You people tend to forget that there is a difference between testing a Megaton bomb and stockpiling warheads of same yield.
The formulation of retaliation strategy can succeed with or without higher yield nukes. Accuracy is a big player and yes we are inching towards precise delivery every day with range of new technologies out on industrial line or those which are exiting R&D Lab. We can not aggressively stockpile higher yield warheads to match China, forget Russia or USA. I will be happy even if we match Israel's numbers. Now having low numbers of warheads has its reason and when you look at it closely, you will find it making sense till the moment we were under nuclear isolation before MMS changed the course. If you trust Sinha's numbers, we were able to enrich some ~110kgs of plutonium from safeguarded/un-safeguarded facilities by 2002. Now by 2008 when nuclear isolation ended, we started receiving fuel supply from outside leaving entire domestic produce for military use (which is not happening even now imo) So by 2010, we have received some ~390tons of uranium combined from France, Russia. Now the reason to go after these number is because we have suffered loss of some 140kgs of WgPu in fueling fast breeder reactors or even power reactors. Some analysts say we had only 10 active bombs before 1998, we lost 5 out of it in tests. Now imagine this was the situation back in 2006 which pushed GOI to go after nuclear deal because we had NO option.
Now coming to Mr.Rajaram's estimate that we had hands on ~700kgs of WgPu in 2009 with civilian use fuel supply taken care of from imports, we are in postition to deploy 120-130 weapons. The accuracy and success of this stock is at the mercy of May 13 tests which were specifically carried out to obtain data for subcritical experiments and future computer simulations. To get the actual weapon numbers under current capability, double the previous count since we have >600kgs of non-weapon grade plutonium. This is without taking into consideration the fuel re-processing ability of current infrastructure and the existence of HEU design.
The NSAB report which led to the formation of Indian Nuclear Doctrine was primarily based on solid opinion that Indian nuclear weapon will be mainly for the second strike. Our immediate threats are regional hence carving a nuclear offensive infra is tricky and not as simple as it has been for post-WW2 powers. There are some of grey areas due no information in public domain regarding missing piece in task force reports conducted in 2000 and 2006, respectively dealing with regional nuclear threat and global strategic security analysis. With nuclear isolation ending and achievements in conventional explosives be it CL-20 or MOAB, first strike weapons will use these new warheads instead of plutonium or uranium. The enrichment cycle of radioactive materials is lengthy and it will make sense only when these are pushed into reserve i.e retaliation measures. The maintenance costs of offensive gears in ever evolving platforms will be in vein, also it will not help to streamline the doctrine. That said, our facilities have been working on barely 60% of its actual capacity in nuclear enrichment in past decade and it can incremented according to the threat perception; this is established fact.
We probably didnt have any considerable number of weaponised nukes between 1974-'98 due to absence of tests to standardize the detonation model suiting the developing delivery mechanism. And it is safe to assume that we are not going to vigorously stockpile to escalate current numbers due to non-streamlined delivery platforms. Once we have reliable, tested and user accepted delivery gears in accordance with SFC directions clearly identifying separate resource requirement on offensive and defensive front, then the mass production will be industry relevant. The standardization of defensive doctrine is the key factor in determining the pace of nuclear enrichment as it maps out plan to generate silo locations for specific lifetime without compromising locations from which the logistical supply originates. Shaurya is the main component of our land-based second strike button. Improved version of Shaurya with conformed propulsion and appreciated range will come out after A5 tests meet >2/3rd of its technical physical objectives, which includes MIRV and electronic/radio countermeasures. It will maybe come out with different name to classify its performance characteristics. Agni, Brahmos are offensive leg imo so we shouldn't count it in retaliation related study, I think. Regarding second-strike via submarines, we are yet to have a full scale SLBM test so user+SFC approval coupled by mass-production of underwater delivery vehicles is a long-standing issue which will take years to operationalize to eventually give us fair opportunity to connect the dots left by the strategists. Sustainability of desi AIP or the one we'll end up accepting on production line is the most critical factor if we are to think about leaving nuke missile on these vehicles for surprising second-strike coming from deep ocean somewhere, whose co-ordinates will not be communicated even with ground command for months unless absolutely necessary.
Regarding second strike using aerial platforms, the miniaturization of warhead is up for a debate. The traditional soviet era bombers are going to face tough challenge from new air defenses, which could be taken care by SEAD using yet-to-induct fighters. But the operational range of A2G missiles is in serious question here. And at the same time it naturally put us out to obsolete those supersonic bombers in coming decade by inducting very very experimental ideas like HSTDV. We are at the same line with US Global Prompt Strike weapon here, i.e. in dilemma to use nuclear or conventional (with ameliorated explosive capacity) warhead for point air-strike. Platforms like HSTDV are the only answer in future if you are looking to retaliate from air, because of the highly sophisticated air defense systems that will be able to shoot down generation-old bombers like balloons in the sky. So again it brings us to the same point that unless these vehicles are industry-standardized, we can not conclude the yield capacity and fleet formulation of the same.
Hence leaving out Surface-to-surface second strike, we have no other button-ready options to actually make anything out of deployment doctrine of present proviso of nuclear material. Other platforms are evolving and it will be foolishness to restrict the research and testing to deploy the stockpiled nukes on vehicles which are not forward-compatible. We are not the only ones in this condition, Chinese are in the same league more or less. Ask them if are going to increase number of warheads on those noisy submarines. Or ask PLAAF if they can trust soviet era re-engineered supersonic bombers. Chinese are known to test range of demonstrators before selecting one. If west will 2 TDs of any machine then Chinese will test 8 different models of equivalent machine. There is clear 1:4 ratio in their industry acceptance method. This is possible because of vast resources available to them be it labor or infra or natural minerals. So in this compulsive competition, PRC will end up developing entire new range of platforms by replacing semi-developed gears that were going through induction. The main advantage Chinese will have over Indians is the quantity of enriched nuclear material ready to couple with inducted platform. Hence it is absolutely necessary for Indian establishment to aggressively start those proposed 20 nuclear plants over next decade. There shouldn't be any wastage of fuel going to power reactors instead of military use like what happened in the past. These things are directly proportional, we are tasked to equally quantify our nuclear fuel supply to power sector, offensive weapons and defensive reserve.
Having said that, we never know how Indian strategists work because of less information in public domain. Remember BARC scientists were secretly carrying out military specific experiments during nights in labs which were made ready for civilian use in daytime. This continued for some 7yrs before someone could come to know about it in 2000 when facilities given separate administration and regulatory body. Dedicated people like K. Subrahmanyam made this deception work in national favor. But its also important to keep in mind that some not-so-good individuals in later years boasted about capability by repeatedly advertising that we have far better capability and ambiguity is maintained for secrecy, skipping straight answers.
Chinese expansionism cautions itself only when challenged by equal and overwhelming power. The discussion surrounding Chinese offensive to seize control of eastern parts of India are often ridiculed by argument that china can not afford a full scale war, nor can India so testing a high yield weapon is irrelevant as far as we are talking about taming PLA in limited border conflict. However, the idea of inducing a fret in Chinese leadership that Indians will escalate the limited military offensive to a full blown battle on strategic front can not ignored. Rather it should be nourished and used as a tool to tame the aggression. Chinese establishment should be informed that the ramifications of any military campaign will result in multiple battle fronts which endangers mainland economic situation and strategic posture not just on regional but also on International political theatre. This is the same tactic which was unknowingly developed by Pakis in 2001 when GOI was busy asserting itself by mobilizing troops and talking about its destructive capability evidenced by recent nuclear test. The domestic business community and investors knocked the south block doors and asked "Will you please stop using words like 'nukes'? Because if this continues then investors will pull out their entire money by the end of 2nd week from now and we'll be out of business within a month". This led GOI to slow down itself on talk of capturing Pok because the risk of outblowing a limited conflict into a full scale war was a deterrence itself. Beijing's expansionist ambitions should be handled in this exact manner. Therefore a high yield test does not serve the sole purpose of technical evidence as it is often propagated. It pushes the verbal talk of union's control over its integral part to a level which decimates enemy ambitions to reality. You can validate above by analyzing difference between situation when we had universal NFU and that when we refined policy to make it NFU only against non-nuclear states.
Coming to Pakistani threat, I have said it before and I will say it again that we don't need nukes to put pakis in place even if they target us with nuclear attack in first place. We can not afford the environmental, demographic problems arising due to fallout on far western parts of punjab and high altitudes terrains of north. Our conventional capability is overkill for pakis. We must not waste any reserve of strategic weapons like nuclear options on pakistani bastards. Capture-and-neutralize is the only option for pakis and our forces conduct mock exercises based on the same principle every six months.
Now considering everything above and present security framework on international stage regarding WMDs, I can not buy it if you tell me that a megaton test for pure power projection is not economical for a nation like India. When one says that a megaton test is necessary, it is not implied that it should be conducted on the very next morning. Nobody can deny us a reason to conduct a Mt test if a 3-5yr long border dispute resolution talks with china fails to arrive on any favorable conclusion, considering today in 2012 they are getting ready to operate 5 tunnels in immediate proximity of Arunachal which will eventually reduce the water holding capacity of Brahmaputra; making a geographic tool out of siang river.
