WAR 1971

[Foxtord50]

Leonblack 08,
Thanks to write the article Operation Jackpot in Pakistan Defense Forum too .
I have noticed few factual error in the article,I have tried to edit them.This errors often occurs if the writer were not present himself in the field.
Honestly I very much appreciate you to do many positive arguments in favor of Naval commandos in PK Defense Forum.
Back to your request to display images, I have few original photos of Mongla Operation,which were
photographed from Dhangmari dam on 15th August,1971 at 7.30 AM.I have talked to my mother in Bangladesh andshe said he will
try to send me those photographs.
We had cameras with us and I was ordered by Lt.Gen.G.S.Aurora to take pictures of ports after the operation.This was briefed to me during our operation briefing meeting at port canning Matler on 27th July 1971 at 3.30 PM.In fact we were 260 commandos.Among us 200 were C&C Special commandos and we 60 Naval commandos.I was the commander of the Operation of Mongla Port only on 15th Aug,1971.Before 26th March 1971,I was a student of 1st year science group of Sathkhira College and joined freedom fight.I think I was the youngest Commander among other 3 commanders of Operation Jackpot.
We could have mined 14 ships on that day night at Mongla port but due to the Navigator Mr. Afzal´s mistake, we arrived at Mongla port on 4.00 A.M.So we had no other choice than to attack from Bania Shanta side.We came through Dhangmari Marsh area from a left zaminder house which was located behind the Dhagmari canal.We took our shelter there on 13th Aug,1971.But I thank to Almighty Allah for our success.Beside this I thank also to our Instructors who trained us as professional commandos within short time.Among the Indian trainer,I am grateful to Commander, M.N.Samath, Lt. Commander Martis,Lt.Das,Lt.Kafil,Leading seaman Gupta,Leading seaman K.Singh,Marathi Combat instructor Nanabuz..And to our all Bengali instructors.In all most all camps the trainees had to address the instructors as sir,I think,we were only a camp where we addressed our Bangladeshi instructor as Dadu.They were really our Dadu.
I would like to make it clear why Palassey was chosen as our training camp.This is because Bengols Independence was lost from this Palassey War Field
and Nabab Sirajudaullah was killed by the Collaborators of English occupation army.That`s why our Bangladeshi instructors talked to Brig.Bhatchariya to setup our training camp at Pallasey Mango Field as token of challenge to bring back the Sun to the sky of Bangladesh from the same field where we lost our independence on 23rd June 1957.Our Camp was situated at bank of Baghirothi river and at rear end of Palassey mango field which is further south of Palassey monument.We were trained in the same Bahgirothi river which flows by the side of Nawabs House.I wont be able to explain the feeling of our commandos of that time. I have seen many times that our commandos were taking oath by touching Nawabs house to fight against Pakistan Army in order to bring back our independence under any circumstances. Our camp and training were often inspected by Gen.M.A.G. Osmani,C&C of Bangladesh Armed Forces along with Admiral Nanda,the then Chief of Naval Staff and Lt.Gen.Gen:J.S.Aurora.They use to stay with us for hours together and use to inspire us . So far I know,no Mukti Bahini training camps were visited by high ranking Bangladesh and Indian officers so many times.We were supplied with best Navy ration and our cook was Bangladeshi Naval commando Ful Babu.After taking his launch with Naval commandos, Admiral Nanda once said,Ful Babu is one of the best cook among the Armed Forces cook of, all over India.
I am grateful to India for many reasons such as they accommodate our 9 Million Refugees for 9 Months,they gave us their best support in all possible ways,the politician,parliamentarians and very specially Her Excellency Prime Minster Mrs.Ghandhi her restless effort to create an International Opinion on Bangladesh was one of the vital key to introduce Bangladesh to the World. , I am very grateful to Indian Armed Forces, among them 10,000 soldiers sacrificed their lives for the freedom of Bangladesh.When we left India for our Operation,I told my fellow commandos,the help, affection and love I received from Indians,can not be forgotten by me ever.Commandos present there told to me not only you, rather we all are grateful to India.
For me and like me and for many others like us, India shall remain the best friend of Bangladesh and we shall not compare this friendship with any country in future even.I pray to Almighty Allah for all kind of success of Indians in all respect.We shall further follow the slogan of our current Prime Minister Sk.Hasina that ,One who want to leave in peace and freedom ,must try to maintain good relation with his neighbor.Let us have that Slogan now,let us be united to arrange trail of War criminals of Bangladesh, and let us create a Bangladesh where all religious people shall have same and equal right ,specially the poor shall get priority in all fields of life.( a Major Slogan of Bapuji & Bangobhandhu)
I shall post the photos as soon as I receive them from Bangladesh.Once again, thank you to write about Naval commandos.

With best Regards,
Foxtord50

 

[LurkerBaba]

^
Sir, leonblack is no longer active.

If you have any articles to share or images, please send them via private message to moderators. We'll publish them to the front page

 

[sob]

LeonBlack08,

Please use imageshack to host images. It is free.

Thanks!

I think he is no longer active on DFI.

 

[thakur_ritesh]

Leonblack 08,
Thanks to write the article Operation Jackpot in Pakistan Defense Forum too .
I have noticed few factual error in the article,I have tried to edit them.This errors often occurs if the writer were not present himself in the field.
Honestly I very much appreciate you to do many positive arguments in favor of Naval commandos in PK Defense Forum.
Back to your request to display images, I have few original photos of Mongla Operation,which were
photographed from Dhangmari dam on 15th August,1971 at 7.30 AM.I have talked to my mother in Bangladesh andshe said he will
try to send me those photographs.
We had cameras with us and I was ordered by Lt.Gen.G.S.Aurora to take pictures of ports after the operation.This was briefed to me during our operation briefing meeting at port canning Matler on 27th July 1971 at 3.30 PM.In fact we were 260 commandos.Among us 200 were C&C Special commandos and we 60 Naval commandos.I was the commander of the Operation of Mongla Port only on 15th Aug,1971.Before 26th March 1971,I was a student of 1st year science group of Sathkhira College and joined freedom fight.I think I was the youngest Commander among other 3 commanders of Operation Jackpot.
We could have mined 14 ships on that day night at Mongla port but due to the Navigator Mr. Afzal´s mistake, we arrived at Mongla port on 4.00 A.M.So we had no other choice than to attack from Bania Shanta side.We came through Dhangmari Marsh area from a left zaminder house which was located behind the Dhagmari canal.We took our shelter there on 13th Aug,1971.But I thank to Almighty Allah for our success.Beside this I thank also to our Instructors who trained us as professional commandos within short time.Among the Indian trainer,I am grateful to Commander, M.N.Samath, Lt. Commander Martis,Lt.Das,Lt.Kafil,Leading seaman Gupta,Leading seaman K.Singh,Marathi Combat instructor Nanabuz..And to our all Bengali instructors.In all most all camps the trainees had to address the instructors as sir,I think,we were only a camp where we addressed our Bangladeshi instructor as Dadu.They were really our Dadu.
I would like to make it clear why Palassey was chosen as our training camp.This is because Bengols Independence was lost from this Palassey War Field
and Nabab Sirajudaullah was killed by the Collaborators of English occupation army.That`s why our Bangladeshi instructors talked to Brig.Bhatchariya to setup our training camp at Pallasey Mango Field as token of challenge to bring back the Sun to the sky of Bangladesh from the same field where we lost our independence on 23rd June 1957.Our Camp was situated at bank of Baghirothi river and at rear end of Palassey mango field which is further south of Palassey monument.We were trained in the same Bahgirothi river which flows by the side of Nawabs House.I wont be able to explain the feeling of our commandos of that time. I have seen many times that our commandos were taking oath by touching Nawabs house to fight against Pakistan Army in order to bring back our independence under any circumstances. Our camp and training were often inspected by Gen.M.A.G. Osmani,C&C of Bangladesh Armed Forces along with Admiral Nanda,the then Chief of Naval Staff and Lt.Gen.Gen:J.S.Aurora.They use to stay with us for hours together and use to inspire us . So far I know,no Mukti Bahini training camps were visited by high ranking Bangladesh and Indian officers so many times.We were supplied with best Navy ration and our cook was Bangladeshi Naval commando Ful Babu.After taking his launch with Naval commandos, Admiral Nanda once said,Ful Babu is one of the best cook among the Armed Forces cook of, all over India.
I am grateful to India for many reasons such as they accommodate our 9 Million Refugees for 9 Months,they gave us their best support in all possible ways,the politician,parliamentarians and very specially Her Excellency Prime Minster Mrs.Ghandhi her restless effort to create an International Opinion on Bangladesh was one of the vital key to introduce Bangladesh to the World. , I am very grateful to Indian Armed Forces, among them 10,000 soldiers sacrificed their lives for the freedom of Bangladesh.When we left India for our Operation,I told my fellow commandos,the help, affection and love I received from Indians,can not be forgotten by me ever.Commandos present there told to me not only you, rather we all are grateful to India.
For me and like me and for many others like us, India shall remain the best friend of Bangladesh and we shall not compare this friendship with any country in future even.I pray to Almighty Allah for all kind of success of Indians in all respect.We shall further follow the slogan of our current Prime Minister Sk.Hasina that ,One who want to leave in peace and freedom ,must try to maintain good relation with his neighbor.Let us have that Slogan now,let us be united to arrange trail of War criminals of Bangladesh, and let us create a Bangladesh where all religious people shall have same and equal right ,specially the poor shall get priority in all fields of life.( a Major Slogan of Bapuji & Bangobhandhu)
I shall post the photos as soon as I receive them from Bangladesh.Once again, thank you to write about Naval commandos.

With best Regards,
Foxtord50

Foxtord50 Sir,

Thanks for joining the forum, and what a fine introduction. We welcome you, and extend our warm and best wishes to you.

Regards.

 

[Beer]

Thursday, August, 23 2012

NEW DELHI: Ahead of the talks between the foreign ministers of India and Pakistan, the government Thursday said 74 Indian defence personnel, including 54 prisoners of war, are believed to be in Pakistani jails since 1971, but Islamabad has not acknowledged it so far.

"As on Aug 16, 2012, as many as 233 Indian civilian prisoners, 81 Indian fishermen and 74 missing defence personnel, including 54 PoWs, are believed to be in Pakistani jails," Minister of State for External Affairs E. Ahmed told the Rajya Sabha.

The government has repeatedly taken up the matter with Pakistan through diplomatic channels and during high-level contacts for the release of Indian PoWs believed to be in that country, he added.

Ahamed, however, stressed that Pakistan does not acknowledge the presence of any Indian PoWs in its custody.

Five years ago, Pakistan finally agreed to receive a delegation of relatives of missing defence personnel to permit them to visit prisons there where the prisoners are believed to be incarcerated.

The delegation visited 10 jails from June 1-14, 2007, but "could not conclusively confirm the physical presence of the Indian PoWs," said Ahamed.

The issue of missing defence personnel was discussed again at May 24-25 home secretary-level talks and the July 4-5 talks between foreign secretaries of the two countries.

The issue of prisoners in each other's country will figure in the talks between External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna and Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar in Islamabad next month.

http://punjabnewsline.com/news/Pakistan-holding-74-Indian-defence-men-since-1971_-Ahmed.html

 

[Singh]

Consequent upon the failure of the Pakistani divisional attack on Poonch, it was decided to carry out local and limited actions all along the ceasefire line to improve our defensive posture. One such attack was launched by an infantry battalion in the area opposite Madarpur on the night of 10/11 December, and having captured Nangi Tekri, Jungle Tekri, Bump and other features denied the use of the Kotli-Madarpur-Hajira road to the enemy.

In pursuance of the overall aim of these operations, it was decided to secure Daruchian, a feature blocking the Balnoi neck of the Kotli-Balnoi road between the Poonch river and the ceasefire line. Daruchian is a conical feature, narrow and rugged at the top and with steep projections. It is forested on all sides except the southwest spur, which has a sparse growth of low scrub. This feature was reported to be held by less than one Pakistani company of regular troops and some Dafai Mujahids as part of the main picquet line. These troops were supported by two other picquets nearby, one north and the other south.

A battalion of grenadiers which was deployed in an extensive area was relieved for the attack on Daruchian and was allotted an additional company and artillery support of four to six fire units. 2200 hours on the night of 13/14 December was fixed.

From the version of the battle reported in Pakistani newspapers and the citation of the award to the defenders commander, it transpires that the enemy battalion commander happened to be visiting Daruchian on inspection in view of the apprehended Indian buildup opposite.

The salient points of the plan were:

Phase 1: B Company less one platoon acting as reserve to capture neck spur and opposition at apex by H plus four hours.
Phase 2: C Company to capture west spur by H plus eight hours from western approach. One platoon from A Company to act as reserve.
Phase 3: D Company to capture southwest spur from apex side, one company from another battalion acting as reserve.
Stops: One platoon each from outside resources to establish stops at S1 and S2 to prevent reinforcement of Daruchian feature from neighbouring localities.

Preliminary movements for concentrating the attacking troops were completed the previous night, and on the night of the attack various actions stipulated in the plan were set in motion as scheduled. All troops, including stops, were in position by 2320 because of slow physical movement. As a result, H hour was postponed to 2335 hours. The attack progressed later as follows.
Phase I (B Company)

The company captured the right portion of the neck, another pimple short of the apex. Because of heavy enemy enfilade automatic fire from Mala, the company suffered heavy casualties and the momentum of the attack petered out. Our troops consequently took up positions in trenches short of the objective, which had been booby trapped by the enemy, thus causing still more casualties. The company commander rallied his remaining troops and pressed home the attack on the apex. He was killed by a mine just short of the objective and the battle bogged down.

The battalion commander ordered the company to dig in and contain the enemy occupying the apex, and at this stage ordered Phase 2 of the attack to commence. He also ordered A Company, less the reserve for Phase 1, to attack the apex from the north along the existing mule track. En route, the company came under heavy fire and its commander, his second in command and the company officer were killed. Bereft of leadership, the company lost cohesion and fell back in driblets.
Phase 2 (C Company)

The attack commenced at 0100 hours and C Company captured two-thirds of its objective, the west spur, where they reached the basketball court covered by intense automatic fire from bunkers sited on the reverse slopes of the apex. C Company suffered casualties and by 0210 hours the attack was stalled near the edge of the court. The charges the company commander led personally to destroy pillboxes failed to make any dent on the defences. The commander was eventually wounded and his second in command killed.
Phase 3 (D Company)

While Phase 2 was in progress, D Company was ordered to move forward at 0112 hours to capture the southwest spur along the southern approach. The company commandar reached the forming-up place by 0300 hours with about ten to 15 men but was not able to collect his company till 0354 hours. This company also came under heavy automatic fire in an effort to close with the enemy along the spur. The commander was killed, and with that the attack fell into disarray.

The plan for centrifugal three-directional attack was certainly unconventional by Indian Army standards and came as a surprise, and for quite some time the enemy faced a difficult situation.

It became clear about 0600 hours that the multipronged attack from all sides had failed. In a rash action, the battalion commander mustered his reserves, consisting of one company of the supporting battalion, and rushed to link up with C Company, the only successful prong. This hurried movement in daylight immediately came under observed automatic and artillery fire, and the reserve elements were pinned down soon after they started from Picquet A. Some troops broke line and the company dispersed. The battalion commander was left behind with a handful of men and was out of touch with the battle.

The situation at 0930 hours on 14 December for the brigade commander was not altogether bright. A Company was out of communication, its commander and second in command having been killed, B Company had suffered heavy casualties and had been ordered back to its forming-up place, C Company was partially on the objective with its commander wounded and his deputy killed. The commander of D Company was also killed and its personnel were making their way to our lines in driblets. The reserve company from the supporting battalion was split into small groups and scattered beyond control. The stops had been withdrawn.

In anticipation, the brigade commander had moved in an additional company, but it arrived only after first light, too late to influence the outcome. In a final bid to change the course of events, an air strike was ordered on the apex. This materialised about 1115 hours and heavy artillery fire was directed on this objective. The battalion commander was asked to rally the returning men under this covering fire and join C Company on the objective. The battalion commander expressed his inability to do so because he lacked sufficient troops and because of the devastating effect of the enemy's observed fire on his party. He then called off the attack, ordering C Company to disengage after sunset and return to the Indian side of the ceasefire line.

From the version of the battle reported in Pakistani newspapers and the citation of the award to the defender's commander, it transpires that the enemy battalion commander happened to be visiting Daruchian on inspection in view of the apprehended Indian buildup opposite. He was involved in the battle as he was about to return to his headquarters, and in the event this saved the situation for Pakistan.

The plan for centrifugal three-directional attack was certainly unconventional by Indian Army standards and came as a surprise, and for quite some time the enemy faced a difficult situation. The locality was surrounded from all sides, and the noose was tightening with the progress of the battle, no reinforcements or relief being possible. There were also no immediate reserves nearby to counterattack.The Indian failure was of our own making and may be broadly attributed to inept handling of the battle professionally and lack of grit in leadership. The defended localities on the main picquet along the ceasefire line had their defence potential enhanced over almost a quarter of a century by methodical laying of mines, erection of other obstacles like wire, and construction of shellproof fortifications and bunkers with weapons sweeping the slopes with murderous fire.

To force an entry through such obstacles meant acceptance of casualties among the leading assault troops, but once the initial entry had been made by the leading troops and the weapons covering the approach had been silenced the passage of the followup troops would have been comparatively smooth and the requisite strength could have been made up to carry the locality.

The Indian failure was of our own making and may be broadly attributed to inept handling of the battle professionally and lack of grit in leadership.

In the case of the Indian attack, each prong was independent of the others, with its own reserves, making its own entry through the obstacle, suffering its own casualties and fending for itself in case of failure. As it happened, the prongs bogged down in the minefield and suffered such heavy casualties, especially in leadership, that the attack petered out except in the case of the company working its way along the west spur. There was now a chance to exploit the successful eftry into the enemy locality from that side, but the battalion commander and his reserves were well behind in terms of time to exploit this limited success to advantage. Even if he had started for the west spur immediately he would have reached it after about three hours or so, and by that time the enemy could have readjusted his weapons. In any event, day would have broken by then, and as it happened the movement was caught in observed fire.

It would perhaps have been profitable to contain the locality from the east and develop the attack along the west and southwest spurs, with the battalion commander and his reserves located at a central place close behind or in between the spurs, ready to reinforce success wherever achieved on either prong. In case of hesitancy or slow progress, the battalion commander should have been able to get things moving by personal command in battle. As it was, he was almost left out of it, content to command by telephone or radio. Moreover, strengthening a close thrust would have been better for concentration of artillery and infantry resources, as also for tighter battle control.

By daybreak, the situation, as depicted earlier, was bad but by no means hopeless. Our troops along the prongs had been badly mauled and had suffered heavy casualties, but they were certainly not decimated. Total casualties out of an approximate bayonet strength of 600 were no more than 160 odd, which made roughly one platoon worth in each company. Each company however had local reserves with it to make up the best strength. Command and control had certainly been disrupted because company commanders, and in some instances their seconds in command, had been killed. But the senior platoon commanders and artillery observers were there to take charge.

Book_India_wars_sinceIf the troops had been ordered to hold on wherever they were and dig in this would have been a perfect setting for a siege. The committed troops would admittedly have suffered more casualties the next day, but the enemy was in no position to counterattack and the Indians would have had a definite psychological edge. It would have been definitely possible to carry the position through the west spur the next night by bringing in additional reinforcements. Time is always in the attacker's favour in a siege, and this factor should have been exploited. The commanders lost this battle in their hearts more than the troops who were involved in it. It does not pay for commanders to direct battles by remote control. They should have been forward to get its feel firsthand.

Who was to blame? All the commanders from the divisional commanders downward for having approved such an unsound plan. After all, this must have been one of the contingency plans wargamed successively in the intervening period between the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971. The brigade and battalion commanders were to blame for not having displayed the tenacity to stick it out and the ability to wrest success out of apparent failure. Finally, there was the failure of the Indian Army system, which by constant spoonfeeding in peace does not bring out the initiative and the ability of the ranks to take control in such situations.

by Maj Gen Sukhwant Singh
1971 War: Battle of Daruchian » Indian Defence Review

 

[LurkerBaba]

Part 2 has been published

Operation Jackpot - Part 1
Operation Jackpot Part 2

 

[Daredevil]

Bangladesh asks Pak to apologise for 1971 atrocities


SOURCE: PTI

Bangladesh today demanded a formal apology from Pakistan for the genocide committed by its troops during the 1971 liberation war, but Islamabad said it's time to carry forward ties "burying the past".

During a meeting with her Pakistani counterpart Hina Rabbani Khar, foreign minister Dipu Moni said "Bangladesh expects an apology from Pakistan for the genocide carried out by their troops in 1971".

Mrs Moni also underscored the need for resolving the other outstanding issues with Pakistan, foreign secretary Mijarul Quayes quoted the minister as saying.

In response, Mr Quayes said, the Pakistani foreign minister said since 1974 Islamabad "at different times and different manners expressed its regret for the 1971 incidents".

"She (Khar) said it is now the time to proceed forward burying the past."

Mr Quayes's comments came as Mrs Moni told a private news agency yesterday that Pakistan must apologise for the mass killings.

Ms Khar, the first Pakistani minister to visit Dhaka since the ruling Awami League assumed office three years ago, arrived here on a five-hour tour to invite Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to attend the Developing-8 Summit to be held in Islamabad on 22 November.

Ms Khar later called on Mrs Hasina and handed over an invitation letter from Pakistan president Asif Ali Zardari at her Ganabhaban official residence.

She is also expected to meet main Opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) chief and ex-premier Khaleda Zia ahead of her departure.

Bangladesh was the eastern wing of Pakistan until 1971 when it won its independence after a nine-month long liberation war against Pakistani troops.

The incumbent government has been demanding Islamabad's official apology for the Pakistani troops' atrocities during the liberation war.

 

[Yusuf]

Yeah, get the Pakis to apologize. The humiliation of 71 will be complete.

 

[cloud_9]

October 29, 2012

10 November 2012

Nothing to do with this,right?

 

[Blackwater]

@ Farhaan.

As a Pakistani on this forum ,you must apologise Bangladeshi on this forum

after all pakistani have big heartssssss:cool2::cool2:

 

[The Messiah]

This news pleases me.

 

[sasi]

The Hindu : NATIONAL / ANDHRA PRADESH : Basantar Brigade pays tribute to war heroes
The Basantar Brigade in Mehdipatnam gears up to commemorate the 41st anniversary of the historic battle in the annals of Indian history post Independence. Onthe night of December 16, 1971, the Brigade spearheaded the march of the Indian Army across the Basantar river in Jammu & Kashmir when the Indian position Jarpal in Shakargarh sector was attacked by a Pakistani armoured regiment. Outnumbered but undeterred, the Indian troops emerged victorious in this fierce battle.
Raised on August 1, 1966, at Golconda by Brigadier B.D. ManSingh, the 47 Infantry Brigade glorified itself in many operations. But the formation definitely had the distinction ofbeing baptised by fire in 1971.The day is commemorated every year as Basantar Day by the 47 Infantry Brigade, which was later christened Basantar Brigade after the war.
Solemn reminder
The Basantar Brigade (part of54 Infantry Division) led the march of the Indian Army into the Shakargarh Bulge. That the Pakistani forces were pitted against the best military outfit of India was proved by the ensuing battle.
Lt. Gen W.A.G.Pinto, the General Officer Commanding ofthe 54 Infantry Division, who led the troops to victory, revisited the war in his book Bash on Regardless . The battle resulted in the capture of a significant area under the control of Pakistan in Chhamb sector, apart from cutting off the line of retreat for Pakistani troops. Of the 142 Pakistani tanks destroyed in the Western front during the 1971 war, 42 were accounted for in the Battle of Basantar.
The war memorial located in the Basantar Brigade at Mehdipatnam stands as a solemn reminder of the soldiers who laid down their lives and displayed indomitable fighting spirit.
Exemplary bravery
Even after his tank was aflame and he was grievously injured Second Lt. Arun Khetarpal denied the breakthrough that the Pakistani Army was aiming at. He laid down his life fighting and was awarded the Param Vir Chakra (PVC) posthumously.
Seriously wounded by shelling Major Hoshiar Singh did not letthis deter him from inflicting heavy casualties on the Pakistani forces, leading by example. He was awarded the Param Vir Chakra for his gallantry and leadership. The formation has glorified itself innumerous operations since then and is regarded as one of the most decorated Brigades of the Indian Army today. Doesn't the brigade's motto -- Bash on Regardless -- sum up its fighting spirit?
The Basantar Brigade's motto – Bash on regardless – exemplifies its fighting spirit

 

[sasi]

Battle of Basantar - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

[sasi]

http://www.google.com/url?q=http://...EQFjAG&usg=AFQjCNGJeyIRS3_KC0WBxy-pdHFisOVG8g
~
Battle Of Basantar Video | Event Coverage and Interviews

 

[Rage]

Army Gears Up For Victory Day (Vijay Diwas) Celebrations Tmrw

1971 War of Liberation Victory Day Celebrations

Army men in preparation for the Vijay Diwas celebrations at Dadar's Shivaji Park.
Photo Copyright: India Today


So, the Army is celebrating Vijay Diwas at Dadar, Mumbai's Shivaji Park tmrw.

The Victory Day is in commemoration of the 1971 war of liberation of the present-day Bangladesh from what was then East Pakistan.

Around 1,500 Army personnel from across the state will participate in the three-day program, which was last held at the Shivaji Park grounds in 2003.

Army equipment including tanks and Army Air Service Corps helicopters will be present, and the Day will also feature a parade by the NCC-corps and aero and ground displays by the Parachute and the Maratha Light Infantry Regiments.

This space will be used to update with pictures of the Vijay Diwas celebrations.

@Neil, @ashdoc

 

[Yusuf]

Thank you Sambahadur, thank you IG, thank you Gen Arora, Gen Jacob and thank you all the brave soldiers of IA!

 

[sasi]

Mumbai: Indian Army to hold Vijay Diwas celebrations at Shivaji Park

Mumbai: Indian Army to hold Vijay Diwas celebrations at Shivaji Park- Maharashtra- IBNLive
Mumbai: The Indian Army willbe holding an event at ShivajiPark, Mumbai to observe Vijay Diwas, honouring the martyrs of the 1971 Indo-Pak war. 93,000 Pakistani troops led by General Amir Aabdullah Khan Niazi surrendered to theIndian army on this day.
The Army through 'Know YourArmy Mela' would also try to reach out to people and wouldshow its military might."Through Army Mela we will show to the people what all equipment we have and will also try to encourage the youth to join the Indian Army,"Major General Rajesh Bawa, General Officer Commanding, Mumbai Sub Area, had said.
Military bands will be displayed at Gateway of India,Chowpatty and at Radium Mall. Problems of ex-servicemen's residing in Mumbai and nearbyareas will also be addressed in the Mela. Youth will also be told about the benefits of joining the Army.
The Chief guest for the preliminary function is Mohit Shah, Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court, while Maharashtra Governor K Sankarnarayanan is the chief guest for the main function on16. People from the metropoliscan have a look at motor cycle display by Army, sky-diving, 'malkhamb' and aero-modelling display by the National Cadet Corps cadets, Major General Bawa added.
Around 1,500 Army personnel from across the state are participate in the three-day programme, which was last held at the Shivaji Park grounds in 2003. Lamenting about the shortfall of officers in the Indian Army he said,"maximum recruitment in Indian Army is from Maharashtra. We want to fill the shortfall at the officers category. There is not much shortfall in soldiers category," he said.
(With Additional Input from PTI)

 

[sasi]

Re: Mumbai: Indian Army to hold Vijay Diwas celebrations at Shivaji Pa

Army takes over Shivaji Park - The Times of India

 

[bengalraider]

Never has our nation achieved greater glory post independence, thank you all for this wonderful day. Though i am saddened that it is not commemorated in the same vein as V-E day in europe