UAVs and UCAVs

[nrj]

For use against maoists, and to shower love on the ones waiting near borders?

Pakis can no more win argument against such use in Washington.

 

[Patriot]

There is no fun in buying the "battle proven drones" from US with KIll switch & inbuilt programmed bugs, which are of no use to them now & derail our own development of Rustom series. We already have our UCAV program AURA. More over , we are not in such a dire need of such strike drones. for surveillance purpose , we have sufficient Herones & new addition Nishant.

 

[debasree]

this will be a great assets agaist maoists and paki millitants in kashmir.but i really doubt do the obama admin is really serious to sell this to us.

 

[mayfair]

I doubt we'll ever use the armed drones or gunships against the Maoists..

 

[sesha_maruthi27]

We must not given for the American market. We must be careful before we get their material into INDIA. We have get the TOT signed first without any preconditions.

 

[agentperry]

if its coming with conditions that they will be operated in the environment directed and favored by the americans then i guess it will be a bad move. India should only buy when it is allowed to use it in the way it wants and not something like necessary deployment of nato.

 

[Galaxy]

US mulling sale of armed drones to India, allies

US mulling sale of armed drones to India, allies

Washington: US is eyeing to sell its battle proved armed drones to key allies, including India, but the move is being opposed by lawmakers who don't want the technology to be exported.

"The Pentagon wants more North Atlantic Treaty Organization members to have such pilotless aircraft to ease the burden on the US in Afghanistan and in future conflicts like the alliance's air campaign in Libya this year," Obama

Administration officials were quoted by The Wall Street Journal as saying.

It is believed that India would be one of the potential target countries for the US to sell its drones.

India has been purchasing drones from Israel for quite some time now, and has been developing its drone capabilities, but does not have armed drones like the Predators and Reapers used by US security agencies with devastating effect against al-Qaeda and Taliban targets in Pakistan.

"The Pentagon's proposed sales have set off a behind-the-scenes debate between the administration and some members of Congress over whether the US should speed the spread of a technology that will allow other countries to carry out military strikes by remote control," the report said.

Drones have been highly successful in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan and also in countries like Yemen and Somalia.

However, the report some lawmakers are resisting to such a move from the Administration.

"There are some military technologies that I believe should not be shared with other countries, regardless of how close our partnership," said Senate Intelligence Committee Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein.

US mulling sale of armed drones to India, allies - World News - IBNLive

 

[sob]

What use are the drones without the Satellite systems and other backup hi tech electronics that the US employs to make the drones such a deadly weapon.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

Companies pair for UAV business

Companies pair for UAV business

Two European companies are exploring possible cooperation to become leaders in the design and manufacture of unmanned aerial vehicles.

Cassidian, on behalf of EADS Deutschland GmbH, and Alenia Aeronautica S.p.A. of Italy, said their new Memorandum of Understanding is for medium-altitude, long -endurance unmanned aerial systems and unmanned combat aerial vehicles.

"The signing of this agreement is important for Alenia Aeronautica because it allows us to collaborate with a capable player in the sector of UAS, favoring the growth of our ability to design, build, integrate and support a complex system for the global market, both civil and military," said Giuseppe Giordo, chief executive officer of Alenia Aeronautica and Alenia Aermacchi.

"The UAS sector has a strategic importance for the future of Alenia Aeronautica's programs and we are convinced that this agreement will allow us to become even more competitive in this quickly expanding market."

Giordo is also responsible for the aeronautics sector of Finmeccanica, the two Italian companies' parent organization.

Cassidian and Alenia Aeronautica, in a joint statement, said they will analyze the UAS and UCAV requirements of the Italian and German governments to "create a strategic partnership" and expand their global UAS market share.

"We look forward to investigate further collaboration with Alenia Aeronautica around a next-generation MALE UAS, like for instance, the Talarion which is of outmost importance for Europe's military aviation industry," said Cassidian Chief Operating Officer Bernhard Gerwert.

"It will fulfill government security missions and commercial applications which cannot be implemented with current solutions and their derivatives."

Talarion is the European program for a next-generation, medium-altitude, long-endurance UAS and calculated to meet the requirements of France, Germany and Spain for future MALE aircraft. The first prototype aircraft is scheduled for 2015.

Deliveries of the first aircraft are to begin three years later.

Cassidian, a subsidiary of EADS, which has headquarters in the Netherlands and which provides air systems; land, naval and joint systems; intelligence and surveillance, cybersecurity, secure communications solutions, among others.

In other UAS-related news from Europe, Indra of Spain this month demonstrated its Pelican and Mantis aircraft.

The Pelican is a rotary unmanned system designed for maritime use. It is can fly six hours, is fully autonomous and can carry a payload of about 120 pounds.

The Mantis is a small UAV for land use and has a range of about 18 miles. The system, which can be carried by one or two people, is autonomous in flight along a pre-established route.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

Thailand signs up for drone mine-hunters

Thailand signs up for drone mine-hunters


The Thai navy has signed a deal with Atlas Elektronik in Germany for the company's SeaFox mine neutralization submersible drone systems.

The SeaFox systems will comprise a number of SeaFox I units for training and reconnaissance purposes and a small number of SeaFox C combat units for actual mine disposal, Atlas said.

More SeaFox C units will be supplied "over the next few years."

This fiber-optic guided "one-shot" SeaFox C is the vehicle used for destroying mines once the SeaFox I vehicle has identified the target.

SeaFox C automatically relocates previously identified targets and other underwater ordnance within minutes of programming. Once the target is found, further identification and confirmation of target is done using the vehicle's CCTV system.

The target is destroyed with the on-board explosive charges, which also eliminates the vehicle.

SeaFox I is a reusable vehicle specifically for identification of mines. It's based on the SeaFox C vehicle but with the warhead replaced by ballast weight.

SeaFox I is a completely independent system needing no external support, on-board ship facilities or other specialist equipment. This means it's deployable from a wide range of carrier platforms, including dedicated mine-destroyer ships, rubber boats and helicopters, Atlas said. It's also easily integrated in ship upgrades.

Atlas said 10 navies will, or are, using the SeaFox system -- the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Estonia, Finland, the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan and Germany.

Atlas Elektronik a specialist electronics joint venture company between ThyssenKrupp and EADS. It has headquarters in Bremen, Germany, and has a workforce of around 1,900.

Products include sonars and sensors, command and control systems for submarines and surface combatants, mine countermeasure systems, unmanned underwater vehicles, radio and communications equipment.

In October 2009, Atlas bought the underwater systems business of QinetiQ, based in the United Kingdom. The deal needed the approval of the U.K. government and was "in line with QinetiQ's strategy to dispose of certain non-core assets within its EMEA business and reallocate capital into higher growth investments," QinetiQ said at the time.

The underwater systems business, in Winfrith, England, has around 220 employees. It operates in the areas of hydro-acoustics, sonar, open architecture sonar and combat management systems, acoustic counter measures, submarine signatures, maritime security and control of unmanned maritime vehicles.

The business is a supplier to the U.K. Ministry of Defense and other defense departments and corporate customers internationally.

In September, Volker Paltzo was appointed as managing director of Atlas Elektronic in Bremen. Paltzo, 46, was the chief operating officer of Eurofighter, which has headquarters in Germany.

He took over at Atlas from Kai Horten, who left after five years to become chief executive officer of and president of aircraft manufacturing supplier Premium Aerotec in Augsburg, Germany. Aerotec makes fuselage parts for aircraft including for the Eurofighter Typhoon, the Airbus A400M and the Boeing 737.

 

[Galaxy]

India's SLYBIRD MAV maturing fast

India's SLYBIRD MAV maturing fast

December 16, 2011

The Indian SLYBIRD hand-launched mini unmanned drone is maturing with a series of regular test-flights this year, and the coast clear for the second phase. Designed as a 2-kg all-composite fixed wing unmanned system with an endurance of 1-hour and a 10-km range, scientists developing the drone say they are extremely happy with flight test results and are ready to begin sensor integration for Phase-2 of flights.

The drone, being developed for a service ceiling of 14,000 feet (but which has only been tested at 3,000 feet and sea-level so far is intended for real-time telemetry and video surveillance using miniaturized electro-optic payloads or a daylight/IR video camera. The programme team intends to deliver a drone with capabilities and performance similar to the Israeli Elbit Skylark (being partnered by HAL in India) and the American AeroVironment RQ-11 Raven, demonstrated to the Army at Exercise Yudh Abhyas in 2009. SLYBIRD, first revealed earlier this year at Aero India 2011, is a major thrust area under the NP-MICAV (National Program on Micro Air Vehicles) jointly by DRDO-ADE, CSIR-NAL , IITs, IISc and National Design and Research Forum of the Institution of Engineers. Earlier this year, the National Aerospace Laboratory experimented successfully with a valved pulsejet engine on a miniature version of the Rustom-1 experimental drone. The development of man-portable tactical drones is aimed at the Army and paramilitary forces — both have officially announced their interest in acquiring such a capability.

The Army and CPMF have both tested Honeywell's RQ-16 T-Hawk for counter-insurgency and anti-Maoist operations, while the Army is being seen as a possibly buyer of the American AeroVironment RQ-11 Raven or Lockheed-Martin Desert Hawk, though no decision has been taken yet.

India's SLYBIRD MAV maturing fast | idrw.org

 

[W.G.Ewald]

Any idea how long the bird will take to reach service ceiling and how long it can stay in the air? I think in use the operator will need to have very good information on upper level wind speeds and directions to complete the mission.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

Defence and Weapon technology: Harpy ---- UAV

Harpy ---- UAV

HARPY is a lethal UAV designed to detect, attack and destroy radar emitters.
Harpy is a "Fire-and-Forget" all-weather, day/night autonomous weapon system, launched from a ground vehicle behind the battle zone or from ship based launchers.

HARPY effectively suppresses hostile SAM and radar sites for long duration, by detecting, attacking and destroying radar targets with a very high hit accuracy.

HARPY provides the most effective solution to the hostile radar problem, at the lowest price. HARPY is in production, is already operational with several nations Air Forces, and is currently available. Weighs 135 kg, 2.1 meter long, 2.7 meter span and with range of 500 km. It is sealed in its sealed launcher/container, to endure harsh battlefield conditions. It can be fueled or defueled in the launcher, therefore retaining its readiness at all time. The system uses periodical built-in test to maintain full readiness.

The Harpy mission is planned and programmed in the battery ground control center, as an independent mission, or planned in accordance with other manned or unmanned systems. The drone flies autonomously enroute to its patrol area its radar seeker head constantly search for hostile radars. Once suspicious radar is acquired, Harpy compares the signal to the library of hostile emitters, and prioritizes the threat. If the target is verified, the drone enters an attack mode, as it transitions into a near vertical dive, homing on the signal. The drone is set to detonate its warhead just above the target, to generate the highest damage to the antennae, and surrounding facilities. If the radar is turned off before Harpy strikes, the drone can abort the attack and continue loitering. If no radar was spotted during the mission, the drone is programmed to self destruct over a designated area. Follow-on systems which are already proposed to foreign clients, are calling for a combination of seeker and killer drones that will enable visual identification and attack of targets even after they turn off their emitters.


Harpy Delivered to Turkey

In a deal dating back to 1999, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) have taken delivery of a number on Harpy lethal unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from Israel Aircraft Industries Ltd. (IAI). The exact number is unknown, but reports suggest that more than 100 lethal UAVs were delivered.

IAI's MBT Division develop and produce the Harpy system, which is an attack UAV used in the suppression of enemy aerial defences (SEAD) role. It is a 'Fire-and-Forget' all-weather, day/night autonomous weapon system, launched from a ground vehicle mainly against hostile radar emitters, amongst others.

In June 1999 MBT and Raytheon Missile Systems teamed to market the more advanced Combat UAV Target Locate and Strike System (CUTLASS), based on the proven Harpy's UAV type airframe.
Harpy is currently operational with several Air Forces globally.

Harpy Delivered to India

According to media reports, the Indian army has purchased a number of the armed Harpy drone, produced by Israel Aircraft Industries.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

CROSS POSTED


UCAVs: The Future of Air Warfare For PAF



UCAVs: The Future of Air Warfare For PAF ~ INDIAN DEFENSE NEWS BLOG


The Indian Air Force is projected to induct a large number of 5th generation fighter aircraft within the timeframe of 2025. This poses serious challenges for the numerically smaller Pakistan Air Force (PAF). The paper suggests UCAVs as a possible solution in countering India's military aviation threat to Pakistan. Pakistan can develop UCAVs in the same manner they developed the JF-17. The argument is in favor of UCAVs to supplement 4th generation fighters and enumerates an active and specific solution for PAF.


Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs) are a category of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) that are designed to fire munitions and are characterized by increased autonomy of operation. Key attributes coupled with UCAVs, as defined in conventional military jargon, include an unmanned counterpart of a manned attack or fighter aircraft. This necessitates such capabilities as range, high speeds and a significant weapon load. Another key salient of UCAVs is the broad requirement for UCAVs to survive engagements rather than be used in one-way kamikaze strikes. UCAVs operational today are largely restricted to small, lightly armed derivatives of more conventional UAVs.[1]

UCAVs are an emerging technology that has the potential to revolutionize air warfare. While the 5th generation of combat planes today is the pinnacle of military aviation, UCAVs present paradigms that can supplement if not supplant them. Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) who discuss a potential 6th generation inevitably mention unmanned aircraft as a possible key salient.[2]

This paper focuses on UCAVs in a function as air-to-air combat vehicles focused on air superiority missions. The paper is in exclusion of other roles such as air-to-ground and Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR). It is recognized that UAVs are highly effective in both these roles and this exclusion in no way implies the belittlement of these key aspects to UCAV and UAV technology.

The paper considers the advantages, disadvantages, technology and politics and how this relates to Pakistan and her threat perception. It offers a specific solution tailored for the Subcontinent.

The Advantages of UCAVs

Long Range Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Combat

The world is increasingly converging towards long range air-to-air combat, not only with increasingly sophisticated radars[3] that negate stealth[4], but also AAMs like the ASRAAM and the A-Darter that provide an improvement in range of IR-based missiles (Defense Industry Daily, 2010). Pilots engaged in BVR combat perhaps have the least value added to combat; essentially, they monitor their sensor-suite, communicate with controllers and then fire a missile which then takes over the task of actually destroying the target. An F-pole style maneuver or other similar maneuvers are limited by the G-forces that the pilots can sustain. Dodging incoming BVR missiles, fired from enemy aircraft is again limited by the G-forces the pilot can handle. The case for a UCAV in this form of combat is arguably the strongest after ISR.


Short Range within Visual Range Combat:

To consider WVR combat, let us visualize what is achievable with the state-of-the-art at present in the form of the F-35. We will later consider how much better a UCAV can exploit these advantages than a manned pilot.

In a post-merge scenario where a large number of friendly and enemy aircraft are embroiled in a dogfight, identifying friend-or-foe and firing at a target can become both critical and yet complicated. When a fraction of a second counts, the human pilot has to analyze his MMI and make a quick choice. The F-35 helps this critical process by providing an MMI that keeps track of all aircraft embroiled in the fight and displaying them in the most user-friendly method possible.

The process sounds difficult, but is only so for a human. A computer can analyze aircraft shapes easily. Situational awareness, whether human or computer-enabled, allows a fighter aircraft to assign missiles for targets as soon as a picture of the battle-space has been formed. With HOBS missiles, the execution is relatively simple even for a less maneuverable combat aircraft.

Another element added by the F-35 is interconnectivity or swarm logic. Once situational awareness has been achieved by man or machine and the fighter aircraft knows where the friends or foes are, and at the same time can communicate with the rest of the friendly fighter aircraft who also share the same picture of the battle-space, computers can execute complex plays in a team format. This creates a veritable soccer match were one side knows exactly what is going on in the entire football field and the location of its players. As a result, they can significantly outplay the opposing team. Such strategies may include providing cover fire, cross fires, gambits and other game-theory based plays[5]. All such maneuvers can take place pre-programmed and at speeds, G-forces and time frames not possible by human operators. Swarm tactics have already been demonstrated by US aircraft manufacturers in their UCAV programs (Jaquish, 2004).


CONTINUED

 

[LETHALFORCE]

Can a human operator compete? Kasparov may or may not be able to beat Deep Blue on a given day. However, to do so while sitting in a fighter cockpit, facing G-forces and in the time constraint of fractions of a second, the victor becomes all too obvious.

Human operators can always be put in the loop where necessary, but a UCAV can easily handle many tasks autonomously, and like an attack dog, only need to be pointed at the enemy. The UCAV can take off, fly a designated route, destroy targets and awaiting instruction or flying back to base, dodging missiles and being fully aware of many factors pilots often forget – being aware of status of weapons, fuel supply, location of enemies and friendly forces, ground units and whether weapons doors are open or closed. It can think of all this simultaneously and do so without mistakes, under any amount of stress, either physical or sensory.

Low Costs:

UCAVs can be manufactured and operated at a tiny fraction of the cost of manned fighters. Quality pilots are a rare commodity and are hard to find, train and keep operationally ready. They also take a considerable amount of lead-time to train effectively. Another aspect is the low maintenance and operational costs due to not having a requirement to constantly fly aircraft. This also means that many important systems do not need to be as reliable or have high MTBF (Mean Time Before Failure). After all, if the UCAV is not endangering a pilot's life, does not fly frequently and is cheap to manufacture, they need not be as durable. UCAVs need only be flown during wartime or during high tension periods.

This means that their subsystems can be built more cheaply, a key cost element particularly in combat aircraft engine technology. However, some caution needs to be placed as to how far reliability can be compromised as this can be a double-edged sword with accidents and mishaps also effecting costs (Lewis, 2002).

UCAVs may also be cheaper because many expensive elements in a modern fighter relate to the pilot. For instance, cockpit glass is an exceedingly expensive item. Ejection seats, life support systems, cockpit avionics and targeting systems and the sheer space, bulk and weight savings all go to make UCAVs significantly cheaper than manned alternatives[6].

Due to modern network centric warfare, not all UCAVs need have sensors. Expensive AESA radars for instance can be avoided in but a few aircraft within a "pack". These can often be a manned fighter that orchestrates the package, perhaps preferably a twin-seater, or even be managed by ground controllers / radars or airborne AWACS.

A small UCAV built from an existing parts bin of spare parts can lower costs significantly. We shall discuss further about this aspect later in the paper.

Quantity versus Quality:

Most nations including the United States and China are increasingly fielding sharply smaller quantities of later generation fighters because of the cost and complexity. UCAVs can be produced cheaply, at a small fraction of the cost of modern fighters and can be mass produced for war. As Joseph Stalin once said, quantity has a quality all its own. As modern 5th generation aircraft increasingly resemble flying Tiger tanks, a cheap, simple solution may just prove be the equivalent T-34 equivalent in modern warfare.

Kamikaze:

UCAVs can go into combat disregarding whether they need to come back or not. While fighter pilots may have similar patriotism, operationally air forces for moral and morale reasons prefer to have an exit strategy unless in the most extreme of circumstances. UCAVs make kamikaze strategies practical not only during desperate phases of the war but viable from Day 1. In BVR combat, this becomes an interesting aspect as there is always a tradeoff between the distance a fighter shoots its missile from (and thus how effective this shot will be), and how likely the plane is to come back intact
This proposition is even more tenable because UCAVs may prove to be significantly cheaper than their manned enemies and the tradeoff would favor the UCAV operator. Most vitally, UCAVs employing such tactics would have a drastic impact on the enemy's psychology. The Rand Corporation expresses this doctrine best in the following words:

Aerospace power will tend to perform best when the desired outcome involves affecting adversary behavior rather than seizing and holding terrain.
-RAND Corporation


The Disadvantages of UCAVs

Tackling the Problem of Jamming:

One of the first responses to proposals for UCAVs is whether they will be able to communicate in the event of jamming by the enemy. When we discuss UCAVs, we often have the image of a Predator operator sitting in some trailer guiding the plane and wonder what would happen to the Predator if that link was lost. The first element to consider is that today's Air-to-Ground based UAVs such as the Predator need a high proportion of the human element because of the vagaries of today's COIN and CAS operations. High bandwidth data transfer such as video streaming is assumed to be an integral part of UAV operation. This does not have to be true for UCAVs. Identifying friend-or-foe can be significantly easier in an air-to-air battle, particularly with mature IFF technologies. This is true particularly in a Pakistan-India scenario, where the direction of enemy inbound fighters is well known and the environment is best described as sensor rich.

The end result is that, a highly autonomous UCAV will not need constant connectivity but will need to be assigned a task and given instructions for post-task completion. For instance, if after destroying enemy aircraft no other enemy aircraft are found in the vicinity and no instructions are forthcoming from friendly forces, the UCAV may simply be programmed to return to base. In case of fear of electronic warfare incapacitating or overriding the UCAV, a controller may pre-program the UCAV to not accept signals from a specified time period forward. To accomplish the given mission and either go back to base or move to a specific geographical area deep inside Pakistani territory and receive specific directional signals for further instructions.

In this scenario, a UCAV can still be jammed from being operationally effective, but manned aircraft will suffer to the same extent as the UCAV. Even a 5th generation aircraft without AWACS or other auxiliary support will be vulnerable. Another point is that modern communications, even Link 16 is exceedingly hard to jam. Directional communication links are also increasingly mature and near ideal for UCAV use.

Human Element:

Despite all the advantages of a UCAV, the human element cannot be fully substituted, whether one with Artificial Intelligence (AI-UCAV) or a more conventional model. There will always be an opportunity for a fighter pilot to think outside the box. This will continue to remain a weakness of UCAVs. Carlo Kopp mentions the two ideological extremes in UCAV literature, one looking at UCAVs as a "dumb RPV" while the other trying to build a James Cameron's "Terminator" and suggests a moderate approach between them may be most appropriate (Kopp, 2001).

Reasons Why the West is Being Held Back

Their Politics:

Many technology choices made by the United States and her allies are not based on merit alone but are made because of political reasons. USAF officers for instance, would not like UAVs to take over jobs of their pilots. An example is the Congressional deadline for the USAF to field a third of its force as UAVs by 2010 (Jaquish, 2004). The USAF considered a Predator that can fire its own missile a bad idea and this was not overturned until the CIA used them with great success. Even when forced to fly UAVs, they have insisted on using pilots to fly the UAVs. The US Army proved otherwise when they began using NCOs instead. Another glaring example of the organizational hubris of the US armed services is in their Joint Vision 2020. There is not one mention of UAVs or UCAVs, nor a single picture of one in a paper that has over 50 images of tanks, submarines, fighter jets, warships, transports and refugee camps[7]. William Lewis (Lewis, 2002) also complains about the long lead times in acquisition and procurement within the US armed services.

This bias in the USAF and perhaps in other Western air forces is a key reason for why UAVs in general and UCAVs in particular, have not made breakthroughs in the scale anticipated with technologies now available. History has shown that it often takes a major shock in the form of a war to change perceptions, as was seen in WWI, WWII and to a lesser extent the subsequent wars up to Gulf War II. What we do know is that the people closest to knowing the feasibility of technology in building operational UCAVs are putting their money in this technology. Boeing, Northrop Grumman and General Atomics have spent their own hard cash in researching and developing new UCAVs without formal requests or interest from the USAF.

The Technology behind UCAVs

The technology for fielding real UCAVs has many critical areas that are already proven and mature. Many of the technologies are in fact only waiting to be integrated together. Consider the example of autopilot computers that can now takeoff, fly to a destination and land a commercial aircraft. This technology is operational in the commercial airline industry and is considered mature today. Pilots can merely take control when something untoward happens and requires out-of-the-box thinking.

An American Global Hawk today can take off, fly around the world, accomplish its ISR mission and come back to base making a perfect landing, with no manual input. A JSF is being designed with the ability to visually track a large number of targets, identify and categorize them without any human input. Modern missiles can defeat maneuvering fighters by employing multiple tactics, even being able to come back in case it missed the designated aircraft in its first pass. Again, all this is accomplished without input from a human.

Diffusion of Technology Worldwide:

The technology to build manned fighter aircraft has traditionally remained within a handful of nations such as Russia, USA, China, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom. This monopoly of technology has been a major issue particularly vis-à-vis the West and the Rest of the World. UAV and UCAV technology on the other hand, has been far more diffused throughout the world. Smaller countries and countries with little previous record of aircraft manufacture, such as Israel, Austria, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Switzerland, Turkey, among others are making significant contributions. For instance, Camcopter, a product by a small, hitherto unknown Austrian company Siebel, has sold a large number of its UAVs including over 80 to the UAE (Wezeman, 2007). What is even more interesting is that a number of parts will be manufactured by such an unknown as the UAE Research and Technology Center. It may also be noted that even within the US military-industrial complex, it is General Atomics as opposed to Boeing or Lockheed Martin that has stolen the lead. From these examples and a number of others, the technology behind UCAVs is realizable by firms outside of the traditional countries and corporations that had earlier dominated military aviation. The UAV industry is by all indications Schumpeterian and remains wide open to any country or company.

Golden Opportunity to Pull Ahead:

If the Pakistan Air Force can do better and avoid institutional and political barriers that the West is plagued with, they can make a relative leap in capabilities and meet their goals and objectives far better than a linear and asymmetric solution could. Pakistan has achieved a significant milestone with the JF-17. With a UCAV, Pakistan will have achieved the next major milestone. Pakistan's aircraft manufacturing industry would remain relevant rather than become outdated and relegated to obsolescence. Pakistan does not have the technology or the resources to build an expensive and complex 5th generation plane. A UCAV however, is a far more achievable goal. As we shall see later, the technologies involved allow far greater flexibility and can be said almost ideally suited to Pakistan's military-industrial complex's strengths.

Pakistan's Threat Scenario 2025

Before considering an active solution and the technologies relevant to that solution, it may be helpful to first consider the threat scenario for Pakistan. A 15 year forward plan may be relevant to our discussion. This is based on the perceived change in the quality of the threat in Pakistan's neighborhood in that timeframe and allocates time to field a response for Pakistan's aeronautical industries.

India will begin to field PAKFA fighter jets from Russia and may also develop her own from technology bought from the Russians. While the latter may be discounted as another employment opportunity for DRDO and related third-rate Indian bureaucracies, PAKFA and any specific design built for India by the Russians will provide a challenge that would be wholly new to the subcontinent: a 5th generation fighter. Further, it may not be farfetched to imagine a JSF purchase for the IAF, given the blossoming long-term partnership developing between India and the United States.

While the credentials for the JSF are still unclear and the jury may be out on its air-to-air combat capabilities, the PAKFA is a clear threat. The PAKFA was designed to counter the F-22 in air combat. The threat is perhaps best defined as reasonable stealth, super cruise, high altitude and high speed. The PAKFA takes BVR combat to a new level that the airframe of the JF-17, by design, cannot compete with. BVR missiles launched from a high-high profile aids missile range and speed, and reduces the threat, range and effectiveness of Pakistani BVR launches in response. With AWACs and refuelers in the sky, such threats would be a menace, particularly with longer ranged BVR missiles from Russia.

A major political and geo-strategic to consider is the War on Terror (WOT) in Afghanistan may be winding down by then and aid from the United States and other Western countries are likely to dry up. Pakistan's Afghanistan leverage vis-à-vis the international community could be drastically reduced. In a worst case scenario, sanctions may once again be imposed in one form or another.

By 2025, India could field PAKFAs and perhaps even JSFs in the hundreds, drastically changing the military balance in the Subcontinent. Pakistan can either go bankrupt attempting to counter this new threat or she can become obsolete, back to a decade similar to the 1990s. Or Pakistan can develop UCAVs.

In the next section of this paper we consider UCAVs as a solution to Pakistan's air defense needs.

Possible UCAV solutions for Future Air Combat

Establishing a requirement first requires the establishment of a doctrine. This is a critical weakness for the European Union were divergent needs are hard to align and researchers often have to work on the basis of practicality (Freitas, et al., 2009). As concerns PAF, there is a clear threat scenario and easier possibilities of establishing a doctrine. Based on an outlined doctrine, we can consider a number of possible UCAV solutions for the PAF in tackling the future threat scenario of an Indian PAKFA and other possible 5th generation aircraft.

Let us start with a quick recap of possible strategies. The general approach has been to counter India's provocative procurements on a largely symmetric basis. Increasing number of manned fighter jets have been reciprocated by increases in Pakistan's inventory of manned jets. Purchase of AEW assets have been matched by an equivalent purchase. Nuclear tests were responded to with equivalent nuclear tests as were ballistic missile tests. However, this asymmetry is increasingly impractical because of differing size and economic development between the two countries.

Meanwhile, India is now slated to acquire a large number of 5th generation planes in a 50-50 partnership with the Russians. Instead of attempting to break the bank and procure increasingly complex (and expensive) 5th generation fighters with the added exponential increase in maintenance and other operational costs, a solution may be to respond asymmetrically.

Two possible scenarios appear within a broad asymmetric strategy – positive asymmetry or negative asymmetry. Examples of implementing a negative asymmetric scenario against an IAF fielding significant numbers of 5th generation fighters would be to push back defenses further away from the border, rely more on LR-SAMs and resort to hardening major assets against the inevitable.

A strategy of positive asymmetry is also possible. This would imply responding asymmetrically but in a more proactive, aggressive and positive manner. This paper will outline such a strategy. As an example of such a strategy, Pakistan can choose to skip the 5th generation concepts and move towards combining the most practical of the 3rd, 4th and 5th generation with concepts deriving from the 6th generation; a simplified UCAV to supplement PAF's 4+ generation fighters. This approach will not be unique. Japan for instance, may choose to skip the 5th Generation concept with its i3 fighter concept (Perrett, 2010).


A Practical UCAV for Pakistan

The attempt forward will be to propose a solution in the form of a UCAV for the PAF. We will first focus on some basic parameters that need to be fulfilled. The focus will then shift to defining a specific solution that meets those requirements in a most balanced manner.

We identify the following characteristics as imperative for the discussed UCAV solution:

1. Unmanned Platform
2. Simple construction and achievable technology
3. Simplified single-engine buildable in Pakistan
4. Relatively Low Cost
5. Economy and asymmetry in sensor load
6. Using parts bin of existing aircraft and from industry partners
7. Designed for high altitude, high speed f-pole BVR combat
8. Structure can operate in and sustain high G-forces
9. Artificial Intelligence
10. Network centric
11. Swarm & Group Tactics
12. Low Observable
13. Combat Air Patrol efficiency
14. Interceptor suitability




A specific solution to fulfill the above requirements is investigated next. For purposes of this paper, the designation used will be J-UCAV or Joint UCAV, assuming a partnership at least with China, if not with other countries such as Turkey, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, UAE, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Iran, Italy, and more. The proposed solution is in the form of a well-swept delta, single-engine UCAV.

The X-47 Pegasus is a design that broadly appears suitable for Pakistan's requirements. The design features a simple, single engine, well-swept, diamond-shaped delta. The large delta provides low wing-loading, ideal for high altitude flight and maneuverability. The high sweep mitigates the delta's drag, allowing a classic high-high aerodynamic profile to counter the PAKFA. Inherent structural integrity of the diamond-shape delta simplifies construction and allows the design to be strengthened for high G-forces at a smaller weight and cost penalty.

While a tailless design appears most efficient in terms of drag and RCS, developing a maneuverable fighter may prove problematic and high-risk from the perspective of keeping the project within the meager budget and time constraint of the PAF. A proportionately small twin tail is proposed instead (not illustrated). This twin tail may or may not be supplemented by thrust vectoring. Developmentally, this suggests a safer choice and allows greater control authority.


A single engine solution is proposed for the J-UCAV to be cost effective in acquisition and maintenance. As discussed earlier, since UCAVs do not need to fly frequently because of pilot training requirements and has to maintain a simple, cost effective solution. Simplicity of design and manufacture is important since the J-UCAV must be built in, and afforded by Pakistan.

The J-UCAV design proposed in this paper makes the hypothetical assumption of using an RD-93 or a WS-13 / WS-12 size engine. Taking a standard fighter aircraft engine as the benchmark can help allow the program to use the engine parts bin of an existing system. Assuming the stringent requirements for metallurgy, advanced composites and other advanced materials and manufacture processes can be relaxed, degraded or substituted to an extent, the UCAV engine can then perform adequately in the same thrust range with the tradeoff of degraded MTBF and reliability in lieu of low cost and simplicity.

A problem faced by a high-sweep delta design is poor CAP performance. This problem exists because of higher cruise speed as a result of sweep and greater drag because of delta wings. The solution proposed thus compromises our CAP requirements. To alleviate this issue and allow the J-UCAV better CAP performance, one possible solution is using non-movable, disposable canards. The reasoning behind such a solution is explainable as a fighter does not need to pull high Gs while on CAP, nor does it need to fly particularly fast. In fact, the slower and higher it can fly the better. Such flight profiles allow a balanced tradeoff between fuel efficiency and endurance, on the one hand, and potential kinetic energy from the high altitude profile. Adding high aspect ratio disposable canards can help slow and high flight profiles. In case of a threat, the fighter can dispose its canards in-flight and engage.

The diagram indicates possible locations for such canards. The canards may be added to the wing tips and / or forward of the wings. In the latter case, one anticipated issue is of clearance during disposal; avoiding the disposed canards from hitting the airframe. Some possible solutions are listed below:
1. Having an ejector mechanism that pushes the canards away from the airframe.
2. Building the forward disposable canards with light composite material and coating them with softer material to avoid damage in case of accidental collision.
3. Carefully planning disposal flight profile. For instance, a high angle-of-attack release profile, particularly possible with thrust vectoring, may allow seamless separation.

DSI intakes may also be incorporated to decrease RCS, increase performance, and reduce weight and costs. A possible improvement to DSI intake design that PAF, PAC Kamra and Chengdu engineers can look into may be a variable DSI. At first glance, this sounds contradictory given that DSI intakes are meant to supplant variable intake designs. However, a DSI bump that can enlarge or contract using pneumatic, hydraulic or other mechanisms can improve flight performance in a wide variety of flight profiles. These can possibly be significantly cheaper and lighter than more traditional variable inlet designs and simultaneously be stealthier. However, given Pakistan's budget constraints, any J-UCAV program should not be stalled because of risky technology choices and men better qualified than this author can perhaps decide better whether to pursue such technologies.

Using off-the-shelf parts from existing platforms can reduce such development risks further and reduce costs and time. The F-117 program is testament to the usefulness of this strategy. The approach can be extended to the maximum possible parts from the JF-17 and Chinese combat aircraft, UAVs and UCAVs. A UCAV designed around an RD-93-class engine can possibly use a large number of subsystems from the JF-17; the landing gear is a possible example.






Other technology choices for the J-UCAV may include a 360 degree sensor suite similar to the F-35 and asymmetric sensor payloads. The latter implies that only a portion of the UCAVs / manned aircraft in a pack will have expensive systems such as AESA radars installed. Others will be more dispensable missile careers. This strategy is sometimes referred to as cloud shooting (Perrett, 2010) and is similar in concept to naval engagements. The Japanese concept is illustrated and shows relevance to our strategy with the exception that instead of 6th generation manned fighters guiding UCAV swarms, 4th generation fighters available to PAF may provide the equivalent UCAV guidance authority.

Given the ability today of remotely launching AAMs and the highly sensor rich environment over Pakistani air space in the time-frame of deployment, such auxiliaries would provide cheap force multipliers for Pakistan. There is some discussion among observers that at least some of PAF's Mirage and F-7 fleets have been upgraded in a similar manner to launch BVR missiles using input from external sensors through the C4I network. While there is doubt about the feasibility and usefulness of maintaining older jets in this role with due consideration to pilot training and maintenance costs, J-UCAVs would provide ideal substitutes and appear to be perfect platforms for this role.

In the Grande Strategic view, PAF can use large numbers of J-UCAVs as a cheap and ideal counter for IAF and any other air force that seeks to undermine Pakistani airspace. They could form a picket line that are the first to deal with enemies and are reinforced with manned fighters where necessary. Such J-UCAVs would require very low maintenance, near zero training costs and may be cheap enough to not worry about being put outside hardened shelters, a valued commodity for PAF. Armed with 2 BVRs and 2 WVRs, J-UCAVs could prove to become the foot soldier of the skies, lightly armed and yet overwhelming in their numbers.
In Conclusion

UCAVs are an emerging technology that has the potential to revolutionize air warfare. While the 5th generation of combat planes is today the pinnacle of military aviation, UCAVs present paradigms that can supplement if not supplant manned fighters of the 4th and 5th generations. People who discuss a potential 6th generation inevitably mention unmanned aircraft as a likely salient. Unlike the 5th generation of aircraft that are extremely expensive and complex to build and maintain UCAVs provide the potential of finding an equivalent solution with significant reduction in complexity and cost.

The PAF has until now not considered UCAVs in the air-to-air role. With the systematic addition of net-centric warfare with platforms such as Erieye, ZDK03, ground radars, future planned communication satellite and the necessary middleware for a superior C4I, Pakistan has managed to transform the battle environment to one were UCAVS can multiply the effectiveness and flexibility of the entire air defense system.

While nations struggle to keep their 4th generation aircraft operational and can barely dream about 5th generation solutions, UCAVs provide an interesting paradigm shift that cannot be ignored by those entrusted with the defense of their nations and peoples. For some like Pakistan, UCAVs may be the only realistic way to counter a large number of PAKFAs and possibly other 5th generation planes sitting across the border in belligerent India, whose stalwarts dream about "cold starts" and "surgical strikes", and are only kept at bay by the strength of arms and the courage of the Pakistani soldier; whether on land, in the depths of the seas, or up high over the towering mountains and skies above.

 

[Kunal Biswas]

[h=2] Lockheed Martin's Sabre Warrior - 6th generation UACV[/h]

This is Lockheed Martin's Sabre Warrior, a next-generation plane that looks like something Batman and Darth Vader would fight over for. Instead, some good-turned-evil computer will get a fleet, as part of a plan to destroy us all. It's impressive.

The Sabre Warrior drone is 46 feet long, with a 36-foot wingspan, capable of taking off with 30,000 pounds of load using a 22,000-pound trust afterburning turbofan engine. It has two modular payload sections, which can be changed by soldiers in the field. Each bay can handle one 2,000 pound or two AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles or 10 smart bombs or sensors, or even fuel for extended range missions—even while this thing is air refuelable.

Its twin nose can also hold multiple sensors, which are interchangeable. And it is designed so there could be a version with a cockpit, so they can send man version as an on-the-scene controller, overlooking over the unmanned versions.

Sinister Sabre Warrior Drone Will Kill Us All One Day

 

[Kunal Biswas]

CROSS POSTED

UCAVs: The Future of Air Warfare For PAF

UCAVs: The Future of Air Warfare For PAF ~ INDIAN DEFENSE NEWS BLOG

Recently spotted in China, Though it can be a fake..

 

[Kunal Biswas]

[h=2]Unmanned aerial vehicles made in Israel - 2012[/h]

 

[Kunal Biswas]

 

[Patriot]

US Army to deploy UAS

The U.S. Army is using a hybrid-type acquisition approach to develop a helicopter-like, Vertical-Take-Off-and-Landing Unmanned Aerial System with a so-called ARGUS wide-area surveillance sensor suite designed to beam back information and images of the surrounding terrain, service officials said.

Beginning in May or June of 2012, the Army will deploy three Boeing-built A160 Hummingbird Vertical-Take-Off-and-Landing Unmanned Aerial Systems, or VTOL-UAS, to Afghanistan as part of a Quick Reaction Capability, an acquisition approach aimed at delivering cutting-edge and emerging technologies to theater to add capability and inform requirements while simultaneously developing a formal Program of Record approach, said Lt. Col. Matthew Munster, product manager, UAS Modernization.

"These aircraft will deploy for up to one full year as a way to harness lessons learned and funnel them into a program of record," Munster said.

The formal VTOL Program of Record will involve a full and open competition among many vendors able to propose UAS solutions able to meet the desired requirements, he added.

Army VTOL UAS program developers and engineers are now finishing up some wiring work on the A160 aircraft and performing ground tests with the ARGUS sensor suite.

"The ARGUS sensor suite has never been flown on this platform before so we have to make sure that the integration is complete. We are finishing that up now and adding some different types of antennas. We begin flight testing of the UAS at Yuma Proving Grounds, Arizona, early next year," Munster said.

The VTOL aircraft will give forward-positioned Army units the ability to deploy a wide-area UAS Intelligence, Surveillance Reconnaissance, or ISR, asset without needing access to a runway.