfighters forced the Gnat down.[15][16][17] This Gnat is displayed as a war trophy in the Pakistan Air Force Museum, Karachi.
After the ceasefire, one Pakistani Cessna O-1 was shot down on 16 December 1965 by a Gnat.[18]
Indo-Pakistani War of 1971
The Gnats were used again by India in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 against Pakistan.[19][20] The most notable action was the Battle of Boyra where the first dogfights over East Pakistan (Bangladesh) took place. The IAF Gnats downed two PAF Canadair Sabres in minutes and badly damaged one. The Pakistan Air Force claims that one Gnat was shot down, which was proved incorrect. Another notable dogfight involving a Gnat was over Srinagar airfield where a lone Indian pilot held out against six Sabres,[21] scoring hits on two of the Sabres in the process,[22][23] before being shot down. Gnat pilot Nirmal Jit Singh Sekhon was posthumously honoured with Param Vir Chakra (India's highest gallantry award), becoming the only member of the IAF to be given the award.
By the end of 1971, the Gnat proved to be a frustrating opponent for the larger, heavier and older designed Sabre. The Gnat was referred to as a "Sabre Slayer" by the Indian Air Force since most of its combat "kills" during the two wars were against Sabres.[24][25] The Canadair Sabre Mk 6 was widely regarded as the best dogfighter of its era.[26] Tactics called for Gnats taking on the Sabres in the vertical arena, where the Sabres were at a disadvantage. Moreover, because the Gnat was lightweight and compact in shape, it was hard to see, especially at the low levels where most of the dogfights took place.[13] Apart from air defence operations, the aircraft performed multiple roles in the Bangladesh Liberation War, being used in anti-shipping operations, ground attack, bomber/transport escort and close air support with devastating effects on the PAF.[19][20] The success of the indigenously produced Gnats against the more sophisticated Pakistani-flown aircraft was viewed as a significant achievement.[27]
After 1971
The IAF were impressed by the Gnat's performance in the two wars, but the aircraft had problems including hydraulics and unreliable control systems. To address these issues, the IAF issued a requirement for an improved "Gnat II" in 1972, at first specifying that the new version was to be optimized as an interceptor, but then expanding the specification to include the ground-attack role. Over 175 of the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited-built licenced version, the Ajeet ("Unconquerable"), were produced in Bangalore, while about 40 were purchased directly from Folland.
Gnats served in India from 1958–1978, and several remain in use in private hands. Some IAF Gnats, one of which had participated in the 1971 war in East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh), were presented to the Bangladesh Air Force.[28]
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikiped...jpg/800px-Folland_gnat_xr991_sideview_arp.jpg
General characteristics
Crew: 1
Length: 28 ft 8 in (8.74 m)
Wingspan: 22 ft 1 in (6.73 m)
Height: 8 ft 1 in (2.46 m)
Wing area: 136.6 ft² (12.69 m²)
Empty weight: 4,800 lb (2,175 kg)
Max. takeoff weight: 9,040 lb (4,100 kg)
Powerplant: 1 × Bristol Siddeley Orpheus 701-01 turbojet, 4,705 lbf (20.9 kN)
Performance
Maximum speed: 695 mph (mach 0.95) (1,120 km/h) at 20,000 ft (6,100 m)
Range: 500 mi (800 km)
Service ceiling: 48,000 ft (14,630 m)
Rate of climb: 20,000 ft/min (101.6 m/s)
Armament
2x 30mm ADEN cannons
2x 500 lb (227 kg) bombs or 18x 3 in (76 mm) rockets
The Sabre slayer waiting ,,,,,
Data Courtesy:- Wikipidia
Image COurtesy: Bharat Rakshak and wikipidia
5)Folland Gnat:- The Folland Gnat was a small, swept-wing British subsonic jet trainer and light fighter aircraft developed by Folland Aircraft for the Royal Air Force, and flown extensively by the Indian Air Force.
The Gnat was designed by W.E.W. Petter as a development of the private venture Folland Midge and first flew in 1955. Its design allowed its construction without specialised tools by countries not highly industrialised.[1][2] Although never used as a fighter by the Royal Air Force (RAF), the Gnat T.1 trainer variant was widely used. The Gnat became well known as the aircraft of the RAF's Red Arrows aerobatic team.
The Gnat was exported to Finland, Yugoslavia and India. The Indian Air Force became the largest operator and eventually manufactured the aircraft under licence. India then developed the HAL Ajeet, a modified and improved variant.
Origin:- Origins
The Gnat was the creation of W.E.W. "Teddy" Petter, a British aircraft designer formerly of Westland Aircraft and English Electric. Designed to meet the 1952 Operational Requirement OR.303 calling for a lightweight fighter, Petter believed that a small, simple fighter would offer the advantages of low purchase and operational costs. New lightweight turbojet engines that were being developed enabled the concept to take shape.[1] Petter's first design resulted in the private venture Folland Midge which had a short lifespan, but served as a proof-of-concept design. It failed to interest the RAF as a combat aircraft, but they encouraged the development of a similar aircraft for training purposes.[3]
Gnat F.1 single seat fighter variant at the 1957 Paris Air Salon
The Midge first flew on 11 August 1954 but was destroyed in a crash on 20 September 1955. The Gnat, being developed in parallel with the Midge, was an improved version of the original fighter design, differentiated by larger air intakes for the Bristol Orpheus engine (the Midge had an Armstrong Siddeley Viper engine), a slightly larger wing, and provision for a 30 mm ADEN cannon in each intake lip.[3][4]
The first prototype Gnat was built as a private venture project by Folland but subsequently six further aircraft were ordered by the British Ministry of Supply for evaluation.[3] The Folland prototype, serial number G-39-2, first flew on 18 July 1955 from Boscombe Down.
Although the evaluation by the British did not end up in an order for the lightweight fighter orders were placed by Finland, Yugoslavia and a large order from India which included licence production by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. Although the Gnat's development was attributed as motivating the Mutual Weapons Development Team to issue a NATO requirement for a low level light fighter, the Gnat was not evaluated in the competition, won by the Fiat G.91.[5] The Gnat was evaluated in 1958 by the Royal Air Force as a de Havilland Venom replacement, as well as other light fighters such as the BAC Jet Provost,[6] the Hawker Hunter was the eventual winner of the fly-off competition.
Operational History In IAF:- The first 13 aircraft for the Indian Air Force were assembled at Hamble, they were followed by partly completed aircraft and then sub-assemblies as Hindustan Aircraft slowly took over at first assembly then production of the aircraft.
The first flight of an Indian Air Force Gnat was in the United Kingdom on the 11 January 1958, it was delivered to India in the hold of a C-119 and accepted by the Air Force on the 30 January 1958. The first Gnat squadron was No. 23 (Cheetah) Squadron which converted from Vampire FB.52 on 18 March 1960 using six Folland-built Gnats. The first aircraft built from Indian-built parts first flew in May 1962. The last Indian-built Gnat F.1 was delivered on 31 January 1974.
Indo-Pakistani War of 1965
Serving primarily with the Indian Air Force, the Gnat is credited by many independent and Indian sources to have shot down seven Pakistani Canadair Sabres[11] in the 1965 war.[12][13] The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) claims only three Gnat victories over F-86s in air to air combat,[14] while two Gnats were downed by PAF fighters. During the initial phase of the 1965 war, an IAF Gnat, piloted by Squadron Leader Brij Pal Singh Sikand, landed at an abandoned Pakistani airstrip at Pasrur and was captured by the PAF. Two Lockheed F-104 Starfighters forced the Gnat down.[15][16][17] This Gnat is displayed as a war trophy in the Pakistan Air Force Museum, Karachi.
After the ceasefire, one Pakistani Cessna O-1 was shot down on 16 December 1965 by a Gnat.[18]
Indo-Pakistani War of 1971
The Gnats were used again by India in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 against Pakistan.[19][20] The most notable action was the Battle of Boyra where the first dogfights over East Pakistan (Bangladesh) took place. The IAF Gnats downed two PAF Canadair Sabres in minutes and badly damaged one. The Pakistan Air Force claims that one Gnat was shot down, which was proved incorrect. Another notable dogfight involving a Gnat was over Srinagar airfield where a lone Indian pilot held out against six Sabres,[21] scoring hits on two of the Sabres in the process,[22][23] before being shot down. Gnat pilot Nirmal Jit Singh Sekhon was posthumously honoured with Param Vir Chakra (India's highest gallantry award), becoming the only member of the IAF to be given the award.
By the end of 1971, the Gnat proved to be a frustrating opponent for the larger, heavier and older designed Sabre. The Gnat was referred to as a "Sabre Slayer" by the Indian Air Force since most of its combat "kills" during the two wars were against Sabres.[24][25] The Canadair Sabre Mk 6 was widely regarded as the best dogfighter of its era.[26] Tactics called for Gnats taking on the Sabres in the vertical arena, where the Sabres were at a disadvantage. Moreover, because the Gnat was lightweight and compact in shape, it was hard to see, especially at the low levels where most of the dogfights took place.[13] Apart from air defence operations, the aircraft performed multiple roles in the Bangladesh Liberation War, being used in anti-shipping operations, ground attack, bomber/transport escort and close air support with devastating effects on the PAF.[19][20] The success of the indigenously produced Gnats against the more sophisticated Pakistani-flown aircraft was viewed as a significant achievement.[27]
After 1971
The IAF were impressed by the Gnat's performance in the two wars, but the aircraft had problems including hydraulics and unreliable control systems. To address these issues, the IAF issued a requirement for an improved "Gnat II" in 1972, at first specifying that the new version was to be optimized as an interceptor, but then expanding the specification to include the ground-attack role. Over 175 of the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited-built licenced version, the Ajeet ("Unconquerable"), were produced in Bangalore, while about 40 were purchased directly from Folland.
Gnats served in India from 1958–1978, and several remain in use in private hands. Some IAF Gnats, one of which had participated in the 1971 war in East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh), were presented to the Bangladesh Air Force.[28]
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikiped...jpg/800px-Folland_gnat_xr991_sideview_arp.jpg
General characteristics
Crew: 1
Length: 28 ft 8 in (8.74 m)
Wingspan: 22 ft 1 in (6.73 m)
Height: 8 ft 1 in (2.46 m)
Wing area: 136.6 ft² (12.69 m²)
Empty weight: 4,800 lb (2,175 kg)
Max. takeoff weight: 9,040 lb (4,100 kg)
Powerplant: 1 × Bristol Siddeley Orpheus 701-01 turbojet, 4,705 lbf (20.9 kN)
Performance
Maximum speed: 695 mph (mach 0.95) (1,120 km/h) at 20,000 ft (6,100 m)
Range: 500 mi (800 km)
Service ceiling: 48,000 ft (14,630 m)
Rate of climb: 20,000 ft/min (101.6 m/s)
Armament
2x 30mm ADEN cannons
2x 500 lb (227 kg) bombs or 18x 3 in (76 mm) rockets
The Sabre slayer waiting ,,,,,
Data Courtesy:- Wikipidia
Image COurtesy: Bharat Rakshak and wikipidia
