Survival
In relation to aircraft observability to radar and vulnerability to associated firing solutions, there still seems to be a lot of confusion out there of what defines a stealth aircraft and what defines a "balanced" survivability aircraft design.
True stealth aircraft designs take a great deal of care to make sure that the areas of interest (such as a nose-on aspect) have good shaping.
Balanced survivability fighter aircraft designs like the Typhoon, the Rafale and Super-Hornet try to use shape and radar absorbing material and skin where possible along with trying to hide the leading edge of jet engine components, to degrade the effects of the kinds of radars that are most likely to kill you, such as air-intercept-radar, radar in missile seekers and high-frequency surface-to-air missile radar ground guidance stations. The results have been reported as tactically useful, but they are not stealth aircraft.
Where are stealth aircraft and balanced survivability aircraft designs on this chart?
The "balanced" part comes in where in a terminal defensive situation, the use of on-board defensive jamming aids--combined with the enhancements mentioned above--help to further reduce the effects of enemy radar emitters. A towed decoy fused to the defensive system (for example, the ALE-50/55 on the Super Hornet) helps survivability in terminal enemy missile events even more.
While on-board defensive jamming may make your general location locatable, it makes it harder for the enemy to use a radar-homing missile against such aircraft in a defensive situation.
The survivability design of the F-35 is flawed. Badly. The F-35 has good nose-on shaping; just not so good anywhere else.
Welcome to "affordable", "export-friendly" stealth. That was the hope anyway. Or the hopes of what may be the greatest defense industry Ponzi scheme.
Ever.
The F-35 is neither balanced survivability nor a true stealth aircraft. The F-35 has no credible defensive jamming. Those selling the idea that the F-35's AESA radar as a defensive device against enemy terminal radar concerns aren't believable. Power output limits, thermal concerns along with the limited field of view and in-band frequency limits make the idea of the F-35 radar as a defensive solution of little value. It is only useful on a marketing PowerPoint slide to the clueless. And, unlike the designers of the F-22, the F-35 will not be in possession of true stealth, high-speed and high altitude to help degrade enemy no-escape-zone firing solutions of weapons. The thrust-vectoring on the F-22 is also an aid for quickly changing direction at Mach and not just sub-sonic speed.
The balanced survivability people have a workable solution, combined with, "man's got to know his limitations", (Dirty Harry; Magnum Force).
The F-22 designers also have a workable defensive solution: extreme performance regardless if the aircraft is or is not, naked due to degraded low observability event.
The F-35 design is not useful for future air combat survival. And, certainly, not at any price. Further, the numerous faults in the design--since it will be unable to face emerging threats and is too expensive to own and operate for anything else--point toward "balanced" survivability aircraft like the Typhoon, Rafale and Super Hornet, as providing more overall value to an air arm.
By 2020 (if there are no more delays), a seriously flawed F-35 may be ready to fight an air war 21 years earlier: ALLIED FORCE 1999.
Failure of the F-35 program--for a nation over $16T in the red--should be easy to define.
Eric Palmer blog: Survival
