ADA Tejas (LCA) News and Discussions

[Chinmoy]

There is an operational issue here which should be addressable.

Which operational issue you are talking of here?

 

[Rahul Singh]

Why can't we double or triple the production of tejas...
Just outsource all the parts,sub assemblies and HAL needs to integrate them...
Chinese are making 40-60 j-10 per year...

To out source you need to have vendors to cater to. Right now country lacks Tier 1,2 vendors and whatever few are there are around HAL only. Unfortunately situation won't change until we start producing 50-60 fighters of even various types together. Vendors will only put their money in setting up production unit if they are sure of good returns. Right now with meager order of just 80-100 Tejas MK-1 and 30-40 Sukhoi (that left to be produced) with combined rate of production at ~30-34 units does not present enough logic for many to jump into production of sections of a fighter be it Tejas or Sukhoi. The situation is not gonna change until we start producing major volume of aircraft. And that required volume will need support of substantial export order.

So all in all we lack a complete ecosystem. The situation won't change until we create large orders and industrial capability to cater to it. For that we will have to look towards producing over 90% of any aircraft locally which country buys. And i am happy that with new single engine purchase India will get another production line (a private one) besides HAL. Apart from this TATA-AIRBUS will produce C-295 which will give us another production line besides helping ecosystem to grow.

 

[kamaal]

SP3 undergoing testing in bengaluru..

 

[EXPERT]

[Here I am posting an article by an American author (Name at the end). The article contains very negative analysis (with very little positive analysis) of Indian capabilities as a fighter jet producer. I shall say that he is mocking Tejas. Strong heart needed to read. About: Tejas Mk1. Are you agreed with his views?]




T H E L I G H T W E I G H T C O M P O N E N T


THE TEJAS MARK 1

For many years, the IAF resisted the notion that the Tejas Mark 1 was an adequate combat

aircraft because of its myriad weaknesses. It accepted the lightweight fighter in small numbers

only in test units with a series of waivers to its desired requirements. The many shortcomings

of the aircraft are by now well-known: it was developed by civilian design bureaucracies—

primarily the Aeronautical Development Agency in collaboration with Hindustan

Aeronautics Limited—without any significant IAF input until very late in the engineering

and manufacturing development phase.

The net result was an aircraft that is overweight, possesses a suboptimal thrust-to-weight

ratio despite the heavy use of composites, has poor energy addition and a limited top speed,

and an egregious ergonomic design of the cockpit. Even the aircraft’s remarkable instantaneous

turn capability—superior to that of the MiG-21—does not compensate for the limitations

of its compound delta wing design, which, like other aircraft with similar planforms,

produces an extremely high airspeed bleed-off rate in any turning fight. As one Indian

engineer, Prodyut Das, savagely concluded, “We have a fairly mediocre fighter somewhere

between the Gnat F1 and the MiG-21 on our hands.”

For all of the shortcomings of the Tejas, what is perhaps most attractive to the government

of India right now is its supposedly low cost. The Tejas Mark 1 is advertised as costing

somewhere in the vicinity of $38 million apiece. If the development cost of the program

thus far—some $2.7 billion—is factored in, the unit cost of each aircraft rises to about $60

million, which if true would be about 72 percent of the price of the Gripen NG offered to

Norway in 2008. The publicized price of the Tejas, however, must be taken with a grain

of salt: senior Indian aerospace industry insiders expect that the aircraft will cost closer to

$50 million each and that its unit cost would actually rise to about $80 million when its

development bills are included. If true, the Tejas may end up being somewhat cheaper than

the least expensive foreign competitor on the horizon, the Gripen NG.

But the critical question that is as yet unanswerable is how much cheaper it would be, an issue

that bears fundamentally on the matter of cost effectiveness. Given the Gripen’s impressive

air combat capabilities, operational flexibility, and low operating and life-cycle costs,

it would be hard to make the case that the Tejas is, even at the low end of the cost range,

more than 72 percent as capable as its Swedish peer. That argument will become even more

untenable as the expenses of the ongoing rectification initiatives are added to the overall

development costs of the Light Combat Aircraft program. At $80 million per unit, the cost

effectiveness of the Tejas as compared to the Gripen NG disappears almost entirely, leaving

the IAF with a fighter in its inventory that is pricey, hard to maintain, and ultimately

suboptimal for the swing-role mission.

In any event, the lure of lower costs, however marginal the difference, appears to have

swayed the Modi government’s decision in favor of the Tejas. This accountant’s approach

to force modernization may be understandable, given the fiscal pressures on the Indian defense

budget, but it hardly meets the test of cost effectiveness, let alone mission superiority. Despite the

fact that it is still not obvious whether the domestic manufacturer, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited,

has the production capability to build the Tejas Mark 1 in the numbers required annually, the Ministry

of Defense has obliged the IAF to acquire six squadrons of this improved version to replace the

early model MiG-21s that will be retired in a few years. This translates into 126 aircraft, with

108 deployed in squadron service and the rest stored as maintenance, attrition, and war

wastage reserves.

Because no other alternatives appear to be viable, acquiring some 100-odd upgraded Tejas Mark

1s seemed to be the best solution that the government of India could come up with at this

point, despite the IAF’s well-founded and continuing reservations about the aircraft’s

performance. Some of the limitations of the Tejas will be addressed through specific fixes: it

appears that the final production version will be equipped for air-to-air refueling; will have an

Israeli active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, the EL/M- 2052, as its principal sensor; and

will be equipped with an Israeli weapons suite, consisting of Python short-range infrared-guided

and Derby long-range active radar-guided air-to-air missiles, besides various other free-fall

and precision-guided air-to-ground munitions.

With such improvements, the Tejas Mark 1 could be transformed into a serviceable fighter,

thirty years after its conception, but its aerodynamic deficiencies will almost certainly be

harder to correct. The claims from early 2016, as reported in the Indian newspaper Tribune,

that remediation engineering will produce an aircraft that is “1,000 [kilograms] lighter than

the existing version” are simply laughable. Consequently, it is still too early to declare, as

one unidentified Indian defense official did in an interview with the Times of India, that

the Tejas “will be more than able to outgun the similar JF-17, which Pakistan is acquiring

with China’s help,” let alone surpass the Chinese J-10, which has also turned out to be an

impressive lightweight fourth-generation combatant.

Whether the Tejas ends up being superior to such comparable adversaries will depend on

many things, especially the aircraft’s flight performance; the quality of the situational awareness

enjoyed by its pilot, which hinges in substantial measure on its radar detection and

tracking range and the effectiveness of its integration with other onboard and offboard

sensors; the quality of its air-to-air weaponry, including their maximum kinematic range

and, more important, the size of their no-escape zone, the effectiveness of their guidance

systems, and their levels of electronic protection; as well as the sophistication of the aircraft’s

air-to-ground munitions and their associated targeting systems; and the sophistication of its

defensive avionics suites.

There are reasons for concern in some of these areas. A detailed evaluation of the Tejas as

an air-to-air fighter, both intrinsically and in relation to its rivals, cannot be undertaken

here, but the following issues are worth considering. For starters, it is unlikely that the

aircraft’s thrust and maximum speed can be dramatically improved at this juncture because

its General Electric F404 engine unfortunately cannot be replaced by the advanced General

Electric F414-INS6 successor without major modifications to the airframe—and, by implication,

without further delays in acquiring an aircraft that is unlikely to complete entering

service before the first quarter of this century. A high top speed is irrelevant for close-in

maneuvering, but it can make a huge difference in a fighter’s ability to engage and disengage

at will; a high thrust-to-weight ratio, meanwhile, is desirable, especially in maneuvering

air-to-air combat, because it affects a fighter’s climbing, acceleration, and sustained G performance,

giving it great advantages especially in the vertical plane and allowing it to regain

energy quickly after high-G maneuvers. The Tejas’s limited top speed and thrust-to-weight

ratio in particular will force the IAF to develop air combat tactics that minimize its vulnerabilities—

the latter especially in regard to vertical performance—given that the aircraft will

have to live with the General Electric F404 engine permanently. This is especially true given

that the IAF has decided to drop the Mark 2 variant, which was supposed to be powered by

the General Electric F414-INS6 engine; instead, all the Tejas fighters, in both Mark 1 and

Mark 1A variants, will be powered only by the General Electric F404.

Complicating matters further, the performance of the Israeli EL/M-2052 radar, the successor

to the EL/M-2032 that now equips the Tejas, is unknown because the system is still in

development. If the Tejas is to be able to pull off successful first-look, first-shot, first-kill air

engagements against comparable opponents without airborne warning and control system

(AWACS) support, its EL/M-2052 radar will have to perform significantly better than the

EL/M-2032 radar does in comparison to KLJ-7 radar that equips all fourth-generation

Chinese-origin fighters. Of particular concern is the troubling report that the EL/M-2052

radar, which Elta is supposed to co-develop with India’s Defense Research and Development

Organization, might already have been transferred to (or stolen by) China—a development

that, if true, could imply future transfers of some of its key capabilities to Pakistan.

The decision to equip the Tejas with the EL/M-2052, rather than some alternative

such as the U.S. Scalable Agile Beam Radar (SABR) or the Raytheon Advanced Combat

Radar (RACR)—both AESA radar systems—was apparently reached because Elta offered

the Defense Research and Development Organization the prospect of co-development.

While it is hoped that this gamble will pay off over time, the fact remains that the EL/M-

2052 is a developmental AESA radar that is not yet fielded on any combat aircraft, let alone

on Israel’s own fighters that are equipped largely, though not exclusively, with U.S. sensors

and weapons.

In comparison, the Israeli weapons suite intended for the Tejas offers more promising prospects.

The Derby active radar-guided air-to-air missile that will be the aircraft’s primary

beyond-visual-range weapon is excellent, with superb electronic protection features and a

range of pulse repetition frequencies that provide high accuracy in the intercept endgame.

But it is shorter-ranged than the comparable active missiles carried by Chinese fighters, the

Chinese PL-12, and by Pakistani fighters, the U.S. AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range

Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM). The versions already in Indian employ do not have a data

link, which presumably will be added as it is integrated with the Tejas’s EL/M-2052 radar.

These limitations will matter less in short-range engagements, but in the AWACS-supported

beyond-visual-range combat that will increasingly become the norm in southern Asia,

they could turn out to be costly. The Python 4 within-visual-range missile that the Tejas

is likely to carry, in contrast, outclasses anything India’s adversaries can bring to a close-in

fight, and the Israeli display and sight helmet (DASH) mounted sight will enable Indian pilots

to target adversaries in the beam or in other difficult geometries without having to pivot

the entire aircraft. Success in maneuvering combat, however—especially when it involves

multiple adversaries—is as much a product of comparative pilot proficiency and luck as it

is a function of technological superiority. The odds of success in this aerial combat regime,

therefore, will increase greatly if the Tejas is gradually armed with the even better Python

5, a weapon with significant range and countermeasure advantages over all the short-range

air-to-air missiles now carried by Chinese and Pakistani combatants.

Finally, the Tejas’s defensive avionics will need appropriate improvement if the aircraft is to

dominate the kind of combat to be expected in the future. The aircraft’s electronic warfare

suite has the four basic subsystems—a radar warning receiver, a missile approach warning

system, chaff and flares, and an automated countermeasures dispensing system—carried by

modern fighters, except for an onboard self-protection jammer. The solution now settled

upon seems to be a podded system, mostly likely the EL/L-8222, which is already carried

by several other IAF fighters. The EL/L-8222 is an excellent narrowband digital radio

frequency memory (DRFM) system. It is almost certainly superior to the Chinese KG300

DRFM-based jammer, which equips the JF-17; whether it surpasses the defensive avionics

system on the J-10 is unclear.

In any event, coping with Chinese airborne electronic warfare capabilities will be the test

facing the EL/L-8222, because although Pakistani capabilities are modest, the equivalent

Chinese threat is not. China’s airborne electronic warfare investments are enormous, with

diverse and often high-powered systems equipping fighter aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles,

and dedicated standoff jammer aircraft; they have also historically profited immensely

from both Russian and Israeli technology. A key component of Tejas modernization will,

therefore, have to include focused investments in upgrading its electronic warfare suites

to keep up with the Chinese fighters and combat support aircraft it is likely to encounter.

The critical issue here, however, is not simply improving specific components such as the radar

warning receiver or the missile approach warning systems or the self-protection jammer.

More important, the entire defensive avionics suite needs to be sufficiently integrated with the

new EL/M-2052 AESA radar to enable those jam-and-search, jam and-track, & jam-and-shoot

capabilities that would give it the upper hand in the face of its other maneuvering and energy state

deficiencies in air combat.

All this adds up to the sobering conclusion

that the Tejas has potential but that it is a

mixed bag. Accordingly, the Indian government

should be cautious about pushing

ahead with plans to acquire more than the six squadrons currently authorized until the

shortcomings of the aircraft as an aerodynamic platform and as a combat system are satisfactorily

addressed. Of those two deficiencies, the combat system may be easier to fix: the

IAF at least has the option of selecting the SABR or the RACR at some future point if the

EL/M-2052 does not deliver according to expectations, and the U.S. government has released

the AMRAAM for integration with the Tejas if India seeks to acquire this weapon in

addition to the Derby. Such a shift, however, is likely to be both time-consuming and costly,

and so one can only hope that the contemplated Israeli systems work as advertised. The

integration of any sophisticated AESA radar would transform the Tejas into at least a useful

standoff air intercept platform, especially when operating over Indian territory or above the

interstitial battlefields in southern Asia. Even with improvements, however, it is unlikely to

ever become a sophisticated air superiority fighter capable of operating in depth or successfully

against high-end opponents. But if its problems can be sufficiently corrected to allow

its acquisition in larger numbers—say, twelve squadrons, a prospect with which the IAF is

extremely uncomfortable, and for good reason—the shortcomings in the IAF’s lightweight

fighter force could arguably be mitigated, albeit with a compromise in capabilities in regard

to the all-weather point air defense and strike missions.

Serious problems would arise, however, if efforts to improve the Tejas fail to yield a satisfactory

outcome, because that would leave the service with a huge gap at the low end of

the force, given the hopes that this aircraft could still come to serve as the IAF’s principal

short-range air defense fighter and the backbone of its light multirole component. In such

circumstances, the IAF would be compelled to consider further expanding the medium (30

tons or less) and heavyweight (40 tons or less) segments of the combat aircraft inventory.

Such an outcome would bring considerable increases in war fighting capability, but at much

higher costs at exactly the time when the service is struggling to find the resources to fund

its medium-weight aircraft requirements as well as its future heavy acquisitions.

Author: Ashley J. Tellis

Source Article: TROUBLES, THEY COME IN BATTALIONS

Subject/About: The Manifold Travails of the Indian Air Force

© 2016 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Here its more like he is pushing for Israel products. Whatever we developed is a milestone for us. Every single person in india knows that Tejas is not that capable but we are trying hard. Hopefully we will outclass your fucking F-16's in near Future..

 

[Rahul Singh]

SP3 undergoing testing in bengaluru..

Proper word should be trials, not tests.

 

[Certified Gipsy]

Here its more like he is pushing for Israel products. Whatever we developed is a milestone for us. Every single person in india knows that Tejas is not that capable but we are trying hard. Hopefully we will outclass your fucking F-16's in near Future..

Tejas is capable of doing everything and even more than what it was originally conceived to replace. It is almost becoming a Gripen equivalent now.

 

[Certified Gipsy]

SP3 undergoing testing in bengaluru..

How does one know what SP series the jet is?

 

[Rahul Singh]

How does one know what SP series the jet is?

If you could read trail number; it should read LA 5003 for SP3 and L.A. 5002 for
SP 2.

 

[kamaal]

Proper word should be trials, not tests.

Thik ba Rahul saheb, humka laga "Trial" and "Test" me difference naahi hot hai.

 

[Certified Gipsy]

I apologize if this has been already posted in this thread. I think it is a very good piece.

Demolishing some Tejas's Falsehoods.

https://www.reddit.com/r/india/comments/4r5hgo/demolishing_some_lca_tejas_falsehoods/

 

[Rahul Singh]

Thik ba Rahul saheb, humka laga "Trial" and "Test" me difference naahi hot hai.

A developer does tests,an user does trials. Just this much

Tejas is capable of doing everything and even more than what it was originally conceived to replace. It is almost becoming a Gripen equivalent now.

It is gripen equivalent. Only place it scores less is internal volume because of shorter fuselage: Tejas is 13.2 m and Gripen C is 14.1 m.

 

[Defcon 1]

I apologize if this has been already posted in this thread. I think it is a very good piece.

Demolishing some Tejas's Falsehoods.

https://www.reddit.com/r/india/comments/4r5hgo/demolishing_some_lca_tejas_falsehoods/

The article itself has many falsehoods. Such articles promoting falsehoods do more damage to LCA program than good.
Some top issues with the article are as follows:
1. The article states that EFT's first flight was in 1986, but conveniently omits that the program itself was started in 1983, same year as that of LCA and 1986 flight was just that of TD, Prototype flew in 1994. On the other hand, LCA started in 1983 and TD flew in 2001.
2. The article seeks to defend LCA program by suggesting disruptions due to nuclear tests, but ignores even bigger disruptions in European fighter programs due to end of cold war.
3. The article ridicules EFT for not having operational AESA (true when the article was written), but ignores that even LCA MK1 doesn't have it, and the same argument can be used to ridicule Mk1 in future. Anyways, there is nothing like "definitive version" of EFT that should have been come with AESA as the article claims.
4. The article ridicules IAF for inducting short legged fighters/bombers like Su7, Mig 21 and Jaguar, without understanding the simple fact that those were inducted decades ago and IAF is not inducting short legged fighters anymore now that it has access to heavier platforms. LCA will become the most short legged fighter in the fleet once the legacy planes are retired.


Having said that, the spirit of the article is right, while I don't agree with the way they have compared development cost of Kaveri with other nations, they are right to suggest that for programs like LCA, we must not judge them on the basis of shallow accomplishments, in terms of time to get FOC and numbers produced. LCA has successfully built a combat aircraft R&D, testing, production centre in India and resulted in development of various subsystems, which have diverse applications, producing a host of benefits for the nation. The AMCA and FGFA programs would unthinkable without an LCA. The R&D effort on LCA will not stop with FOC, but go with Mk1A, Mk2, NLCA MK2, and probably even Mk2. Those are the bigger and true achievements of LCA program.

 

[charlie]

Which operational issue you are talking of here?

There won't be one but hundreds of operational issues that has to be sorted out and that happens in every system not just aircraft, tejas is not an exception and you would see an customer support building next to the first squadron.

 

[Chinmoy]

There won't be one but hundreds of operational issues that has to be sorted out and that happens in every system not just aircraft, tejas is not an exception and you would see an customer support building next to the first squadron.

The first issue that need to short out is number of ordered aircraft. With a meager order of 120, you can't expect integrator or manufacturer to open up production line after line to cater your need.

 

[charlie]

The first issue that need to short out is number of ordered aircraft. With a meager order of 120, you can't expect integrator or manufacturer to open up production line after line to cater your need.

I think it's more of a political answer rather then technical

 

[rohit b3]

The first issue that need to short out is number of ordered aircraft. With a meager order of 120, you can't expect integrator or manufacturer to open up production line after line to cater your need.

The order of 40 was small. However an order of 120 is nowhere near meager.

 

[Chinmoy]

The order of 40 was small. However an order of 120 is nowhere near meager.

When you take into account the number in terms of production, its definitely small. Fighter Aircraft assembly line is not something like commercial planes assembly. You might have noticed that many of the fighters assembly line does close down after a certain period of time unlike commercial jets. A good example is of Mirage.
Although the sub assembly could go on for as long as the particular fighter is flying, provided customer wants the spare, but the main production line would close down once the order is fulfilled. Now for any one to spend Crores in setting up of multiple production line for a number of 120 is very much unlikely although HAL had committed on setting up of two lines.

 

[wuzetian]

When you take into account the number in terms of production, its definitely small. Fighter Aircraft assembly line is not something like commercial planes assembly. You might have noticed that many of the fighters assembly line does close down after a certain period of time unlike commercial jets. A good example is of Mirage.
Although the sub assembly could go on for as long as the particular fighter is flying, provided customer wants the spare, but the main production line would close down once the order is fulfilled. Now for any one to spend Crores in setting up of multiple production line for a number of 120 is very much unlikely although HAL had committed on setting up of two lines.

I hope HAL has two production lines acting as lead tester and integrator . My dream is to see 250 plus Tejas of all versions flying with IAF as well as IN .

 

[Abhishek Shrivastava]

The order of 40 was small. However an order of 120 is nowhere near meager.

Ok, But as per Tejas FB page GOI/IAF only ordered 20 Aircrafts only. Sad but truth is IAF/GOI not willing to have LCA in larger numbers.

 

[Kunal Biswas]

1. The difference here is not just about the concept but prototype as well as funding, Similar generations for example the latest imported hardware is actually conceived in late 70s with prototyping and got funded in next half decade or so unlike Tejas.

2. We are talking about a third world country such as India who depend on other nation for material technology back then and even today to some extend, Very unlikely the case with first world countries, Their development phases and technological access is proof of it. T

3. MK1P/A is a version of MK1, Their is nothing new abt it.

4. The so call short legged is work horse of Indian Airforce operational doctorine both in peace and war, Even today their are more sorties done by MIG-21 than SU-30MKI, In future it will remain so as IAF as the number suggest.

The arguments here by you are not well researched.

The article itself has many falsehoods. Such articles promoting falsehoods do more damage to LCA program than good.
Some top issues with the article are as follows:
1. The article states that EFT's first flight was in 1986, but conveniently omits that the program itself was started in 1983, same year as that of LCA and 1986 flight was just that of TD, Prototype flew in 1994. On the other hand, LCA started in 1983 and TD flew in 2001.
2. The article seeks to defend LCA program by suggesting disruptions due to nuclear tests, but ignores even bigger disruptions in European fighter programs due to end of cold war.
3. The article ridicules EFT for not having operational AESA (true when the article was written), but ignores that even LCA MK1 doesn't have it, and the same argument can be used to ridicule Mk1 in future. Anyways, there is nothing like "definitive version" of EFT that should have been come with AESA as the article claims.
4. The article ridicules IAF for inducting short legged fighters/bombers like Su7, Mig 21 and Jaguar, without understanding the simple fact that those were inducted decades ago and IAF is not inducting short legged fighters anymore now that it has access to heavier platforms. LCA will become the most short legged fighter in the fleet once the legacy planes are retired.