sorcerer
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The Unconventional War :- Parallels between the Combat Experience in Vietnam and Iraq
Part 3
Working in opposition to any efforts of ameliorating the privations of soldiers in both wars were the harsh climates they fought in. In Vietnam, soldiers were forced to "live in mud
and rain" and to deal with the terrors of nighttime combat in a stygian jungle occupied by a clandestine enemy.90 O'Brien constantly remained on edge, because even when "the day was quiet and hot," the "bushes [could] erupt." Likewise, soldiers in Iraq had to carefully monitor windows and rooftops in cities, and still, "many skirmishes . . . [would] begin in confusion." Americans in Iraq found themselves "humping," or marching, with over 60 pounds of gear while enduring "120-degree temperatures with one . . . bottle of water."
One could argue that the environment in which soldiers in each war fought appears dissimilar. Iraq constitutes an arid desert and urban landscape, while Vietnam is primarily a tropical jungle environment. These differences notwithstanding, both environments equally encumbered soldiers. In both wars, the enemy remained elusive—"insurgents and civilians . . . indistinguishable" from one another, leading to confusion and frustration. Irrespective of the conflict, American infantry occupied a country in which the population gradually turned against them.In light of these observations, to what extent can the issues faced by American forces in Vietnam offer insight towards an understanding of Iraq and the current engagements in Afghanistan? It would be suspect to argue that the Vietnam experience offered a solution for the unconventional warfare the U.S. faced in Iraq. As George Herring opines, "each historical situation is unique, moreover, and to extract lessons from one and apply them indiscriminatelyto another and very different event is at best misleading." Furthermore, despite similarities in the combat experience of each war, the motives, objectives, and cohesion of the enemy was rather different. As Carpenter suggests, the enemy insurgency in Iraq constituted a conglomeration of entities from diverse nationalities and socio-cultural backgrounds, often at odds with one another, and holding ambiguous objectives to counter the American occupation.
Regardless of these differences and cautionary suggestions against applying the lessons of Vietnam to Iraq, one can tease out some minor connections. For example, the Vietnam War was essentially a war waged by an unconventional enemy who used tactics designed to weaken, not destroy, the American army both physically and psychologically. Herring argues that many politicians and military tacticians after Vietnam suggested that, "the [U.S.] military should have adapted to the unconventional war in which it found itself and shaped an appropriate counterinsurgency strategy."General Westmoreland's strategy of attrition directly impacted the nature of the operations in which U.S. ground forces were engaged, with the main objective of these missions being to "mount aggressive 'Search and Destroy' operations against the VietCong and their NVA comrades." This plan was complemented by the utilization of defended enclaves from which soldiers could deploy into the jungle on assignment.
General Westmoreland's aims tended to be justified through reports of body counts, and the necessity to destroy the Vietcong's capacity to wage war. Colin Powell recalls that body
counts "became a macabre statistical competition" which often led to inflated and exaggerated numbers. The strategy lacked sufficient organization to effectively win over civilians, and did not allow for advantageous ground to be permanently occupied by U.S. soldiers. Therefore, infantry would contest an area only to abandon it and allow the enemy the privilege to reoccupy the ground. Another consequence was that soldiers were sent on assignments to engage the enemy, which more often than not entailed walking into ambushes and booby-traps. Robert Conner depicts the realities of "search and destroy" tactics when he recalls often walking through the jungle on "hot summer days . . . [praying] . . . Please God, don't let us run into any VietCong." The strategy also failed to consider furnishing protection for the civilian population, which rendered the small villages and hamlets safe-zones for the depredations of insurgents. The Vietcong adapted quickly to the predictable attrition strategy, primarily by attacking U.S. contingents in small numbers and melting "into the jungles before an effective counterstrike could be organized." Private First Class Reginald Edwards opines that Americans in Vietnam should have started from "one tip of South Vietnam" and worked its way "to the top," rooting out all VC along the way.
While Specialist Harold Bryant asserts that "America should have won the war," he identifies the common argument that soldiers were not "free . . . to fight." Instead of doing monotonous search and destroy missions, which constituted no meaningful conclusion to the war, Bryant agreed with PFC Edwards by asserting that U.S. soldiers should have been put "shoulder to shoulder" and marched from Saigon "all the way up to the DMZ," making one clean sweep of the country. The lesson to be learned from Vietnam, whether it applies wholly to the Iraq situation or not, is that a clear strategy should have been adopted to deal with unconventional guerilla warfare. Marching soldiers around aimlessly in order to hunt for an elusive enemy runs the riskof causing psychological and physical exhaustion. \
As some veterans noted, the problem with Vietnam was that most soldiers experienced, as Westmoreland ably phrased it, a "limited war, fought with limited means, for limited objectives." The threat of the enemy in Iraq was largely unconventional, and could not be prosecuted with the same means as World War II and Korea, with the focus being on body-counts and the victories consisting of "blitzkrieg-style warfare against other states."
The problem, as Thomas Ricks pronounced it, was that U.S. strategy in Iraq ignored the fundamental lessons of the Vietnam conflict—including the ability to counter "protracted ground combat, especially of an irregular or unconventional nature." Regardless of whether President George W. Bush and his generals had successfully won the major battles, the real victory would come when the U.S. could effectively respond to an insurgency, as well as pacify the indigenous population. Ricks notes the conversation that retired Army Colonel Harry Summers, Jr. recalled having with a North Vietnamese General after the Vietnam War:
You know, you never defeated [the U.S.] on the battlefield," Summers said. The North Vietnamese officer considered this assertion for a moment, and then responded, "That may be so, but it is also irrelevant." Hanoi's center of gravity had not been on the battlefield
One can argue that the overall strategy is crucial for influencing the combat experience of soldiers on the ground. American military strategists in Iraq should have adopted one of the crucial lessons from Vietnam, "that American power, however great, [has] distinct limits." The military doctrine espoused during the Iraq War could not be fundamentally based on kill- ratios and battles won. Although battles can be decisive in some respects, the most importan understanding to be wrought from the Vietnam experience is the importance of an effective, solid counter-insurgency response that would assist the soldiers operating in the midst of car bombings, mines, booby-traps, and enemies indiscernible from civilians.
On the whole, the combat experience of soldiers in Vietnam and Iraq convey numerous similarities. Although the men-at-arms and the technology utilized by soldiers differed considerably between wars, the raw nature of combat remained the same. Americans in Vietnam faced an enemy that was often indistinguishable from civilian populations. The Vietcong and NVA were adept at evading American contingents, particularly when outnumbered. However, if it was so desired, both of these forces could engage numerically superior American platoons and companies from the jungle foliage without sustaining severe casualties. American servicemen in Iraq faced a similar threat during the insurgency.
While the combatant forces did not constitute a united front, the motley paramilitary forces posed challenges to the ponderous American convoys negotiating narrow alleyways, city streets, and back roads. Insurgents in Iraq camouflaged themselves in civilian clothes, therefore possessing the ability to meld into their environment. In Vietnam, American soldiers were more likely to stumble into Vietcong ambushes than to pre-emptively strike the enemy. The Vietcong's uncanny ability to utilize dense foliage, tunnel systems, and the cover of night compounded problems faced by American "search and destroy" detachments.
Similarly, in Iraq, insurgents could utilize the plethora of windows, doors, or rooftops to their advantage. Thus, American convoys and platoons often patrolled occupied villages and cities until receiving enemy fire. The covert operations employed by the enemy in both wars identify one paradox of fighting a guerilla enemy. Although both a jungle and an urban setting afford American units adequate cover, the ubiquitous nature of the enemy stifles any modicum of comfort. Whether by dint of snipers, grenadiers, sappers, or mines, American units in both wars often suffered casualties without the ability to inflict sufficient damage to the enemy. Furthermore, one has identified that as a consequence of the guerilla tactics employed by the enemy in Vietnam, the ability to accurately tally enemy casualties was impeded. While the cumbersome climate in each war hampered the effectiveness of soldiers, the pervasive utilization of deadly anti-personnel devices in the form of mines, IEDS, and car bombs posed an equally acute threat to soldiers in each war.
Finally, the plight of soldiers was hardly ameliorated by the intense psychological repercussions endured after months of combat. Soldiers in both Iraq and Vietnam became a "bundle of nerves" as a result of the motley threats they countenanced on each patrol. This aspect of combat in Iraq is best evidenced in the assassination of American soldiers at point- blank range by disguised insurgents. Overall, one can argue that despite objections raised to comparing the Vietnam and Iraq war, it is justifiable to suggest that the combat experiences of American soldiers in each war strongly parallel one another.
Part 3
Working in opposition to any efforts of ameliorating the privations of soldiers in both wars were the harsh climates they fought in. In Vietnam, soldiers were forced to "live in mud
and rain" and to deal with the terrors of nighttime combat in a stygian jungle occupied by a clandestine enemy.90 O'Brien constantly remained on edge, because even when "the day was quiet and hot," the "bushes [could] erupt." Likewise, soldiers in Iraq had to carefully monitor windows and rooftops in cities, and still, "many skirmishes . . . [would] begin in confusion." Americans in Iraq found themselves "humping," or marching, with over 60 pounds of gear while enduring "120-degree temperatures with one . . . bottle of water."
One could argue that the environment in which soldiers in each war fought appears dissimilar. Iraq constitutes an arid desert and urban landscape, while Vietnam is primarily a tropical jungle environment. These differences notwithstanding, both environments equally encumbered soldiers. In both wars, the enemy remained elusive—"insurgents and civilians . . . indistinguishable" from one another, leading to confusion and frustration. Irrespective of the conflict, American infantry occupied a country in which the population gradually turned against them.In light of these observations, to what extent can the issues faced by American forces in Vietnam offer insight towards an understanding of Iraq and the current engagements in Afghanistan? It would be suspect to argue that the Vietnam experience offered a solution for the unconventional warfare the U.S. faced in Iraq. As George Herring opines, "each historical situation is unique, moreover, and to extract lessons from one and apply them indiscriminatelyto another and very different event is at best misleading." Furthermore, despite similarities in the combat experience of each war, the motives, objectives, and cohesion of the enemy was rather different. As Carpenter suggests, the enemy insurgency in Iraq constituted a conglomeration of entities from diverse nationalities and socio-cultural backgrounds, often at odds with one another, and holding ambiguous objectives to counter the American occupation.
Regardless of these differences and cautionary suggestions against applying the lessons of Vietnam to Iraq, one can tease out some minor connections. For example, the Vietnam War was essentially a war waged by an unconventional enemy who used tactics designed to weaken, not destroy, the American army both physically and psychologically. Herring argues that many politicians and military tacticians after Vietnam suggested that, "the [U.S.] military should have adapted to the unconventional war in which it found itself and shaped an appropriate counterinsurgency strategy."General Westmoreland's strategy of attrition directly impacted the nature of the operations in which U.S. ground forces were engaged, with the main objective of these missions being to "mount aggressive 'Search and Destroy' operations against the VietCong and their NVA comrades." This plan was complemented by the utilization of defended enclaves from which soldiers could deploy into the jungle on assignment.
General Westmoreland's aims tended to be justified through reports of body counts, and the necessity to destroy the Vietcong's capacity to wage war. Colin Powell recalls that body
counts "became a macabre statistical competition" which often led to inflated and exaggerated numbers. The strategy lacked sufficient organization to effectively win over civilians, and did not allow for advantageous ground to be permanently occupied by U.S. soldiers. Therefore, infantry would contest an area only to abandon it and allow the enemy the privilege to reoccupy the ground. Another consequence was that soldiers were sent on assignments to engage the enemy, which more often than not entailed walking into ambushes and booby-traps. Robert Conner depicts the realities of "search and destroy" tactics when he recalls often walking through the jungle on "hot summer days . . . [praying] . . . Please God, don't let us run into any VietCong." The strategy also failed to consider furnishing protection for the civilian population, which rendered the small villages and hamlets safe-zones for the depredations of insurgents. The Vietcong adapted quickly to the predictable attrition strategy, primarily by attacking U.S. contingents in small numbers and melting "into the jungles before an effective counterstrike could be organized." Private First Class Reginald Edwards opines that Americans in Vietnam should have started from "one tip of South Vietnam" and worked its way "to the top," rooting out all VC along the way.
While Specialist Harold Bryant asserts that "America should have won the war," he identifies the common argument that soldiers were not "free . . . to fight." Instead of doing monotonous search and destroy missions, which constituted no meaningful conclusion to the war, Bryant agreed with PFC Edwards by asserting that U.S. soldiers should have been put "shoulder to shoulder" and marched from Saigon "all the way up to the DMZ," making one clean sweep of the country. The lesson to be learned from Vietnam, whether it applies wholly to the Iraq situation or not, is that a clear strategy should have been adopted to deal with unconventional guerilla warfare. Marching soldiers around aimlessly in order to hunt for an elusive enemy runs the riskof causing psychological and physical exhaustion. \
As some veterans noted, the problem with Vietnam was that most soldiers experienced, as Westmoreland ably phrased it, a "limited war, fought with limited means, for limited objectives." The threat of the enemy in Iraq was largely unconventional, and could not be prosecuted with the same means as World War II and Korea, with the focus being on body-counts and the victories consisting of "blitzkrieg-style warfare against other states."
The problem, as Thomas Ricks pronounced it, was that U.S. strategy in Iraq ignored the fundamental lessons of the Vietnam conflict—including the ability to counter "protracted ground combat, especially of an irregular or unconventional nature." Regardless of whether President George W. Bush and his generals had successfully won the major battles, the real victory would come when the U.S. could effectively respond to an insurgency, as well as pacify the indigenous population. Ricks notes the conversation that retired Army Colonel Harry Summers, Jr. recalled having with a North Vietnamese General after the Vietnam War:
You know, you never defeated [the U.S.] on the battlefield," Summers said. The North Vietnamese officer considered this assertion for a moment, and then responded, "That may be so, but it is also irrelevant." Hanoi's center of gravity had not been on the battlefield
One can argue that the overall strategy is crucial for influencing the combat experience of soldiers on the ground. American military strategists in Iraq should have adopted one of the crucial lessons from Vietnam, "that American power, however great, [has] distinct limits." The military doctrine espoused during the Iraq War could not be fundamentally based on kill- ratios and battles won. Although battles can be decisive in some respects, the most importan understanding to be wrought from the Vietnam experience is the importance of an effective, solid counter-insurgency response that would assist the soldiers operating in the midst of car bombings, mines, booby-traps, and enemies indiscernible from civilians.
On the whole, the combat experience of soldiers in Vietnam and Iraq convey numerous similarities. Although the men-at-arms and the technology utilized by soldiers differed considerably between wars, the raw nature of combat remained the same. Americans in Vietnam faced an enemy that was often indistinguishable from civilian populations. The Vietcong and NVA were adept at evading American contingents, particularly when outnumbered. However, if it was so desired, both of these forces could engage numerically superior American platoons and companies from the jungle foliage without sustaining severe casualties. American servicemen in Iraq faced a similar threat during the insurgency.
While the combatant forces did not constitute a united front, the motley paramilitary forces posed challenges to the ponderous American convoys negotiating narrow alleyways, city streets, and back roads. Insurgents in Iraq camouflaged themselves in civilian clothes, therefore possessing the ability to meld into their environment. In Vietnam, American soldiers were more likely to stumble into Vietcong ambushes than to pre-emptively strike the enemy. The Vietcong's uncanny ability to utilize dense foliage, tunnel systems, and the cover of night compounded problems faced by American "search and destroy" detachments.
Similarly, in Iraq, insurgents could utilize the plethora of windows, doors, or rooftops to their advantage. Thus, American convoys and platoons often patrolled occupied villages and cities until receiving enemy fire. The covert operations employed by the enemy in both wars identify one paradox of fighting a guerilla enemy. Although both a jungle and an urban setting afford American units adequate cover, the ubiquitous nature of the enemy stifles any modicum of comfort. Whether by dint of snipers, grenadiers, sappers, or mines, American units in both wars often suffered casualties without the ability to inflict sufficient damage to the enemy. Furthermore, one has identified that as a consequence of the guerilla tactics employed by the enemy in Vietnam, the ability to accurately tally enemy casualties was impeded. While the cumbersome climate in each war hampered the effectiveness of soldiers, the pervasive utilization of deadly anti-personnel devices in the form of mines, IEDS, and car bombs posed an equally acute threat to soldiers in each war.
Finally, the plight of soldiers was hardly ameliorated by the intense psychological repercussions endured after months of combat. Soldiers in both Iraq and Vietnam became a "bundle of nerves" as a result of the motley threats they countenanced on each patrol. This aspect of combat in Iraq is best evidenced in the assassination of American soldiers at point- blank range by disguised insurgents. Overall, one can argue that despite objections raised to comparing the Vietnam and Iraq war, it is justifiable to suggest that the combat experiences of American soldiers in each war strongly parallel one another.