WAR 1971

[Tamil]

pakistan kicked east pakistan but after renaming into bangladesh ,this ppl again joined with pakistan so india wasted her resources for fighting for east pak freedom but they never had any thing good towards india

its not our matter to talk. its their own faith. we already get a shot by 1971, so just leave. if they wish to forgive them its their wish. with out punishing of 90,000 POW is our mistake. not theirs.

 

[Vinod2070]

There was a Genocide,but our official figure of 3 million is quite unbelieveable.Now there is a mixture of emotion and hatred in that number.

I am elaborating it:

1.After Sheikh Mujib was released from Pakistan,he initially said 1 million in London.But when he stepped in Bangladesh,he said its 3 million.

2.There are reports that Sheikh Mujib mixed up "1 lakh" with "1 million".And it is possible.

3.Killing 3 million in 9 months is quite difficult for an invading army,when Freedom Fighters were a constant trouble to them.

4.We did not find that many mass graves.But that might be because Pakistan army killed and then threw the bodies into river.The eyewitnesses speak of "water turning Red".

With all those estimates,my conclusion is actual number of death ranges between 300000 to 1000000.Now that's my conclusion.So I hope nobody will fume over it.

Why didn't you guys do a thorough study of the real numbers? Why not invite international experts and get it resolved once and for all. This confusion is quite ridiculous and it helps many Pakistanis to remain in a state of denial about the genocide itself.

So Pakistan should give a formal apology to us,and then we can all go back again as brothers.Because that is the only way forward.

That will be quite a feat. Yes, Pakistan should own up to its misdeeds to get this to a closure. Trouble is, I don't think they are capable of that. They would rather be in a state of denial and try to sweep it under the carpet by talking of "Indian hand", atrocities from both sides etc.

 

[Vinod2070]

I remember reading a news article that a women was violated for more than 50 times in one night before she succumbed to death.

But it was an Indian woman who let us down.I am talking about Sharmila Bose.

I am not sure why so much credence is given to Sarmila Bose. She is a nobody. Her so called study was not even scientific.

Why don't we have Bangladeshi scholars leading debates on this issue? It is your responsibility above everyone else.

 

[leonblack08]

I am not sure why so much credence is given to Sarmila Bose. She is a nobody. Her so called study was not even scientific.

Why don't we have Bangladeshi scholars leading debates on this issue? It is your responsibility above everyone else.

She is given so much of importance because she did the survey when everything was still hot.So her words count.We protested and still protest her verdict,but through her Pakistan got one chance to deny the war crimes.

 

[Vinod2070]

She is given so much of importance because she did the survey when everything was still hot.So her words count.We protested and still protest her verdict,but through her Pakistan got one chance to deny the war crimes.

I thought that she did the survey decades later. When did she do her survey?

All I know is that she walked the streets of those areas and reached her conclusions. She has written other pro Pakistani articles too and I doubt her neutrality. Pakistanis obviously take her words as holy, if she had said that Pakistanis were guilty then she would be another Indian agent out to malign Pakistan!

Still the fact remains that it is the Bangladeshis who are most responsible for making their voice heard on this issue. They should be the ones who should be experts, not other countries. If she is wrong, Bagladeshi experts should step forward and prove it so instead of sitting back and blaming her.

 

[I-G]

US role in 1971 B'desh independence war 'tragic mistake': Envoy

Updated on Thursday, September 03, 2009, 09:02 IST Tags:US, role, 1971, Bangladesh, independence, war, mistake, US

Dhaka: America's role in opposing the 1971 emergence of Bangladesh was a "tragic mistake", a top US envoy has said.

"Senator Kennedy helped my country to correct the mistake back in 1971 and we expressed that by quickly recognising Bangladesh," US Ambassador in Dhaka James F Moriarty said while speaking at a memorial meeting on Edward Kennedy at the Liberation War Museum here yesterday.


"I think we expressed that view by very quickly recognising Bangladesh after the end of the war. I think you all will recall that we were one of the first countries to recognise Bangladesh," Moriarty said.

The then US administration under President Richard Nixon and secretary of state Henry Kissinger sided with Pakistani military junta during the nine-month Liberation war, crucially backed by India.

The US media largely, several influential US senators including Kennedy widely supported the Bangladesh’s cause when Washington preferred to support Pakistan as Kissinger was engaged in a reconciliation dialogue with Communist China with active mediation of Islamabad.

Several state department officials in Washington, Dhaka and New Delhi too tended to support Bangladesh but several of them was exposed to wraths of Kissinger while one of them Archar Blood, the then US consular general in Dhaka eventually lost his career for his role in support of Independence struggle at that time.

But Moriarty said his country now wanted to look at each country individually and "We don't look at you as a former part of Pakistan or Bangladesh and Pakistan as former parts of India".

Recalling Kennedy's visit to refugee camps in West Bengal, Moriarty said Kennedy drew the attention of the world to the humanitarian disaster for the first time.

"Senator Kennedy's visit and continued support for Bangladesh's independence has a great impact on public opinion. I have no doubt that his efforts led to the early recognition of Bangladesh by the US," Moriarty added.

He said Ted Kennedy's visit to Dhaka in February 1972 was one of the first visits to an independent Bangladesh by an international leader.

"The events, as we have seen this week, bonded Ted Kennedy with the people of this country in a deep way and Senator Kennedy will live on in the hearts of the people of Bangladesh," Moriarty said.

Bureau Report


US role in 1971 B`desh independence war `tragic mistake`: Envoy

 

[leonblack08]

Rereading an account of a long-ago war
Mumtaz Iqbal takes a critical look at a soldier's tale

Surrender At Dhaka
Birth of a Nation
Lt.Gen. JFR Jacob


Retired Indian Lt. Gen. J.F.R. Jacob is a tactful guest. Invited by COAS Gen. Moeen U Ahmed for the 26 March celebrations, a nice gesture, Jacob at a press conference complimented Bangladeshis by saying that “freedom fighters' gallantry… liberated Bangladesh from Pakistan occupation.”

Jacob is an accomplished soldier and author. His book is a valuable account of the events leading to the fall of Dhaka (spelt as Dacca in 1971) because Jacob was an insider.

The book's value lies not so much in the campaign detailsthese are well-covered in Victory in Bangladesh by Maj. Gen. Lachman Singh Lehl but in anecdotes and vignettes about people and Jacob's candid assessment and opinion about events and personalities.

Perhaps Jacob's most revealing information is the details on the effective logistics build-up that he and others rightly consider to be “…the critical factor in the success of the campaign” (p. 78-83). Hadn't Napoleon said that an army marches on its stomach? Constructing roads, upgrading signals and other forms of communications, collecting vehicles, transporting stores (54,000 tons), getting bridging equipment, moving ammunitionall these and myriad other requirements for waging war successfully were in place before hostilities commenced.

Jacob rightly claims credit for this impressive achievement. He took a risk and started stockpiling by end-May 1971 even before receiving Army HQ's (AHQ) operating instruction and without briefing Aurora. When Aurora later found out, he wanted to suspend work till the op instruction arrived. Jacob with difficulty prevailed upon him to let logistics preparations continue.

This episode is symptomatic of the uneasy Aurora-Jacob relationship. The COS seems to have had little time for his GOC-in-C. Jacob makes the remarkable contention that he couldn't brief Aurora on the logistics preparation because the latter was “…involved in advising the Mukti Bahini and spent time touring.” These activities kept Aurora so busy that Jacob was “…left to get on with the planning, both operational and logistic, for the regular Army.” (P.64).

This astonishing observation doesn't exactly flatter Aurora though Jacob maintains he got on well with his boss despite this and other differences (p.155), nor is it a particularly edifying example of a smooth Commander/COS relationship based on mutual confidence.

Though Jacob fulsomely praises India's Chief of Army Staff, Gen. (later Field Marshal) S.H.F.J. Manekshaw (p.153-54), he berates him for putting the capture of the ports of Chittagong and Khulna, and other territory, ahead of the capital Dhaka as the strategic objective in AHQ's operating instruction and 13 December 1971 directive to Eastern Command (p. 65-67; 159).

Jacob graphically describes the conference in early August 1971 in Fort William's war room to discuss AHQ's instruction. Manekshaw, Aurora and Director of Military

Operations Maj. Gen (later Lt. Gen.) K.K. Singh adamantly rejected Jacob's forceful recommendation that Dhaka should be the strategic objective. Jacob quotes Manekshaw:

“Sweetie, don't you see that if we take Khulna and Chittagong, Dacca will automatically fall.” (“Sweetie” was the loaded endearment the COAS used before proceeding to rebuke). Jacob stuck to his guns. But his superiors were unmoved.

Jacob provides a tantalising peek into Delhi's vacillation on the timing of Indian military intervention in Bangladesh. In early April 1971, Manekshaw at a cabinet meeting used astute arguments and with some difficulty managed to convince Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of the unpreparedness and inadvisability of the Indian army intervening forthwith (Appendix 6 gives Manekshaw's amusingly candid account of this meeting).

Jacob corroborates Manekshaw's account. In the beginning of April, Manekshaw had rung up Jacob to say that the government wanted Eastern Command “…to move immediately into East Pakistan”. Jacob protested, observing that he “…could be ready earliest by 15 November”.

“Upset and impatient” at this answer, Manekshaw called Jacob the next day to say “…senior bureaucrats were accusing the Army of being over-cautious, if not cowardly”. Jacob reiterated his position and praises Manekshaw for having the “…courage to uphold our (Eastern Command) stand”. (p.36).

What is puzzling in this exchange is that Aurora, Jacob's boss, figures nowhere in it!

The matter on intervention did not end there. Jacob sardonically recalls a visit shortly thereafter by a Border Security Force (BSF) delegation led by its Director General FK Rustomjee. He informed Jacob that Delhi had tasked BSF to throw out the Pakistanis since Eastern Command would not do so. Would Jacob please send a contingent to take part in the Victory Parade BSF planned to hold in Dhaka two or three weeks hence?

Jacob laughed, told Rustomjee that he was out of his depth and politely ushered him out (p.37).

What is one to make of these accounts, especially the quixotic BSF episode? It is reasonable to assume that policy makers in Delhi, like many others, did not have

a clear grasp in early April 1971 of what was happening inside East Pakistan. Mrs. Gandhi's government was puzzled and unsure about the quality and magnitude of military posture and response ((See Muldhara.'71 by Muyeedul Hasan, one of the finest accounts of the liberation movement, including a critical analysis of Indian policy deliberations)

Jacob's graphic account of the background events and climactic negotiations, where he played a major role, leading to Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi's surrender on 16 December 1971 is absolutely fascinating (p.129-148). He records Niazi and Indian Maj. Gen. G.C. Nagra, who knew Niazi while defence attache in Islamabad, constantly cracking bawdy jokes in Punjabi (many of which Maj. (later Maj. Gen) Siddiq Salek in his book Witness to Surrender says are unprintable) while negotiating surrender with the Indians in Niazi's Kurmitola ops room! This is an interesting insight into Niazi's tortuous character and an intriguing reaction of a defeated general under stress.

On the Mukti Bahini (MB), Jacob considers that operation Jackpot, the code name for guerrilla operations inside Bangladesh, probably could have been even more effective had fewer (about 8,000) but more intensively trained fighters been deployed rather than the 100,000 or so that were actually recruited. However, this does not stop Jacob from praising the MB's performance, judging their contribution to be “…a crucial element in the operations prior to and during full-scale hostilities.” (p.94).

The one occasion Jacob ventures into diplomacy, and gets roundly snubbed, is around 18 December 1971 when running into External Affairs Policy Planning Chief late D.P. Dharthe suave architect of India's Bangladesh policy--at Dum Dum Airport, Kolkata. Jacob suggested that India should get Bangladesh to agree on “three essentials”: guarantees for the Hindu minority; rationalisation of the enclaves and transit rights by rail and inland waterways through Bangladesh with the use of facilities at Chittagong Port.” Dhar smiled and in effect told Jacob to mind his own business (p.99).

These three items form an intriguing menu for Indo-Bangladesh diplomacy. The last item is of course a hot button issue of some vintage between Dhaka and Delhi.

Jacob makes interesting assertions about his role in the Bangladesh liberation movement.

Thus, he clams to have suggested to Bangladesh leaders around the first week or so of

April 1971 to “proclaim a Provisional Government…like the Free French Government … (of) de Gaulle” and even prepared the related draft declaration which he gave to Tajuddin (p. 41).

Again, Jacob claims credit for initiating the first contact in early April 1971 with diplomat Deputy High Commissioner Hossain Ali in Kolkata which resulted in Ali and his staff switching allegiance to Bangladesh on 18 April 1971. The interesting point here is that Jacob did not inform Manekshaw or Aurora before taking this initiative (p.41-42). This strains credulity.

These and other claims in this readable and informative narrative suggest that modesty is not necessarily one of Jacob's strengths. The book makes transparent Jacob's disappointment that his accomplishments were not sufficiently recognised or rewarded.


:The Daily Star: Internet Edition

 

[leonblack08]

16th August 1971 : "Operation Jackpot"
​

Although during the nine months of the liberation war,a number of military operation by Indian armed forces was code named "Operation Jackpot".But the one we will be discussing here is about the Bangladeshi naval commando operation,which destroyed tonnes of Pakistani shipping anchored at Bangladeshi docks in a simultaneous attack.

The outcome of this particular operation was very significant.

Firstly,it busted the myth of "East Pakistan was under control".The world came to know more about the situation in East Pakistan.

Secondly,it deprived Pakistan army off valuable logistical support.With air-drop option already cut down by India,it was a major set back for the occupying Pakistani troops.

Thirdly,it certainly boosted the morale of Freedom fighters who were already high on spirit and patriotism.If the war from March 26th to August was won by Pakistani army,it can certainly be said that this operation turned the tide.


Prologue

Bangladesh naval commando operation actually originated at Toulon, a coastal city of Southern France. In 1971, there were 11 naval crews of East Pakistan who were receiving training in a Pakistani submarine. Among them, only one commissioned officer (Mosharraf Hassain) and 8 crews decided to take the submarine and to fight against Pakistani. However, their plan was disclosed and they had to ran away under severe death threats from Pakistani intelligence. Out of these 9 crews, one were killed by Pakistani Intelligence and rest of the 8 managed to travel to Indian Embassy in Geneva, Switzerland. From Geneva, Indian Embassy took them to New Delhi on the 9th of April at 9:30 a.m. and set up a top secret naval training for them.


Planning

At the conclusion of Operation Searchlight, the Pakistani Army had driven the Mukti Bahini into India, where they entered a period of reorganization during June and July 1971 to train guerrillas, set up networks and safe houses in the occupied territories to run the insurgency and rebuild the conventional forces. As the pace of military operations in East Pakistan slacked off, the civilian morale was adversely affected, which prompted Pakistani authorities to claim that the situation had returned to "normal".

In response to this declaration, the Mukti Bahini launched 2 operations:

1) Guerrilla attacks in targets in Dhaka by a crack commando group trained by Major ATM Haider (ex-SSG commando).

2) the simultaneous mining and damaging of ships in Chittagong, Chandpur, Mongla and Narayanganj on the 15th of August, which became known in Bangladesh and international media as "Operation Jackpot".Now among naval commandos included Bengali sailors who defected from Pakistan navy and off course the civilians.From students to workers to farmers.


Preparation

Indian commander Bhattachariya, major Jalil and Colonel M.A.G. Osmani in collaboration with top regional commanders established the secret camp codenamed C2P in Plassy, West Bengal on May 23, to train volunteers selected from various Mukti Bahini sectors (Bangladesh was divided in 10 operational sectors for Mukti Bahini operations) for this purpose. Initially 300 volunteers were chosen, ultimately 499 commandos were trained in the camp. The course included swimming, survival training, using limpet mines, hand to hand combat and navigation. By August 1971, the first batch of commandos were ready for operation.

Mosharraf Hossain,who was probably a Commodore in the Independent Bangladesh Navy later on.It nice listening to the details of the operation from him.I am just writing down some details,hope my memory doesn't betray me.

The operation was an extremely dangerous one,actually it was a "suicide mission".How often one see such a large suicide squad,except may be for the Japanese in WW2.
It was suicidal,as they had to attach limpet mines to their body and swim to the ships.Then there was the threat of triggering alarm and then get caught.Which meant certain death by torture.
Every naval commando had accepted that this was a suicidal mission,yet they decided to volunteer.
He mentions one particular case,where he even had to make one freedom fighter learn to swim and then given commando training.When asked,he said,"He was at the war longer than me,I was at France,but he was there from the word go".

The Operation

The operation was planned in the last week of September, under tight security. Information on river tides, weather and Pakistani infrastructure and deployment was collected through the Mukti Bahini.Even the commanding Generals,General M A G Osmani,Admiral Nanda and General Aurora were not informed about when the operation will take place.

Selected commandos were sent from C2P to forward bases in Tripura and West Bengal, where a final briefing was given to them.
Mukti Bahini in Sector 1 assisted the group going to Chittagong,
Sector 2 aided the groups going to Chandpur and Naryanganj and
Sector 9 assisted the group targeting Mongla.
Each commando carried a pair of fins, a knife, a limpet mine, and swimming trunks. Some had compasses, 1 in 3 commandos had sten guns and hand grenades, the group leaders carried a transistor radio. All the groups carried their own equipment to their targets and after entering Bangladesh between August 3/9, reached their destinations by August 12th, using the local Mukti Bahini network of safe houses. A pair of songs was played in India Radio (Akashbani)at specific times to convey the intended signal for commencing the operations. The first song (Amar putul ajke prothom jabe shoshur bari) was played on the 13th of August, the second song (Ami tomay joto shuniyechilem gan tar bodole chaini kono dan) on the 14th.

One extract from the account of a naval commando.

the naval commandos had evaded all precautions of the occupation army under the disguise of ardent visitors to the locally famous shrine of Muhsin Auliya and crossed the river under their nose to reach village Gahira to target the ships at outer anchorage. Farid had fastened a 6 kg.heavy limpet mine on his chest and before plunging into the roaring water requested his leader-friend Faruq-i-Azam to read with him the kalima. It was a daring operation and Farid and his friends were wading back-stroke towards the target with cheers. Soon they faced an attack on their bare body from a concentration of shrimps in the whirling water of the confluence and four of them get lost in the sea. But the lifeless body of Muham-mad Husain Farid with a limpet mine on his chest came back from the sea into the river alone and it reached the pontoon of the Pakistan Navy at New Mooring only to take revenge.

Consequence:

• Chittagong: 60 commandos were sent, out of which 31 finally took part in the sabotage operation on the 16th. Between 1:45 to 2:15AM explosions sank the MV Al-Abbas, the MV Hormuz and the Orient barge no.6, sinking 19,000 tons of arms and ammunitions.
• Chandpur: 18 out of 40 commandos finally took part in the operation. 3 steamers/barges were damaged or sunk.
• Narayanganj: 20 commandos conducted the sabotage operation. 4 ships were sunk or damaged.
• Mongla: 20 commandos managed to damage 6 foreign owned ships.

The operation was a success and worked greatly in favour of the allied forces.But it took away lives of many brave freedom fighters.

Naval Commandos killed in Operation Jackpot

* Commando Abdur Raquib, who was killed in Foolchhori Ghat Operation
* Commando Hossain Farid, who was killed in second Chittagong operation. He was caught by Pakintaki army. They put him in a manhole and bend his body until his vertebral column was broken.
* Commando Khabiruzzaman, who was killed in second operation in Faridpur
* Comamndo Sirajul Islam, M. Aziz, Aftab Uddin, and Rafiqul Islam, nothing further known about them.

Naval Commandos Who Received Bangladesh 'National Hero' Recognition

* Mr. A.W. Chowdhury- Beer Uttam
* Mr. Badiul Alam- Beer Uttam
* Dr. Shah Alam- Beer Uttam
* Mr. Mazhar Ullah- Beer Uttam
* Mr. Sheikh Md. Amin Ullah- Beer Uttam
* Mr. Abedur Rahman- Beer Uttam
* Mr. Mosharraf Hossain- Beer Uttam
* Mohammad Khabiruzzan- Beer Bikrom
* Mr. Momin Ullah Patwari- Beer Protik
* Mr. Shahjahan Kabir- Beer Protik
* Mr. Faruq-e-Azam- Beer Protik
* Mohammad Rahmatullah-Beer Protik
* Mohammad Mojjamel Hossain- Beer Protik
* Mr. Mosharraf Hossain- Beer Uttam

"Operation Jackpot" will probably go down in the history as one of those battles which changed the course of the battle.
An unconfirmed source told me that,war colleges in US and UK have taken this operation as a case study,if anyone can verify it,I will be more than happy.

 

[leonblack08]

Referrences:

1.Daily star (victory day special edition)
2.Baishakhi tv talk show ( অতন্দ্র প্রহরী )
3.Bangladpedia
4.Wikipedia

 

[leonblack08]

 

[leonblack08]

 

[F-14]

They put him in a manhole and bend his body until his vertebral column was broken

man thats tooooo dastardly so the pakistani army has an experince of doing this huh

 

[leonblack08]

A map of Bangladeshi FF sectors and location of the "Operation Jackpot"

 

[ppgj]

worthy read.

The darkest December
By Ahmad Faruqui
Monday, 07 Dec, 2009

Yahya Khan with President Nixon in the White House.

In his landmark poem, The Wasteland, T. S. Eliot calls April the cruellest month. But to most people, December is the cruellest month, with its short days and long nights. To Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, the darkest December is the one that came in 1971. What happened then is well known. Why it happened is less well known.

Ambassador Arshad Sami Khan provided his take on the events in his memoir, Three Presidents and an aide. A fighter pilot who earned the Sitara-i-Jurat during the 1965 war, Sami was ADC to presidents Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Historians have pinned the blame for the secession of East Pakistan on Gen Yahya. Without absolving Yahya of his weaknesses, Sami says that a good part of the crisis predated the general’s arrival on the political scene.

At partition, Pakistan was split into two wings that were 1,000 miles apart. Many, including Lord Mountbatten, had questioned whether the glue of religion would be strong enough to hold them together. Since the two wings did not share a common language, it made no sense to impose a single language on them. Imposing Urdu, a minority language spoken in the west, made even less sense. But that was precisely what was done in 1952. Deadly language riots ensued in the east.

In the years to come, the west continued to rule the east. The Bengalis felt like they had traded one colonial master for another. The general elections of Dec 7, 1970 provided an opportunity to redress the grievances of East Pakistan and promote national integration. But the divided demographics delivered a politically explosive result.

The Awami League (AL) emerged with an absolute majority but all its seats were located in the east, where 55 per cent of Pakistanis resided. Sheikh Mujib, its leader, was called the future prime minister by Gen Yahya. Sami says this was just a façade. Yahya had never intended to hand over power to the civilians, least of all to the Bengalis. He had hoped that a fractured coalition would emerge, allowing him to continue as the all-powerful president.

He began to pressure Mujib into accepting a strong presidency with several ministries under the direct control of the president. When that failed, he tried to hatch a power-sharing arrangement between the AL and the PPP headed by Bhutto. That also failed. By now, the AL had sensed a trap and began a campaign of public agitation. Yahya accused the party of wanting to secede and playing into India’s hands. Sensing an opportunity, says Sami, Bhutto gave Yahya a strong hint that he would support a military solution. Yahya’s commander in the east, Lt-Gen Sahibzada Yaqub Ali Khan, opposed military action. His counsel was ignored and he was replaced by a man who would be reviled in history as the ‘Butcher of Bengal’.

Gen Tikka Khan launched a ruthless operation to crush the AL on March 25, dashing all hopes of making a democratic transition. Ironically, on that day the National Assembly was to have been convened in Dhaka. By June, the regime claimed that the insurgency was over. In reality, it had simply gone underground. Millions of refugees fled to Indian Bengal to escape the violence.

As autumn approached, Yahya realised that India was not going to sit idle. Bhutto was sent as the head of a military mission to Beijing with Lt-Gen Gul Hasan and Air Marshal Rahim. According to Sami, when these people returned home, they lied to Yahya and told him that if hostilities with India broke out, crack Chinese troops would cross the Himalayas to relieve pressure on the Pakistani garrison in the East.

Sami’s insightful recounting of history is pregnant with lessons. First, even with its two far-flung wings, Pakistan was not destined to break apart. No one had forced East Bengalis to join Pakistan. To preserve the union, the leaders in the west should have shared power with those in the east.

Second, during the 1965 war, East Pakistan felt abandoned with little military presence. West Pakistan proceeded to rub salt into the wounded psyche of the east by imposing upon it the humiliation of the Agartala conspiracy trials. These diverted attention from the post-war problems in the west and were designed to project the image of India as a perpetual enemy. The mass movement that unseated Ayub Khan later was conveniently blamed on India.

Third, even at this point, Pakistan’s unity could have been preserved. Mujib was willing to compromise on several of the Six Points. Instead, the regime blundered by not honouring the electoral outcome. A campaign to malign the winning party was launched. The AL’s unprecedented victory was blamed on the Indian intelligence agencies as if they could have duped the entire populace of East Pakistan into voting against their will.

Fourth, when the AL leadership refused to buckle, another blunder was committed by resorting to armed force on the presumption that the rebellion was confined to a few ‘miscreants’. The regime seriously over-estimated its ability to subdue a province of 75 million with a military force of 45,000.

Fifth, when war with India appeared imminent, Yahya knew the game was over. He could have sought ways to avoid war with India and let the east secede peacefully. The suffering of millions could have been avoided.

Instead, the regime conjured up dreams of Chinese and American intervention. The Indo-Soviet Treaty had neutralised China’s ability to mount any military operation against India. And the Vietnam War had sapped the ability of the US to get involved in a second Asian war. The salience of both developments was lost on Yahya and his advisers. They had naively expected their allies to bail them out.

And sixth, for three decades all governments that came after Yahya suppressed the Hamoodur Rehman Commission report into the war. It only saw the light of day when an India publisher posted it on the web.

Unless the bitter lessons of what befell Pakistan 38 years ago are shared widely with the people, the nation will continue to wallow in conspiracy theories. It is much easier to blame others than to blame oneself. But, as the Greek historian Polybius put it, ‘There are only two sources from which benefit can be derived: our misfortunes and those that befell other men.’

[email protected]

DAWN.COM | Pakistan | The darkest December

 

[ironman]

An excellent post by Igor Djadan....


in December 3, was 38 years anniversary of the Indo-Pakistan conflict, 1971. Then the Russian (Soviet) involvement has played an important role in prevention the Anglo-Saxon pressure on India which was directed to save face of their Pakistani ally and not to allow Bangladesh secession. This video is a part from the Russian TV program 'Strike Forces' and it's involved the witnesses of those events. The translation from Russian is mine.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Er2E_PpVUYw

In 1971, December, 3 the World has become an attestor to a new war between India and Pakistan. At afternoon the Pakistani aviation has strike the Indian cities and airstrips. The Indian PM Indira Gandhi put the country in emergency state and gave the order to nip the aggression. Hard clashes were started on the ground in the air, and at the sea.

Historic document: "Confident. December, 10, 1971. Moscow. For the DM Marshal Andrey Grechko. According to the information from our attaché in Delhi in the first day of conflict the Indian destroyer 'Rajput' has sunk a Pakistani submarine by depth charges. In December, 4 and 9, the Indian fast boats have destroyed and damaged 10 Pakistani battle ships and vessels by the P-15 missiles. In addition 12 oil storages was burned in flame. The Commander of the Military Intelligence Service Gen. Pyotr Ivashutin".

In the same day the Soviet Intelligence has reported that the British Naval group with the leadership of 'Eagle' carrier went closer to the territorial waters of India. The Soviet Government immediately sent a unit of battle ships under the leadership of counter-admiral Vladimir Kruglyakov for helping to the fraternal country.

Vladimir Kruglyakov, the former (1970-1975) Commander of the 10th Operative Battle Group (Pacific Fleet) remembers:

"I received the order from the Chief Commander 'To not allow access of the American Navy to the Indian military objects'.

- On the way of American Navy stood the Soviet cruisers, destroyers and atomic submarines equipped with anti-ship missiles.

Vladimir Kruglyakov, the former (1970-1975) Commander of the 10th Operative Battle Group (Pacific Fleet) remembers:

"We encircled them and I have targeted the 'Enterprise' by missiles. I have blocked them and didn’t allow enclosing to Karachi, nor to Chittagong or Dhaka".

On the Soviet ships then were only the missiles with limited to 300 km range. Thus, to be sure the rival is under the hindsight the Russian commanders have had to take the risk of maximal enclosing to the American fleet.

Vladimir Kruglyakov, the former (1970-1975) Commander of the 10th Operative Battle Group (Pacific Fleet) remembers:

"The Chief Commander has order me: 'Lift the subs when they (the Americans) appear!' – It was done to demonstrate, there are all the needed in Indian Ocean, including the nuclear submarines. I have lifted them, and they recognized it. Then, we intercepted the American communication. The commander of the Carrier Battle Group was then the counter-admiral Dimon Gordon. He sent the report to the 7th American Fleet Commander: 'Sir, we are too late. There are the Russian atomic submarines here, and a big collection of the battleships'.

The war was then two weeks long, and it has finished by Pakistani forces surrendering.

Defunct Humanity: 1971. The War of Nerves in Bengal Bay

 

[Daredevil]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gbOUfnbc4Tc

 

[Soham]

"We encircled them and I have targeted the 'Enterprise' by missiles. I have blocked them and didn’t allow enclosing to Karachi, nor to Chittagong or Dhaka"[/I].

One sec... Is it being stated that missiles were fired at the Enterprise ? If yes, what happened to the American response ?

 

[bengalraider]

One sec... Is it being stated that missiles were fired at the Enterprise ? If yes, what happened to the American response ?

the soviets merely locked onto the Americans and let the Americans know they had been "locked on". no actual missiles left the firing tubes.

 

[ppgj]

A Chakma in Pakistan
Nirupama Subramanian December 16, 2009

He is virtually unknown to the present generation of Pakistanis, and a fading memory for those old enough to know. But in the aftermath of 1971, when Bangladesh came into existence, Raja Tridiv Roy was quite the toast of Pakistan.

Then the titular chief of the Chittagong Hill Tract Chakmas, Mr. Roy was just one of two East Pakistan parliamentarians — Noor-ul-Amin was the other — to reject the new country, and throw in their lot with West Pakistan.

On the eve of the December 16 anniversary of the “Fall of Dhaka”, as the event is remembered in Pakistan, Mr. Roy told The Hindu in Islamabad that he has no regrets about that life-changing decision as his people continue to be discriminated against by Bangladesh.

“Chakma House”, as the small unassuming plaque on the gate says, in the leafy E-7 sector, is Mr. Roy’s home in the Pakistani capital. The coat of arms on it has dulled with time. Inside, the living room is furnished simply, and of the few paintings that adorn the walls, two are by a Bengali painter dated November 1971 portraying idyllic scenes of rural life in what was then East Pakistan.

“One of the chief reasons in my decision to support the Pakistani nation rather than the rebels in 1971 was that the people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts are not Bengalis, but unfortunately, the government of East Pakistan at that time was exploiting the area and the indigenous population,” said Mr. Roy.

The peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts felt more secure with the Pakistan central government, he said, even though they held it responsible for the large scale suffering of tens of thousands in the area displaced in 1960 by the building of the Kaptai Dam.

Referring to a report earlier this year by the International CHT Commission, Mr. Roy said the 1997 peace treaty between the people of the region and the Bangladesh government had yet to be implemented in letter and spirit.

“The feeling of being exploited is even more acute now,” he said, pointing to the changed demography of the region that had made the “son of the soil a minority in his own home.”

But Mr. Roy has studiously kept away from the Chakma issue over the last 38 years, and though he did not say why, one reason could be that he wanted to avoid embarrassment for Pakistan as it negotiated relations with the new Bangladesh.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto rewarded his decision to plump for Pakistan with a place in his 12-member cabinet, as minister for minority affairs, also holding the tourism portfolio. However, he never joined the Pakistan People’s Party, and even now, is not a member of any political party in this country. General Zia ul Haq sent him as envoy to Argentina, and after an unprecedented 15-year-stint in that country, Mr. Roy, who returned to Pakistan in 1996, remains a Federal Minister, but without portfolio.

In the early days, he had a reputation for his colourful personal life and the parties he threw at his home. But the 76-year-old is now a shadow of his former self. Seen at the occasional diplomatic reception, Mr. Roy cuts a lonely figure these days, though still a dapper one. He keeps a low profile, playing golf and bridge, travelling and working with Pakistan’s tiny Buddhist association.

“I’m concerned about the Chakmas, but not involved in any of the Chakma politics. I am not in touch with any of the groups, they do not seek my advice, nor do I advise any group on how they should conduct themselves,” he said.

“My overall advice is that that fight for your rights constitutionally, peacefully and do no go in for violence and killings amongst yourself and with others,” the 76-year-old Buddhist said.

He was, however, quite emphatic that he could have done nothing for his people had he chosen Bangladesh over Pakistan.

“If I had been there and not toed the government line, which I would not have been able to do,” he said, “I would have either been eliminated, put behind bars or silenced in one war or another. How would it have helped the Chakmas if I had been forced to become a stooge?”

Mr. Roy said he wanted to correct the popular impression that he ran away after the surrender of Pakistani forces on December 16. He left East Pakistan on November 11, much before the war began.

“The government of Pakistan [then led by General Yayha Khan] called me to represent the country as a special envoy, and my role was [to build international support] to prevent the impending war,” he said.

The fighting began on December 3, while he was still on a tour of south-east Asian countries. He recalled that he was in Bangkok on December 16, and returned to Pakistan on December 22. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had taken over the reins of the country by then, and asked him to join his cabinet.

Mr. Roy had been elected to the National Assembly in 1970 as the only independent candidate from the whole of East Pakistan, and with Noor-ul-Amin, was only one of two non-Awami League members in the East wing. A Buddhist, he was also the only non-Muslim in the parliament.

“He was a revered and respected head of his people. With him and Noor-ul-Amin, we were able to say that we were not without constituencies in East Pakistan,” recalled Mubashir Hassan, an associate of Bhutto and a senior cabinet colleague of Mr. Roy in that cabinet.

Bangladesh made early attempts to reclaim Mr. Roy. When the Chakma leader went to New York as leader of the Pakistani delegation in 1972, Sheikh Mujib sent his mother to persuade him to join Bangladesh, but he refused her entreaties. For this act of loyalty, he was feted by Bhutto on his return.

Most of Mr. Roy’s family, including his wife, remained behind in the new Bangladesh. Three children joined him later, but his eldest son, Debashis Roy, who remained behind with his mother and a sister, was anointed the new Chakma chief. He is a barrister in Dhaka and served in the recent interim government.

Mr. Roy, however, has never gone back to his home, Rangamati, in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, all these years, nor has he ever visited Bangladesh.

“Of course, I miss my people, my home, my community,” said the ageing raja, “but circumstances and history have played a great role in my life”.

Circumstances and history, says

Raja Tridiv Roy, have played a

great role in his life.

The Hindu : Opinion / Op-Ed : A Chakma in Pakistan

 

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