Arjun Main Battle Tank (MBT)

notinlove

New Member
Joined
Dec 11, 2009
Messages
466
Likes
23
Your provided article in doubt, and if you follow the procses there has been more types of kinetic penetrators, to say that you know the performance of Pakistani ammunition based on a assumption is not something i will like to believe without some sort of explanation, meanwhile the basis of your assumption, that post in military forum contains the incorrect article.
As it stands i do know its performance characterstics.

Naiza 125 mm DU round (armor penetration: 550 mm in RHA at 2 km)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Khalid_(tank)

It can penetrate approximately 540 mm rolled homogeneous armor (RHA) at 0 degrees (NATO) and 630 mm RHA at 60 degrees (NATO), at a range of 2,000 m
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M829_(munition)#M829A1


http://www.btvt.narod.ru/4/kontakt5_.htm
The russians are not claiming anysuch thing, there is always a risk that any explosion on surface will cause fragmentation on the inside or damage to equipment, there is nothing you can do about it, however its something one has to accept, like faulty ammunition.
On the contrary the russians are claiming such a thing.
As you know, booking LME (BTR, BMP) is much weaker than the tanks in case of activation of EDZ and PTAs on their armor in such a blast sharing the protected object can have a serious injury. As shown by the available test results, under these conditions may arise breaks and significant residual deformation armor parts, cracks in welds buildings and towers of the protected object. In addition, while the internal volume of the protected object there is a complex superposition of several shock waves with an amplitude and time of action, sufficient to cause harm to crew members (rupture eardrums, etc.).To avoid the above problems, EDZ placed layers of filler made of foam polymeric material, which provides a smooth braking dispersed by the explosion of metal plates, on the one hand, allows them to inflict damage on penetration of a cumulative jet, the trajectory of where they intersect the other hand, the inhibition of the plates in this filler reduces the speed of their attack on the neighboring explosive reactive elements to a safe value
http://www.btvt.narod.ru/4/kontakt5_.htm
The HESH rounds are not futile, they were not as effective as they were before, as in its better to fire a kinetic or HEAT round (better chances of success)You can reduce it but the risk is always there.
Er. that is pretty much what rendering futile means :p.
You taking about a explosive than is able to negate the speed of a kinetic round to a degree that helps the armour inside absorb rest of the blast, there will be some damage.
There is always some damage, be it any kind of armour.
In the end its essential for the Soviets to do this as their armour is not thick enough, along with other steps like active defences.
Is that a bad thing?
I can right now start a site and register the domain russiaarmytanks, upload a couople of pages claiming information from all sorts of arbit defence people, that does not prove anything, and its not credible, moreover no one can do anything about online information, just go check several civil pakistani defence sites.
I can also take Mr. Ajai shukla as an Arbit defence person , in that case all this debate is just useless, so we should pretty much close our browsers and get back to our work.
They have provided the firing range where the test took place , and the gave the name of the institute that conducted the tests and they gave the name of the person who gave the data.and they also admitted the shortcomings of the armour against RPG-29 , i don't see how much more credible online information can get, but you can still choose to believe what you want, its a free world mostly .
 
Last edited:

kuku

Respected Member
New Member
Joined
Mar 30, 2009
Messages
510
Likes
10
Country flag
As it stands i do know its performance characterstics.

Naiza 125 mm DU round (armor penetration: 550 mm in RHA at 2 km)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Khalid_(tank)

It can penetrate approximately 540 mm rolled homogeneous armor (RHA) at 0 degrees (NATO) and 630 mm RHA at 60 degrees (NATO), at a range of 2,000 m
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M829_(munition)#M829A1
There is no source of quotation in both wiki articles, please give better sources for your statements, to show you how bad a source wiki is, i am going to edit that part. now its 900mm at 0 degree and 1200 at 60 deg, go check that again.

At-least stop quoting your militaryphotos as a source of discussions and argument, or bring more accurate figures.

And the important facts is underlined
The A2's performance gains, while classified, result from several novel features. These include the use of new manufacturing process to improve the structural quality of the depleted uranium penetrator, the use of a carbon-epoxy composite for the sabot (a world-wide first in a projectile this large) and a special manufacturing process which partially cuts the propellant charge to allow it to behave ballistically like a granular propellant bed, while loading like a stick charge. Combined, these features increase the muzzle velocity of the M829A2 approximately 100m/sec greater than the M829A1, while operating at slightly lower pressure. PRIMEX is the sole producer of this advanced technology penetrator coupled with a state-of-the-art composite sabot and propulsion system. The M829A2 APFSDS-T KE munition is compatible with all standard NATO smoothbore 120mm tank cannons.
Throwing around fancy figures is fine, unless we know about the issue in finer details, which is impossible.
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/m829a1.htm

On the contrary the russians are claiming such a thing.
Read that again, its a protection, which often times fail, a reason behind research to develop better systems.
Er. that is pretty much what rendering futile means :p.
S: (adj) futile, ineffectual, otiose, unavailing (producing no result or effect) "a futile effort"; "the therapy was ineffectual"; "an otiose undertaking"; "an unavailing attempt"
S: (adj) bootless, fruitless, futile, sleeveless, vain (unproductive of success) "a fruitless search"; "futile years after her artistic peak"; "a sleeveless errand"; "a vain attempt"
Its not ineffective it will still cause damage to tanks, however there are other ammunition that can cause much severe damage, futile would be if the countermeasure developed completely negated the effects.
There is always some damage, be it any kind of armour.
However with some types the chances of damage are more.
Is that a bad thing?
Yes, when their are countermeasures developed (tandem warheads), which require greater protection, like ERA/NERA over a thicker armour.
I can also take Mr. Ajai shukla as an Arbit defence person , in that case all this debate is just useless, so we should pretty much close our browsers and get back to our work.

They have provided the firing range where the test took place , and the gave the name of the institute that conducted the tests and they gave the name of the person who gave the data.and they also admitted the shortcomings of the armour against RPG-29 , i don't see how much more credible online information can get, but you can still choose to believe what you want, its a free world mostly.
But we know that Mr. Ajai is working in the field has a history of working in the indian army (armour) and regularly interacts with people involved in the field.

Can you show me similar credentials for your source.

I can tell you the name of Indian labs, firing ranges.

Well it is a free world, with people like you quoting wiki as a source.
 
Last edited:

notinlove

New Member
Joined
Dec 11, 2009
Messages
466
Likes
23
There is no source of quotation in both wiki articles, please give better sources for your statements, to show you how bad a source wiki is, i am going to edit that part. now its 900mm at 0 degree and 1200 at 60 deg, go check that again.

At-least stop quoting your militaryphotos as a source of discussions and argument, or bring more accurate figures.

And the important facts is underlined

Throwing around fancy figures is fine, unless we know about the issue in finer details, which is impossible.
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/m829a1.htm
look closely,There is a citation on the first article.for once we are talking about M829A1 and not M829A2 moreover here is something for you.
Standard armour-penetration performance is 540 mm of Rolled Homogeneous Armour (RHA) at 2,000 m.
http://www.janes.com/articles/Janes...mm-M829-APFSDS-T-cartridge-United-States.html
This is the performance of M829 which was inferior to the M829A1 so as it stands the pakistani round is even inferior to the M829A1.
So if i am right , you are allowed to quote your talks with german people on online forums and we are not allowed to quote MP.net or wiki?? Bravo!!


Read that again, its a protection, which often times fail, a reason behind research to develop better systems.
To avoid the above problems, EDZ placed (placed refers to past tense which means this has already been done)layers of filler made of foam polymeric material, which provides a smooth braking dispersed by the explosion of metal plates, on the one hand, allows them to inflict damage on penetration of a cumulative jet, the trajectory of where they intersect the other hand, the inhibition of the plates in this filler reduces the speed of their attack on the neighboring explosive reactive elements to a safe value.
Read that again,it WAS a protection which often failed, a reason behind research which has ALREADY developed a better system.if you are going to twist even basic english to suite your agenda then i cannot argue with you.


Its not ineffective it will still cause damage to tanks, however there are other ammunition that can cause much severe damage, futile would be if the countermeasure developed completely negated the effects.
what can i say , i meant futile in the sense that most of its effect can be negated by spall liners if not all , and you would consider it futile only when it is totaly useless lets just not argue over this one.

Yes, when their are countermeasures developed (tandem warheads), which require greater protection, like ERA/NERA over a thicker armour.
kontakt-5 succesfuly defended itself against most of the tandem warheads like kornet and konkurs, and it has already been replaced twice once by kaktus and then by relikt, kontakt-5 is an 80's tech which still holds extremely good against weapons even today safe to assume how effective its replacements would be, moreover there are countermeasures developed for everything , even composite armour is not an endall , second generation chobham was pierced by RPG-29.

But we know that Mr. Ajai is working in the field has a history of working in the indian army (armour) and regularly interacts with people involved in the field.

Can you show me similar credentials for your source.

I can tell you the name of Indian labs, firing ranges.

Well it is a free world, with people like you quoting wiki as a source.
did you know Mr.shukla when he was still in the army or for that matter how many army people that work with armour do you know? he is a Lt.col ,he does not publish articles and doesn't writes blogs, in short people don't know him means he is less credible than mr shukla?

In your next reply you are going to say that even jane's is not a good enough source for you, isn't that so?

I am sorry but i don't have any more time to dig the net and keep giving you credible information which you are going to tout as not credible just because you don't want to believe it.
You are free to believe what you want to i am not wasting my time anymore.
 
Last edited:

Dark_Prince

New Member
Joined
Jan 31, 2010
Messages
374
Likes
81
A Plan For Arjun


Just a few clarifications to put my recent three-article series on Indian tanks in context. (BY Ajai Shukla)

1. I think that the conclusion that some visitors are drawing --- that everything Russian is bad --- amounts to overreaction to my articles. As one critic of the articles correctly posted, Russia has provided us systems that nobody else was willing to provide at prices that nobody else could match. Even it that was in the past, and Russia today adopts a far more hard-nosed, where-are-the-dollars approach towards arms sales to India, one would be ill-advised to forget history.

For example, one visitor posted about my article: “Did you read the parts that establish that the T-90 is at worst a piece of junk, or at best as good/bad as the obsolete T-72?” Well, I’d just point out that you are reading more into my account of the T-90 deal than I actually said. I certainly said that the deal was tailored to bypass parliamentary opposition, India ended up getting an under-equipped T-90 tank, important tank systems failed could not withstand exposure to the Indian environment, there were problems in transferring technology, and we have not yet managed to get the tank upgraded to the level that it should have been acquired in.

All that is true, yes! But also remember that, compared to the T-72, the T-90 is a much better tank. And, whether you like it or not, the T-90 will be in service with the Indian Army till at least 2040, maybe even 2050.

2. I also think that anyone who argues: scrap all Russian equipment and go Indian is fantasizing. Russian equipment is still the mainstay of our mechanised forces and, even if we adopt a conscious policy of Indianisation, it will be decades before Russian equipment serves out its life. Since we have to live with Russian systems for a long, long time, we need to identify which tanks we could phase out first, in what time frame we could retire them, and what we can upgrade and retain in service for a longer period.

3. The answer, in my opinion, will depend upon doubling the rate of retirement of the obsolescent T-72s. One replacement stream is the T-90, being produced at the HVF, Avadi. A second stream of Arjuns must supplement this, for which the following broad process must begin:

(a) Increase Arjun tank production on an expanded assembly line, at the rate of 30, 40, and then 50 tanks per year in 2011, 2012 and 2013 respectively. Task CVRDE to ready the Arjun Mark II by 2013. By 2015 the Arjun production line at HVF MUST roll out 62 Arjun Mark II tanks per year (i.e. one regiment at full scale, including reserve tanks). By 2018, the Arjun Mark III must roll out. Each of these upgrades must have limited and realistic improvements, identified not from glossy magazines but through operational usage by Indian Army regiments.

(b) Alongside the Arjun Improvement Programme (AIP), which will handle the upgrade to Mark II and Mark III standards, work must commence by 2012 on the Future MBT programme. Two consortiums must compete in creating the design: a CVRDE-led consortium that can draw on the Arjun experience. And a private industry-led consortium, which is granted full access to the Arjun design experience, as well as to any other resources that they choose. The private industry consortium must be fully funded by the MoD, their budget in line with what the CVRDE-led consortium is permitted to spend.

(c) As Arjun tanks roll out, T-72M regiments must convert to the Arjun, those with older tanks first. The conversion will serve a two-fold purpose: firstly, the T-72 regiments that first convert to Arjuns, i.e. 4-5 regiments by 2015, need not be upgraded with TIFCS, etc. Secondly, the introduction of Arjuns into service, and the setting up of Arjun instructional cells at the Armoured Corps Centre & School, Ahmednagar, will start spreading an Arjun culture into an army where the opposition to the Arjun is based on an outdated impression of the tank --- on what it was, rather than what it is.

(d) The remaining T-72s need to be upgraded on priority. The ten-year-old process to upgrade them needs to be pushed through, if necessary by a high-voltage, public resignation by whoever the DGMF happens to be. By doing so, that officer will have done more for his arm than any of his recent predecessors; and will be remembered for much more than just “being a good chap”.

(e) By 2015, the DRDO, in collaboration with private industry, must produce and operationalise an Arjun Bridge Layer Tank (BLTs), an Arjun Trawl Tank, and the specialised maintenance vehicles that will be provided to each Arjun regiment. Production lines must cater for adequate scales of these.

(f) The process needs to be set in motion now for creating two Arjun overhaul facilities in the private sector. The first fifteen Arjuns will soon be due for overhaul and the HVF has proved unable to even handle the T-72 overhaul. Just as an RFI has been floated for creating T-72 overhaul facilities, the Arjun overhaul facilities must be kicked off immediately.

http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com/2010/02/plan-for-arjun.html
 

sayareakd

New Member
Joined
Feb 17, 2009
Messages
17,734
Likes
18,953
Country flag
This trial is rigged from the start, so dont expect any thing or miracles that will change the mind set of IA officers.
IA dont want to be proved wrong therefore wrong parameter were chosen for the trial.
Not to forget the timing of the trial, which should have been conducted in Jun heat of Rajasthan's desert.
Why the IA just accept that let the best tank win, even otherwise their is enough space for both T 90 and Arjun tank in 3800 modern tanks doctrine.

Just hope that DRDO has install black box this time.

BTW Arjun tank is up against 14 of the best T 90 Tank crews of IA to defeat it.
 

sayareakd

New Member
Joined
Feb 17, 2009
Messages
17,734
Likes
18,953
Country flag
to all the fans of T90 tank, check the video
frame No.0.22 says it all.
It is modified T 72 tank.
 
Last edited by a moderator:

bengalraider

DFI Technocrat
New Member
Joined
Oct 10, 2009
Messages
3,780
Likes
2,682
Country flag
to all the fans of T90 tank, check the video
frame No.0.22 says it all.
It is modified T 72 tank.
Every nation uses it's older tanks as a template for newer generation armor
The M1 abrams to the 1980's has evolved into the M1A2 Tusk today
The Merkava IV owes it's heritage in part to the SABRA and is a direst descendant of the Merkava of the 1982 war
The chieftain evolved into the challenger and the challenger 2 today
The T-72 evolved into the T-90
The T-64 evolved into the T-80
The Leo 2 of the 80's has evolved into the LEO2A6 of today
Heck! i believe that the T-95 shall be a modified T-80/T-90 hull albeit with a more modern crew interface and a completely new turret with a large amount of automation

Col. Shukla presents an interesting option and assessment, i must admit i was one of those who got carried away, The Arjun should be inducted in larger no's once it's defects are ironed out but the T-90 is ready now.
 
Last edited by a moderator:

kuku

Respected Member
New Member
Joined
Mar 30, 2009
Messages
510
Likes
10
Country flag
look closely,There is a citation on the first article.for once we are talking about M829A1 and not M829A2 moreover here is something for you.
This is the performance of M829 which was inferior to the M829A1 so as it stands the pakistani round is even inferior to the M829A1.
So if i am right , you are allowed to quote your talks with german people on online forums and we are not allowed to quote MP.net or wiki?? Bravo!!
Quality of Penetrators with Iraqi army was not challenged before it started to dip in performance against the US army.
Well most of your article was not in janes, it is stated in the thread itself, so either show me credible information of the tests or stop with you BS about the KE penetrator on russian armour.
No, your atleast required to show a proper source or proove the argument technically.
Read that again,it WAS a protection which often failed, a reason behind research which has ALREADY developed a better system.if you are going to twist even basic english to suite your agenda then i cannot argue with you.
what can i say , i meant futile in the sense that most of its effect can be negated by spall liners if not all , and you would consider it futile only when it is totaly useless lets just not argue over this one.
Read it plenty of times from a long time ago, if you go through the article with some common sense you will find that the effects are not negated the impact in absolute sense, the reason people went for a layered defence (adding active protection system to take care of anti tank rockets and missiles before they hit the tank).
ERA was designed primarily against shaped charges and to negate the KE penetrators by reducing their kinetic energy enough to let the armour absorb rest of the impact.
kontakt-5 succesfuly defended itself against most of the tandem warheads like kornet and konkurs, and it has already been replaced twice once by kaktus and then by relikt, kontakt-5 is an 80's tech which still holds extremely good against weapons even today safe to assume how effective its replacements would be, moreover there are countermeasures developed for everything , even composite armour is not an endall , second generation chobham was pierced by RPG-29.
did you know Mr.shukla when he was still in the army or for that matter how many army people that work with armour do you know? he is a Lt.col ,he does not publish articles and doesn't writes blogs, in short people don't know him means he is less credible than mr shukla?
In your next reply you are going to say that even jane's is not a good enough source for you, isn't that so?
Kontact-5 was not made to withstand tandem warhead hits by havy anti tank missiles, that is why there was a development of active protection systems.

Chally-2 tank was attacked in a different environment, just like the Russian tanks were attacked and defeated in Chechenya. Attackers focused on a area with less protection (as KE shots are not targeted in that region, none of which has any bearing on tank warfare, they have a bearing on tactics.

Yes as i previously told you no tank is invulnerable, even a all side heavy Armour tank will still be blown up by a heavy anti tank mine, and till the mid 80s when M1A1s, Leo-2s, Chally-2s started service in large numbers T-72 was much better than the US and NATO armour, this conversation however was about T-72/90 vs. Arjun MBT in Indian Army service.

Well my dad was in the engineers and I know a lot of them, Shukla ji was a tankie in the indian army, I can state for that information and proove it, too.
Unlike your webpage that credits restricted informatin on some lt.col. that no one can possibly contact.
You’re the one who quotes from incorrect posts in a threads from one forum as credible information on another forum.

If you followed his reporting before 2005, he was not optimistic about Arjun MBT completing development, and changed his views as progress was made overtime.
I am sorry but i don't have any more time to dig the net and keep giving you credible information which you are going to tout as not credible just because you don't want to believe it.
You are free to believe what you want to i am not wasting my time anymore.
Try to use that head of yours, instead of copying and pasting information you find online.

dont really care if you dont.
 
Last edited:

p2prada

New Member
Joined
May 25, 2009
Messages
10,234
Likes
4,017
Like throwing around a non issue of weight has not had that impact.

The point of pointing out the power to weight ratio, ground pressure, transmission and suspension is to counter the argument that Arjun MBT is less maneuverable or that it will sink in the sand, this bridge issue you came up with is not new, and believe me it can be an issue in mountenaus regions where often times you have bridges which are over 50 years old, its not a issue in open field deserts, and the canals past the punjab plains will have their crossing blown up as soon as there is a threat.
Firstly, I never made the bridge issue and nor do I support it. Sinking in the sand is a problem for all tanks. So, that is a non issue as well. I never made these statements. So, I don't know how you are accusing me for it.

However, I remember one Abrams being scuttled because it was stuck in sand in Iraq.

As it stands without the multiple tenders that is not the case.
Don't understand this part. Can you be a little more clear?

Softwares made to work with the PTD, RAM materials developed, research into composites, a generational development of FCS and avionics, all that research was useful, without it in the next tender they wont have any way to compete against the same competitor.
Just because they lost their current deal, LM has a better chance of securing any future deal because of their experience with the F-22. The experience gained in the YF-23 program is lost. The engineers who worked on it will either be retired or dead by the time the US starts a new project. LM engineers have been survived by their new employees who have continued working with the present F-22 and F-35.

Without risk there is only one business its called a monopoly based PSU, if 20 years from now indian private firms are afraid of that we would be in the same economic conditions we are in now.
Our current private industries lack technology, experience or even the motivation to compete with DRDO. Simply because our companies have made some strides elsewhere we are ready to put them on the throne. They are far from ready. And will need a long time if they need to be able to supplement DRDO.

Eventually both companies cooperated on F-22 and F-35.
Boeing lost out on research. Right now the cooperation is in manufacturing. LM is continuing on F-22 related research while Boeing is building up their experience by making Super Hornets and Silent Eagles.:rolleyes:

Quite simple put It has more indigenous parts than T-90, and subsequent changes to domestic components under development does not require express Russian permission, provides a soft landing platform for development of indigenous technology.(which would keep on happening as projects mature)
Quite wishful and a bit too optimistic. We don't need Russian permission to upgrade the T-90. The T-72 Project Rhino has nothing to do with Russia. Almost all component upgrades are European.

Your far away from the point, the BMS will work with any system T-90/Arjun/T-72, its not a consideration in deciding which tank to choose, it will work on both tanks at the same time.

If you read the specification of the active protection system, its the same damn thing, they can be used on any tank/ICV/BMP you want to use them on.
The BMS and APS on the Arjun are supposed to be indigenous or else the costs will simply sky rocket. A BEL built BMS is already being tested while a BEL built APS with soft kill capability is being tested. The T-90 is supposedly being upgraded with a time tested and battle proven Elbit BMS and also a Swedish APS. Unfortunately I cannot prove either, however, I am sceptical on the Elbit supplied BMS. An Elbit supplied Navigation system is used on the Arjun though, perhaps something similar on the T-90 has been chosen.

This is India, contracts and implementation in a year or two is wishful thinking.
Developing an indigenous product, contracts and implementation will take even longer. So, I know which one to choose right now.

Open up any Swedish, German, Israeli manufacturers site, all options are available to anyone who chooses to purchase them,
Why would we chose European armour and increase costs along with time delay when a Russian version has already been upgraded twice?

could you provide a source for the DRDO ERA (being far from ready)?
On the contrary can you provide a source saying the ERA is ready? I doubt they will even be used in the comparative trials.

Could you give at least any indications from the OFB, Russia or the Army regarding that, as right now most of the information available shows different things, Russian plans are to keep on selling their materials, they wont agree to this in the contract.
Most of this info is not open source. Go into DRDO website and try searching for Kanchan armour, you will get nothing. So, trying to look for any info from their website is also impossible. However, a ToT on the T-90s composite armour is not coming.

Again with the cheaper argument, right now as has been reported the cost of T-90 has gone up, will go up further as upgrades are carrier out and its not going to be cheaper to operate just because its a medium tank.
A heavy tank with the same upgrades will push up the costs too. Maintaining a Heavy tank with NERA, APS and rest 60% imported electronics will not be cheap either.

No, guess where we have to go when we want to make modification to the FCS to accommodate a domestic missile?
If the missile can handle a 125mm smoothbore and a 120mm rifled gun then we have to go to France for the T-90 and Israel for the Arjun. All critical products like FCS and Navigation on the Arjun is imported.

Well as i doubt your sources, the tank is delayed none the less, products designed, i trust our own scientists, you trust the russians. The ToT on the gun was a well documented issue.
I trust our scientists. But, I don't trust the project managers when they make media statements.

The tank is as good as the T-90 and better in terms of technology in transmission, suspension and with a stronger armour.
At the same time I can use the T-90 to fight Pakistan tomorrow, while it will take me a decade with the Arjun. If I enter Pakistan I will need a working ERA and proven Tank shells. Not untested ERA and brand new tanks shells.

The current capabilities in mechanical technology and electronic technology are on their way up every thing from engine design to microchip design will rise to new levels, in 20 years the army will still be concerned about tanks already in service and common heritage to go for russian option, we need at least 20 years to start indigenous induction.
We are not a first world country. We don't have their level of funding or even their level of a military industrial complex. If DRDO cannot catch up to their foreign counterparts like IMI, Krauss-Maffei or Chrysler, then the army will obviously go out.

Yes i am saying exactly that, the 2 tier protection is their to compensate for the smaller protection through the composite armour.
Even the Americans are going for a 2 tier armour protection. Perhaps even their DU armour is not as good as the kanchan.:rolleyes:

FYI, The composite armour on the T-90 is 1000mm and a 340mm ERA over it. Can you get a similar figure for the Arjun because I can't find it?

Abrams are being upgraded under TUSK, a upgrade program for urban conditions in Iraq,
Still Abrams need ERA.

hardly the battlefield we are looking for.
Statement of the century. The Americans are fighting the same bunch of guys with RPGs that India will. There are enough places in Pakistan where tanks will get killed on a daily basis, Lahore and the hundreds of towns that dot the border which the T-90s will need to capture. The conditions in Iraq are less extreme than Pakistan. Any Tom, **** and Harry will know that fact. With easy proliferation of Chinese RPG-29s and we will have a blood bath.

Where is the tender? Haven't seen it anywhere, let alone the payments or the delivery schedule, will be nice to see know this.
I cannot prove it. It is by word of mouth. If the Army does release this, again the media will pounce on it because the deal will further increase the costs of induction of the T-90 which actually holds no truth because a similar Arjun tank will be even more expensive.

Strange that the simple situation that indigenous work can be upgraded steadily, and provides us with the ability to manufacture to our standards, still misses to hit home.
I would have been happy if a ERA, APS equipped Arjun would have come out in early 2000 instead of post 2010. The time line has already defeated the purpose of inducting the Arjun. Even in the 2001 tests the Arjun had too many problems that were not fixed even after 10 years of testing. Post 2020 the army hopes to induct their 2020 tank or FMBT.

Short sighted decisions provide us with nothing.
Yes. And that's why the Army has asked DRDO to continue developing the Arjun and then come out with a FMBT post 2020 either on their own or wit foreign help. The T-90s are basically a stop gap for the FMBT. All because the Arjun was late.

another Ivan, there is no money for T-95, hell the great Russian army did not have night vision for the georgian war, and there is nothing so special about the T-90 that scores over Arjun MBT, The plan now is to upgrade the current huge inventory and go for a replacement later, which sits absolutely opposite the plans for Indian Army Induction timeline.
The Russians are not upgrading any of their old stuff. They don't have the funds and the recession has not helped either. Look at their navy and Airforce and it gives the same picture. The Russians are in tatters and will take time coming out of that jungle.

That said the army has stated what it wans and its the T-90, no point wasting time there all the contracts for T-90 and T-72 upgrades need to be signed asap, hopefully with Arjun replacing the huge number of T-72s in the desert section of our border to at least 500 nos, otherwise it will takea round 40-60 years to even think of a indigenous tank program and inventory, the only justification for that could be that we see our engineering industry at the same level in that time along with the economy.
No it won't. You are simply echoing the media. The Army has made it clear that they need a FMBT post 2020.

No the army has not made anything clear, thats the comments of a lone army officer, and you should post the comment in full, i have very interesting observations to make on the comment.
http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/army-wants-futuristic-mbt-death-knell-for-arjun/41594/on

"Army will no more place orders for Arjun beyond 124 that was already contracted. That is because Army is now looking 20 years ahead and wants a futuristic MBT," Lt Gen Dalip Bharadwaj, Army Director General (Mechanised Infantry), said here.
Lt Gen Dalip Bharadwaj, Army Director General (Mechanised Infantry) is not a lone army officer. Even if he is, his statement is enough. And the source is PTI. The 2 names itself should be enough.
 

ppgj

New Member
Joined
Aug 13, 2009
Messages
2,029
Likes
168
@p2p,

let's take a look at the same mr. Bharadwaj talks about Arjun. this is from DRDO newsletter for AUG 09.

Lt Gen D Bhardwaj, VSM, DGMF during
his address, appreciated the capabilities and
perseverance of all the agencies–CVRDE/DRDO,
HVF, Ordnance Factories, DGQA, PSU, private
institutions and the users that made Arjun tank a
reality.
He exuded confidence in the Indian MBT in
his speech, stating, that the Arjun Tank has proved to
the world that India cannot be ignored in the defence
technology domain. The Arjun Tank is equipped with
the state-of-the-art technologies and ranks among the
world’s finest main battle tanks.
He confidently said
that it will dominate any future battle field. The Indian
Army is proud to be equipped with the Arjun Tank
http://www.drdo.org/pub/nl/2009/aug09.pdf
 

ppgj

New Member
Joined
Aug 13, 2009
Messages
2,029
Likes
168
a 2008 article... valuable read at army's role...

The Arjun battle tank acquires a growing fan club

Ajai Shukla / New Delhi June 16, 2008, 0:45 IST

India's own Arjun tank is finally proving its worth. Despite continuing criticism from an army establishment that judges the Arjun far more strictly than foreign purchases like the T-90, the Arjun is successfully completing a gruelling 5,000-kilometre trial in the Rajasthan desert.

During six months of trials, the Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO), along with tank crews from the army's 43 Armoured Regiment, have proved not just the Arjun's endurance, but also the ability of its computer-controlled gun to consistently blow away suitcase-sized targets placed more than a kilometre away.

The army's Directorate General of Mechanised Forces (DGMF), which must eventually okay the tank, is not impressed but key decision-makers are rallying behind the Arjun.

The head of the Pune-based Southern Command, Lieutenant General N Thamburaj, strongly backs the Arjun. On a visit to the Mahajan Field Firing Ranges in Rajasthan to watch his troops exercising, Lt Gen Thamburaj noticed the Arjun firing nearby.

After walking across, he was invited by the DRDO team to drive and fire the tank. Half an hour later, the general was an Arjun backer; two holes in the target he aimed at testified that a soldier without previous experience operating tanks could get into the Arjun and use it effectively.

Business Standard has evidence of many more such incidents. On June 29, 2006, the commander of the elite 33 Armoured Division, Major General BS Grewal, visited the Mahajan Ranges along with a colleague, Major General Shiv Jaswal. Both drove and fired the Arjun for the first time that day; the two rounds that each fired punched holes through targets almost two kilometres away.

That same month, 43 Armoured Regiment, which is the first army tank unit equipped with the Arjun, pronounced itself delighted with the Arjun's firing performance. After firing trials in summer 2006, 43 Armoured Regiment endorsed: "The accuracy and consistency of the Arjun have been proved beyond doubt."

But the establishment was quick to strike back. Barely three months after that report, the commanding officer of 43 Armoured Regiment, Colonel D Thakur, was confronted by the then Director General of Mechanised Forces, Lt Gen DS Shekhawat. Eyewitnesses describe how he was upbraided for "not conducting the trials properly". But in a career-threatening display of professional integrity, Colonel Thakur's brigade commander, Brigadier Chandra Mukesh, intervened to insist that the trials had been conducted correctly.

In a series of interviews with the army, including the present Director General of Mechanised Forces, Lt Gen D Bhardwaj, and with the MoD top brass, Business Standard has learned that opposition to the Arjun remains deeply entrenched. This despite the soldiers of 43 Armoured Regiment declaring that if it came to war, they would like to be in an Arjun.

Minister of State for Defence Production, Rao Inderjeet Singh recounts: "I've spoken, off the record, to officers who have gone through the trials. Even the crews (from 43 Armoured Regiment)… who have been testing the tank… I forced them to choose between the Russian tanks and the Arjun.

I said, you've driven this tank and you've driven that tank (the T-90). Now mark them out of ten, which tank is better? And I've found that the Arjun tank was given more numbers than the T-90 tank."


With new confidence, the Arjun's developer, the Central Vehicles R&D Establishment (CVRDE), is arguing strongly for "comparative trials", in which the Arjun would be pitted head-to-head, in identical conditions, with the army's T-90 and T-72 tanks. But the DGMF continues to resist any such face-off.

http://www.business-standard.com/india/storypage.php?autono=326234
 

ppgj

New Member
Joined
Aug 13, 2009
Messages
2,029
Likes
168
in the past people have questioned about the weight of Arjun tank. let's take a look at it's implications...it is again an old analysis but very useful...

Arjun MBT weight implications

June 27th, 2007

The weight of the Arjun MBT is incidental to the Indian Army General Staff Qualitative Requirement (GSQR). Arjun Tank weight arises due to the systems and protection levels as monitored by the Vice Chiefs of Army Staff right from the project inception. Since Arjun Tank project was initiated to match the current western MBT’s, naturally, the Arjun MBT weight will also match them.

Some senior Indian army officers have the opinion that the Arjun is too heavy for bridges on Indian western border and for the bridging equipment held by the Indian Army Corps of Engineers. We need to look at the Arjun MBT weight issue in a broader perspective, at the entirety of reasons and implications. It has to be analyzed based on tactical and strategic mobility of the Arjun Tank.


Arjun MBT

India busted the myth of the Patton’s in 1965, with Centurions Mk VII which weighed close to 52t. In 35 years gone by, Indian infrastructural woes has caught up with Arjun Tanks too, in addition to not being able to run heavier cost efficient big trucks on the roads and bridges. In comparission to Centurions Mk VII, the Arjun Tank is a mere 7 ton heavier. As the China builds “otherwise” impossible rail and road networks on Indian border to counter a future threat, India has not bothered to make infrastructural improvements to take on current threats.

The Arjun MBT is the heaviest tank in our inventory, but that is not a reflection of its agility and gradability. Being powered with a 1400 HP engine, its HP / t ratio is 23.9 which is substantially better than 20.4 of the BMP which is its combat support.

COMPARATIVE DATA OF AFVs

Tank HP* Wt** HP/wt NGP***(kg / cm2)

T-72 780 41.5 18.8 0.83

T-90 1000 46.5 21.5 0.94

Challenger 1200 62.5 19.2 0.90

Merkava 1200 61.0 19.7 0.96

LeoII 1500 55.2 27.2 0.83

M1A2 1500 63.0 23.3 0.96

Leclerc 1500 54.5 27.5 0.90

Arjun 1400 58.5 23.9 0.84

BMP 285 14 20.4 0.65

* Horse Power

** Weight in tons

*** Nominal Ground Pressure

Arjun MBT has a bigger track-print, hence, its Nominal Ground Pressure is only 0.84 kg/cm2 which compares well with other MBTs of the world . Further, with a combination of low NGP and high power / weight ratio, it has commendable going ability. The proof being Arjun MBT crossing the Ravi at Lassian, without any engineer support, whatsoever and it has crossed numerous patches of marshy terrain which are marked ‘non-tankable’ in going maps of the Gurdaspur-Pathankot sector.

MBT Arjun is broader and heavier than other tanks in our fleet, resulting in special, but not insurmountable, difficulties in transportation. During the last 15 years, various prototypes of Arjun MBT has been moved for trials to various sectors, by both, rail and road, by existing means of transportation, albeit with adhoc expedients, but without facing any serious difficulties.

The existing BWTA wagons have pay load capacity of 60+ tons ; the Arjun weighs 58.5 tons. The only issue is that the width of the tank is more than that of the flat and so, the tracks protrude on both sides. A six inch wooden sleepers when placed on the floor of the wagons before loading the Arjun MBT ensures that the tank tracks move over adjacent platforms without fouling with them. With this arrangement Arjun MBT’s were moved as class ‘A’ ODC on Chennai-Delhi, Delhi-Suratgarh, Delhi-Jaiselmer, Chennai-Balasore and Balasore-Delhi lines, on several occasions.

In addition, Ministry of Railways, RDSO, Lucknow were approached in 1992 to conduct a feasibility study for rail transportation of MBT Arjun. The study was based on a two pronged approach i.e. design of a new wagon and modification of existing BWTA wagon. The feasibility report was submitted along with all-India broad gauge railway maps showing sectors where the loaded wagon could move as class ‘A’ ODC and the empty wagon could be run as non-ODC. In consonance, the Army HQ, Q Move (Rail) approved both proposals. The RITES / Texmaco team has delivered prototypes of the new wagon for field trials in 2006, it has been proposed that the case for modification to existing BWTA wagons be foreclosed because the population of the new rail wagons can comfortably match the production schedule of the Arjun MBT.

On a number of occasions, the Arjuns has been ferried over long distances, on BEML P-80 trailers towed by Tatra Tractors. Of course, in this case also, the tracks of the tank protrude on either side of the P-80 mount, but that is so with even other tanks like T-90S and T-72’s in Indian Army fleet.

In December 1994 the DGST sent a copy of their Draft GSQR 636 for a 65 ton trailer to BEML Bangalore who, in turn, have issued their specification for the new trailer which is to be towed by BEML-Tatra T815 VTI 8×8 tractor which is already in service.

CVRDE has successfully designed and proven a scissors type 20m, cl 60 BLT (christened Kartik) on the Vijayanta chassis. Another scissors type bridge layer of MLC 70 has been built on the T-72 hull and this also spans 20m. The latest on the anvil is the Arjun BLT with a sliding MLC 70 bridge and a span of 24m. That constitutes substantial initiative and homework on the part of DRDO for trafficability of the Arjun and any other heavy vehicles / equipment.

It is true that assault bridging equipment are scarce but are a number of bridging equipment over which Arjuns can traverse without risk. These include the PMP / PMS, MGB, MLAB, Sarvatra, CEASE (60) and the KM (wet type).

The issue of “Civil Bridges Over Defence Oriented Canals” is a painfull episode for the simple reason that, when India built ‘defence oriented canals’, we ought to have also planned ‘defence oriented bridges’ on them. Alternatively, we should have upgraded them in requisite sectors which, in any case, is imperative now. It would be quixotic to propose a solution by seeking reduction of the weight of the Arjun to suit vintage bridges!

There have been proposals of purning the Arjun MBT weight. Even Indian Army’s opinion is divided over this new, trivial issue which may be referred, perhaps more aptly, as a ‘non-issue’. Yet, in the din which accrues from the gambit of dissent and the consequent ‘unfounded fear of non-acceptance’, panic-driven designers and a section of supporting Users have jointly undertaken a weight reduction exercise !

Several areas of the tank have been identified and targeted for reductions ranging from a couple of hundred kgs to just a few hundred grams! In ultimate judgement, if the cumulative loss is not going to change the bridge classification of the Arjun, the whole effort will have been rendered futile. All attempts at weight reduction must be made conditional, in that, there will be no trade-offs with some other parameters such as levels of protection, structural strength, life expectancy of alternate materials and the ease of handling and maintenance.

The Arjun excels the specifics for self-propulsion stated in the GSQR. As for transportation and bridging are concerned, no one in the world designs tanks to suit these means. Instead, civil and military bridges, and the means of rail / road transportation are upgraded to suit new tanks. If Indian Army has problems with the bridges on the defensive canals or assault bridging equipment, its Indian Army’s fault.

http://frontierindia.net/arjun-mbt-weight-implications/
 

kuku

Respected Member
New Member
Joined
Mar 30, 2009
Messages
510
Likes
10
Country flag
Firstly, I never made the bridge issue and nor do I support it. Sinking in the sand is a problem for all tanks. So, that is a non issue as well. I never made these statements. So, I don't know how you are accusing me for it.
However, I remember one Abrams being scuttled because it was stuck in sand in Iraq.
And since the great WW-II many tanks of all weights and size have had same problem, some surfaces require very low ground pressure, like a swamp.
Don't understand this part. Can you be a little more clear?
Without the proposed tenders for T-90 upgrade its not superior than the Arjun.
Just because they lost their current deal, LM has a better chance of securing any future deal because of their experience with the F-22. The experience gained in the YF-23 program is lost. The engineers who worked on it will either be retired or dead by the time the US starts a new project. LM engineers have been survived by their new employees who have continued working with the present F-22 and F-35.
Our current private industries lack technology, experience or even the motivation to compete with DRDO. Simply because our companies have made some strides elsewhere we are ready to put them on the throne. They are far from ready. And will need a long time if they need to be able to supplement DRDO.
Boeing lost out on research. Right now the cooperation is in manufacturing. LM is continuing on F-22 related research while Boeing is building up their experience by making Super Hornets and Silent Eagles.:rolleyes:
First of all Boeing worked with Lockheed martin on YF-22 and F-22.
Northrop Grumman was the one opposing with YF-23 with their experience on B-2 bomber, and their reserach advanced the technology they had developed in RCS management, Avionics and Materials, this will be used for the USAF next generation bomber project, the research done is very much alive.
Quite wishful and a bit too optimistic. We don't need Russian permission to upgrade the T-90. The T-72 Project Rhino has nothing to do with Russia. Almost all component upgrades are European.
Integrate a new missile or shell on the T-90 and Russians are back in business, its the era of computerised FCS, and the maker still keeps the source.
The BMS and APS on the Arjun are supposed to be indigenous or else the costs will simply sky rocket. A BEL built BMS is already being tested while a BEL built APS with soft kill capability is being tested. The T-90 is supposedly being upgraded with a time tested and battle proven Elbit BMS and also a Swedish APS. Unfortunately I cannot prove either, however, I am sceptical on the Elbit supplied BMS. An Elbit supplied Navigation system is used on the Arjun though, perhaps something similar on the T-90 has been chosen.
Developing an indigenous product, contracts and implementation will take even longer. So, I know which one to choose right now.
A tender requires permission from the ministry of finance and under the new DPP intimation to the parliament, so i guess if there is a tender we would know about it.
The APS will be common for all MBTs and ICVs.
The active part in APS shows a approach to distruct a ATGM in flight.
Why would we chose European armour and increase costs along with time delay when a Russian version has already been upgraded twice?
You asked about where a top of the line ERA for arjun will come from in the next 5 years, i answered with possible locations.
On the contrary can you provide a source saying the ERA is ready? I doubt they will even be used in the comparative trials.
OK
DRDO has mastered varieties of techniques in the areas of propellants, high explosives, pyrotechnics, polymers, etc. Development of ERA was altogether a new area, a challenging task. DRDO has accomplished this task successfully with totally indigenous efforts. This has placed DRDO on the world map of armour developers, a note of which has been taken by pioneer institutes like RAFAEL of Israel, Euromissile of France, etc.
Explosive Reactive Armour (ERA) is an add-on armour designed to offer additional protection to tanks against shaped charge warheads of modern antitank guided missiles (ATGMs). Over the last two decades, DRDO has developed expertise in this vital technology and has a large database of various designs of ERA.
Responding to user requirements of providing additional protection to tank, DRDO has developed an ERA system, which effectively reduces penetration of Milan 2 shaped charge warhead to the extent of 70 per cent.
The ERA developed by DRDO is a sandwich of explosive and metal plates. The panels of ERA are assembled in metallic containers. When the jet of a shaped charge warhead hits ERA panel, explosive in it detonates. As a result, the plates are accelerated and start moving outward in normal direction. The moving plates and the detonaters render the jet ineffective which loses its penetration capability.
Based on RDX, a special type of sheet explosive has also been developed for ERA.This sheet explosive is waterproof. It is not cap sensitive and also quite insensitive to frition, impact and heat. However, it gets initiated by a shaped-charge jet.
The ERA technology has met all the requirements of the user and was accepted for introduction into the Indian Army. The production of ERA panels has commenced in the Ordnance factories.
SALIENT FEATURES
Effectively reduces the penetration of warheads of modern ATGMs.
Immune to detonation against small arms ammunition and artillery shell fragments
No sympathetic detonation of neighbouring panels when one panel explodes .
Minimum collateral damage
The weight penalty is kept to the minimum about 1.5 ton per tank
No initiation by arc welding or by accidental drops.
Tank mobility and manoeuvrability not compromisis.
Functions with equal efficiency even after deep fording by the tank .
Operational temperature ranges from 20 oC to +55 oC .
The technology is totally indigenous, possesses high contemporary innovation element and has made the nation self-reliant in this vital field of military importance. It has saved foreign exchange by eliminating the necessity to import of this technology (estimated cost of ERA kit for one tank in foreign countries is around Rs 48 lakhs), and even has export potential. Being indigenous, the technology can be modified/upgraded with some efforts to meet similar other and futuristic requirements.
http://www.drdo.org/explosive.html
Most of this info is not open source. Go into DRDO website and try searching for Kanchan armour, you will get nothing. So, trying to look for any info from their website is also impossible. However, a ToT on the T-90s composite armour is not coming.
India and Russia have a IPR agreement in place, we can not go outside the contract boundaries and modify a russian product without permission. If there is no ToT and Russia refuses to allow modification we need to keep importing the armour tiles.
A heavy tank with the same upgrades will push up the costs too. Maintaining a Heavy tank with NERA, APS and rest 60% imported electronics will not be cheap either.
Not when the heavy MBTs costs are going down with aggreements in place for domestic manufacturing (which might fall through if the order is stuck at 124), In T-90 most of the tank is imported and assembled here in India, and yet it might end up being cheaper manufactured in Russia than India (ala Su-30).
If the missile can handle a 125mm smoothbore and a 120mm rifled gun then we have to go to France for the T-90 and Israel for the Arjun. All critical products like FCS and Navigation on the Arjun is imported.
FCS on arjun is indigenous computerised one, and its next generation all electric type fire and drive control are already in final stages of development for the ICV project abhay .
We are not a first world country. We don't have their level of funding or even their level of a military industrial complex. If DRDO cannot catch up to their foreign counterparts like IMI, Krauss-Maffei or Chrysler, then the army will obviously go out.
Look at the projected figures of economic and industrial performance for 2030.
FYI, The composite armour on the T-90 is 1000mm and a 340mm ERA over it. Can you get a similar figure for the Arjun because I can't find it?
If i had it i wont give it, dont trust such figures, these are confidential and often heavily under quoted or over quoted by people in the know (they risk loosing their jobs or are trying to market the product).
Even the Americans are going for a 2 tier armour protection. Perhaps even their DU armour is not as good as the kanchan.:rolleyes:
Still Abrams need ERA.
Statement of the century. The Americans are fighting the same bunch of guys with RPGs that India will. There are enough places in Pakistan where tanks will get killed on a daily basis, Lahore and the hundreds of towns that dot the border which the T-90s will need to capture. The conditions in Iraq are less extreme than Pakistan. Any Tom, **** and Harry will know that fact. With easy proliferation of Chinese RPG-29s and we will have a blood bath.
At the same time I can use the T-90 to fight Pakistan tomorrow, while it will take me a decade with the Arjun. If I enter Pakistan I will need a working ERA and proven Tank shells. Not untested ERA and brand new tanks shells.
That is just strange, our opponent is a regular army with tanks and heavy ATGMs (for which no ERA works as both shaped charges are massive), and the shells are fired thousands of times before induction.
That doctrine you stated, in both pre and post cold start time concentrates on occupying lands and cutting off major population centres, nowhere does the army intend to control a city, as that bogs them down rids them of the advantage to maneuver in a maneuver warfare and risks there supply lines.
Please read about the previous battles and have a look at the map
US army in Iraq and Russian army in Chechnya faced a enemy in urban scenario where the tanks supporting infantry was suppressed while the anti tank team fired from a preferred vector and distance like the top of roop which gave a top attack profile, or the basement of a building which gave access to the bottom parts of the tank (vulnerable in all profiles front or side), in open field tank battle the situation is very different and frontal armour protection against Kinetic rounds is very important.

Will T-90 work, yes it will excel with all the possible upgrades, Arjun will also achieve the same results with more protection.

A battle to cut supply routes and occupying territory for post war negotiations is very different from a occupation of a city where the opposing force is able to fight with the death with a thousand cuts mentality.

These two situations could not be any more different.

Many people falsely claim that T-series tank have ineffective armour and ERA based on Russian experience in chechnya, which is incorrect as the tanks were in a urban setting where the terrorists were able to attack from a distance and angle of their choosing, perhaps a tactical mistake, but in no way a reflection of the tanks ability.
I cannot prove it. It is by word of mouth. If the Army does release this, again the media will pounce on it because the deal will further increase the costs of induction of the T-90 which actually holds no truth because a similar Arjun tank will be even more expensive.
Any major tender if accepted or paid for will be in the know.
I would have been happy if a ERA, APS equipped Arjun would have come out in early 2000 instead of post 2010. The time line has already defeated the purpose of inducting the Arjun. Even in the 2001 tests the Arjun had too many problems that were not fixed even after 10 years of testing. Post 2020 the army hopes to induct their 2020 tank or FMBT.
Yes. And that's why the Army has asked DRDO to continue developing the Arjun and then come out with a FMBT post 2020 either on their own or wit foreign help. The T-90s are basically a stop gap for the FMBT. All because the Arjun was late.
The only mentioned time line for FMBT is 2030 and its not been mentioned that many times (nothing is for certain).
p2prada;114554 No it won't. You are simply echoing the media. The Army has made it clear that they need a FMBT post 2020. [url said:
http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/army-wants-futuristic-mbt-death-knell-for-arjun/41594/on[/url]
Lt Gen Dalip Bharadwaj, Army Director General (Mechanised Infantry) is not a lone army officer. Even if he is, his statement is enough. And the source is PTI. The 2 names itself should be enough.
He also said in the same briefing
"Tank-X is a hybrid of T-90 and T-72, which are both contemporary technology tanks. There is no point in having technologically obsolete tanks for warfare two decades hence,"
"Army will no more place orders for Arjun beyond 124 that was already contracted. That is because Army is now looking 20 years ahead and wants a futuristic MBT,"
:D
And he stated the timeline as around 2030 for induction.
If the army requirements for the Arjun MBT are met they will have to buy more, MoD is the boss, even after saying that they will not place any more orders, there will still be trials for more.
Throughout your post your position is that media is somehow against T-90 which is incorret, its mostly col. Ajai Shukla right now, and before 2005 he openly criticised the Tank.
And eveyone knows that the Army doesnot want more than the 124 arjun MBTs, its not in doubt, the discussion is why should they take more, no one here or in the media can have any bearing on the final decision, this is just a discussion on what if and why should they, like the many carried out in online forums about what if we had kept on pushing forward in 1971 or why should some candidate win the indian idol etc. etc.
 
Last edited:

nitesh

Mob Control Manager
New Member
Joined
Feb 12, 2009
Messages
7,550
Likes
1,309
Similar is different from same. Can you tell me the difference between the killing capability of the LAHAT and the Refleks? They are the same in killing capability.
And I was thinking range do matters

Already answered in previous posts.
If I missed it sorry but can you please point me where you posted it

Yes. It will be rejected again. But, we are learning, aren't we?
What exactly is the point in wasting the resources then, this is a laughable statement to say at leasgt


We do not know how the next generation tank will be like. It could be smaller and lighter. Add stealth and automation too. So, 10 or 20 years down the line we may look at a completely new type of warfare.
I am not getting what you try to say by this

This is not pre independence days. We are living in a capitalist world. Every country on the planet wants to sell to India. Why would the army go indigenous by compromising on quality.
Are you trying to imply there is no need of domestic industry then as we can get everything from outside?
 

ppgj

New Member
Joined
Aug 13, 2009
Messages
2,029
Likes
168
The Kanchan Armor

September 24th, 2007

Kanchan armor is a composite armor also called sandwich armor. During the initial days, India had approached the British to co-develop a composite armor. British armor research was based in British tank research centre on Chobham Common, the reason the generic name Chobham armor for all such type of composite armor. The British were not favorable to the Indian proposal.

Development of a composite armor was earnestly taken up at Armour Design & Development Division at the Defence Metallurgical Research Laboratory (DMRL), Kanchan Bagh, Hyderabad. Like the British name Chobham, Kanchan Armor got its name from Kanchan Bagh.

Kanchan Armor uses the same principle as the Chobham armor, but the composition is different. It has Rolled Homogenous Armor (RHA) and composites. RHA is a type of steel sheet used as protection for the armored vehicles since World War II. Kanchan Armor has a composite panel sandwiched between RHA. The number of layers is decided based on the user requirement.

When a projectile is fired, the armor stops it via compression and de-compression method. As the projectile hits the armor, it faces compression because of the RHA, and then it faces decompression because of the composite. When the projectile passes through several such sandwiched layers, it breaks up the APFDS or HEAT shot. A HESH shot is ineffective against a spaced armor. It definitely will not go through a layered armor.

In 1980’s the Kanchan composite had a composition of ceramic, alumina, fiber glass and some other such materials mixed. The RHA tried out had two thicknesses, i.e. a 350 mm plate and a 315 m plate. However these two plates had the same weight as a 120mm RHA. Hence it is said that Kanchan armor is more volume at same weight. The anti-tank munitions have problems in penetrating denser mass.

This is the time when the Russian Tank T-72 imported by Indian Army could not penetrate the Kanchan Armor protected Arjun Tank , with APFDS at point blank range. Subsequently, the debate took place if the Russians had supplied us with training rounds rather than the actual ammunition. As a side note, in January 2000 at Proof & Experimental Establishment (PXE), Balasore, Arjun tank armor defeated all available HESH and FSAPDS rounds including Israeli FSAPDS rounds.

Back to 1980’s, after the T-72 incident, a 106 mm RCL gun was tried on the Arjun Tank. 106 RCL’s were effective anti-tank weapons those days. It played havoc on enemy tanks in 1971 war. The Kanchan armor defeated that too.

Kanchan armor composition has undergone massive changes since 1980’s. The volume of the RHA has been reduced to lesser mass because of better metallurgy. The composite has evolved too and it does not use the 1980’s technology anymore.

http://frontierindia.net/the-kanchan-armor/
 

Dark Sorrow

Respected Member
New Member
Joined
Mar 24, 2009
Messages
4,988
Likes
9,937
A Plan for Arjun

Posted by Broadsword,
1. I think that the conclusion that some visitors are drawing --- that everything Russian is bad --- amounts to overreaction to my articles. As one critic of the articles correctly posted, Russia has provided us systems that nobody else was willing to provide at prices that nobody else could match. Even if that was in the past, and Russia today adopts a far more hard-nosed, where-are-the-dollars approach towards arms sales to India, one would be ill-advised to forget history.

For example, one visitor posted about my article: “Did you read the parts that establish that the T-90 is at worst a piece of junk, or at best as good/bad as the obsolete T-72?” Well, I’d just point out that you are reading more into my account of the T-90 deal than I actually said. I certainly said that the deal was tailored to bypass parliamentary opposition, India ended up getting an under-equipped T-90 tank, important tank systems failed because they could not withstand exposure to the Indian environment, there were problems in transferring technology, and we have not yet managed to get the tank upgraded to the level that it should have been acquired in.

All that is true, yes! But also remember that, compared to the T-72, the T-90 is a much better tank. And, whether you like it or not, the T-90 will be in service with the Indian Army till at least 2040, maybe even 2050.

2. I also think that anyone who argues: scrap all Russian equipment and go Indian is fantasizing. Russian equipment is still the mainstay of our mechanised forces and, even if we adopt a conscious policy of Indianisation, it will be decades before Russian equipment serves out its life. Since we have to live with Russian systems for a long, long time, we need to identify which tanks we could phase out first, in what time frame we could retire them, and what we can upgrade and retain in service for a longer period.

3. A crucial step, in my opinion, will have to be doubling the rate of retirement of the obsolescent T-72s. One replacement stream is the T-90, being produced at the HVF, Avadi. A second stream of Arjuns must supplement this, for which the following broad process must begin:

(a) Increase Arjun tank production on an expanded assembly line, at the rate of 30, 40, and then 50 tanks per year in 2011, 2012 and 2013 respectively. Task CVRDE to ready the Arjun Mark II by 2013. By 2015 the Arjun production line at HVF MUST roll out 62 Arjun Mark II tanks per year (i.e. one regiment at full scale, including reserve tanks). By 2018, the Arjun Mark III must roll out. Each of these upgrades must have limited and realistic improvements, identified not from glossy magazines but through operational usage by Indian Army regiments.

(b) Alongside the Arjun Improvement Programme (AIP), which will handle the upgrade to Mark II and Mark III standards, work must commence by 2012 on the Future MBT programme. Two consortiums must compete in creating the design: a CVRDE-led consortium that can draw on the Arjun experience. And a private industry-led consortium, which is granted full access to the Arjun design experience, as well as to any other resources that they choose. The private industry consortium must be fully funded by the MoD, their budget in line with what the CVRDE-led consortium is permitted to spend.

(c) As Arjun tanks roll out, T-72M regiments must convert to the Arjun, those with older tanks first. The conversion will serve a two-fold purpose: firstly, the T-72 regiments that first convert to Arjuns, i.e. 4-5 regiments by 2015, need not be upgraded with TIFCS, etc. Secondly, the introduction of Arjuns into service, and the setting up of Arjun instructional cells at the Armoured Corps Centre & School, Ahmednagar, will start spreading an Arjun culture into an army where the opposition to the Arjun is based on an outdated impression of the tank --- on what it was, rather than what it is.

(d) The remaining T-72s need to be upgraded on priority. The ten-year-old process to upgrade them needs to be pushed through, if necessary by a high-voltage, public resignation by whoever the DGMF happens to be. By doing so, that officer will have done more for his arm than any of his recent predecessors; and will be remembered for much more than just “being a good chap”.

(e) By 2015, the DRDO, in collaboration with private industry, must produce and operationalise an Arjun Bridge Layer Tank (BLTs), an Arjun Trawl Tank, and the specialised maintenance vehicles that will be provided to each Arjun regiment. Production lines must cater for adequate scales of these.

(f) The process needs to be set in motion now for creating two Arjun overhaul facilities in the private sector. The first fifteen Arjuns will soon be due for overhaul and the HVF has proved unable to even handle the T-72 overhaul. Just as an RFI has been floated for creating T-72 overhaul facilities, the Arjun overhaul facilities must be kicked off immediately.
 

ppgj

New Member
Joined
Aug 13, 2009
Messages
2,029
Likes
168
http://164.100.47.5/newdebate/214/22102008/11.00amTo12.00Noon.pdf

look at what the minister sri. rao inderjit singh said to the parliament -

A GSQR 326 issued 1972 and the Prototype was ready in 1983. but in 1982 another GSQR was issued because of which a new tank was design was initiated accordingly.yet another GSQR 667 was issued in 1985 and the tank was ready in 1995! from the pre production series made available whatever problems army came across were solved and they were satisfied.
 

kuku

Respected Member
New Member
Joined
Mar 30, 2009
Messages
510
Likes
10
Country flag
A GSQR 326 issued 1972 and the Prototype Prototype was ready in 1983
would be nice to see the picture of this prototype if possible.
 

Articles

Top