I will simply add the years to quantify the delays or time taken to reach the milestones.
GSQR 326 | 1972 | Initial requirement was finalized. |
GSQR 431 | 1982 | The 115 mm main gun was already tested prior to this year. New changes were requested: (1) Increase in width and height, (2) 120 mm main gun, (3) improved FCS. |
GSQR 467 | 1985 | Prototypes were already built by this time. Now, even more changes were requested: (1) increased lethality (whatever that means), (2) APFSDS through rifled barrel - possible but challenging, (3) semi-combustible cartridge cases and high energy propellants (meaning, new metallurgy and redesigning of the barrel and breach), (4) modification of FSC and sighting systems, (5) night vision capabilities, (6) Kanchan armour. |
References:
http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/indian-army/264-development-indian-arjun.html
http://pib.nic.in/archieve/others/2008/apr/r2008042813.pdf
It is true, if the adversary introduces new technology, or, if technology in general across the globe evolves to something new, the GSQR must reflect those. That is not my point of contention. My point of contention is, just like DRDO has missed the timeline at times, it has also met the timelines many times. I have seen detractors of the Arjun count the number of years beginning with 1972, but those that do, are simply lying. From a technical perspective, if we look at the various iterations the Arjun went through, we have to say, we have attempted to make
three tanks, and I am not even counting Arjun Mark II.
I don't have a problem with the Army going for the first batch of T-90s. I have a problem with going for the second batch. That was unnecessary, IMHO.
Sir, everything you are saying is valid.
I will present two options now:
Either we settle for a light tank where the crew will get fried on being hit by an RPG (refer to the Kiev regime's BMPs, or even the T-72s in Ukraine), or, go for a heavy 70 ton vehicle that will guarantee high crew survivability, but won't be able to cross many bridges. There is no way to have the benefits of a light vehicle with high crew survivability rolled into one tank.
This is impossible.
Sir, many requirements are indeed flights of fantasies. Here is one example from
an article by Dave Majumdar:
Pardon my cynicism, because I have to make this caustic remark: Same survivability as Abrams, but about 20 tons? What were these people smoking? Or did these people fail every single physics and math class in school, and somehow ended up being in some committee that writes requirements?
Armata concept leads the way. The only way to have a reasonably light tank with high crew survivability is to have:
- a crew size that is no more than 3;
- a crew-less turret;
- autoloader;
- empty weight no less than 45 metric tons.
First of all, there has been revised GSQRs for two reasons, as I can comprehend.
(a) to keep up with the latest technology. It obviously was in consultation with the DRDO, MOD and other agencies and not unilaterally. And it was accepted as valid, or so I presume.
(b) accepting outdated technology would put the military back vis a vis adversaries since once an equipment is accepted, it cannot be canned within a few years because the assembly lines etc costs a fortune to include the ancillary sector which cannot be discard owing to the Govt's social responsibilities. It is the same reason as to why non profitable Ordnance PSU, like the Parachute and Military Clothing factory etc cannot be junked.
How many years have our MIG 21s been operational inspite of all the problems? Why was it not junked and instead upgrades continues with accidents not going away?
Unfortunately all fighters are designed primarily for air superiority but end up in the more hazardous low level close support role.
This was also the case with the MiG 21.
From the 1980s the MiG switched to the close support role. New upgrades to make the type suitable for close support also meant a steady increase in weight. The aircraft became more sluggish and unwieldy particularly during the landing and take off and in circuit where the aerodynamic control forces decline as a square of the flight velocity but the inertias remain the same. The weight increase affected the wing, power and span loadings (please refer toTable A- for the MIG the figures on the top of each box are for the FL those below are for the Bis).
So, for a country like ours which has very little leeway to squander our meager wealth, it is always mix and match.
Now, it it is THREE tanks, so be it. There is a simple way it is done Mk I, II and so on. Still, no matter how many Mks, it must come up to expectation compatible to the operation requirement and technological pace.
Do you drive an Ambassador? I would say given the road conditions, it is still the best, even if the performance is not matching today's cars. And what would really come into question is the cost will be near similar, but in fuel expenditure, it will burn a hole in the pocket compared to the modern vehicles.
I agree there is no way, a light tank can be compatible with an MBT.
But an MBT must be compatible to India's operational requirement and not a white elephant that is of no use to man or beast. As I said in a post, the desert in the Thar is not similar. There is soft sand and there is firm sand. Even this firm sand has a certain load bearing capacity and is not the same as hard earth in the plains. This is where the ingenuity and expertise of the scientist come into play and test, beyond their promising the moon.
I presume the wider tank specification in one of the GSQR would be a DRDO input since increasing the size of the contact area on the ground (the footprint) in relation to the weight decreases the ground pressure. So, it would not be solely the Army's. I am sure that other modifications were similarly after consultations and not unilateral. Of course, you and I would not know and so can justifiably be inflamed.
As far as Dae Majumdar's article it is not India's.
It is The Russian Army's Secret Weapon: Enter the Armata Program. Yes, it sounds out of Sci fi. But have you heard of DAPRA? They also dabble in Sci Fi. I am sure they the Russian and American Sci Fi chaps deliver. Heard of Velcro? Check the history of development.
I have full faith in Indian scientists and engineers in the DRDO. But they are hamstrung by the bureaucracy cranked in by their superior, who have self interest and live off the fat of the land.
If Kurt Tank could design and manufacture HF 24 in record time with Indian scientist, engineers and technologist, then why can the DRDO with Indians do?
If HAL under Air Force Heads could deliver, then why can't the HAL with civilian bureaucrats/ scientists at the Head deliver?
Skewed work culture?
Think that over.