F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

[BON PLAN]

That would be a really foolish thing to do for Erdogan. So he's leaving a strong group of allies with top notch weapons lead by the Americans for a weak loose group of desperados with second-rate weapons that only pariah states buy because they cannot buy Americans and their allies' weapons?

Oh well, only megalomaniacs like Erdogan makes that mistake. I just hope the rest of Turkey wakes up and takes control before Erdogan totally drags them down to hell.

I'm afraid Turkey is already in radical muslim hands.

 

[BON PLAN]

The real price of the fabulous stealthy goose is not so affordable it seems....

it smells good for F15X .

 

[asianobserve]

An old video on DAS capabilitoes

The real price of the fabulous stealthy goose is not so affordable it seems....

it smells good for F15X .

Another disingenuous claim. That's an average orice of all 3 versions. The target of $80M per unit is only the F-35A. F-35 B and F-35C will be more expensive since not a lot of these verdions will be ordered.

USAF did not even request for F-15X. It's that Boeing guy Trump appointee who is pushing for it.

 

[StealthFlanker]

F-35 instantaneous turn rate published first time : 135 deg/ 3 second => average 45 degrees/second
Like i always said, its ITR is eye-watering

Podcast: Behind The F-35’s New Aerial Tricks
Aviation Week & Space Technology
Apr 03, 2019
Since first flight of the original F-35 test aircraft more than 12 years ago, the U.S. military has given the public only one glimpse of the aircraft’s hotly contested dogfighting chops — and that was nearly two years ago at the Paris Air Show. That’s changing this year. Defense Editor Steve Trimble talks with U.S. Air Force F-35 Demo Pilot Capt. Andrew “Dojo” Olson about the new display’s public debut on March 30 in Melbourne, Florida.
http://m.aviationweek.com/defense/p...m=email&elq2=46ce449c64f94ecea82172645d23cd46

 

[BON PLAN]

F-35 instantaneous turn rate published first time : 135 deg/ 3 second => average 45 degrees/second
Like i always said, its ITR is eye-watering

It may be of 60°/s during the first second....
Can't read the article, and no video to watch....

 

[StealthFlanker]

It may be of 60°/s during the first second....
Can't read the article, and no video to watch....

It is a Podcast with the pilot, similar to Rafale Podcast
http://m.aviationweek.com/defense/p...m=email&elq2=46ce449c64f94ecea82172645d23cd46

 

[asianobserve]

Pentagon eyes F-35 sales to Greece, Romania and Poland: U.S. official

https://www.google.com/amp/s/mobile.reuters.com/article/amp/idUSKCN1RG2OF

 

[BON PLAN]

Pentagon eyes F-35 sales to Greece, Romania and Poland: U.S. official

https://www.google.com/amp/s/mobile.reuters.com/article/amp/idUSKCN1RG2OF

Greece and Romania : out of funds.
Poland : Yes, probably, als. And paid with EU funds like F16...

 

[asianobserve]

This escaped my attention:

Switzerland to decide on new fighter aircraft, competition begins

The aircraft competing are Airbus’s Eurofighter, Boeing’s F/A-18 Super Hornet, Dassault’s Rafale, Lockheed Martin’s F-35A Lightning II, and the Gripen E made by Saab.

I cannot wait to see the F-35A in the hands of a Swiss Air Force demo pilot...

https://thenewsrep.com/113359/switzerland-to-decide-on-new-fighter-aircraft-competition-begins/

 

[Immanuel]

Greece and Romania : out of funds.
Poland : Yes, probably, als. And paid with EU funds like F16...

Doesn't really matter who pays, Unkil get's richer funnily Greece which is out of funds still allocates 2% of GDP to defense unlike freeloading France, Germany and others.

 

[asianobserve]

Poland hopeful of speeding F-35 acquisition

Poland believes it can accelerate the purchase of up to 32 Lockheed Martin F-35 combat aircraft, following suggestions that the USA is willing to expand the fifth-generation jet's operator base.

In total, Warsaw could require as many as 48 of the stealthy type.

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/poland-hopeful-of-speeding-f-35-acquisition-457275/

 

[Wisemarko]

Why America Needs New Alliances
The international order of the Cold War era no longer makes sense. But the world can’t do without U.S. leadership. Here’s a better approach.
By
Yoram Hazony and

Ofir Haivry

April 5, 2019 6:30 p.m. ET

President Trump is often accused of creating a needless rift with America’s European allies. The secretary-general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Jens Stoltenberg, expressed a different view Thursday when he told a joint session of Congress: “Allies must spend more on defense—this has been the clear message from President Trump, and this message is having a real impact.”

Mr. Stoltenberg’s remarks reflect a growing recognition that strategic and economic realities demand a drastic change in the way the U.S. conducts foreign policy. The unwanted cracks in the Atlantic alliance are primarily a consequence of European leaders, especially in Germany and France, wishing to continue living in a world that no longer exists. The U.S. cannot serve as the enforcer for the Europeans’ beloved “rules-based international order” any more. Even in the 1990s, it was doubtful the U.S. could indefinitely guarantee the security of all nations, paying for George H.W. Bush’s “new world order” principally with American soldiers’ lives and American taxpayers’ dollars.

On paper, America has defense alliances with dozens of countries. But these are the ghosts of a rivalry with the Soviet Union that ended three decades ago, or the result of often reckless policies adopted after 9/11. These so-called allies include Turkey and Pakistan, which share neither America’s values nor its interests, and cooperate with the U.S. only when it serves their purposes. Other “allies” refuse to develop a significant capacity for self-defense, and are thus more accurately regarded as American dependencies or protectorates.

Liberal internationalists are right about one thing, however: America cannot simply turn its back on the world. Pearl Harbor and 9/11 demonstrated that the U.S. can and will be targeted on its own soil. An American strategic posture aimed at minimizing the danger from rival powers needs to focus on deterring Russia and China from wars of expansion; weakening China relative to the U.S. and thereby preventing it from attaining dominance over the world economy; and keeping smaller hostile powers such as North Korea and Iran from obtaining the capacity to attack America or other democracies.

To attain these goals, the U.S. will need a new strategy that is far less costly than anything previous administrations contemplated. Mr. Trump has taken a step in the right direction by insisting that NATO allies “pay their fair share” of the budget for defending Europe, increasing defense spending to 2% of gross domestic product in accordance with NATO treaty obligations.

U.S. has a genuine interest, for example, in preventing the democratic nations of Eastern Europe from being absorbed into an aggressive Russian imperial state. But the principal interested parties aren’t Americans. The members of the Visegrád Group—the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia—have a combined population of 64 million and a 2017 GDP of $2 trillion (about 50% of Russia’s, according to CIA estimates). The principal strategic question is therefore whether these countries are willing to do what is necessary to maintain their own national independence. If they are—at a cost that could well exceed the 2% figure devised by NATO planners—then they could eventually shed their dependent status and come to the table as allies of the kind the U.S. could actually use: strong frontline partners in deterring Russian expansion.

Nations that demonstrate a commitment to these shared values and a willingness to fight when necessary should benefit from relations that may include the supply of advanced armaments and technologies, diplomatic cover in dealing with shared enemies, preferred partnership in trade, scientific and academic cooperation, and the joint development of new technologies. Fair-weather friends and free-riding dependencies should not.

Perhaps the most important candidate for such a strategic alliance is India. Long a dormant power afflicted by poverty, socialism and an ideology of “nonalignment,” India has become one of the world’s largest and fastest-expanding economies. In contrast to the political oppression of the Chinese communist model, India has succeeded in retaining much of its religious conservatism while becoming an open and diverse country—by far the world’s most populous democracy—with a solid parliamentary system at both the federal and state levels. India is threatened by Islamist terrorism, aided by neighboring Pakistan; as well as by rapidly increasing Chinese influence, emanating from the South China Sea, the Pakistani port of Gwadar, and Djibouti, in the Horn of Africa, where the Chinese navy has established its first overseas base.

India’s values, interests and growing wealth could establish an Indo-American alliance as the central pillar of a new alignment of democratic national states in Asia, including a strengthened Japan and Australia. But New Delhi remains suspicious of American intentions, and with good reason: Rather than unequivocally bet on an Indian partnership, the U.S. continues to play all sides, haphazardly switching from confrontation to cooperation with China, and competing with Beijing for influence in fanaticism-ridden Pakistan. The rationalizations for these counterproductive policies tend to focus on Pakistan’s supposed logistical contributions to the U.S. war in Afghanistan—an example of how tactical considerations and the demands of bogus allies can stand in the way of meeting even the most pressing strategic needs.

A similar confusion characterizes America’s relationship with Turkey. A U.S. ally during the Cold War, Turkey is now an expansionist Islamist power that has assisted the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, al Qaeda and even ISIS; threatened Greece and Cyprus; sought Russian weapons; and recently expressed its willingness to attack U.S. forces in Syria. In reality, Turkey is no more an ally than Russia or China. Yet its formal status as the second-largest military in NATO guarantees that the alliance will continue to be preoccupied with pretense and make-believe, rather than the interests of democratic nations. Meanwhile, America’s most reliable Muslim allies, the Kurds, live under constant threat of Turkish invasion and massacre.

The Middle East is a difficult region, in which few players share American values and interests, although all of them—including Turkey, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and even Iran—are willing to benefit from U.S. arms, protection or cash. Here too Washington should seek alliances with national states that share at least some key values and are willing to shoulder most of the burden of defending themselves while fighting to contain Islamist radicalism. Such natural regional allies include Greece, Israel, Ethiopia and the Kurds.

A central question for a revitalized alliance of democratic nations is which way the winds will blow in Western Europe. For a generation after the Berlin Wall’s fall in 1989, U.S. administrations seemed willing to take responsibility for Europe’s security indefinitely. European elites grew accustomed to the idea that perpetual peace was at hand, devoting themselves to turning the EU into a borderless utopia with generous benefits for all.

 

[BON PLAN]

This escaped my attention:

Switzerland to decide on new fighter aircraft, competition begins


I cannot wait to see the F-35A in the hands of a Swiss Air Force demo pilot...

https://thenewsrep.com/113359/switzerland-to-decide-on-new-fighter-aircraft-competition-begins/

Just hope the results to be released....

 

[BON PLAN]

Doesn't really matter who pays, Unkil get's richer funnily Greece which is out of funds still allocates 2% of GDP to defense unlike freeloading France, Germany and others.

2% of quite nothing

 

[BON PLAN]

Why America Needs New Alliances
The international order of the Cold War era no longer makes sense. But the world can’t do without U.S. leadership. Here’s a better approach.
By
Yoram Hazony and

Ofir Haivry

April 5, 2019 6:30 p.m. ET

President Trump is often accused of creating a needless rift with America’s European allies. The secretary-general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Jens Stoltenberg, expressed a different view Thursday when he told a joint session of Congress: “Allies must spend more on defense—this has been the clear message from President Trump, and this message is having a real impact.”

Mr. Stoltenberg’s remarks reflect a growing recognition that strategic and economic realities demand a drastic change in the way the U.S. conducts foreign policy. The unwanted cracks in the Atlantic alliance are primarily a consequence of European leaders, especially in Germany and France, wishing to continue living in a world that no longer exists. The U.S. cannot serve as the enforcer for the Europeans’ beloved “rules-based international order” any more. Even in the 1990s, it was doubtful the U.S. could indefinitely guarantee the security of all nations, paying for George H.W. Bush’s “new world order” principally with American soldiers’ lives and American taxpayers’ dollars.

On paper, America has defense alliances with dozens of countries. But these are the ghosts of a rivalry with the Soviet Union that ended three decades ago, or the result of often reckless policies adopted after 9/11. These so-called allies include Turkey and Pakistan, which share neither America’s values nor its interests, and cooperate with the U.S. only when it serves their purposes. Other “allies” refuse to develop a significant capacity for self-defense, and are thus more accurately regarded as American dependencies or protectorates.

Liberal internationalists are right about one thing, however: America cannot simply turn its back on the world. Pearl Harbor and 9/11 demonstrated that the U.S. can and will be targeted on its own soil. An American strategic posture aimed at minimizing the danger from rival powers needs to focus on deterring Russia and China from wars of expansion; weakening China relative to the U.S. and thereby preventing it from attaining dominance over the world economy; and keeping smaller hostile powers such as North Korea and Iran from obtaining the capacity to attack America or other democracies.

To attain these goals, the U.S. will need a new strategy that is far less costly than anything previous administrations contemplated. Mr. Trump has taken a step in the right direction by insisting that NATO allies “pay their fair share” of the budget for defending Europe, increasing defense spending to 2% of gross domestic product in accordance with NATO treaty obligations.

U.S. has a genuine interest, for example, in preventing the democratic nations of Eastern Europe from being absorbed into an aggressive Russian imperial state. But the principal interested parties aren’t Americans. The members of the Visegrád Group—the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia—have a combined population of 64 million and a 2017 GDP of $2 trillion (about 50% of Russia’s, according to CIA estimates). The principal strategic question is therefore whether these countries are willing to do what is necessary to maintain their own national independence. If they are—at a cost that could well exceed the 2% figure devised by NATO planners—then they could eventually shed their dependent status and come to the table as allies of the kind the U.S. could actually use: strong frontline partners in deterring Russian expansion.

Nations that demonstrate a commitment to these shared values and a willingness to fight when necessary should benefit from relations that may include the supply of advanced armaments and technologies, diplomatic cover in dealing with shared enemies, preferred partnership in trade, scientific and academic cooperation, and the joint development of new technologies. Fair-weather friends and free-riding dependencies should not.

Perhaps the most important candidate for such a strategic alliance is India. Long a dormant power afflicted by poverty, socialism and an ideology of “nonalignment,” India has become one of the world’s largest and fastest-expanding economies. In contrast to the political oppression of the Chinese communist model, India has succeeded in retaining much of its religious conservatism while becoming an open and diverse country—by far the world’s most populous democracy—with a solid parliamentary system at both the federal and state levels. India is threatened by Islamist terrorism, aided by neighboring Pakistan; as well as by rapidly increasing Chinese influence, emanating from the South China Sea, the Pakistani port of Gwadar, and Djibouti, in the Horn of Africa, where the Chinese navy has established its first overseas base.

India’s values, interests and growing wealth could establish an Indo-American alliance as the central pillar of a new alignment of democratic national states in Asia, including a strengthened Japan and Australia. But New Delhi remains suspicious of American intentions, and with good reason: Rather than unequivocally bet on an Indian partnership, the U.S. continues to play all sides, haphazardly switching from confrontation to cooperation with China, and competing with Beijing for influence in fanaticism-ridden Pakistan. The rationalizations for these counterproductive policies tend to focus on Pakistan’s supposed logistical contributions to the U.S. war in Afghanistan—an example of how tactical considerations and the demands of bogus allies can stand in the way of meeting even the most pressing strategic needs.

A similar confusion characterizes America’s relationship with Turkey. A U.S. ally during the Cold War, Turkey is now an expansionist Islamist power that has assisted the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, al Qaeda and even ISIS; threatened Greece and Cyprus; sought Russian weapons; and recently expressed its willingness to attack U.S. forces in Syria. In reality, Turkey is no more an ally than Russia or China. Yet its formal status as the second-largest military in NATO guarantees that the alliance will continue to be preoccupied with pretense and make-believe, rather than the interests of democratic nations. Meanwhile, America’s most reliable Muslim allies, the Kurds, live under constant threat of Turkish invasion and massacre.

The Middle East is a difficult region, in which few players share American values and interests, although all of them—including Turkey, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and even Iran—are willing to benefit from U.S. arms, protection or cash. Here too Washington should seek alliances with national states that share at least some key values and are willing to shoulder most of the burden of defending themselves while fighting to contain Islamist radicalism. Such natural regional allies include Greece, Israel, Ethiopia and the Kurds.

A central question for a revitalized alliance of democratic nations is which way the winds will blow in Western Europe. For a generation after the Berlin Wall’s fall in 1989, U.S. administrations seemed willing to take responsibility for Europe’s security indefinitely. European elites grew accustomed to the idea that perpetual peace was at hand, devoting themselves to turning the EU into a borderless utopia with generous benefits for all.

What is the link with F35 ?

 

[asianobserve]

Just hope the results to be released....

Switzerland does not actually need cutting edge fighters. They have no enemies and the US guarantees their sovereignty 100%. So a Gripen C will do for them. But if they want the best money can buy then they'll choose the F-35.

 

[Immanuel]

2% of quite nothing

Funny, even the poorer nation has better honor among friends, exactly why France is a freeloading shithole. Besides isn't Greece growth rate better than France for the moment?

 

[BON PLAN]

Switzerland does not actually need cutting edge fighters. They have no enemies and the US guarantees their sovereignty 100%. So a Gripen C will do for them. But if they want the best money can buy then they'll choose the F-35.

The best?
They don't need a deep air strike fighter, but mainly air defense and CAS. The EF with CAPTOR E and Meteor is nice for that.
F35 is not a perfect air mission. You will not agree, but it's my opinion. Too fat, not as agile as you say.

 

[BON PLAN]

Funny, even the poorer nation has better honor among friends, exactly why France is a freeloading shithole. Besides isn't Greece growth rate better than France for the moment?

Greece GDP is so low.... Even with 5% growth rate Greece is so far....
F35 will not land in Greece. Just not to offenseTurkey too much .

 

[vampyrbladez]

Greece GDP is so low.... Even with 5% growth rate Greece is so far....
F35 will not land in Greece. Just not to offenseTurkey too much .

Greece will buy it at discount by buttering Trump.