Arjun Main Battle Tank (MBT)

[manindra]

I said a lot more in two my posts above. You just focussed on the word "incompetent" which is sadly true. DRDO has to succeed somewhere or on something after thirty years of work, minor successes here and there excepted.

He is asking since when DRDO start production of weapons.


Hint : DRDO is only a developer not producer.

 

[jouni]

China has already gone to Russia trains with armored vehicles, machine service and military with the task to win the international "Tank Biathlon - 2015".
Pakistan also claimed to participate.
Can wait Arjun?

Tank biathlon...that is a great Russian invention. Together with military EXPO in Moscow. Too bad we cannot take part with our new Leo 2A6's.

 

[Blood+]

I said a lot more in two my posts above. You just focussed on the word "incompetent" which is sadly true. DRDO has to succeed somewhere or on something after thirty years of work, minor successes here and there excepted.

Evidently the question was totally lost on you,sire.

 

[Blood+]

You just focused on the word "incompetent" which is sadly true.

Lets not go there,projecting our own opinions as facts,that's for immature kiddies,it doesn't look good when grown up people like us indulge into the same.Thank you.

DRDO has to succeed somewhere or on something after thirty years of work, minor successes here and there excepted.

And how do you expect them to start succeeding if you keep changing the GSQR,set by none other than yourself (you being used to denote the DGMF here and not you literally) at your will,at regular intervals??If you are serious about getting something,you first have to learn to stick to those damn requirements set by you!!Unless of-course the developer was never meant to succeed (or rather you never wanted them to,to put it into more clear terms) to begin with!!

 

[Hari Sud]

Blood+

Your language is offensive while even in a defensive mode.

I was a DRDO supporter until nothing seemed to succeed. LCA project management e.g. Ordering the ceramic dome at the last minute when it was pretty well known that existing dome is inadequate and that too waiting for after the initial operation clearance, set the project back by one and half year. Or not ordering service contracts while ordering sub assemblies for Arjun project. This is all inadequately anticipating maintenance issues, read in between the lines bad project management. This has effectively killed the Arjun project. Army has issued a RFI for a new tank design because existing staff has no clue why a client gets angry.

I have made my points. I wish no more to discuss the subject with you, so do not bother to analyze my writing word for word as you have done before.

Cheers

 

[pmaitra]

DRDO has to succeed somewhere or on something after thirty years of work, minor successes here and there excepted.

I disagree with you using that number "thirty." Please read all the discussions about the Arjun tank.

 

[abhi_the _gr8_maratha]

I said a lot more in two my posts above. You just focussed on the word "incompetent" which is sadly true. DRDO has to succeed somewhere or on something after thirty years of work, minor successes here and there excepted.

do you think designing a tank or a plane when requirements are changed every time when you are near to deliver project is something like having a baby..... Sleep today, you will have it after 9 months
.
army changed their requirements for 4 times in arjun project
.
iaf changed requirement many times during tejas project.....
.
drdo has delivered missiles and also successfully completed projects for navy cause the requirements are not changed.....

 

[Zebra]

http://www.defensenews.com/story/de...y-arjun-t72-frcv-medium-weight-fmbt/29208793/

India's Tank Plan Clouds Future of Arjun

By Vivek Raghuvanshi 1:41 p.m. EDT June 27, 2015

NEW DELHI — The Indian Army's plan to develop and build a medium-weight main battle tank to replace more than 2,500 Russian T-72s has raised questions about the future of the homemade Arjun tank and likely would kill a decade-old proposal by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) to build a tank, according to analysts and officials.

The Indian Army this month floated a global request for information to seek partners to design the new tank under a program called Future Ready Combat Vehicle (FRCV). As a medium-weight platform it would weigh 40-plus tons, compared with the Arjun, which weighs 60 tons.

"The proposed FRCV is in the medium category and is more likely to be around the T-90 platform than the Arjun Mark-II platform, which is getting close to the medium-heavy/heavy category," said Anil Chait, retired Indian Army lieutenant general. "Designing and developing the product around proposed qualitative requirements afresh would suggest that we may be looking toward the end of the Arjun saga," he said.

However, Rahul Bhonsle, a retired Army brigadier general and defense analyst, said the Arjun will progress from the current Mark-1 level to Mark-3.

"The lead time for the FRCV to be manufactured, if all goes well, is likely to be approximately 15 years or so. This provides adequate scope for the Arjun series to be progressed to at least Mark-3. Moreover, there is a need in the Indian Army for an Arjun class of tank."

While no Ministry of Defence official would comment on the fate of the decade-old Futuristic Main Battle Tank (FMBT) project to be developed by DRDO, an Army official said FRCV has "surely killed" the FMBT.

The FMBT, intended to be in the 50-plus ton category, was also meant to replace the T-72s.

"The FRCV seems to be a completely new project which possibly junks the FMBT, which was being worked upon by the DRDO or may be a lead to the developing agency to add on to the existing work that has already been done on the same," Bhonsle said.

"I surely see Americans, Russians, French, Germans, Koreans and British participating along with Indian companies in stand-alone or joint venture mode. We could see leading companies from there which are involved with tank design, participating in it," Chait said.

Unlike the earlier tank effort, the FRCV does not restrict production to the DRDO. Domestic defense companies in tie-ups with overseas defense companies can serve as the production agencies.

"As this is an open competition, private agencies could also be roped in to develop the tank. The best option would be for DRDO designing and developing the same with a foreign partner as it is best placed technically to do so. For an Indian private company in collaboration with a foreign partner it would be a Greenfield venture," where the foreign company would construct new facilities for the project, Bhonsle said.

The Army plans to begin induction of the basic FRCV by 2025-27, which would be the platform on which numerous variants would be developed to serve different functions. These variants will include a tracked light tank, a wheeled version, a bridge layer tank, a trawl tank and mine plows, armored recovery vehicle, self-propelled gun, anti-aircraft tank, artillery observation vehicle, engineer reconnaissance vehicle, and armored ambulance.

According to the request for information, FRCV will be executed in three stages: design, prototype developmental and production.

The request says the design agency and developing agency can be separate entities. The best design will be chosen and given to the nominated development agency for prototype production. The selected prototype will be given to the production agency or agencies for bulk production.

Shankar Roy Chowdhury, retired Army general and former service chief, said the paramount requirement for the tank is survivability.

"Russian designers sought to achieve this [survivability] by smaller size [three-man crew and lighter armor], lower profile and speed. The West preferred larger turrets, hence thicker armor, heavier tanks. The test for both designs has been the Arab-Israeli wars and the gulf war. The Russian designs did not do too well. Blame that on the crews if you like," Roy Chowdhury said.

The most important requirement, however, is that the future FRCV must be indigenously designed, Roy Chowdhury said.

 

[su35]

is the right fit for next 20 years.

IT can fit more than 20 years via upgrades, but that depend upon Army interest

 

[Bhadra]

Lets not go there,projecting our own opinions as facts,that's for immature kiddies,it doesn't look good when grown up people like us indulge into the same.Thank you.



And how do you expect them to start succeeding if you keep changing the GSQR,set by none other than yourself (you being used to denote the DGMF here and not you literally) at your will,at regular intervals??If you are serious about getting something,you first have to learn to stick to those damn requirements set by you!!Unless of-course the developer was never meant to succeed (or rather you never wanted them to,to put it into more clear terms) to begin with!!

Technology in weaponry changes very rapidly. DRDO is given a project and as per their own estimates the PDC is determined say 1980. The GSQR then is given for a technology that will remain relevant for 1990s. However, DRDO completes the project in 2010.

What do you expect from the user? To accept the technology of 1980 in 2010 ? This calls for immediate rejection of the product. However, since both are govt agencies and DRDO have pumped money down the drain only changes is GSQR are made. That is to save someone's back. But Papus get unnecessarily upset.

You guys still have problem with that. If the developer is no longer technically relevent,he should raise hands and get aside.

 

[Bhadra]

China has already gone to Russia trains with armored vehicles, machine service and military with the task to win the international "Tank Biathlon - 2015".
Pakistan also claimed to participate.
Can wait Arjun?

Oh... Why did not the Chinese bring their T-99 to the Tank Biathlon - 2015 ... they could won hands down !

Or - they did not wish to show their best tank to the Russians ?

 

[no smoking]

Oh... Why did not the Chinese bring their T-99 to the Tank Biathlon - 2015 ... they could won hands down !

Well, because 96 is more appropriate candidate in the similar class with Russian T-72 or T-90.

Or - they did not wish to show their best tank to the Russians ?

I don't see there is any reason that Chinese need to show their best tank to Russians.
1. Chinese has no intention to export 99 so far;
2. Russia is not going to buy any tank from Chinese.

 

[marrakesh]

Not yet known what the tank goes from China to Russia. We welcome any tank, Abrams, Leo, Leclerс ets.

 

[Bhadra]

26. Design and development of main battle tank-ARJUN
CAG Report​

26.1 Introduction

Main Battle Tank (MBT) occupies a pivotal role in the present day battle field on account of its ability to provide accurate fire power with cross country mobility, reasonable protection from conventional and nuclear threats and flexible response to changing battle situations.

In order to eliminate dependence on foreign countries for design and manufacture of Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFV) and to place the country on par with super powers with regard to quality of tanks and also to eliminate completely the requirement of foreign exchange (FE) in the production of tanks, Government in May 1974 sanctioned a project for design and development of MBT by Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) at a total cost of Rs 15.50 crore (FE Rs 3.70 crore). The tanks were to be in service during 1985 to 2000 AD and were in replacement of existing tanks which were expected to be out-dated beyond 1985.

26.2 Scope of Audit

Mention was made in paragraph 8 of the Report of Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Union Government, Defence Services for the year 1981-82 and also in paragraph 43 of the report for the year 1987-88 about the delay in development of the MBT, consequential time and cost overrun, delays to bulk production schedule and its impact on defence preparedness. The Public Accounts Committee (1988-89) in its Hundred and Sixty Eighth Report (Eighth-Lok Sabha) had also expressed its displeasure over the steep increase in the project cost and also concern over the inordinate delay in the completion of the development project. The Public Accounts Committee 1991-92 in its Twenty Sixth Report (Tenth Lok Sabha) while reviewing the action taken by Government on its recommendations again urged the Government to keep unremitting vigil on the progress of the project and ensure speedy solution of the problems if any, so that bulk production may commence at the earliest. The development of the MBT project with reference to the production of prototypes, pre-production series, user assisted technical trials, user trials and action taken for limited series production were examined in Audit during the period March 1997 to July 1997 through a test check of the records at Combat Vehicle Research and Development Establishment (CVRDE), Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), Project Manager MBT - Arjun and Army Headquarters.

26.3 Implementing agency

The programme was entrusted to the CVRDE and its Director/Project Co-ordinator was authorised to allot sub-projects to other DRDO Laboratories/Establishments/ Academic Institutions for development/manufacture of materials, components and sub-assemblies required for the project. In all 12 laboratories/establishments/academic institutions are involved in the project.

26.4 Highlights



•Main Battle Tank Project sanctioned in may 1974 envisaged bulk production by April 1984. However this time frame was not adhered to and was revised from time to time and bulk production was to commence from 1990 onwards but even the revised time frame could not be adhered to.


(Paragraph 26.6 and 26.7)



•12 MK-I prototypes based on imported propulsion unit, seven MK-II prototypes with indigenous propulsion were to be delivered by June 1987 and June 1990 respectively; 23 MK-I, PPS tanks by December 1988 and bulk production was to commence from 1990 onwards. As against this, 12 MK-I prototypes with imported propulsion were produced by February 1989 and 15 MK-I PPS tanks upto December 1996. MK-II type prototype were not expected to be ready in the near future on account of the delays in the development of the indigenous engine.


(Paragraph 26.6)



•The automotive trials of two prototypes carried out by Army during 1988-89 revealed major deficiencies. The Army, therefore, on 26 July 1989 wanted these deficiencies to be sorted out before commencement of production of pre-production series (PPS). However, on 31 July 1989 Ministry decided to place orders for the production of PPS tanks. Two fully integrated prototypes were given to the Army for full fledged evaluation only in March 1990 after the commencement of production of PPS tanks. The evaluation trials of the prototypes also revealed major deficiencies. Subsequent trials were conducted on PPS tanks. Till July 1997, 15 pre-production series tanks which were subjected to extensive user and troop trials failed to meet fully even the bottom line parameters of the user.


(Paragraph 26.6 and 26.7)



•MBT Arjun is designed around a fire control system of a foreign country and its performance was far short of the user requirement. While the Army was of the view that the design was no longer responsive to any technical inputs and its performance was at its saturation level, DRDO stated that they had removed the causes for erratic firing.


(Paragraph 26.8)



•The imported transmission system of MBT Arjun had been designed to cater upto 60 tonne load where as the all-up weight of MBT Arjun is over 61.5 tonne. This had created a mismatch between engine and transmission resulting in premature failure of six transmission units and frequent overheating of transmission oil. DRDO have however stated that they will not allow the all up weight of the MBT to go beyond 60 tonne.


(Paragraph 26.9)



•According to the Army the overall reliability of MBT Arjun was far from satisfactory as it had failed to fully meet even the bottom line parameters. DRDO while contending that the summer trials of 1997 clearly met eight out of the ten bottom line parameters have agreed to make efforts for changes/requirements which can then be incorporated in due course in the limited series production. Despite the Army�s reservations regarding the MBT - Arjun in its present form and even though a fully integrated PPS-15 tank (reference tank for bulk production) was yet to be successfully evaluated by the Army, the Ministry in August 1996 sanctioned the manufacture of 15 numbers of Limited Series Production tanks by Ordnance Factory Board at an estimated cost of Rs 162 crore without CCPA�s approval and decided to commence Limited Series Production work using PPS-12 as reference tank. Clearance for bulk production of MBT was yet to be given by the Army as of November 1997.


(Paragraph 26.7 and 26.10)



•A state-of-art modern battle tank ensures its design superiority through more efficient systems, less maintenance and manpower requirements. However, MBT Arjun configured around the present design would require 16 additional three tonne vehicles and 45 personnel per regiment to sustain its operational mobility.


(Paragraph 26.11)



•In view of MBT Arjun�s large size and weight a suitable wagon for its rail transportation and a trailer for its transportation by road were required to be developed. Three prototypes of special wagons being designed by RITES at an estimated cost of Rs 1.65 crore are expected to be delivered by January 1999. Use of the special wagons will entail payment of 150 percent more than the normal charges even for the transportation of empty wagons.


(Paragraph 26.11)



•The initial cost of the project estimated at Rs 15.50 crore in 1974 was revised to Rs 56.55 crore in 1980 and to Rs 280.80 crore in 1987. The actual expenditure however was Rs 307.48 crore at the time of closure of the project despite the fact that there was a shortfall in the production of 10 prototypes/pre-production series tanks.


(Paragraph 26.12)



•Two supplementary projects costing Rs 41.98 crore were sanctioned by the Ministry in September 1995 and January 1997 for product support and modifications to MBT without CCPA�s approval. This would also result in underwriting the project cost of MBT Arjun to the extent of Rs 41.98 crore.


(Paragraph 26.13)



•Power Pack, Gun control and Fire Control Systems of MBT Arjun are based on imported technology. Cost estimates made in December 1995 indicated that nearly 60 per cent of the cost related to imported supplies.


(Paragraph 26.14)

26.5 Scope of the project

The project (Code named as `Arjun�) sanctioned in May 1974 was for design and development of MBT based on a General Staff Qualitative Requirement (GSQR) prepared by the Army in August 1972. This GSQR under went several changes after mutual discussions between Army HQ and DRDO and the last major revision took place in November 1985. The project envisaged manufacture of 12 prototypes. The prototype plans and availability of sub systems were reviewed in August 1984 and in order to try out individually the various components and sub-systems, to have them integrated with the major system and evaluate their performance before finalising the design, the number of prototypes were increased to 19. In addition, 23 Pre- Production Series (PPS) Tanks were to be manufactured and thereafter bulk production was to commence.

26.6 Development of prototypes and pre-production series tanks
The MBT was scheduled to undergo user assisted technical trials, user trials and troops trials thereafter. A dedicated users� evaluation team constituted in November 1986 on examination of two prototypes between November 1986 and February 1987 pointed out various deficiencies. These were then examined by five taskforces constituted for optimising the prototypes built and finally two prototypes were made available for users� automotive evaluation till July 1989

The automotive system evaluation of two prototypes carried out till July 1989 by the Army revealed major deficiencies such as overheating of engine, excess weight, very low mission reliability etc. In the Steering Committee Meeting held on 26 July 1989, when the matter relating to the commencement of production of pre-production tanks came up, the Army emphasised that �since not a single fully integrated tank had as yet been evaluated by the users, they cannot recommend placement of orders for Pre-Production Series (PPS) tanks�. However, within a week (31 July 1989) in a meeting taken by Raksha Mantri it was decided to place orders for six PPS tanks (two each to Heavy Vehicle Factory and two Public Sector Undertakings).

Two fully integrated prototypes were made available to the users in March 1990 and these were subjected to automotive and weapon trials. During the trials a number of deficiencies had come to light, some were quite major. The Army, therefore, indicated in the Steering Committee Meeting held on 24 August 1990 that the major problems in areas like bogie wheel, suspension units, ammunition, fuel starvation etc. needed to be sorted out before PPS were taken up for manufacture. The CVRDE then assured the committee that since orders for PPS had already been placed, all the deficiencies pointed out by the users would be resolved and modifications incorporated in the six PPS tanks ordered.

Two PPS tanks were demonstrated in February 1993. The results of the demonstration which included gunnery and automotive capabilities were stated to be satisfactory. Thereafter, between June 1993 and July 1996, 14 PPS tanks were handed over to a Field Regiment for trials. These PPS tanks were thereafter subjected to extensive user and troop trials in the desert/semi desert terrain, plains and riverine terrain.
The trials carried out subsequent to June 1993 revealed major deficiencies and failed to meet the requirement projected in the GSQR. The weapon system�s performance was also well below the acceptable level and the mission reliability of the tank was alarmingly low and the tank was accordingly not acceptable to the users. Thereafter, in May 1994 the COAS spelt out the minimum `Bottom Line� parameters acceptable for the MBT

Following the summer 1994 trials, Army HQ in consultation with DRDO laid down ten imperatives for acceptance of MBT as under:

•improved accuracy of the gun at battle ranges,



•establish accuracy in the dynamic mode to acceptable
levels,



•enhancement of overall mission reliability,



•fielding of Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) and
Medium Fording capability,



•configuration of ammunition bin with blow-off panel, (new requirement added for the first time in 1994)



•ergonomics needs substantial attention,



•cruising range to be enhanced,



•firing in the rear arc at zero degree is a must,



•provision of an emergency power traverse and Auxiliary Power Unit (APU), and



•an all electric power traverse to obviate the problem of leaks that occur in the present system in our environmental conditions (new requirement added in 1994).

26.12 Financial Status

The project was sanctioned in May 1974 at a cost of Rs 15.50 crore (FE Rs 3.70 crore). Consequent on revision of GSQR, escalation of prices etc. the project cost was revised to Rs 56.55 crore (FE Rs 12.96 crore) in October 1980. As a result of the need for increased number of prototypes and PPS tanks, import of power packs, price escalation, consultancy charges etc. the project cost was further revised to Rs 280.80 crore (FE Rs 102.32 crore) in May 1987. The total expenditure of the project at the closure of project was Rs 294.70 crore (FE Rs 97.87 crore).

Interestingly the CVRDE did not book the expenditure on manpower for the years 1993-94 and 1994-95 amounting to Rs 12.78 crore to the project account on the grounds that funds allocated for MBT manpower had been exceeded. The Ministry was yet to issue orders regularising this expenditure (July 1997). Thus the total expenditure of the project at the time of closure of the project in March 1995 was Rs 307.48 crore as against the revised cost of Rs 280.80 crore.


26.13 Sanctioning of supplementary Projects without CCPA approval

The MBT project was closed on 31 March 1995 apparently to bring the cost of the project within the ambit of the sanctioned amount of Rs 280.80 crore in order to comply with Para 2.12 of the recommendations of the PAC made in their 168th report (Eighth Lok Sabha). However, the activities on the MBT project continued even beyond March 1995. These are discussed below:

26.13.1 Product Support

The extensive user trials of MBT Arjun carried out by the Army during the years 1993 and 1994 did not fully meet the laid down parameters. This necessitated extended users� trials during the years 1995, 1996 and 1997 for clearance by the users for bulk production. The extended users trials were an additional requirement not originally catered for in the CCPA paper. Since the development activity on MBT Arjun had been completed and project was closed by 31 March 1995, the CVRDE initiated a separate project for product support for this extended user trial. The project was sanctioned by Ministry in September 1995 at a total cost of Rs 16.98 crore (FE Rs 6.50 crore). This cost comprised of Rs 9.98 crore (FE Rs 6.50 crore) for provision of maintenance and product support and Rs 7.00 crore towards cost of manpower. The PDC of the project was 31 March 1996. This was extended upto 31 March 1997.

The additional expenditure of Rs 16.98 crore (FE Rs 6.50 crore) was solely necessitated as the PPS tanks made available for users� evaluation trials by the CVRDE failed to completely meet the required parameters.

26.13.2 Modifications to MBT Arjun

Though the Army authorities had reservations about the present design of the tank, the Ministry in January 1997 sanctioned a project for �improvements to systems of MBT� at a total cost of Rs 25 crore by CVRDE. The PDC of the project is 30 September 1999.

Thus, sanctioning of two supplementary projects by the Ministry in September 1995 and January 1997 for product support at a total cost of Rs 16.98 crore (FE 6.50 crore) and for improvement to systems of MBT at a cost of Rs 25 crore (FE Rs 5.00 crore) respectively were irregular and should have been done only with the approval of CCPA as the main project of MBT Arjun was still on. This had also resulted in underwriting the project cost of MBT Arjun to the extent of Rs 41.98 crore

26.14 Foreign Exchange Content

As per the estimates made in early 1987, the import content of MBT Arjun was 27 per cent and the expenditure in FE was 45 per cent. Three major systems of MBT Arjun i.e. Power Pack, Gun Control and Fire Control Systems are based on imported technology. The cost estimate made for 15 LSPs in December 1995 indicated that nearly 60 per cent of the total cost estimate related to imported supplies.

 

[abhi_the _gr8_maratha]

being overweight and late is not problem with arjun as army wanted an abraham killer..... And army changed requirement 4 times during project
.
@Bhadra ..... How will you pass 12th standard if at start of the year you are told to study science after 2 month they tell you to study arts then after two months commerce and when just one week is remaining for exam you are told that you have to attend exam of syllabus you haven't studied.....

 

[pmaitra]

Following the summer 1994 trials, Army HQ in consultation with DRDO laid down ten imperatives for acceptance of MBT as under:​

•improved accuracy of the gun at battle ranges,



•establish accuracy in the dynamic mode to acceptable
levels,



•enhancement of overall mission reliability,



•fielding of Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) and
Medium Fording capability,



•configuration of ammunition bin with blow-off panel, (new requirement added for the first time in 1994)



•ergonomics needs substantial attention,



•cruising range to be enhanced,



•firing in the rear arc at zero degree is a must,



•provision of an emergency power traverse and Auxiliary Power Unit (APU), and



•an all electric power traverse to obviate the problem of leaks that occur in the present system in our environmental conditions (new requirement added in 1994).

Ok, we are done with stale information.

Let's move 15 years ahead:

Report from 2010.

Arjun tank outruns, outguns Russian T-90

But, Business Standard has learned from multiple sources who were involved in the trials that the Arjun tank has outperformed the T-90 on every crucial parameter.

The Arjun tanks, the observers all agreed, performed superbly. Whether driving cross-country over rugged sand-dunes; detecting, observing and quickly engaging targets; or accurately hitting targets, both stationery and moving, with pinpoint gunnery; the Arjun demonstrated a clear superiority over the vaunted T-90.

The importance of this comparative trial can be gauged from a list of those who attended. Witnessing the Arjun in action were most of the army’s senior tank generals, including the Director General of Mechanised Forces, Lt Gen D Bhardwaj; strike corps commander, Lt Gen Anil Chait; Army Commander South, Lt Gen Pradeep Khanna; and Deputy Chief of the Army Staff, Lt Gen JP Singh. The Director General of Military Operations, Lt Gen AS Sekhon also attended the trials.

The army’s Directorate General of Mechanised Forces (DGMF), which has bitterly opposed buying more Arjuns, will now find it difficult to sustain that opposition. In keeping out the Arjun, the DGMF has opted to retain the already obsolescent T-72 tank in service for another two decades, spending thousands of crores in upgrading its vintage systems.

The Arjun’s sterling performance in the desert raises another far-reaching question: should the Arjun — with its proven mobility, firepower and armour protection — be restricted to a defensive role or should it equip the army’s strike corps for performing a tank’s most devastating (and glamorous) role: attacking deep into enemy territory during war?

I have highlighted the names of the people who witnessed the comparative trials.

This news has been posted in DFI several times before. Apparently, our friend @Bhadra is not aware of events regarding the Arjun Tank since nineteen ninety four.

 

[pmaitra]

being overweight and late is not problem with arjun as army wanted an abraham killer..... And army changed requirement 4 times during project
.
@Bhadra ..... How will you pass 12th standard if at start of the year you are told to study science after 2 month they tell you to study arts then after two months commerce and when just one week is remaining for exam you are told that you have to attend exam of syllabus you haven't studied.....

Arre yaar, goli maro tank ko, it looks like we have some serious issues with the recruitment and promotion process. People hired in the army must be thoroughly vetted as to their loyalty to the nation. Our nation can never be self sufficient and will never be able to stand on its own feet when the very people in influential positions stubbornly and persistently throw the spanner in our indigenization efforts.

 

[abhi_the _gr8_maratha]

http://idrw.org/chinese-military-research-academy-praises-indias-arjun-tank/
.
@Bhadra read this..... And shut your mouth. Arjun has already outgunned t90. Arjun will be a better choice in rajasthan and also in punjab cause of low ground pressure....
.
and I have also heard of kanchan armour on t90 which is primarily arjun's armour so actual t90 has low quality armour than arjun.... And chinese praising arjun tank....

 

[Kharavela]

Arre yaar, goli maro tank ko, it looks like we have some serious issues with the recruitment and promotion process. People hired in the army must be thoroughly vetted as to their loyalty to the nation. Our nation can never be self sufficient and will never be able to stand on its own feet when the very people in influential positions stubbornly and persistently throw the spanner in our indigenization efforts.

Sir, you have spoken my thoughts. I wonder, how these Generals & Marshalls can think against indigenous platforms which in the long run can be deciding factor in winning war !!

 

[Khagesh]

http://idrw.org/chinese-military-research-academy-praises-indias-arjun-tank/
.
@Bhadra read this..... And shut your mouth. Arjun has already outgunned t90. Arjun will be a better choice in rajasthan and also in punjab cause of low ground pressure....
.
and I have also heard of kanchan armour on t90 which is primarily arjun's armour so actual t90 has low quality armour than arjun.... And chinese praising arjun tank....

Kanchan is essentially a brand name and various derivatives of the line are there on BMPs, T-90s and Arjuns.

Even the IAF approaches DRDO for their needs but only when they can avoid having to admit that they have. The limelight and consequent CASH is reserved for the foreigners.