Retaliation against a Nuclear attack on India

[Iamanidiot]

No doubt. But that was fission bomb. Fusion bomb is something else. The claim is that India does not have a TNW and that the one test either failed or didn't give the desired data to make a perfect weapon.

I find it to be a very valid claim

 

[Yusuf]

I find it to be a very valid claim

Data and source to validate that. Don't give me western sources. They are taking us for suckers.

 

[Iamanidiot]

Data and source to validate that. Don't give me western sources. They are taking us for suckers.

Yusuf c'mon we cannot conjure a fusion weapon from thin air on the first try it is not even remotely possible

 

[Yusuf]

Yusuf c'mon we cannot conjure a fusion weapon from thin air on the first try it is not even remotely possible

The Chinese first test of TNW was an air dropped 3MT yield. How did they conjure that from thin air?

 

[Iamanidiot]

The Chinese first test of TNW was an air dropped 3MT yield. How did they conjure that from thin air?

Was it a success?How many more tests did they do perfect the design

 

[Yusuf]

Was it a success?How many more tests did they do perfect the design

It was a success. They had the luxury to test more and more. We had all the book knowledge which we tested in labs over and over again and then validated it once and for all.


From wiki

Test No. 6 is the codename for the China's first test of a three-staged thermonuclear device and, also its sixth nuclear weapons test. The device was detonated at Lop Nur Test Base, or often dubbed as Lop Nur Nuclear Weapon Test Base, in Malan, Xinjiang, on 17 June 1967. With successful testing of this three-stage thermonuclear device, China became the fourth country to have successfully developed a thermonuclear weapon after the United States, Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. It was dropped from a Hong-6 (Chinese manufactured Tu-16) and was parachute-retarded for an airburst at 2960 meters. The bomb was a three-stage device with a boosted U-235 primary and U-238 pusher. The yield was 3.3 megatons.

It was a fully functional, full-scale, three-stage hydrogen bomb, tested 32 months after China had made its first fission device. China thus produced the shortest fission-to-fusion development known in history. China had received extensive technical help from the Soviet Union to jump-start their nuclear program, but by 1960, the rift between the Soviet Union and China had become so great that the Soviet Union ceased all assistance to China.[1] Thus, the Number 6 test was indeed an independent endeavor, after the induced military and economic sanctions enacted by the superpowers at the time, the United States and the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, a comparison of other fission-to-fusion timespans may be instructive. The time between the U.S.'s first atomic test and its first hydrogen bomb test was 86 months, for the USSR it was 75 months, for the UK 66 months and later for France, 105 months.[1]

 

[Iamanidiot]

Guys found some info on the ----ing state of Paki nukes

US congressional report

Pakistan's nuclear forces, 2011

 

[Iamanidiot]

Yusuf here is an idea of Pakistan Nukes

Pakistan's Nuclear Surge
May 15, 2011 1:00 AM EDT
Photos obtained by NEWSWEEK reveal a more aggressive buildup than previously known. So why does Washington still stay mum?

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Exclusive satellite imagery taken in April 2011 exposes a new nuclear facility (circled) in Khushab, Pakistan—which now has the fastest-growing nuclear program in the world. The facility was undetectable in satellite images take as recently as December 2009. Pictured directly above the circled area are two white boxes which are also nuclear reactors. Image by © GeoEye

Exclusive satellite imagery taken in April 2011 exposes a new nuclear facility (circled) in Khushab, Pakistan—which now has the fastest-growing nuclear program in the world. The facility was undetectable in satellite images take as recently as December 2009. Pictured directly above the circled area are two white boxes which are also nuclear reactors. Image by © GeoEye

Even in the best of times, Pakistan's nuclear-weapons program warrants alarm. But these are perilous days. At a moment of unprecedented misgiving between Washington and Islamabad, new evidence suggests that Pakistan's nuclear program is barreling ahead at a furious clip.

According to new commercial-satellite imagery obtained exclusively by NEWSWEEK, Pakistan is aggressively accelerating construction at the Khushab nuclear site, about 140 miles south of Islamabad. The images, analysts say, prove Pakistan will soon have a fourth operational reactor, greatly expanding plutonium production for its nuclear-weapons program.

"The buildup is remarkable," says Paul Brannan of the Institute for Science and International Security. "And that nobody in the U.S. or in the Pakistani government says anything about this—especially in this day and age—is perplexing."

Unlike Iran, which has yet to produce highly enriched uranium, or North Korea, which has produced plutonium but still lacks any real weapons capability, Pakistan is significantly ramping up its nuclear-weapons program. Eric Edelman, undersecretary of defense in the George W. Bush administration, puts it bluntly: "You're talking about Pakistan even potentially passing France at some point. That's extraordinary."

Pakistani officials say the buildup is a response to the threat from India, which is spending $50 billion over the next five years on its military. "But to say it's just an issue between just India and Pakistan is divorced from reality," says former senator Sam Nunn, who co-chairs the Nuclear Threat Initiative. "The U.S. and Soviet Union went through 40 years of the Cold War and came out every time from dangerous situations with lessons learned. Pakistan and India have gone through some dangerous times, and they have learned some lessons. But not all of them. Today, deterrence has fundamentally changed. The whole globe has a stake in this. It's extremely dangerous."

It's dangerous because Pakistan is also stockpiling fissile material, or bomb fuel. Since Islamabad can mine uranium on its own territory and has decades of enrichment know-how—beginning with the work of nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan—the potential for production is significant.

Although the White House declined to comment, a senior U.S. congressional official who works on nuclear issues told NEWSWEEK that intelligence estimates suggest Pakistan has already developed enough fissile material to produce more than 100 warheads and manufacture between eight and 20 weapons a year. "There's no question," the official says, "it's the fastest-growing program in the world."

What has leaders around the world especially worried is what's popularly known as "loose nukes"—nuclear weapons or fissile material falling into the wrong hands. "There's no transparency in how the fissile material is handled or transported," says Mansoor Ijaz, who has played an active role in back-channel diplomacy between Islamabad and New Delhi. "And the amount—they have significant quantities—is what's so alarming."

That Osama bin Laden was found in a Pakistani military community, and that the country is home to such jihadi groups as Lashkar-e-Taiba, only heightens concerns. "We've looked the other way from Pakistan's growing program for 30 years," says Sharon Squassoni, a director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. What we're facing, she says, is "a disaster waiting to happen."

A Defense Department official told NEWSWEEK that the U.S. government is "confident that Pakistan has taken appropriate steps toward securing its nuclear arsenal." But beyond palliatives, few in Washington want to openly discuss the nightmare scenario of terrorists getting hold of nuclear material or weapons. "The less that is said publicly, the better," says Stephen Hadley, national-security adviser to President George W. Bush. "But don't confuse the lack of public discussion for a lack of concern."
nukes-graphic-OV01-vl

Compiled with Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists

The bomb lends the Pakistanis a certain diplomatic insouciance. Nukes, after all, are a valuable political tool, ensuring continued economic aid from the United States and Europe. "Pakistan knows it can outstare" the West, says Pakistani nuclear physicist Pervez Hoodbhoy. "It's confident the West knows that Pakistan's collapse is too big a price to pay, so the bailout is there in perpetuity. It's the one thing we've been successful at."

Pakistani leaders defend their weapons program as a strategic necessity: since they can't match India's military spending, they have to bridge the gap with nukes. "Regretfully, there are several destabilizing developments that have taken place in recent years," Khalid Banuri of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division, the nuclear arsenal's guardian, wrote in response to NEWSWEEK questions. Among his country's concerns, Banuri pointed to India's military buildup and the U.S.'s -civilian nuclear deal with India.

"Most Pakistanis believe the jihadist scenario is something that the West has created as a bogey," says Hoodbhoy, "an excuse, so they can screw us, defang, and denuclearize us."

"Our program is an issue of extreme sensitivity for every man, woman, and child in Pakistan," says former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf, adding that the nukes are "well dispersed and protected in secure locations." When asked whether the U.S. has a role to play in securing the arsenal, Musharraf said: "A U.S. role to play? A U.S. role in helping? Zero role. No, sir. It is our own production?.?.?.?We have not and cannot now have any intrusion by any element in the U.S." To guard its "strategic assets," Pakistan employs two Army divisions—about 18,000 troops—and, as Musharraf drily puts it, "If you want to get into a firefight with the forces guarding our strategic assets, it will be a very sad day."

For now, the White House appears to have made a tacit tradeoff with Islamabad: for your cooperation in Afghanistan, we'll leave you to your own nuclear devices. "People bristle at the suggestion, but it follows, doesn't it?" says Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, formerly the CIA's chief officer handling terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. "The irony is that the U.S. presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the money we're giving them to fight terrorism, could inadvertently aggravate the very problem we're trying to stop. After all, terrorism and nukes is the worst-case scenario."

With this fourth nuclear facility at Khushab coming online as early as 2013, and the prospect of an accelerated nuclear-weapons program, the U.S. is facing a diplomatic dilemma. "The Pakistanis have gone through a humiliation with the killing of Osama bin Laden," says Nunn. "That's never a time to corner somebody. But with both recent and preexisting problems, we are in a race between cooperation and catastrophe. Both sides need to take a deep breath, count to 10, and find a way to cooperate."

With Ron Moreau in Islamabad and Fasih Ahmed in Lahore

Fourth Nuclear Reactor at Pakistan's Khushab Site - The Daily Beast

Yusuf lets have a conservatice estimate of about 150-200 nukes for India

 

[Iamanidiot]

http://docs.nrdc.org/nuclear/files/nuc_02019401a_121.pdf

 

[sayareakd]

for retaliation against Pakistan, two line of thoughts.

First should be measured but massive retaliation in response for any kind of attack on India or its forces any where.

second is to make sure Pakistan cease to exist as state.

for both we require different numbers of nukes and their delivery systems.

BTW we should plan this from the angle of deterrence to Pakistan Army which is the ultimate and only structure and authority in Pakistan. If they know that once they attack India with nukes they ceased to exist as fighting army (including their families) that would be good enough reason to avoid nukes exchange with India.

I think all the possible nuclear weapons storage sites, Military installations, economic centers, Capital etc should be target of any retaliation.

 

[Iamanidiot]

for retaliation against Pakistan, two line of thoughts.

First should be measured but massive retaliation in response for any kind of attack on India or its forces any where.

second is to make sure Pakistan cease to exist as state.

for both we require different numbers of nukes and their delivery systems.

BTW we should plan this from the angle of deterrence to Pakistan Army which is the ultimate and only structure and authority in Pakistan. If they know that once they attack India with nukes they ceased to exist as fighting army (including their families) that would be good enough reason to avoid nukes exchange with India.

I think all the possible nuclear weapons storage sites, Military installations, economic centers, Capital etc should be target of any retaliation.

Sayare a request.Please find out and fish out any open source material about ballistic nuke triggers being developed by India .This info is urgently required in this thread

 

[Iamanidiot]

The Consequences of Nuclear Conflict between India and Pakistan NRDC's nuclear expert

Here is open source info about an Indo-Pak Nuclear exchange

The Consequences of Nuclear Conflict between India and Pakistan
NRDC's nuclear experts think about the unthinkable, using state-of-the-art nuclear war simulation software to assess the crisis in South Asia.

The months-long military standoff between India and Pakistan intensified several weeks ago when suspected Islamic militants killed more than 30 people at an Indian base in the disputed territory of Kashmir. As U.S. diplomatic pressure to avert war intensifies, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is going to India and Pakistan this week to discuss with his South Asian counterparts the results of a classified Pentagon study that concludes that a nuclear war between these countries could result in 12 million deaths.

NRDC (Natural Resources Defense Council) has conducted its own analysis of the consequences of nuclear war in South Asia. Prior to this most recent crisis we calculated two nuclear scenarios. The first assumes 10 Hiroshima-sized explosions with no fallout; the second assumes 24 nuclear explosions with significant radioactive fallout. Below is a discussion of the two scenarios in detail and an exploration of several additional issues regarding nuclear war in South Asia.

Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Forces

It is difficult to determine the actual size and composition of India's and Pakistan's nuclear arsenals, but NRDC estimates that both countries have a total of 50 to 75 weapons. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we believe India has about 30 to 35 nuclear warheads, slightly fewer than Pakistan, which may have as many as 48.

Both countries have fission weapons, similar to the early designs developed by the United States in the late 1940s and early 1950s. NRDC estimates their explosive yields are 5 to 25 kilotons (1 kiloton is equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT). By comparison, the yield of the weapon the United States exploded over Hiroshima was 15 kilotons, while the bomb exploded over Nagasaki was 21 kilotons. According to a recent NRDC discussion with a senior Pakistani military official, Pakistan's main nuclear weapons are mounted on missiles. India's nuclear weapons are reportedly gravity bombs deployed on fighter aircraft.

NRDC's Nuclear Program initially developed the software used to calculate the consequences of a South Asian nuclear war to examine and analyze the U.S. nuclear war planning process. We combined Department of Energy and Department of Defense computer codes with meteorological and demographic data to model what would happen in various kinds of attacks using different types of weapons. Our June 2001 report, "The U.S. Nuclear War Plan: A Time for Change," is available at NRDC: The U.S. Nuclear War Plan: A Time for Change.

Scenario: 10 Bombs on 10 South Asian Cities

For our first scenario we used casualty data from the Hiroshima bomb to estimate what would happen if bombs exploded over 10 large South Asian cities: five in India and five in Pakistan. (The results were published in "The Risks and Consequences of Nuclear War in South Asia," by NRDC physicist Matthew McKinzie and Princeton scientists Zia Mian, A. H. Nayyar and M. V. Ramana, a chapter in Smitu Kothari and Zia Mian (editors), "Out of the Nuclear Shadow" (Dehli: Lokayan and Rainbow Publishers, 2001).)

The 15-kiloton yield of the Hiroshima weapon is approximately the size of the weapons now in the Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals. The deaths and severe injuries experienced at Hiroshima were mainly a function of how far people were from ground zero. Other factors included whether people were in buildings or outdoors, the structural characteristics of the buildings themselves, and the age and health of the victims at the time of the attack. The closer to ground zero, the higher fatality rate. Further away there were fewer fatalities and larger numbers of injuries. The table below summarizes the first nuclear war scenario by superimposing the Hiroshima data onto five Indian and five Pakistan cities with densely concentrated populations.

Estimated nuclear casualties for attacks on 10 large Indian and Pakistani cities
City Name Total Population Within 5 Kilometers of Ground Zero Number of Persons Killed Number of Persons Severely Injured Number of Persons Slightly Injured
India
Bangalore 3,077,937 314,978 175,136 411,336
Bombay 3,143,284 477,713 228,648 476,633
Calcutta 3,520,344 357,202 198,218 466,336
Madras 3,252,628 364,291 196,226 448,948
New Delhi 1,638,744 176,518 94,231 217,853
Total India 14,632,937 1,690,702 892,459 2,021,106
Pakistan
Faisalabad 2,376,478 336,239 174,351 373,967
Islamabad 798,583 154,067 66,744 129,935
Karachi 1,962,458 239,643 126,810 283,290
Lahore 2,682,092 258,139 149,649 354,095
Rawalpindi 1,589,828 183,791 96,846 220,585
Total Pakistan 9,409,439 1,171,879 614,400 1,361,872
India and Pakistan
Total 24,042,376 2,862,581 1,506,859 3,382,978

As in the case of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in this scenario the 10 bombs over Indian and Pakistani cities would be exploded in the air, which maximized blast damage and fire but creates no fallout. On August 6, 1945, the United States exploded an untested uranium-235 gun-assembly bomb, nicknamed "Little Boy," 1,900 feet above Hiroshima. The city was home to an estimated 350,000 people; about 140,000 died by the end of the year. Three days later, at 11:02 am, the United States exploded a plutonium implosion bomb nicknamed "Fat Man" 1,650 feet above Nagasaki. About 70,000 of the estimated 270,000 residents died by the end of the year.

Ten Hiroshima-size explosions over 10 major cities in India and Pakistan would kill as many as three to four times more people per bomb than in Japan because of the higher urban densities in Indian and Pakistani cities.

Scenario: 24 Ground Bursts

In January, NRDC calculated the consequences of a much more severe nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan. It first appeared as a sidebar in the January 14, 2002, issue of Newsweek ("A Face-Off with Nuclear Stakes"). This scenario calculated the consequences of 24 nuclear explosions detonated on the ground -- unlike the Hiroshima airburst -- resulting in significant amounts of lethal radioactive fallout.

Exploding a nuclear bomb above the ground does not produce fallout. For example, the United States detonated "Little Boy" weapon above Hiroshima at an altitude of 1,900 feet. At this height, the radioactive particles produced in the explosion were small and light enough to rise into the upper atmosphere, where they were carried by the prevailing winds. Days to weeks later, after the radioactive bomb debris became less "hot," these tiny particles descended to earth as a measurable radioactive residue, but not at levels of contamination that would cause immediate radiation sickness or death.

Unfortunately, it is easier to fuse a nuclear weapon to detonate on impact than it is to detonate it in the air -- and that means fallout. If the nuclear explosion takes place at or near the surface of the earth, the nuclear fireball would gouge out material and mix it with the radioactive bomb debris, producing heavier radioactive particles. These heavier particles would begin to drift back to earth within minutes or hours after the explosion, producing potentially lethal levels of nuclear fallout out to tens or hundreds of kilometers from the ground zero. The precise levels depend on the explosive yield of the weapon and the prevailing winds.

For the second scenario, we calculated the fallout patterns and casualties for a hypothetical nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan in which each country targeted major cities. We chose target cities throughout Pakistan and in northwestern India to take into account the limited range of Pakistani missiles or aircraft. The target cities, listed in the table below, include the capitals of Islamabad and New Dehli, and large cities, such as Karachi and Bombay. In this scenario, we assumed that a dozen, 25-kiloton warheads would be detonated as ground bursts in Pakistan and another dozen in India, producing substantial fallout.

The devastation that would result from fallout would exceed that of blast and fire. NRDC's second scenario would produce far more horrific results than the first scenario because there would be more weapons, higher yields, and extensive fallout. In some large cities, we assumed more than one bomb would be used.

15 Indian and Pakistani cities attacked with 24 nuclear warheads
Country City City Population Number of
Attacking Bombs
Pakistan Islamabad (national capital) 100-250 thousand 1
Pakistan Karachi (provincial capital) > 5 million 3
Pakistan Lahore (provincial capital) 1-5 million 2
Pakistan Peshawar (provincial capital) 0.5-1 million 1
Pakistan Quetta (provincial capital) 250-500 thousand 1
Pakistan Faisalabad 1-5 million 2
Pakistan Hyderabad 0.5-1 million 1
Pakistan Rawalpindi 0.5-1 million 1
India New Dehli (national capital) 250-500 thousand 1
India Bombay (provincial capital) > 5 million 3
India Delhi (provincial capital) > 5 million 3
India Jaipur (provincial capital) 1-5 million 2
India Bhopal (provincial capital) 1-5 million 1
India Ahmadabad 1-5 million 1
India Pune 1-5 million 1

NRDC calculated that 22.1 million people in India and Pakistan would be exposed to lethal radiation doses of 600 rem or more in the first two days after the attack. Another 8 million people would receive a radiation dose of 100 to 600 rem, causing severe radiation sickness and potentially death, especially for the very young, old or infirm. NRDC calculates that as many as 30 million people would be threatened by the fallout from the attack, roughly divided between the two countries.

Besides fallout, blast and fire would cause substantial destruction within roughly a mile-and-a-half of the bomb craters. NRDC estimates that 8.1 million people live within this radius of destruction.

Most Indians (99 percent of the population) and Pakistanis (93 percent of the population) would survive the second scenario. Their respective military forces would be still be intact to continue and even escalate the conflict.

Thinking the Unthinkable

After India and Pakistan held nuclear tests in 1998, experts have debated whether their nuclear weapons contribute to stability in South Asia. Experts who argue that the nuclear standoff promotes stability have pointed to the U.S.-Soviet Union Cold War as an example of how deterrence ensures military restraint.

NRDC disagrees. There are major differences between the Cold War and the current South Asian crisis. Unlike the U.S.-Soviet experience, these two countries have a deep-seated hatred of one another and have fought three wars since both countries became independent. At least part of the current crisis may be seen as Hindu nationalism versus Muslim fundamentalism.

A second difference is India and Pakistan's nuclear arsenals are much smaller than those of the United States and Russia. The U.S. and Russian arsenals truly represent the capability to destroy each other's society beyond recovery. While the two South Asia scenarios we have described produce unimaginable loss of life and destruction, they do not reach the level of "mutual assured destruction" that stood as the ultimate deterrent during the Cold War.

The two South Asian scenarios assume nuclear attacks against cities. During the early Cold War period this was the deterrent strategy of the United States and the Soviet Union. But as both countries introduced technological improvements into their arsenals, they pursued other strategies, targeting each other's nuclear forces, conventional military forces, industry and leadership. India and Pakistan may include these types of targets in their current military planning. For example, attacking large dams with nuclear weapons could result in massive disruption, economic consequences and casualties. Concentrations of military forces and facilities may provide tempting targets as well.

NRDC: The Consequences of Nuclear Conflict between India and Pakistan

Here is an open source of info about Paki as well as India cities.

Now in case of war we also have to target military installations ,Water resources ,air bases and nuclear installations

 

[nrj]

I won't believe that we have thermonuclear nukes I doubt it.Nobody in history made a perfectly working nuclear design for thermonuclear devices on their first test.The US perfected a thermonuclear device after 1000 tests,ditto with USSR and China did it after some 50 tests

JP, We tested TNW in 1998. That was the first nuke test after the gap of 7-8yrs from last test carried out by US in 1990.

By '98, computing processing power and technological automation advanced by substantial measure. So it perfectly makes sense when we see that US/USSR had to conduct so many test to perfect that design. The recent designs, be chinese or Indian had advantage of using newer technology, which is why their bomb design was reliable and technically satisfying.

Regarding number of tests in cold war era, lets face it US and USSR were in competition to measure their stick so Tsar bomba or 1000 tests by US were competitive requirements of their survival. Also they had to stockpile not based on just one model but imo they developed several designs fitting different delivery mechanisms and different preemptive or retaliatory scenario. Apart from BMs, other delivery platforms were not mature in those times. By late 90s, most of the jet engine planes and missile propulsion technology became stable. We knew that we will be successful if we drop off bomb from M2Ks.

Indian nuclear test '98 was out of threats from Pakistan. It did not trigger competition in subcontinent. We were expecting that Pak will follow us with a nuke test within a week. It would have been a different case if China had tested another bomb in the wake of Op Shakti. Then the matter would have got complicated pushing Indian side to test larger yield design.

 

[Iamanidiot]

@NRJ only when we have a considerable amount of data we can do simulations.any open sources which suggest that USSR shared their test data with us

 

[sayareakd]

Sayare a request.Please find out and fish out any open source material about ballistic nuke triggers being developed by India .This info is urgently required in this thread

Idiot you wont find any open source material on ballistic nuke triggers. Nuke triggers were made by DRDO. what is ballistic nuke triggers ??

 

[nrj]

@NRJ only when we have a considerable amount of data we can do simulations.any open sources which suggest that USSR shared their test data with us

USSR might have shared their data with us back in '70s. I can not confirm it. But that data will be irrelevant today or even during 1998. I also doubt if Soviets helped us with data after Indian political turmoil of early '80s.

We got cut off when soviet broke down so no chance we received any inputs after 1990. It wouldn't even make sense to use their data now.

btw few of our low yield tests under Op Shakti were not detected by anyone as seismographs failed to register anything. Now when we see sub-kiloton delivery missiles, I sometime wonder if strategists at that time did plan to perfect smaller bomb design as to be able to rapidly stockpile these low yield weapons. If we go by what Sinha said then ~125-130Kgs of Plutonium is what we can enrich annually. It makes sense to appreciate number of warheads by reducing individual yield especially looking at pre-2005 scenarios when we were under nuclear isolation.

 

[Ashwin_Sharma]

 

[AKHAND BHARAT]

Don't read too much into them. They have their way of thinking. I believe we should trust our own people.

Tell me how did china perfect the bomb after 50 tests something that the US took 1000 as you said?

In the age of powerful supercomputers when simulation becomes very easy you can even perfect a thermo design in 5 tests only.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

@NRJ only when we have a considerable amount of data we can do simulations.any open sources which suggest that USSR shared their test data with us

I once got into a bitter flame war with a famous engineer when I expressed this.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

USSR might have shared their data with us back in '70s. I can not confirm it. But that data will be irrelevant today or even during 1998. I also doubt if Soviets helped us with data after Indian political turmoil of early '80s.

We got cut off when soviet broke down so no chance we received any inputs after 1990. It wouldn't even make sense to use their data now.

btw few of our low yield tests under Op Shakti were not detected by anyone as seismographs failed to register anything. Now when we see sub-kiloton delivery missiles, I sometime wonder if strategists at that time did plan to perfect smaller bomb design as to be able to rapidly stockpile these low yield weapons. If we go by what Sinha said then ~125-130Kgs of Plutonium is what we can enrich annually. It makes sense to appreciate number of warheads by reducing individual yield especially looking at pre-2005 scenarios when we were under nuclear isolation.

There were rumors that Indian scientist were at some Russian tests. This may have been cold war
Rumors but no official conformation. Even if they were not how can data transfer be caught? This was
In a time possibly pre-NPT. Even china transferred CHIC designs to Pakistan along with uranium before
Signing NPT.