LETHALFORCE
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Pakistan's nuclear forces-and source country
China Military News & Updates
- Thread starter Skynet2
- Start date
Even if you as a Chinese civilian wishes well for India, unfortuantely your government does not. This rather off-balance position is what makes us take precautions both militarily and strategically against China without focusing on any other country. I do not see any other reason for the cold war that is between the two Asian countries. Apart from this, I do not see any other reason for conflict.
threadbrowser
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Claims of Chinese plotting to overthrow us are i think overblown.
China is simply doing what a rational actor would do to protect its interests.
China's main objective is to safeguard the routes by which fuel and trade flows. This means creating a navy capable of dominating the asian region. The only credible opponent in its quest for regional influence is India. therefore tying us down by encouraging our obsession with pakistan and vice versa is simply good sense.
We remain as a regional power while China can focus on chasing the US.
China is simply doing what a rational actor would do to protect its interests.
China's main objective is to safeguard the routes by which fuel and trade flows. This means creating a navy capable of dominating the asian region. The only credible opponent in its quest for regional influence is India. therefore tying us down by encouraging our obsession with pakistan and vice versa is simply good sense.
We remain as a regional power while China can focus on chasing the US.
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China Goes Top Gun
June 5, 2006: Another example of how serious China is about creating world class armed forces, is their establishing a "Top Gun" school. That means some of their Su-27 aircraft would have their pilots trained to use fly and fight like F-16's (in particular, Taiwanese F-16s). The 28 ton Su-27 is actually a larger aircraft than the 17 ton F-16. But the only F-16 class aircraft China has is the new JF17. There are not enough JF17s available to serve in an "aggressor squadron", and the JF17 is actually only equal in performance to older model F-16s. The Su-27 can do the job, even if it's more similar in size to the F-15. The Chinese were encouraged to go this way when, during realistic training exercises, their Su-27 pilots were easily defeated when up against aircraft fighting like Taiwanese pilots in F-16s.
The original "Top Gun" fighter pilot school was established in 1969, by the U.S. Navy, in response to the poor performance of its pilots against North Vietnamese pilots flying Russian fighters. What made the Top Gun operation different was that the training emphasized how the enemy aircraft and pilots operated. This was called "dissimilar training". In the past, American pilots practiced against American pilots, with everyone flying American aircraft. It worked in World War II, because the enemy pilots were not getting a lot of practice and were using similar aircraft and tactics anyway. Most importantly, there was a lot of aerial combat going on, providing ample opportunity for on- the- job training. Not so in Vietnam, where the quite different Russian trained North Vietnamese were giving U.S. aviators an awful time. The four week Top Gun program solved the problem. The air force followed shortly with it's Red Flag school.
Over the last thirty years, the two training programs have developed differently, and the entire concept of "dissimilar training" has changed. The navy kept Top Gun as a program to hone fighter pilot's combat skills. The air force made their Red Flag program more elaborate, bringing in the many different types of aircraft involved in combat missions (especially electronic warfare.) But after the Cold War ended. It became increasingly obvious that none of our potential enemies was providing their fighter pilots with much training at all. In other words, the dissimilar training for U.S. fighter pilots was not a crucial as it had been during the Cold War. Actually, it had been noted that flying skills of Soviet pilots was declining in the 1980s, as economic problems in the USSR caused a cut in flying time. During that period, American pilots were actually getting more flying time. Moreover, U.S. flight simulators were getting better. American pilots were finding that even the game oriented combat flight simulators had some training value. So in the late 1990s, Top Gun and Red Flag found their budgets cut. But the programs remain, as does the memory of why they were set up in the first place. If we find that, say, China is continuing to improve it's combat aviation, gives it's fighter pilots more flying time and their politicians maintain a bellicose attitude towards the U.S., there will be a need to increase American Top Gun training. Because of the new Chinese "dissimilar training" effort, the U.S. Top Gun and Red Flag schools may be restored to their former prominence. The Chinese move is certainly a very meaningful one, as it shows that they are serious about preparing their pilots to fight, and defeat Taiwanese and American pilots. Dissimilar training is how that is done.
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairfo/articles/20060605.aspx
So obviously this article is about 3 years old but good info nonetheless. I didn't know that he Chinese were actually this serious about making good pilots. I was under the impression that their combat doctrine was trying to throw out as many people as possible and drown the enemy with their(Chinese) own blood.
June 5, 2006: Another example of how serious China is about creating world class armed forces, is their establishing a "Top Gun" school. That means some of their Su-27 aircraft would have their pilots trained to use fly and fight like F-16's (in particular, Taiwanese F-16s). The 28 ton Su-27 is actually a larger aircraft than the 17 ton F-16. But the only F-16 class aircraft China has is the new JF17. There are not enough JF17s available to serve in an "aggressor squadron", and the JF17 is actually only equal in performance to older model F-16s. The Su-27 can do the job, even if it's more similar in size to the F-15. The Chinese were encouraged to go this way when, during realistic training exercises, their Su-27 pilots were easily defeated when up against aircraft fighting like Taiwanese pilots in F-16s.
The original "Top Gun" fighter pilot school was established in 1969, by the U.S. Navy, in response to the poor performance of its pilots against North Vietnamese pilots flying Russian fighters. What made the Top Gun operation different was that the training emphasized how the enemy aircraft and pilots operated. This was called "dissimilar training". In the past, American pilots practiced against American pilots, with everyone flying American aircraft. It worked in World War II, because the enemy pilots were not getting a lot of practice and were using similar aircraft and tactics anyway. Most importantly, there was a lot of aerial combat going on, providing ample opportunity for on- the- job training. Not so in Vietnam, where the quite different Russian trained North Vietnamese were giving U.S. aviators an awful time. The four week Top Gun program solved the problem. The air force followed shortly with it's Red Flag school.
Over the last thirty years, the two training programs have developed differently, and the entire concept of "dissimilar training" has changed. The navy kept Top Gun as a program to hone fighter pilot's combat skills. The air force made their Red Flag program more elaborate, bringing in the many different types of aircraft involved in combat missions (especially electronic warfare.) But after the Cold War ended. It became increasingly obvious that none of our potential enemies was providing their fighter pilots with much training at all. In other words, the dissimilar training for U.S. fighter pilots was not a crucial as it had been during the Cold War. Actually, it had been noted that flying skills of Soviet pilots was declining in the 1980s, as economic problems in the USSR caused a cut in flying time. During that period, American pilots were actually getting more flying time. Moreover, U.S. flight simulators were getting better. American pilots were finding that even the game oriented combat flight simulators had some training value. So in the late 1990s, Top Gun and Red Flag found their budgets cut. But the programs remain, as does the memory of why they were set up in the first place. If we find that, say, China is continuing to improve it's combat aviation, gives it's fighter pilots more flying time and their politicians maintain a bellicose attitude towards the U.S., there will be a need to increase American Top Gun training. Because of the new Chinese "dissimilar training" effort, the U.S. Top Gun and Red Flag schools may be restored to their former prominence. The Chinese move is certainly a very meaningful one, as it shows that they are serious about preparing their pilots to fight, and defeat Taiwanese and American pilots. Dissimilar training is how that is done.
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairfo/articles/20060605.aspx
So obviously this article is about 3 years old but good info nonetheless. I didn't know that he Chinese were actually this serious about making good pilots. I was under the impression that their combat doctrine was trying to throw out as many people as possible and drown the enemy with their(Chinese) own blood.
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China says US report on its military power a 'gross distortion of facts'
BEIJING: China said on Thursday that a Pentagon report on Beijing's military power marked a "gross" misrepresentation of facts and urged the United States to halt the annual publication.
"This is a gross distortion of the facts and China resolutely opposes it," ministry spokesman Qin Gang told journalists in Beijing.
"This report issued by the US side continues to play up the fallacy of China's military threat," he said.
He asked the United States to stop issuing the annual report to "avoid further damage to the two sides' military relations".
The Pentagon said in its report to Congress that China's pursuit of sophisticated weaponry was altering Asia's military balance and could be used to enforce its claims over disputed territories.
China has kept up major investments in its armed forces and made advances in hi-tech weaponry that outpace other countries in the region, the defence department said in the report, issued on Wednesday.
The Chinese foreign ministry reaction came shortly after its harsh reaction to a resolution by US lawmakers pledging defence of Taiwan.
"The Chinese side expresses its strong dissatisfaction and has made solemn representations with the US side," spokesman Qin said in a statement that was posted overnight on the foreign ministry's website.
The US Congress passed a resolution on Tuesday vowing "unwavering commitment" to Taiwan's security and calling the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act a "cornerstone" of US policy.
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/417907/1/.html
BEIJING: China said on Thursday that a Pentagon report on Beijing's military power marked a "gross" misrepresentation of facts and urged the United States to halt the annual publication.
"This is a gross distortion of the facts and China resolutely opposes it," ministry spokesman Qin Gang told journalists in Beijing.
"This report issued by the US side continues to play up the fallacy of China's military threat," he said.
He asked the United States to stop issuing the annual report to "avoid further damage to the two sides' military relations".
The Pentagon said in its report to Congress that China's pursuit of sophisticated weaponry was altering Asia's military balance and could be used to enforce its claims over disputed territories.
China has kept up major investments in its armed forces and made advances in hi-tech weaponry that outpace other countries in the region, the defence department said in the report, issued on Wednesday.
The Chinese foreign ministry reaction came shortly after its harsh reaction to a resolution by US lawmakers pledging defence of Taiwan.
"The Chinese side expresses its strong dissatisfaction and has made solemn representations with the US side," spokesman Qin said in a statement that was posted overnight on the foreign ministry's website.
The US Congress passed a resolution on Tuesday vowing "unwavering commitment" to Taiwan's security and calling the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act a "cornerstone" of US policy.
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/417907/1/.html
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yeah....but my favorite part is "gross misrepresentation of facts and urged the United States to halt the annual publication"
Yeah right, like that's gonna happen....
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China Steps Up Defense Industry Reform
BEIJING — China is accelerating reform of its military aircraft sector by bringing forward the establishment of a company that will be its national defense champion.
Government and industry leaders have dropped plans to initially restrict the new business — a maker of fighters, trainers, drones and missiles — to the status of a division of national aeronautics conglomerate Avic.
Instead, the organization has now been set up as a company under the name Avic Defence.
The change is more important than it may seem, because it implies greater autonomy from the head office and a faster rate of reform.
Avic Defence has almost 60,000 employees. Capital amounts to almost 50 billion yuan and sales are 30 billion a year, only a small fraction of the target of 160 billion for 2017 that has been set for General Manager Wang Yawei.
The company chairman is Li Yuhai, deputy general manager of Avic, who warns that it will not be easy for Avic Defence to meet the requirements placed on it.
“Challenges for Avic Defence are raised by demands for network-centric and integrated air-surface warfare, and by the development of stealth, high-mobility and autonomous technologies,” he says.
The three previously unidentified maintenance businesses that Avic Defence is absorbing have also been named. They are Jilin Aircraft Maintenance Co. Ltd., Changsha No. 5712 Aircraft Industry Co. Ltd. and Tianshui Aircraft Industry Co. Ltd., each named after the cities in which they are based.
Unlike the subsidiary units of Avic Aircraft, which are to be dissolved, the companies under Avic Defence are supposed to remain as separate entities — probably because the Chinese armed forces are used to dealing directly with the factories, such as Shenyang Aircraft and Chengdu Aircraft, and want to keep doing so.
But in view of the unexpected acceleration of Avic Defence’s corporate status, it would not be surprising to see top management eventually win a battle for elimination of subsidiary structure, which would likely stand in the way of full rationalization of the business.
Avic Defence has extensive ambitions for nonmilitary and nonaeronautic business, which Wang says he needs to meet his 2017 sales target.
The unveiling ceremony was attended by the deputy commanders of the Chinese air force and navy. No army participation was mentioned.
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/gene...adline=China Steps Up Defense Industry Reform
They should change the title to China stealing more technology...
BEIJING — China is accelerating reform of its military aircraft sector by bringing forward the establishment of a company that will be its national defense champion.
Government and industry leaders have dropped plans to initially restrict the new business — a maker of fighters, trainers, drones and missiles — to the status of a division of national aeronautics conglomerate Avic.
Instead, the organization has now been set up as a company under the name Avic Defence.
The change is more important than it may seem, because it implies greater autonomy from the head office and a faster rate of reform.
Avic Defence has almost 60,000 employees. Capital amounts to almost 50 billion yuan and sales are 30 billion a year, only a small fraction of the target of 160 billion for 2017 that has been set for General Manager Wang Yawei.
The company chairman is Li Yuhai, deputy general manager of Avic, who warns that it will not be easy for Avic Defence to meet the requirements placed on it.
“Challenges for Avic Defence are raised by demands for network-centric and integrated air-surface warfare, and by the development of stealth, high-mobility and autonomous technologies,” he says.
The three previously unidentified maintenance businesses that Avic Defence is absorbing have also been named. They are Jilin Aircraft Maintenance Co. Ltd., Changsha No. 5712 Aircraft Industry Co. Ltd. and Tianshui Aircraft Industry Co. Ltd., each named after the cities in which they are based.
Unlike the subsidiary units of Avic Aircraft, which are to be dissolved, the companies under Avic Defence are supposed to remain as separate entities — probably because the Chinese armed forces are used to dealing directly with the factories, such as Shenyang Aircraft and Chengdu Aircraft, and want to keep doing so.
But in view of the unexpected acceleration of Avic Defence’s corporate status, it would not be surprising to see top management eventually win a battle for elimination of subsidiary structure, which would likely stand in the way of full rationalization of the business.
Avic Defence has extensive ambitions for nonmilitary and nonaeronautic business, which Wang says he needs to meet his 2017 sales target.
The unveiling ceremony was attended by the deputy commanders of the Chinese air force and navy. No army participation was mentioned.
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/gene...adline=China Steps Up Defense Industry Reform
They should change the title to China stealing more technology...
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India’s Place in China’s South Asia Strategy
India’s Place in China’s South Asia Strategy
By D. S. Rajan
To understand the role of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in South Asia, a study of its overall strategic vision at each historical stage becomes necessary. Major determinants of such a vision included China’s perceived domestic policy priorities at a particular period. To cite instances of domestic and foreign policy linkages, in the Mao Zedong era (1949-76), ‘class struggle’ and ‘self-reliant development’ were the main domestic goals; to facilitate their accomplishment, China externally adopted a strategy of ‘leaning to one side’, i.e with Socialist allies. Internal priorities underwent a major change in the post-1978 period, with veteran leader Deng Xiaoping initiating a path of ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’, to be matched by an ‘open door’ foreign policy. As a break from the past, no alliance or strategic relation with any major power was envisaged.
Deng’s line continues till today, but with additional theoretical inputs from his successors sans any basic change. To illustrate, in the post-Deng period, Jiang Zemin formulated national policies centering round his theory of “ Three Represents”, aimed at making the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) a representative of majority of the people and codified ‘three major historic tasks’ for China – Modernisation, National Reunification and Safeguarding World Peace and Common Development. He selected a matching external line of ‘Independent Foreign Policy of Peace’.
Jiang’s successor Hu Jintao brought forth a development model marking a shift in emphasis – from GDP centric growth to ‘balanced development’; to be backed by his own concept of “ Scientific Outlook of Development”, of which creation at home of a ‘Harmonious Socialist Society’ and ‘Sustainable development’ constituted main elements. Designed to suit to China’s ‘primary stage of socialism’, the model provided for analysis of the country’s own development practice, learning side by side from experiences of other countries. Correspondingly, Hu put in place a foreign policy course based on the idea of a “Harmonious World” which lays emphasis on accomplishing ‘lasting peace and common prosperity, through a win-win solution in international relations’.[1] It was left to Premier Wen Jiabao to pinpoint the links between his country’s domestic goals and external approach. In his words, “what China needs for its development first and foremost is an international environment of long term stability and a stable surrounding environment”[2], which meant that a ‘peaceful periphery’ has become a pre-requisite to Chinese foreign policy.
Signs of China adopting a neutral stand on issues relating to South Asia began appearing by end seventies. For e.g, Beijing at that time started modifying its pro-Pakistan stand on Kashmir issue, with the state-controlled media dropping references to ‘India-occupied Kashmir’ and using instead the term ‘India-controlled Kashmir’. The shift became concrete in December 1996, when the then President Jiang Zemin hinted at a beginning of his country’s ‘balanced’ South Asia policy in his speech to Pakistan Senate, by favouring New Delhi - Islamabad ‘consultations and negotiations’ on Kashmir. A leading China scholar[3] later called this as Beijing’s “South Asia policy under new situation” and observed that subsequent to Premier Wen’s South Asia tour in 2005, the PRC would develop relations with South Asian nations in a ‘parallel’ manner, adding that ‘China’s strategic partnership with India and Pakistan is unprecedented in the sense that each relationship is not directed against any third party’.
Developments since the landmark visit of the then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China in 1988 have been remarkable. China has been more than willing to enter into several key bilateral agreements with India utilising the opportunity of regular exchanges of high level bilateral visits that included - on ‘finding a fair and reasonable settlement to the boundary issue’ and forming a ‘Joint Working Group’ for the purpose (1988), Appointment of Special Representatives ‘to explore the framework of a boundary settlement, from the political perspective of overall bilateral relation (2003), Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity and Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for Settlement of the Boundary Question’ (2005), ‘Promotion of Civil Nuclear Cooperation (2006) and ‘Shared Vision for the 21st Century ( 2008). Also being seen currently is China’s new stress on cooperation with India in the WTO and climate change issues[4], along with its prescription that ‘no country poses a threat to other’.[5]
Most important development has been the recognition of both the sides that the Sino-Indian ties have gone beyond the bilateral context and acquired a global character.[6] The policies of India and China now aim at “building a relationship of friendship and trust, based on equality, in which each is sensitive to the concerns and aspirations of the other” and ‘promoting bilateral relations, looking beyond the border issue’[7]. It can be seen without difficulty that a congruence, to a good degree, of policy interests among China and India has emerged over the years; under its impact, in general, the comfort level in their relations has been increasing.
This is not to deny the existence of other motivating factors for Beijing, besides the need for ‘peaceful periphery’, to improve ties with New Delhi. They include neutralising the perceived US regional strategy to contain China, developing economies in areas bordering India, cooperating with India in exploitation of much needed energy resources, protection of oil transport security in the Indian Ocean with the help of India, getting India’s support to ‘One China’ policy and last, but not least, seeking India’s influence to reduce the pressure on China from the resurgence of Tibet issue.
The foregoing does not mean that mistrust and suspicions have completely disappeared in Sino-Indian relations. India has reasons to note with concern that barring improvements in bilateral trade (US$ 40 billion in 2007 with a target of US $60 billion by 2010 and commencement of Joint Study on Regional Trade Agreement), Sino-Indian relations remain bedevilled by lack of progress on settling core issues mentioned below.
China’s stand on the border issue indicates that Beijing is unwilling to compromise on issues concerning territorial sovereignty. The Sino-Indian border talks, despite twelve rounds of talks so far between two Special representatives, have not led to any substantial result in finalising a ‘frame work’ for a boundary settlement in accordance with the 2005 Agreement on Political Parameters. While Beijing’s stand is to approach the border issue in the spirit of ‘mutual understanding and mutual accommodation’, India wants ‘ground realities’ to be taken into account. Interestingly, the Chinese have of late introduced some new elements to the border question by questioning the already agreed position of keeping areas with settled populations out of the dispute. As confirmation of their official position of claiming entire Arunachal Pradesh, Beijing even raised verbal objections to the visit of the Indian Prime Minister to Arunachal Pradesh soon after his trip to Beijing in January 2008.
Is China ready for a compromise on the border issue? The statement made by the PRC Ambassador to India in November 2006 that both sides should make compromises on the ‘disputed’ Arunachal may be meaningful in this regard. The two sides seem to perceive that the issue is complex, the negotiations could be long and a solution may not be immediate[8]. Chinese academic circles have explained the same in terms of public sentiments in China disallowing any compromise by Beijing on questions concerning national sovereignty as well as the need for priority to solve the critical Taiwan issue first, before any attempt to solve the border tangle with India.[9]
China also considers Tibet issue as sensitive in its relations with India.[10] The March 2008 unrest in Tibet has raised questions of China’s sovereignty over Tibet, a factor naturally connected to the border negotiations. It is being assessed that the Tibet unrest may erode China’s bargaining position during border talks, particularly in respect of its claim over Tawang[11]. On his part, the Dalai Lama has justified the Indian stand on the border issue. Beijing, in response, has accused the spiritual leader of ‘selling’ Chinese territory to India.
China is applying pressure on India by expanding its influence in the latter’s neighbourhood. It has established strategic presence in Pakistan (Gwadar), Sri Lanka (Hambantota), Myanmar (Sittwe), Bangladesh and Nepal, as part of its policy to protect the sea-lanes from the Middle East to South China Sea, crucial for Chinese imports of oil. The West calls this a ‘string of pearls strategy’; Beijing claims that it has no plans to try for domination of the shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean and no intention to establish a chain to encircle India.[12] Especially, Beijing’s cooperation with Islamabad in the domains of military, missiles and nuclear technology is continuing. The PRC has also a peace treaty with Pakistan, unique in South Asia, providing for mutual support in protecting each other’s national sovereignty and integrity. A Chinese assessment has called it as an ‘alliance’ against any foreign threat[13].
Beijing undoubtedly has concerns over India’s joining a ‘Western Alliance’ against the PRC, in particular over the growing India-US strategic relations. Its authoritative media have commented that Washington’s intentions to enclose India into the camp of its global partners fit exactly with India’s wishes’[14]. Also, military experts in Beijing have alleged that India nurtures an ambition to become a regional and world power through collusion with the US[15].
Chinese strategic journals have been vehemently opposing the Japan-US- Australia- India ‘alliance of democracies’ concept, calling it as an ‘Asian NATO’[16]. They have also questioned the motives behind holding the joint naval exercises involving India, the US, Japan etc. A Chinese comment found the Indian involvement along with Japan and the US, in the joint naval drill off the Japanese coast, ‘intriguing’ and viewed the drill as leading to a ‘new balance of power in Asia’.[17] Days before the first-ever official-level security consultation between the United States, India, Japan and Australia in June 2007, China issued demarches to each of the participants seeking to know the purpose behind their meeting.[18]
On the India-US nuclear deal, the Chinese official position has been non-committal. Beijing has said that they welcome civil nuclear cooperation between nations if the same is in the interest of international non-proliferation regime. Beijing’s ultimate stand at the Nuclear Suppliers Group meeting at Vienna in 2008, in favour of granting waiver to India, has further underscored China’s ambivalent thinking on the deal; just prior to the meeting, the People’s Daily strongly criticised the deal. Other Chinese media comments have alleged that India’s development of nuclear weapons is an important reason for nuclear arms race in South Asia and that the India-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement marks a serious breach of the international non-proliferation regime. Their observation that India’s nuclear strategy is a potential challenge to China’s national security is a strong indicator to China’s basic thinking[19].
China’s military modernisation continues to be of concern to regional powers including India. Indian Defence Ministry’s recent annual reports have been indicative of this position. New Delhi may have noted the recent evaluation of the US[20] that China’s military modernisation is changing the regional balance in East Asia. There is a strong feeling in the region that though Beijing’s Defence policy is in the main oriented towards preventing US intervention in Taiwan, it has other intentions, for e.g. gaining capacity to meet contingencies like conflicts over resources and territories. China nevertheless is showing some conciliatory gestures. Its latest Defence White Paper for 2008 downplays Indian concerns about the Chinese naval build up and the ongoing border dispute.[21] On its part, New Delhi has shown a tendency not to highlight the challenge to India coming from China’s military modernization.[22]
Limiting India’s role in the East Asian integration process is also a part of China’s South Asia strategy. Beijing officially supports India’s participation in the regional integration process, including in the East Asia Summit.[23] However, by all indications, it excludes India from any role in the proposed ASEAN Regional Community, which is to come up with ASEAN plus 3 including China in leading position. On the East Asia Summit mechanism, the PRC considers countries like India, Australia and New Zealand as outsiders, desiring to give them only a secondary status. It is also cool to the Indian Prime Minister’s vision for an Asian Economic Community.
China wishes to play a role in SAARC, but seems to be unsure of India’s support to it.. As articulated by a Chinese scholar, India faces a challenge in promoting mutual trust with its neighbours and as such, SAARC is yet to become a bridge between China and South Asian nations. The success of China’s ‘balanced’ South Asia strategy would very much depend on India’s motives vi-a-vis the PRC as well as support from Pakistan, besides its own efforts.[24]
Beijing’s goal is to establish a ‘moderately well off’ society by 2020 through quadruplicating the GDP for 2000 and become a ‘modernised medium level developed country’ by 2050. China is confident that its “Peaceful Development” task will face no obstacles as there are no chances of a war breaking out and a ‘long term peaceful international environment’ and ‘favourable neighbourhood’ will continue to prevail[25]. Keeping this in mind, a drastic change in the PRC’s present global strategy, that includes South Asia, is not likely in the near future.
A long-term picture however appears not promising. Will China become aggressive in international relations once its modernisation drive gets completed at some point of time from now? Immediately coming into one’s mind in this regard is the advice given by veteran leader Deng Xiaoping that China should ‘ stand firmly, hide its capabilities, bide its time and never try to take the lead’ in pursuance of its objectives. Worth noting in this context are evidence already surfacing to suggest that China’s strategy is not going to remain static, for e.g. in the new circumstances, the country’s ‘independent foreign policy of peace’ is being made conditional to ‘safeguarding of Chinese Sovereignty, Security and Development’ and the ‘economic growth’ imperative is being balanced with that of ‘military modernisation’. This would mean that the PRC may not hesitate to modify its strategy, if the need arises. One has only to note what Robert B. Zoellick, former US Deputy Secretary of State and the initiator of the US-China Strategic Dialogue, said. According to him, though China remains absorbed in its domestic development, a question will remain whether it will have a similar view in next 10-15 years.[26]
It is clear that China – South Asia relations are undergoing a tactical phase. Beijing’s present aim is to ease tensions in that region to help China in realising its modernisation task. That is why in the case of India, it is following the principle of ‘reserving the differences and working for common development’ and on India-Pakistan problems, it favours a peaceful dialogue between the two. However, for reasons mentioned earlier, uncertainties seem to be inherent in Beijing’s long-term strategy towards South Asia, on which regional powers like India need to be vigilant.
(The Writer, D.S.Rajan, is Director of Chennai Centre for China Studies. This paper formed the basis of his presentation at the UGC National Seminar on India’s Emerging Security Challenges and Strategies, organised by the Dept of Defence and Strategic Studies, University of Madras, on 23 March 2009. Email: [email protected])
India’s Place in China’s South Asia Strategy
By D. S. Rajan
To understand the role of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in South Asia, a study of its overall strategic vision at each historical stage becomes necessary. Major determinants of such a vision included China’s perceived domestic policy priorities at a particular period. To cite instances of domestic and foreign policy linkages, in the Mao Zedong era (1949-76), ‘class struggle’ and ‘self-reliant development’ were the main domestic goals; to facilitate their accomplishment, China externally adopted a strategy of ‘leaning to one side’, i.e with Socialist allies. Internal priorities underwent a major change in the post-1978 period, with veteran leader Deng Xiaoping initiating a path of ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’, to be matched by an ‘open door’ foreign policy. As a break from the past, no alliance or strategic relation with any major power was envisaged.
Deng’s line continues till today, but with additional theoretical inputs from his successors sans any basic change. To illustrate, in the post-Deng period, Jiang Zemin formulated national policies centering round his theory of “ Three Represents”, aimed at making the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) a representative of majority of the people and codified ‘three major historic tasks’ for China – Modernisation, National Reunification and Safeguarding World Peace and Common Development. He selected a matching external line of ‘Independent Foreign Policy of Peace’.
Jiang’s successor Hu Jintao brought forth a development model marking a shift in emphasis – from GDP centric growth to ‘balanced development’; to be backed by his own concept of “ Scientific Outlook of Development”, of which creation at home of a ‘Harmonious Socialist Society’ and ‘Sustainable development’ constituted main elements. Designed to suit to China’s ‘primary stage of socialism’, the model provided for analysis of the country’s own development practice, learning side by side from experiences of other countries. Correspondingly, Hu put in place a foreign policy course based on the idea of a “Harmonious World” which lays emphasis on accomplishing ‘lasting peace and common prosperity, through a win-win solution in international relations’.[1] It was left to Premier Wen Jiabao to pinpoint the links between his country’s domestic goals and external approach. In his words, “what China needs for its development first and foremost is an international environment of long term stability and a stable surrounding environment”[2], which meant that a ‘peaceful periphery’ has become a pre-requisite to Chinese foreign policy.
Signs of China adopting a neutral stand on issues relating to South Asia began appearing by end seventies. For e.g, Beijing at that time started modifying its pro-Pakistan stand on Kashmir issue, with the state-controlled media dropping references to ‘India-occupied Kashmir’ and using instead the term ‘India-controlled Kashmir’. The shift became concrete in December 1996, when the then President Jiang Zemin hinted at a beginning of his country’s ‘balanced’ South Asia policy in his speech to Pakistan Senate, by favouring New Delhi - Islamabad ‘consultations and negotiations’ on Kashmir. A leading China scholar[3] later called this as Beijing’s “South Asia policy under new situation” and observed that subsequent to Premier Wen’s South Asia tour in 2005, the PRC would develop relations with South Asian nations in a ‘parallel’ manner, adding that ‘China’s strategic partnership with India and Pakistan is unprecedented in the sense that each relationship is not directed against any third party’.
Developments since the landmark visit of the then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China in 1988 have been remarkable. China has been more than willing to enter into several key bilateral agreements with India utilising the opportunity of regular exchanges of high level bilateral visits that included - on ‘finding a fair and reasonable settlement to the boundary issue’ and forming a ‘Joint Working Group’ for the purpose (1988), Appointment of Special Representatives ‘to explore the framework of a boundary settlement, from the political perspective of overall bilateral relation (2003), Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity and Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for Settlement of the Boundary Question’ (2005), ‘Promotion of Civil Nuclear Cooperation (2006) and ‘Shared Vision for the 21st Century ( 2008). Also being seen currently is China’s new stress on cooperation with India in the WTO and climate change issues[4], along with its prescription that ‘no country poses a threat to other’.[5]
Most important development has been the recognition of both the sides that the Sino-Indian ties have gone beyond the bilateral context and acquired a global character.[6] The policies of India and China now aim at “building a relationship of friendship and trust, based on equality, in which each is sensitive to the concerns and aspirations of the other” and ‘promoting bilateral relations, looking beyond the border issue’[7]. It can be seen without difficulty that a congruence, to a good degree, of policy interests among China and India has emerged over the years; under its impact, in general, the comfort level in their relations has been increasing.
This is not to deny the existence of other motivating factors for Beijing, besides the need for ‘peaceful periphery’, to improve ties with New Delhi. They include neutralising the perceived US regional strategy to contain China, developing economies in areas bordering India, cooperating with India in exploitation of much needed energy resources, protection of oil transport security in the Indian Ocean with the help of India, getting India’s support to ‘One China’ policy and last, but not least, seeking India’s influence to reduce the pressure on China from the resurgence of Tibet issue.
The foregoing does not mean that mistrust and suspicions have completely disappeared in Sino-Indian relations. India has reasons to note with concern that barring improvements in bilateral trade (US$ 40 billion in 2007 with a target of US $60 billion by 2010 and commencement of Joint Study on Regional Trade Agreement), Sino-Indian relations remain bedevilled by lack of progress on settling core issues mentioned below.
China’s stand on the border issue indicates that Beijing is unwilling to compromise on issues concerning territorial sovereignty. The Sino-Indian border talks, despite twelve rounds of talks so far between two Special representatives, have not led to any substantial result in finalising a ‘frame work’ for a boundary settlement in accordance with the 2005 Agreement on Political Parameters. While Beijing’s stand is to approach the border issue in the spirit of ‘mutual understanding and mutual accommodation’, India wants ‘ground realities’ to be taken into account. Interestingly, the Chinese have of late introduced some new elements to the border question by questioning the already agreed position of keeping areas with settled populations out of the dispute. As confirmation of their official position of claiming entire Arunachal Pradesh, Beijing even raised verbal objections to the visit of the Indian Prime Minister to Arunachal Pradesh soon after his trip to Beijing in January 2008.
Is China ready for a compromise on the border issue? The statement made by the PRC Ambassador to India in November 2006 that both sides should make compromises on the ‘disputed’ Arunachal may be meaningful in this regard. The two sides seem to perceive that the issue is complex, the negotiations could be long and a solution may not be immediate[8]. Chinese academic circles have explained the same in terms of public sentiments in China disallowing any compromise by Beijing on questions concerning national sovereignty as well as the need for priority to solve the critical Taiwan issue first, before any attempt to solve the border tangle with India.[9]
China also considers Tibet issue as sensitive in its relations with India.[10] The March 2008 unrest in Tibet has raised questions of China’s sovereignty over Tibet, a factor naturally connected to the border negotiations. It is being assessed that the Tibet unrest may erode China’s bargaining position during border talks, particularly in respect of its claim over Tawang[11]. On his part, the Dalai Lama has justified the Indian stand on the border issue. Beijing, in response, has accused the spiritual leader of ‘selling’ Chinese territory to India.
China is applying pressure on India by expanding its influence in the latter’s neighbourhood. It has established strategic presence in Pakistan (Gwadar), Sri Lanka (Hambantota), Myanmar (Sittwe), Bangladesh and Nepal, as part of its policy to protect the sea-lanes from the Middle East to South China Sea, crucial for Chinese imports of oil. The West calls this a ‘string of pearls strategy’; Beijing claims that it has no plans to try for domination of the shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean and no intention to establish a chain to encircle India.[12] Especially, Beijing’s cooperation with Islamabad in the domains of military, missiles and nuclear technology is continuing. The PRC has also a peace treaty with Pakistan, unique in South Asia, providing for mutual support in protecting each other’s national sovereignty and integrity. A Chinese assessment has called it as an ‘alliance’ against any foreign threat[13].
Beijing undoubtedly has concerns over India’s joining a ‘Western Alliance’ against the PRC, in particular over the growing India-US strategic relations. Its authoritative media have commented that Washington’s intentions to enclose India into the camp of its global partners fit exactly with India’s wishes’[14]. Also, military experts in Beijing have alleged that India nurtures an ambition to become a regional and world power through collusion with the US[15].
Chinese strategic journals have been vehemently opposing the Japan-US- Australia- India ‘alliance of democracies’ concept, calling it as an ‘Asian NATO’[16]. They have also questioned the motives behind holding the joint naval exercises involving India, the US, Japan etc. A Chinese comment found the Indian involvement along with Japan and the US, in the joint naval drill off the Japanese coast, ‘intriguing’ and viewed the drill as leading to a ‘new balance of power in Asia’.[17] Days before the first-ever official-level security consultation between the United States, India, Japan and Australia in June 2007, China issued demarches to each of the participants seeking to know the purpose behind their meeting.[18]
On the India-US nuclear deal, the Chinese official position has been non-committal. Beijing has said that they welcome civil nuclear cooperation between nations if the same is in the interest of international non-proliferation regime. Beijing’s ultimate stand at the Nuclear Suppliers Group meeting at Vienna in 2008, in favour of granting waiver to India, has further underscored China’s ambivalent thinking on the deal; just prior to the meeting, the People’s Daily strongly criticised the deal. Other Chinese media comments have alleged that India’s development of nuclear weapons is an important reason for nuclear arms race in South Asia and that the India-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement marks a serious breach of the international non-proliferation regime. Their observation that India’s nuclear strategy is a potential challenge to China’s national security is a strong indicator to China’s basic thinking[19].
China’s military modernisation continues to be of concern to regional powers including India. Indian Defence Ministry’s recent annual reports have been indicative of this position. New Delhi may have noted the recent evaluation of the US[20] that China’s military modernisation is changing the regional balance in East Asia. There is a strong feeling in the region that though Beijing’s Defence policy is in the main oriented towards preventing US intervention in Taiwan, it has other intentions, for e.g. gaining capacity to meet contingencies like conflicts over resources and territories. China nevertheless is showing some conciliatory gestures. Its latest Defence White Paper for 2008 downplays Indian concerns about the Chinese naval build up and the ongoing border dispute.[21] On its part, New Delhi has shown a tendency not to highlight the challenge to India coming from China’s military modernization.[22]
Limiting India’s role in the East Asian integration process is also a part of China’s South Asia strategy. Beijing officially supports India’s participation in the regional integration process, including in the East Asia Summit.[23] However, by all indications, it excludes India from any role in the proposed ASEAN Regional Community, which is to come up with ASEAN plus 3 including China in leading position. On the East Asia Summit mechanism, the PRC considers countries like India, Australia and New Zealand as outsiders, desiring to give them only a secondary status. It is also cool to the Indian Prime Minister’s vision for an Asian Economic Community.
China wishes to play a role in SAARC, but seems to be unsure of India’s support to it.. As articulated by a Chinese scholar, India faces a challenge in promoting mutual trust with its neighbours and as such, SAARC is yet to become a bridge between China and South Asian nations. The success of China’s ‘balanced’ South Asia strategy would very much depend on India’s motives vi-a-vis the PRC as well as support from Pakistan, besides its own efforts.[24]
Beijing’s goal is to establish a ‘moderately well off’ society by 2020 through quadruplicating the GDP for 2000 and become a ‘modernised medium level developed country’ by 2050. China is confident that its “Peaceful Development” task will face no obstacles as there are no chances of a war breaking out and a ‘long term peaceful international environment’ and ‘favourable neighbourhood’ will continue to prevail[25]. Keeping this in mind, a drastic change in the PRC’s present global strategy, that includes South Asia, is not likely in the near future.
A long-term picture however appears not promising. Will China become aggressive in international relations once its modernisation drive gets completed at some point of time from now? Immediately coming into one’s mind in this regard is the advice given by veteran leader Deng Xiaoping that China should ‘ stand firmly, hide its capabilities, bide its time and never try to take the lead’ in pursuance of its objectives. Worth noting in this context are evidence already surfacing to suggest that China’s strategy is not going to remain static, for e.g. in the new circumstances, the country’s ‘independent foreign policy of peace’ is being made conditional to ‘safeguarding of Chinese Sovereignty, Security and Development’ and the ‘economic growth’ imperative is being balanced with that of ‘military modernisation’. This would mean that the PRC may not hesitate to modify its strategy, if the need arises. One has only to note what Robert B. Zoellick, former US Deputy Secretary of State and the initiator of the US-China Strategic Dialogue, said. According to him, though China remains absorbed in its domestic development, a question will remain whether it will have a similar view in next 10-15 years.[26]
It is clear that China – South Asia relations are undergoing a tactical phase. Beijing’s present aim is to ease tensions in that region to help China in realising its modernisation task. That is why in the case of India, it is following the principle of ‘reserving the differences and working for common development’ and on India-Pakistan problems, it favours a peaceful dialogue between the two. However, for reasons mentioned earlier, uncertainties seem to be inherent in Beijing’s long-term strategy towards South Asia, on which regional powers like India need to be vigilant.
(The Writer, D.S.Rajan, is Director of Chennai Centre for China Studies. This paper formed the basis of his presentation at the UGC National Seminar on India’s Emerging Security Challenges and Strategies, organised by the Dept of Defence and Strategic Studies, University of Madras, on 23 March 2009. Email: [email protected])
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A sound analysis of the situation I must add...
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Beyond Pirates: On the High Seas, an India-China Rivalry
Beyond Pirates: On the High Seas, an India-China Rivalry
By Howard Chua-Eoan
These days, the battle for the Indian Ocean seems to be all about the dread pirates of Somalia. On Wednesday, the U.S. briefly became a direct player in the ongoing drama, with news that those pirates had hijacked a U.S.-flagged cargo ship, the Maersk Alabama, and taken 20 American citizens prisoner. But the crew regained control of the ship, except for the captain, who remains on a lifeboat in the hands of the pirates. (See pictures of the brazen pirates of Somalia.)
But a drama with more far-reaching geopolitical consequences may be brewing in the Indian Ocean, involving two of the nations that have sent warships to fight the Somali buccaneers: longtime rivals India and China. New Delhi has had at least one ship in the Gulf of Aden since October, and late last year, with great fanfare, China deployed two warships to the same area. The ships have been active in interdicting pirates and coming to the aid of commercial ships in apparent distress — though they are not part of the U.S.-led Combined Task Force 151 (usually composed of 14 to 15 vessels from several nations), which coordinates its activity with the dominant naval force in the Indian Ocean, the U.S. 5th Fleet, based in Bahrain. But the presence of the Chinese and Indian warships underlines Beijing's and New Delhi's intense economic and strategic interests in the world's third largest ocean.
Both countries are hugely dependent on the petroleum deliveries that course through the Gulf of Aden and Strait of Hormuz to their ports. Defending those supplies is one reason both are building bigger and bigger navies. China's navy, with more than 300 ships, may in fact soon surpass the U.S.'s as the world's largest. Beijing is certainly sparing little to stock its ships with armaments. India, in the meantime, is acquiring several nuclear-powered submarines to augment its 155 military vessels in the ocean that bears its name.
Already, New Delhi and Beijing seem to be focusing their naval strategies on each other. China is constructing naval stations and refueling ports around India, including in Burma, Sri Lanka and India's nemesis Pakistan; India has transformed a beautiful bay in the southern state of Karnataka into an advanced naval installation. Chinese strategic planners look jealously on the fact that India has an aircraft carrier (the recommissioned H.M.S. Hermes, purchased from the British Royal Navy and now called the I.N.S. Viraat).
The potential for confrontation is fueled by China's historical nostalgia. In the 15th century, the Chinese sent seven massive naval and commercial expeditions into the Indian Ocean to extend the prestige and power of the relatively new Ming dynasty. There had not been anything quite like it in history, and the Chinese were recognized as the masters of the ocean. But a change in emperors and national policy curtailed the expensive naval forays after 1433, and China turned inward. As if to declare that centuries-long period over, Beijing staged elaborate celebrations in 2005 to mark the 500-year anniversary of the first expedition. The Ming voyages are now an inextricable part of Chinese nationalist lore — and its populist claim to the Indian Ocean.
Overheated daydreams about history can be dangerous. Nevertheless, at least one analyst believes that while there is potential for conflict, there is also the possibility of a new order for the Indian Ocean — with a central role for the U.S. In the March-April edition of Foreign Affairs, Robert Kaplan envisions the U.S. as managing the rival ambitions of India and China into a workable security continuum, even as Washington's ability to project naval power recedes. There are enough interlocking economic interests, he says, to keep tempers and national interests from roiling the waters. America, Kaplan concludes, "will serve as a stabilizing power in this newly complex area. Indispensability, rather than dominance, must be its goal."
Find this article at:
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1890251,00.html
Beyond Pirates: On the High Seas, an India-China Rivalry
By Howard Chua-Eoan
These days, the battle for the Indian Ocean seems to be all about the dread pirates of Somalia. On Wednesday, the U.S. briefly became a direct player in the ongoing drama, with news that those pirates had hijacked a U.S.-flagged cargo ship, the Maersk Alabama, and taken 20 American citizens prisoner. But the crew regained control of the ship, except for the captain, who remains on a lifeboat in the hands of the pirates. (See pictures of the brazen pirates of Somalia.)
But a drama with more far-reaching geopolitical consequences may be brewing in the Indian Ocean, involving two of the nations that have sent warships to fight the Somali buccaneers: longtime rivals India and China. New Delhi has had at least one ship in the Gulf of Aden since October, and late last year, with great fanfare, China deployed two warships to the same area. The ships have been active in interdicting pirates and coming to the aid of commercial ships in apparent distress — though they are not part of the U.S.-led Combined Task Force 151 (usually composed of 14 to 15 vessels from several nations), which coordinates its activity with the dominant naval force in the Indian Ocean, the U.S. 5th Fleet, based in Bahrain. But the presence of the Chinese and Indian warships underlines Beijing's and New Delhi's intense economic and strategic interests in the world's third largest ocean.
Both countries are hugely dependent on the petroleum deliveries that course through the Gulf of Aden and Strait of Hormuz to their ports. Defending those supplies is one reason both are building bigger and bigger navies. China's navy, with more than 300 ships, may in fact soon surpass the U.S.'s as the world's largest. Beijing is certainly sparing little to stock its ships with armaments. India, in the meantime, is acquiring several nuclear-powered submarines to augment its 155 military vessels in the ocean that bears its name.
Already, New Delhi and Beijing seem to be focusing their naval strategies on each other. China is constructing naval stations and refueling ports around India, including in Burma, Sri Lanka and India's nemesis Pakistan; India has transformed a beautiful bay in the southern state of Karnataka into an advanced naval installation. Chinese strategic planners look jealously on the fact that India has an aircraft carrier (the recommissioned H.M.S. Hermes, purchased from the British Royal Navy and now called the I.N.S. Viraat).
The potential for confrontation is fueled by China's historical nostalgia. In the 15th century, the Chinese sent seven massive naval and commercial expeditions into the Indian Ocean to extend the prestige and power of the relatively new Ming dynasty. There had not been anything quite like it in history, and the Chinese were recognized as the masters of the ocean. But a change in emperors and national policy curtailed the expensive naval forays after 1433, and China turned inward. As if to declare that centuries-long period over, Beijing staged elaborate celebrations in 2005 to mark the 500-year anniversary of the first expedition. The Ming voyages are now an inextricable part of Chinese nationalist lore — and its populist claim to the Indian Ocean.
Overheated daydreams about history can be dangerous. Nevertheless, at least one analyst believes that while there is potential for conflict, there is also the possibility of a new order for the Indian Ocean — with a central role for the U.S. In the March-April edition of Foreign Affairs, Robert Kaplan envisions the U.S. as managing the rival ambitions of India and China into a workable security continuum, even as Washington's ability to project naval power recedes. There are enough interlocking economic interests, he says, to keep tempers and national interests from roiling the waters. America, Kaplan concludes, "will serve as a stabilizing power in this newly complex area. Indispensability, rather than dominance, must be its goal."
Find this article at:
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1890251,00.html
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Chinese Military Developments and Discussions
China says domestic armaments are world-class
By CHRISTOPHER BODEEN – 6 hours ago
BEIJING (AP) — A government-backed science group says many of China's homemade weapons systems are world-class, reflecting the defense industry's new confidence and underscoring its ambitions of becoming a major arms exporter.
Steady advances have produced a solid foundation for Chinese-made armored fighting vehicles, missile systems and other weaponry, according to a report by the government's China Association for Science and Technology.
"In some areas, Chinese weapons have either achieved or are very close to achieving international advanced standards," the report said, without giving details.
Long reliant on Russia for advanced military hardware, China has invested heavily in its domestic defense industry in recent years, notching up breakthroughs such as the J-10 jet fighter and DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missile. China already makes licensed versions of the Russian S-27 fighter jet, but claims to have mastered the technology to make its own advanced aircraft.
Progress has been spurred by the steady growth of military spending — last year the budget jumped 17.6 percent to 417.8 billion yuan ($61 billion) — drawing concern over China's intentions from the U.S. and neighbors like Japan.
Beijing insists it intends no aggression and says much of the spending has gone into upgrading weapons, uniforms, training and living standards for the 2.3 million-member People's Liberation Army.
As an arms exporter, China has long serviced customers in the developing world, including isolated dictatorships like Sudan and Zimbabwe, with simple, cheap technology such as China's version of the Kalashnikov rifle and the JL-8 jet trainer developed jointly with Pakistan.
Advances in technology may allow it to expand that customer base at lower prices than similar technology sold by Russia, France, Britain or the U.S.
China undertook sweeping reforms of the defense industry in the late 1990s to introduce competition and better efficiency, but still releases little solid data about the size and scale of its arms production.
The sprawling but often poorly trained and equipped PLA used to keep its equipment hidden from sight, leading to speculation by foreign military observers that its technical level was so low it constituted an embarrassment.
Such attitudes have begun to change and recent years have seen an ever-growing degree of openness. Later this month, the Chinese navy plans to host ships from the United States and a handful of other nations in an international fleet review to mark its 60th anniversary.
With most of China's perceived threats to its sovereignty emanating from the ocean, the navy has been a particular beneficiary of modernization, adding advanced Yuan class diesel electric submarines alongside Russian imports such as the Sovremenny frigates and Kilo class subs. Chinese officers have stated that the addition of one or more aircraft carriers is simply a matter of time, although its not known if work has begun on one yet.
China imports large amounts of oil for its booming economy, and is worried about keeping sea lanes open. It also has disputes with several countries over islands, many in the South China Sea.
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iMwU3sLTO9BgLwLVw-ozBO_X9dxgD97HERLG0
China says domestic armaments are world-class
By CHRISTOPHER BODEEN – 6 hours ago
BEIJING (AP) — A government-backed science group says many of China's homemade weapons systems are world-class, reflecting the defense industry's new confidence and underscoring its ambitions of becoming a major arms exporter.
Steady advances have produced a solid foundation for Chinese-made armored fighting vehicles, missile systems and other weaponry, according to a report by the government's China Association for Science and Technology.
"In some areas, Chinese weapons have either achieved or are very close to achieving international advanced standards," the report said, without giving details.
Long reliant on Russia for advanced military hardware, China has invested heavily in its domestic defense industry in recent years, notching up breakthroughs such as the J-10 jet fighter and DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missile. China already makes licensed versions of the Russian S-27 fighter jet, but claims to have mastered the technology to make its own advanced aircraft.
Progress has been spurred by the steady growth of military spending — last year the budget jumped 17.6 percent to 417.8 billion yuan ($61 billion) — drawing concern over China's intentions from the U.S. and neighbors like Japan.
Beijing insists it intends no aggression and says much of the spending has gone into upgrading weapons, uniforms, training and living standards for the 2.3 million-member People's Liberation Army.
As an arms exporter, China has long serviced customers in the developing world, including isolated dictatorships like Sudan and Zimbabwe, with simple, cheap technology such as China's version of the Kalashnikov rifle and the JL-8 jet trainer developed jointly with Pakistan.
Advances in technology may allow it to expand that customer base at lower prices than similar technology sold by Russia, France, Britain or the U.S.
China undertook sweeping reforms of the defense industry in the late 1990s to introduce competition and better efficiency, but still releases little solid data about the size and scale of its arms production.
The sprawling but often poorly trained and equipped PLA used to keep its equipment hidden from sight, leading to speculation by foreign military observers that its technical level was so low it constituted an embarrassment.
Such attitudes have begun to change and recent years have seen an ever-growing degree of openness. Later this month, the Chinese navy plans to host ships from the United States and a handful of other nations in an international fleet review to mark its 60th anniversary.
With most of China's perceived threats to its sovereignty emanating from the ocean, the navy has been a particular beneficiary of modernization, adding advanced Yuan class diesel electric submarines alongside Russian imports such as the Sovremenny frigates and Kilo class subs. Chinese officers have stated that the addition of one or more aircraft carriers is simply a matter of time, although its not known if work has begun on one yet.
China imports large amounts of oil for its booming economy, and is worried about keeping sea lanes open. It also has disputes with several countries over islands, many in the South China Sea.
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iMwU3sLTO9BgLwLVw-ozBO_X9dxgD97HERLG0
LETHALFORCE
New Member
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Chinese are saying they are ;what is the rest of the world saying? I know the baby food and toys were good weapons.
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One of my friend had a chance to fire a Chinese rifle. He was at first impressed by its light weight design and stuff but when it came to accuracy and reliability he told he would prefer the INSAS as his mate in a real war rather than a Chinese rifle. He was from the Maratha regiment.
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I heard the same from other sources too... It seems their QBZ-95 isn't as stable as they claim it to be despite the fact that it's a bullpup design...
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ok guys read this: and then decide
http://www.spacemart.com/reports/China_Sells_Comsats_To_Nigeria,_Venezuela_and_Pakistan_999.html
China Sells Comsats To Nigeria, Venezuela and Pakistan
by Andrei Chang | Jeff Chen
Hong Kong (UPI) April 9, 2009
China has sold three communications satellites to Nigeria, Venezuela and Pakistan that have military capabilities, a service life of 15 years and are equipped with C-band frequency and 18 channels of Ku-band frequency transmitters.
The performance characteristics of all three of these satellites were basically the same, and all of them were to be launched by CZ-3B carrier rockets.
However, the communications satellite for Nigeria stopped functioning less than one year after it went into operation when its solar array drive assembly failed. This posed a major challenge to the credibility of China-made communications satellites. :d_training:Two weeks ago, China announced it would replace the Nigerian satellite in 2011 at no charge.
The satellites were developed on the foundation of the domestic Dong Fang Hong IV communications satellite. Of course, all of them can be used for military communications as well as civilian purposes -- a matter of concern to the U.S. military. The United States had asked China not to assist Venezuela with its satellite project, but its request was ignored.
The United States is concerned about China exporting military-use satellites and providing launch services to "rogue nations." :2guns:The People's Republic of China's indifference to this U.S. concern can be seen as a tactic to exert pressure on the United States to halt its sales of advanced arms to Taiwan.
China is now actively cultivating oil-producing nations as customers for its satellites and launch services. China's strategy has been effective so far, and its exports of military equipment have been boosted as a result. Nigeria and Venezuela are among the newest clients of Chinese-made military equipment.
Nigeria has purchased a number of J-7 air-superiority combat fighters from China. In November, shortly after its satellite launch, Venezuela announced that it would purchase 18 K-8 trainers from China.
Iran is another customer that China is pursuing for its satellite sales and launch services. In 2006 China provided a VSAT communications-satellite program to Iran's TA Co. valued at more than $500,000. This satellite network provided voice communications, data and video transmission service to the Iranian oil company, which is believed to have paid for the system with crude oil.
Programs involving satellite technologies often involve huge sums of money, through which full-scale economic and trade relations can be expanded. Following its satellite launch for Nigeria, China won an $8.3 billion project to restructure Nigeria's railway network. However, after the communications satellite stopped functioning, Nigeria coldly declared it would suspend the contract with China.:blum3::Laie_39:
In Angola, when the Angola state television station upgraded to DStv satellite channels, China Electronics Import and Export Corp. provided an entire satellite TV program production and transmission center. Angola is China's second-largest source of imported oil.
(Andrei Chang is editor in chief of Kanwa Defense Review Monthly, registered in Toronto. Jeff Chen is a reporter for the same magazine.)
http://www.spacemart.com/reports/China_Sells_Comsats_To_Nigeria,_Venezuela_and_Pakistan_999.html
China Sells Comsats To Nigeria, Venezuela and Pakistan
by Andrei Chang | Jeff Chen
Hong Kong (UPI) April 9, 2009
China has sold three communications satellites to Nigeria, Venezuela and Pakistan that have military capabilities, a service life of 15 years and are equipped with C-band frequency and 18 channels of Ku-band frequency transmitters.
The performance characteristics of all three of these satellites were basically the same, and all of them were to be launched by CZ-3B carrier rockets.
However, the communications satellite for Nigeria stopped functioning less than one year after it went into operation when its solar array drive assembly failed. This posed a major challenge to the credibility of China-made communications satellites. :d_training:Two weeks ago, China announced it would replace the Nigerian satellite in 2011 at no charge.
The satellites were developed on the foundation of the domestic Dong Fang Hong IV communications satellite. Of course, all of them can be used for military communications as well as civilian purposes -- a matter of concern to the U.S. military. The United States had asked China not to assist Venezuela with its satellite project, but its request was ignored.
The United States is concerned about China exporting military-use satellites and providing launch services to "rogue nations." :2guns:The People's Republic of China's indifference to this U.S. concern can be seen as a tactic to exert pressure on the United States to halt its sales of advanced arms to Taiwan.
China is now actively cultivating oil-producing nations as customers for its satellites and launch services. China's strategy has been effective so far, and its exports of military equipment have been boosted as a result. Nigeria and Venezuela are among the newest clients of Chinese-made military equipment.
Nigeria has purchased a number of J-7 air-superiority combat fighters from China. In November, shortly after its satellite launch, Venezuela announced that it would purchase 18 K-8 trainers from China.
Iran is another customer that China is pursuing for its satellite sales and launch services. In 2006 China provided a VSAT communications-satellite program to Iran's TA Co. valued at more than $500,000. This satellite network provided voice communications, data and video transmission service to the Iranian oil company, which is believed to have paid for the system with crude oil.
Programs involving satellite technologies often involve huge sums of money, through which full-scale economic and trade relations can be expanded. Following its satellite launch for Nigeria, China won an $8.3 billion project to restructure Nigeria's railway network. However, after the communications satellite stopped functioning, Nigeria coldly declared it would suspend the contract with China.:blum3::Laie_39:
In Angola, when the Angola state television station upgraded to DStv satellite channels, China Electronics Import and Export Corp. provided an entire satellite TV program production and transmission center. Angola is China's second-largest source of imported oil.
(Andrei Chang is editor in chief of Kanwa Defense Review Monthly, registered in Toronto. Jeff Chen is a reporter for the same magazine.)
