In Tamil Nadu, though the Sri Lanka Tamil Cause that is the struggle for democratic rights - does not figure prominently in the political agenda, it remains a sensitive and emotional issue. This sensitivity was reflected in the unanimous resolution passed in the State Assembly on August 20, 2006 flaying Sri Lanka for launching the air strikes at an orphanage in Chencholai in Mullaitivu district, which killed 51 teenage girls. This does not mean that LTTE or its struggle automatically kindles the same emotion or support. All political parties including the All India Anna DMK and the Congress party, known for their strong anti LTTE stand, try to convert this emotive issue into political support for their parties. On the other hand, pro-LTTE parties like Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK) and LTTE's closest ally Vaiko-led Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (MDMK) would like to use every opportunity to turn Tamil sensitivity into tangible support for the LTTE. Even the latest clone of Dravidian politics, the maverick Vijaya Kanth's Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazagham(DMDK), is known to be sympathetic to the LTTE. But the pro-LTTE political parties support to LTTE is muted at present due to clear warnings from the Chief Minister. But the moment the issue hits high public rating, they would join the LTTE political bandwagon with the rallying call of 'Tamils in danger' to strengthen their constituencies.
However, political attitudes in no way minimise the strong pockets of sympathy for LTTE that exists in Southern Tamil Nadu. Among the rank and file of most of the political parties, elements sympathetic to the cause of an independent Tamil Eelam, if not LTTE, exist. LTTE has shown an enviable ability to turn such muted sympathy of Tamil Diaspora into tangible sources of support. LTTE will attempt to do the same in Tamil Nadu, if it has not already done so. LTTE's global network, money power, and propaganda machinery, abetted by corrupt elements of bureaucracy could provide an incendiary mixture in Tamil Nadu if LTTE once again becomes a strong political issue.
LTTE is a military machine and does not bother with the nuances of backroom politics. So it does not depend upon political rhetoric. It bankrolls the gaps to buy influence and power. If this sounds alarmist, it is good to remember what the Jain Commission report had said about the significance of the very same subject in the year 1989: "the perpetuation of the general political trend of indulging the Tamil militants on Indian soil and tolerance of their wide-ranging criminal and anti-national activities ... LTTE activities of arms smuggling, abduction of Indian citizens and officials and intimidation of the law enforcement machinery were tolerated". In the existing political environment in India, LTTE might not find it easy to repeat its 1989 performance. LTTE is under tremendous operational pressure with the Sri Lanka Security Forces at its gates, and the sea-lanes of supply increasingly proving unsafe. Thus LTTE has to look to Tamil Nadu for sourcing its supplies. If this need overtakes other considerations, LTTE may well turn back to the basics of 1989. If Sri Lanka carries out military operations unmindful of the suffering caused to the Tamil population will help the LTTE to regain its influence in Tamil Nadu.