Naxals/Maoists Watch

[Pintu]

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...axals-Chhattisgarh-CM/articleshow/5950577.cms

No hard or soft line to tackling Naxals: Chhattisgarh CM
TNN, May 20, 2010, 02.59am IST

NEW DELHI: With the ruling Congress-led UPA debating on whether to opt for the hardline to deal with Maoists, Chhattisgarh chief minister Raman Singh said that, "there cannot be any hard or soft line to tackle naxalism. What has been achieved by adopting a soft line against them in the last 50 years," while replying to a question on the differences within the Centre on the approach on combating naxalism.

The chief minister said the strategy was to continue with the development process in Maoist-infested areas. "At the same time force should also be applied to deal with them," he said, adding, a joint strategy with the Centre is needed on a long term basis to fight naxals.

When asked about the support his state is getting from the Centre, Singh said it has been "adequate" and specifically mentioned the Prime Minister and the home minister as the ones who have always supported him.

"We have several central forces like ITBP, CRPF. But there are no differences (with Centre). Other states may have, I do not know," he said.

Labelling naxals as the "biggest terrorists," Singh said, Maoists were better trained now as was clear from the last incident in Dantewada where they blew up a bus. "Though I have no confirmation, some facts have come to light indicating that naxals may have some connection with Lashkar (LeT) militants... The manner in which they are using IEDs, explosives and weapons with 100 per cent technical surety shows there are experts behind this who are giving them training," Singh said.

He said, "the menace would have to be tackled through joint efforts between the Centre and the state without use of air strikes."

"Who else can be termed as terrorists? They are the biggest terrorists... Naxalism is the biggest challenge to the democracy. They want to capture power at gunpoint," Singh said, when asked whether Maoists are terrorists.

Giving details of Maoist activities in last 10 years in the state, he said they have killed more than 1000 civilians and over 650 policemen besides blowing up 132 electric towers, 106 school buildings and three hospitals in the state.

To a question, he said aerial support was welcome but air strikes could not be an option in the naxal-infested areas because it could have collateral damage. "There are landmines in upto 100 kms in an area. If there is a blast it will take hours to take the injured to hospital by road. Army helicopters can be used here. And also for supplying emergency rations," Singh said.

"But I don't recommend use of air power as Chhattisgarh has a huge dense forest cover inhabited by tribals and if any such attack is launched, then they will suffer greatly... Bombing is not possible in these areas. This is not a war," he added.

He, however, criticised senior Congress leader Digvijay Singh for commenting on naxal issues and said only the PM or home minister should speak on such matters. "Some people feel they are experts on the subject (of naxalism) and continuously issue statements after every naxal incident... The issue should be kept away from politics... It is not a political issue where statements need to be issued," Raman said, when asked about Digvijay's remarks criticising his government on handling of naxals.

Singh said, there was a need to change the strategy to fight naxals as they have also altered tactics from waging guerrilla warfare to mobile war. "There is no last word on the strategy to be adopted against Maoists. We also have to change our strategy," he said.

He rubbished allegations that area domination operations by security forces were aimed at giving a free run to multinational companies to mine in Bastar region. "Mining is done by (state-owned) MMTC and SAIL and no private company is involved in iron ore mining," he said, adding the "propaganda" is being spread by Maoists that Bastar is being vacated for a mining purposes "is wrong" and so are their claims on land reforms.

 

[mehwish92]

insurgency near borders means flow of arms.Naxals can be eleminated through development infrastructure and Human resources.Andhra did it thats the only method possible

I am also hesitant to say this, but yes I think we do need to use the armed forces against the naxals. Had this problem been limited to a certain area it would have been manageable by police. But it spans over a large region of India. Especially since it spans over several states. I don't think the state polices are cooperating with each other in regards to the naxal menace.

But armed forces should be used in a limited manner. Development is the main force which will weaken the naxal movement.

 

[Rahul Singh]

Maoists will kill police informers: Lalu Prasad Yadav


He is the master prototype of shameless power hungry politician.

 

[RAM]

Air force readies to provide additional support

With Naxal violence reaching menacing proportions, the Air Force is gearing up to provide additional support to paramilitary forces in Maoist zones. The IAF, however, has no plans to carry out offensive operations against the Naxals.A senior IAF officer said, "We are anticipating the government will ask us to deploy additional assets for carrying out surveillance."The Air Force's Mi-17 helicopters are currently being used for casualty evacuation, ferrying security personnel and carrying out reconnaissance.The IAF has assigned four helicopters for logistics support to state and central forces engaged in anti-Naxal operations. The officer said Israeli Heron UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) could be deployed for reconnaissance and surveillance to track Naxal movement. The IAF had deployed these UAVs for high-altitude land surveillance in Maoist areas two years back. But their effectiveness was limited due to the terrain in some pockets.The IAF is using armoured Mi-17 helicopters to transport security personnel in Naxal-affected states. The Naxal problem and training of para-military forces was even discussed at the ongoing Army Commanders' Conference, chaired by Army chief General V.K. Singh.

http://www.hindustantimes.com/speci...ovide-additional-support/Article1-545502.aspx

 

[satyam]

Mining industry funding Naxal movement, says Maharashtra home minister R R Patil
//timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/Mining-industry-funding-Naxal-movement-says-Patil/articleshow/5956154.cms

 

[Prince]

10,000 BSF men to be roped in for anti-Naxal ops

New Delhi: Government is likely to rope in about 10,000 more BSF personnel to strengthen anti-Naxal operations in Chhattisgarh and Orissa, which have witnessed a spurt in violence.

Official sources said said five battalions (5,000 personnel) of the BSF would be inducted into the operation for now and another five thousand would be added later.

The force already has about 10,000 men taking part in anti-Maoist operations.

The sources said the number of Border Security Force (BSF) personnel is being increased to strengthen operations in Chhattisgarh and Orissa.

The BSF had played a crucial role in the Gadchiroli district of Maharashtra, where security forces have been able to inflict heavy damage on the Naxals, they said.

A number of Naxals were apprehended there, besides large areas reclaimed from the Maoists' clutches.

While CRPF is the main central force fighting the Naxals, the government had inducted both BSF and Indo Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) personnel in the operations.

At present, five battalions of the ITBP are involved in anti-Naxal operations. All together, over 60,000 central securitymen are helping the state police in conducting operations in naxal affected areas.

Incidentally, former BSF chief EN Ram Mohan, who was appointed by the Union Home Ministry to enquire into the causes and lapses for the April six Dantewada incident in which 76 securitymen lost their lives, had recently hinted that BSF and ITBP were better trained to handle insurgency.

"Preferably, in insurgency, BSF and ITBP should be deployed," he had said.

http://www.zeenews.com/news628646.html

 

[Oracle]

Why we need limited air power to battle the Naxals

The air element has a great psychological effect as it can raise the morale of the forces while lowering that of the adversary, says Colonel (Dr) Anil Athale (retd).

Defence Minister A K Antony is on record as having said that matters of strategic importance about measures to tackle the Naxalites are not a subject of public debate. That is indeed the prerogative of the government.

But such is the dust raised by the bleeding heart liberals in the media that the public ought to be educated on certain nuances of the use of force. Let us not kid ourselves, the Naxals have launched a guerrilla war against the Indian State and it is the rules of war that apply and not the India Penal Code or the Criminal Procedure Code.

The debate on the use or non-use of certain forces has centred on the fear of collateral damage, to the total exclusion of the psychological impact of the Dantewada massacre.

I am reminded of the study I carried out on the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict. When the issue of non-use of offensive air power against the Chinese came up, the then chief of planning of the Indian Air Force actually argued that if we would have used the Air Force, then the "international public opinion" would have gone against us.

Another striking episode on air power: Flight Lieutenant (later, Air Vice Marshal) Doraiswamy was on a sortie to Chhamb on September 6, 1965. He over-flew into Pakistan and saw the Pakistan Air Force aircraft openly lined up on the tarmac. When asked permission to bomb them, he was told not to do so. This was the day when the Indian Army had already crossed the Wagah border and a full-fledged attack was launched on Pakistan. The PAF was quicker off the block, launched a major attack the same evening that destroyed many of our aircraft at Pathankot. One often wonders what would have been the case if there was a little more co-ordination between the army and the air force!

The air element has a great psychological effect on the adversary as it can raise the morale of our own forces while lowering that of the adversary.

Then sample this. In December 1971, when Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw asked the Pakistan Army in Bangladesh to 'surrender or die', in Dacca (as Dhaka was then spelt) General Niazi had 30,000 troops with ammunition and supplies to last six months! The Indian troops surrounding them in Dacca numbered less than 3,000! But having lost their morale, the Pakistani army surrendered on December 16, 1971! Not just at Dacca, but at many other places, Pakistani soldiers surrendered to fewer Indian troops.

The psychological aspect of warfare, whether conventional war as in Bangladesh or guerrilla war against the Naxals, is the most crucial element of success. Yet, being intangible and ill-defined, it is neither well understood nor appreciated. Raising the morale of soldiers/policemen and lowering that of the adversary is primarily the single biggest responsibility of the leadership -- political as well as military.

The Dantewada incidents are tactical reverses but have wide-ranging strategic implications for all other areas of Naxal influence and even on the Kashmir or Assam conflicts. For the Indian State has been shown to be ineffective and weak. This has led to raising the morale of insurgents and lowering that of the security forces. All discussions on the use of various instruments of coercion have to be in this context.

According to the late Lieutenant General Eric Vas, an authority on insurgency, the battle has to be fought on five fronts simultaneously: economic, political, psychological, social, and military. Use of force is thus only one of the fronts, and to be successful it has to be in consonance with the other four. This has to be clear right at the outset. That does not mean force is unimportant. In fact, in order to get the other measures and strategies in place, control over violence is a pre-requisite.

The debate on 'adequate' force has to be conducted keeping in view these parameters, and not extraneous considerations like media exposure, international image, fear of human rights groups and other so-called liberal voices.

The element of air power that would be extremely useful in this fight is surveillance and detection. I do believe that technological advances today have made it possible to track groups of people moving even through jungle terrain. This will mitigate somewhat the lack of intelligence that the security forces face. The area of Naxal operations are very sparsely populated and are unlike the Vietnam delta. With weapons of greater accuracy and precision available today, it should be possible to avoid collateral damage and innocent civilians becoming victims. In the strategy of area domination, the police forces would be located in and around population centres. Thus, use of airpower would be against the isolated Naxals. The use of surveillance and tracking will also force the Naxals to break up into smaller groups, making it that much difficult to stage attacks like the one in Dantewada.

For instance, if armed helicopter support was indeed available to the hapless Central Reserve Police Force men, then the moment they came under fire from hilltops, the helicopters could have come to their help by machine-gunning the Naxals located on hilltops.

Thus, limited use of airpower would improve intelligence, force the Naxals to operate in small groups (and thus reduce the threat to larger bodies of paramilitary forces) and in conjunction with area/population domination, isolate them from their support base. But the biggest gain would be the rise in the morale of our forces and the lowering of the Naxals' since they have no counter to armed helicopters.

The Indian armed forces, operating under the UN mandate, are used to working under very strict operational guidelines of dos and don'ts. It should be possible to thus use air power and yet not alienate innocents.

It is a matter of regret that over four years ago although, as a result of my study in Chhattisgarh, I had recommended the establishment of radio stations and distribution of free radio sets to the tribals, it was not done. This would have given the government a powerful media to connect with the tribal and counter Naxal propaganda. In fact, even before the operations started, a major effort should have been mounted to expose the Naxals and warn the tribal sympathisers of the consequences of supporting the rebels. This very important function of leadership was not carried out. Even now it is not too late and action should be initiated on these lines.

The aim of counterinsurgency is to bring about a behavioural change in the targeted population. In short, move them away from armed politics to peaceful participation. It is also called a struggle for hearts and minds of the people.

There is a common perception that 'one man's terrorist/insurgent is another man's freedom-fighter'. This is moral relativism at worst. If a State is 'legitimate', then an armed challenge to it is illegitimate. The twin bedrock of the State's legitimacy are democracy that guarantees individuals fundamental rights and freedoms, and the second is the federal principle that grants the right to groups/tribes/sects/faiths cultural expression and freedom to practice their faith, use their language and lead a collective life of their choice.

When a State meets these two basic criterion, it has unmatched legitimacy and the use of force to overthrow it is insurgency/terrorism.

Ideologically, the counter-insurgents are always at a disadvantage. The insurgents can promise a socialist utopia. While the counter-insurgents become either status-quo supporters or hark back to the status quo ante, neither of this can compare with the dream of mythical 'Shangri-La' that the insurgents paint and many of their urban arm-chair supporters swallow.

This underscores the importance of propaganda and psychological aspects of counter-insurgency. But none of this would be of any use unless there is honest governance and genuine efforts to help out the tribals.

If the twin measures of developmental effort and show of force are implemented simultaneously, the situation can indeed be brought under control quickly. The armed air operations could then well be suspended if the Naxals show an inclination to come to the negotiating table and agree to give up violence. In the short run there is no substitute to wielding the big stick.

Our countrymen need to be reminded that the situation in our neighbourhood in the Af-Pak area is coming to a head and the nation has to be prepared to face uncertain consequences in the coming year or two. It would be wise to set our own house in order before that happens, else we may face a war on several fronts in 2012.

http://news.rediff.com/column/2010/may/26/why-we-need-limited-air-power-to-battle-the-naxals.htm

 

[Pintu]

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...P-leader-in-Dantewada/articleshow/5977559.cms

Maoists gun down BJP leader in Dantewada
IANS, May 26, 2010, 07.19pm IST

RAIPUR: A Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader was shot dead by Maoists in Chhattisgarh's restive Dantewada district, a police official said.

Budra Sodi, a former Dantewada district BJP president, was gunned down by Maoists in Kerlapal village, 450 km from here, where he had gone to attend a wedding, police said.

"The Maoists struck at the village at about 4pm and gunned down the BJP leader. Sodi died on the spot itself," Superintendent of Police Amresh Mishra said.

Sodi had contested the assembly polls in 2008 as the BJP candidate from Konta and lost to the Congress nominee by a narrow margin. The BJP formed the government in the state after the polls.

Dantewada district is a stronghold of the Leftwing rebels. On April 6, the Maoists massacred 76 security personnel in the region in one of the worst attacks on the security forces by the rebels since the insurgency began four decades ago.

 

[plugwater]

Indirect army involvement in anti-Maoist fight soon

New Delhi: The government has said it won't bring in the army to fight Maoists.
But a current policy decision shows that the Centre has, in principle, decided on some kind of an indirect involvement of the army.

The defence ministry has decided to raise special units by mostly recruiting Rashtriya Rifles (RR) personnel posted in Jammu and Kashmir who will train paramilitary battalions to combat Maoists. RR personnel in J&K are trained in jungle warfare. Initially, seven such units will be raised. Headed by a colonel, they will be trained in the northeast and will be called rural and jungle warfare units.

Two paramilitary units will work under a special unit. Together, they will form a sector. Thus, 21 special units will be raised to fight the Maoists.

But the government will have to sort a few issues first. It will have to decide who will command such a force — defence ministry or home ministry. Another moot question is, who will head a sector — an army brigadier or an IPS officer?

The army is keen that training is conducted directly under its supervision. It is okay with a joint supervisory mechanism. Blueprint of the plan was drawn up after the Dantewada massacre in which 75 CRPF personnel and a policeman were killed by Maoists last month. It is said to have gathered steam after the second attack last week.

A senior official involved with the exercise told DNA: "Each commanding officer of these special units will be given the freedom to choose 70% of the men." Logistic support is expected from Assam Rifles. Existent facilities such as the Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School at Vairengte in Mizoram will also be used.

http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_indirect-army-involvement-in-anti-maoist-fight-soon_1387847

 

[nandu]

Fifteen killed as train derails after blast

Kolkata, May 28 (PTI) At least fifteen passengers were killed and 50 injured when 13 coaches of a Mumbai-bound express train derailed when suspected Maoists triggered a blast in West Midnapore district early today.

Railway officials said the derailed coaches of the express train from Howrah fell on another track and was hit by a goods train. More casualties are feared, they said.

Fifteen bodies were recovered from the mangled coaches that included 10 sleeper bogies and one unreserved coach, besides a pantry car and a luggage van of the Howrah-Kurla Lokmanya Tilak Gyaneshwari Super Deluxe Express, the officials said.

The blast took place at 1:30 am when the express was running between Khemasoli and Sardiya stations, about 135 km from here, the sources said.

 

[mehwish92]

'Maoist' blast derails 13 coaches of Express train, 65 dead

KOLKATA: At least 65 passengers were killed and over 200 injured when suspected Maoists blasted rail tracks in West Midnapore district early Friday derailing 13 coaches of a Mumbai-bound express train, five of which were hit by a speeding goods train.

State home secretary Samar Ghosh said, "At least 65 bodies have been recovered as per the information I just received from the mangled coaches of Howrah-Kurla Gyaneshwari Super Deluxe Express."

26 bodies have been recovered from the mangled coaches of the Howrah-Kurla Lokmanya Tilak Gyaneshwari Super Deluxe Express after the 13 coaches derailed with five toppling over an adjacent track, according to PTI.

In New Delhi, Union home secretary G K Pillai told PTI that 15 passengers were killed and 150 injured and the toll might go up.

"We suspect Maoist hand behind the blast," Vivek Sahai, Member (Traffic), Railway Board, said.

The blast occurred at 1:30 am when the train was running between Khemasoli and Sardiya stations, about 135 km from here, South Eastern Railway officials said.

SER PRO Soumitra Majumdar said that the express train had in all 24 coaches. After the explosion, 13 including 10 sleeper coaches, derailed of which five were hit by the goods train coming on the opposite track.

An unreserved coach, the pantry car and luggage van also derailed, he said.

Railway officials used gas cutter to extricate trapped passengers and bodies from the mangled remains of the affected coaches. Passengers belongings lay strewn scattered on the tracks.

Angry passengers said the first signs of relief came only around 5 am, three-and-a-half hours after the incident.

Nine of the coaches which were undamaged took the injured and the other passengers to Kharagpur where they were admitted to hospital.

Sahai said that railway had were in touch with the Indian air force to airlift passengers who were seriously injured.

Anti-Maoist forces were at the spot and assisting the police and rescue personnel in extricating the bodies from four badly damaged sleeper coaches S-5, S-6, S-7 and S-8.

Railway Minister Mamata Banerjee reached the spot. She announced Rs 5 lakh for the next of kin of each of the dead and Rs 1 lakh for the injured.

Senior railway officials including Railway Board Chairman S S Khurana and DG RPF rushed to the spot.

A relief train left Kharagpur with a team of 12 doctors and 20 paramedics as also two doctors from the Kalaikunda airbase, the officials said.

Helplines have been set up at Kharagpur -- (0322) 255751 and 255735, Howrah - (033) 26382217, besides a toll free number 10722.

Helplines have also been set up at Tatanagar (0657) 2290324, 2290074, 2290382, at Rourkela (0661) 2511155, Chakradharpur (06587) 238072 and Jharsuguda (06445) 270977.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...Express-train-65-dead/articleshow/5983218.cms

 

[Sabir]

Read this old news what our railway minister said about Maoists in WB - all just to get the seat of CM of WB

No Maoists in West Bengal, says Mamata
Special Correspondent

Trinamool Congress chief Mamata Banerjee told journalists here on Wednesday that "there are no Maoists" in West Bengal. Joint security operations are under way in parts of the State to flush out left-wing extremists.

She would like to ask Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram, whether the operations were against the people there or aimed at providing access into the region to activists of the Communist Party of India (Marxist).

"In the name of joint operations why are you doing this"¦letting armed CPI (M) cadres set up camps [in the region]," she asked Mr. Chidambaram, even as she reiterated that the security operations should be withdrawn.

"The joint operations are wrong"¦Why should the CPI (M) be a part of an operation being conducted by governments?," Ms. Banerjee wondered.

"There are no Maoists; the region is totally under the control of armed activists of the CPI(M) who have set up nearly 200 camps there," she said of Jangalmahal. These are forest areas spanning Bankura, Purulia and Paschim Medinipur districts where the extremists have been active.

Ms. Banerjee also demanded "the arrest" of Chief Minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee for "misusing his powers under the Constitution," for engaging in "undemocratic and unconstitutional" activities.

"Why should not any action be taken against him because of his politics of individual killings and mass murder?... I feel it is my social responsibility to say so" she said.

Ms. Banerjee said 60 leaders and supporters of her party had been killed by violence "let loose by the CPI (M)" in the State over the past three months. "The killings that started since the Lok Sabha elections continue till today," she alleged.

"Where is the administration? There is no governance; State-sponsored atrocities have exceeded all limits," she said, charging that arms from neighbouring countries were flooding the State.

"The CPI (M) believes that it can stay on in power by perpetrating killings. The people will not allow this. We will rescue democracy in the State," Ms. Banerjee said.



Comments:
Trinamul Congress chief Mamata Banerjee is playing with dangerous fire which will burn everything. She is not correct to say no Maoists in bengal. For taking advantage of vote bank , she is passing these types of comments. One question to her: if you win next assembly election, how will you run new government if Maoists continue their activities?

from: RATHIN DUTTA
Posted on: Apr 18, 2010 at 00:40 IST
A large portion of our voters are illiterate, poor, uninformed. Even the well to do people take little interest in knowing the real facts. Mamata uses cheap lies to gain fast popularity. Her only goal is to get the CM's post & power. She also cannot plan for long term, not even for herself.


from: Partha Chakraborti
Posted on: May 11, 2010 at 12:55 IST

http://beta.thehindu.com/news/national/article397533.ece

PS: Joint operation means combined operation of CRPF and special task force of WB Police. She claimed CPI(M) using it to reclaim the lost ground in last election. However That time she did not realise it will turn up such big problem. Earlier, theoritical maoist leaders accompanied her in Singur campaign and she went to Lalgarh to support Chatradhar Mahato & Co lacturing from same stage. Let's see What she says now...

here is a photograph of her with Chatradhar Mahato- a Maoist aid....Shoud she still be an Union Minister????

 

[Yatharth Singh]

http://theasiandefence.blogspot.com...m_campaign=Feed:+blogspot/YyaK+(ASIAN+DEFENCE)

 

[mehwish92]

Balance tilts Naxals' way unlike the fight in J&K

NEW DELHI: India's war against Naxalism is turning out be a one-sided bloody affair, as Maoists dominate a battlefield of dispirited security forces with no credible intelligence flow. The level of sophistication shown by the Maoists, in inflicting largescale casualties on civilians and security personnel with minimum damage to themselves, is turning out to be far superior than that of any other guerrilla group in India, including Kashmiri terrorists with suicide bombers.

Dependable statistics show that the fight between an insurgent group and Indian security agencies has never been so one-sided.

Statistics, in fact, are far more frightening than what may grab headlines.

Just one Naxalite gets killed against four deaths among civilians and security personnel in Left-wing extremism-affected areas. Even at the peak of Kashmir insurgency, the casualty rate was almost equal on both sides — a terrorist was killed by security agencies for every death among civilian and security force personnel.

It was always an equal fight in that sense. The year 1996 may have been the bloodiest year in Jammu & Kashmir, when a total of 2,822 lives were lost — 1,424 civilians, 189 security personnel and 1,209 terrorists.

Even then, the ratio between the number of civilians and security personnel killed against slain terrorists was 1.33.

The ratio gradually declined over the years, and over a period of time, the security forces were able to reverse the trend.

By 2005, the security forces in Kashmir were killing more terrorists than the number of securitymen and civilians dying in violence. This superiority could be attributed to the security grid of several battalions created by the military, superior intelligence, and good evacuation and medical assistance available to the forces among others.

"We have contained the trouble," said a senior official in the security establishment, contrasting it with the escalating casualty among security personnel and civilians in the Maoist-affected areas.

The Maoists have far less sophisticated weaponry and explosives than the Kashmiri terrorists, and they do not carry out suicide attacks like the Kashmiri groups. Suicide attacks are believed to be the most powerful means of inflicting largescale casualties in modern day terrorism.

But still, thanks to the lack of credible intelligence, coordination and ill-prepared security forces, the Maoists are able to dominate the cat-and-mouse game. By the end of April this year, over four civilians and security personnel were losing their lives against one Maoist casualty. This ratio may actually go up as long as Maoists are able to carry out train sabotages, remote controlled explosions targeted at crowded buses etc.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...nlike-the-fight-in-JK/articleshow/5986947.cms

 

[mehwish92]

Centre lacks stomach for an all-out war aganst naxals?

NEW DELHI: What Congress's core committee discusses when it meets on Friday is privileged. Even an informal briefing is rare. The agenda is decided in advance and often the news of the day is not on the menu. Hopefully, it will be this Friday. If there was a moment of reckoning, it is at hand.

Irrespective of whether it was a bomb or track sabotage that led to the outrage in Jhargram on Friday, the signal for UPA-2 is unambiguous. There is an enemy at the gate who won't wait patiently while the government settles debates over "limited mandates".

Home minister P Chidambaram's confession that he has a restricted mandate in dealing with Maoists is not, as some believe, only about use of air power by means of helicopter gunships. Despite his efforts to cloak it by invoking the role of states, it is about preparedness for an all-out battle, to have the stomach to bear certain reverses and hunt down a ruthless enemy.

Barely had the Centre injected some steel into its anti-Naxal campaign, voices in Congress cried stop. Party general secretary Digvijay Singh described Maoists as misled ideologues. Former minister Mani Shankar Aiyar shared the sentiment.

Maoists were not terrorists. Indeed, Chidambaram may have erred in some of his pronouncements, but confusing essentials will not help. Though Prime Minister Manmohan Singh flagged Red terror as a serious internal security threat, it is only recently that his government decided to do something about it. The effort still lacks conviction. Apart from dissonance within Congress, Mamata Banerjee sees the ultras as indirect allies against the Left though the railway minister may now realize the cost of cuddling up to a grizzly.

Officers engaged in anti-Naxal operations say while the job is difficult, it is not impossible. Given the go-ahead, they can combat the Red menace and take the war to the Maoists. But every time a Maoist leader dies, he may not be in guerrilla fatigues. Security personnel need legal defence against an army of activists who file suits to harass those who put their lives on the line.

Fear of collateral damage is not unreasonable. An extra-judicial killing can set the battle against Naxals back by years. It took more than a decade for a strong consensus to build in the 1990s in Punjab to root out Khalistanis. It is just possible the murder of passengers on the Howrah-Kurla train may birth such a consensus. This, however, will still not be enough unless Centre and states put their heads together and get the basics right. Like motivating, arming and beefing up districts and thanas at the warfront.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...ut-war-against-Naxals/articleshow/5986809.cms

 

[RAM]

The seduction of maximum force

Aizawal woke that Thursday morning to the thunder of combat jet engines and falling bombs. Earlier that week, Mizo National Army insurgents had engaged military garrisons strung across the State. Mizoram's capital fell days later. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi responded by ordering the Indian Air Force to attack the city. "Most houses in Dawrpui and the Chhinga Veng area were reduced to ashes," a survivor recalled. No one knows for certain just how many died.
Three decades after the March 4, 1966 bombing of Aizawal, India is once again debating the use of massive military force — including air strikes — to fight an insurgency. Last week's tragedy in West Bengal, preceded by large-scale killings of civilians in Chhattisgarh, have made clear that New Delhi's offensive against the Maoist insurgency that has torn apart swathes of eastern and central India is floundering.
Policymakers are now considering committing the Army and air assets to provide logistical and fire support to counter the Maoist campaign. For the most part, the plans envisage only a limited support role for the armed forces — the use of helicopters, for example, for transporting commandos in remote forest areas, or unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with foliage-penetrating radar to locate large Maoist formations. But as public pressure mounts on a government that promised quick success against the Maoists, more aggressive military options will seem increasingly seductive to policymakers. India's rich experience of fighting insurgencies, though, shows that maximum force not only inflicts hideous levels of civilian casualties but it rarely secures decisive outcomes.
Lessons from Manipur
In June 1986, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi arrived at an agreement with the Mizo National Front, laying the foundations for a peace that has survived more than two decades. The 1986 Accord, though, was preceded by a counter-insurgency campaign of colonial-era barbarism: hundreds were executed; thousands tortured; rape was carried out on a massive scale. Designed to crush a rebellion that seemed, at one stage, to be on the edge of success, India's use of the military in Mizoram ended up engendering an insurgency that festered for decades.
Like the Maoist insurgency, the Mizoram conflict had its roots in deprivation. In 1959, the region saw a famine which claimed thousands of lives. In 1961, former Indian Army officer Pu Laldenga formed the Mizo National Famine Front to campaign against New Delhi's apathy. Laldenga later transformed the Famine Front's political offspring, the Mizo National Front, into a potent political force. But by 1963, the lack of state action to address conditions in the Mizo hills led the MNF to initiate an insurgency seeking independence from India.
The army campaign seemed, at first, to work. Forces from the Silchar-based 61 Mountain Brigade were able to rapidly recapture key towns, including Aizawal. Posts taken by the MNA were recovered and its guerrillas forced to shift their headquarters across the border into East Pakistan. The fighting was intense: the Indian forces suffered 59 fatalities, 126 were injured and 23 went missing; 95 of the MNA died and 35 were injured.
But from the summer of 1966, the MNA merged into the population and began launching guerrilla strikes against the Army. Lacking effective local intelligence, unfamiliar with the terrain, and forced to rely on a vulnerable road network for logistical support, the Army lost 95 men between March and December 1966 — more than the number killed in the first phase of fighting.
Military strategists found a template for their response in imperial Great Britain's war against the Malayan Communist Party. In much modern writing, the anti-communist campaign in Malaya is marketed as an example of how victory can be had by winning hearts and minds, rather than the application of force. The idea suffuses much writing on contemporary counter-insurgency. But, as David Benet has noted, "coercion was the reality — 'hearts and minds' the myth." Field Marshal Gerald Templar, the architect of the Malaya campaign, referred in 1968 to the 'hearts and minds' doctrine as a "nauseating phrase I think I invented."
From January 1967, the security forces in Mizoram began cutting the insurgency off from its peasant base. Eighty per cent of Mizoram's population was resettled, mostly by force, into barricaded enclaves known as Protected and Progressive Villages.
In a signal 2001 essay for the journal Faultlines, the former Assam Chief Secretary, Vijendra Singh Jafa, recorded how the village of Darzo was relocated. "My orders," a soldier he interviewed said, "were to get the villagers to collect whatever moveable property they could and to set their own village on fire at seven in the evening. I also had orders to burn all the paddy and other grain that could not be carried away by the villagers." The officer, Jafa recounted, ordered village elders at gunpoint to certify "that they had burnt down their own village."
Despite this massive application of force, the insurgency did not end. Even though the MNA was enfeebled by Pakistan's decisive defeat in the 1971 war, which stripped it of its bases in what is now Bangladesh, it was able to stage a series of bloody attacks. New Delhi and Laldenga were able to agree on the contours of a peace agreement as early as 1976 but the deep anger provoked by the Army's campaign made it impossible to settle the deal.
It is not hard to see why the use of massive military power against the Maoists appears seductive to policymakers. In November last year, as Central forces began to push into Chhattisgarh, Union Home Secretary announced that "within 30 days of security forces moving in and dominating the area, we should be able to restore civil administration there." The promise has been brutally exposed. Unless New Delhi and the naxal-infested States are first able to restore order, developmental programmes targeting the Maoists' constituency are unlikely to get off the ground.
Inadequate force
But the simple fact is this: there just aren't enough security personnel in Chhattisgarh to hold, let alone dominate, the area. The Bastar division of Chhattisgarh sprawls across 40,000 square kilometres, an area larger than the Kashmir Valley. New Delhi has pumped in 14 battalions of the Central Reserve Police Force — each made up of approximately 1,000 men — as well as 5 of the Border Security Force. There are, in addition, some 7 battalions of armed police, and some 5,000 police.
That means each battalion of security forces must engage with insurgents in areas larger than 2,000 square kilometres — and in areas where the use of roads is impossible because of the large-scale use of improvised explosive devices by Maoists. Some police stations are responsible for more than 700 square kilometres of territory.
In Jammu and Kashmir, an estimated 70 battalions of the CRPF are available for counter-insurgency duties, along with 54 battalions of the Army's Rashtriya Rifles. In addition, about a third of the Jammu and Kashmir Police's 75,000 personnel are committed to counter-terrorism work. That means approximately 145,000 personnel are available to guard the 101,437 square kilometre territory on India's side of the Line of Control—an average of one for 1.4 for every square kilometre, and one for every 53 residents of the State. Manipur, with an estimated population of 2.3 million, has 67 battalions of counter-insurgency forces, including 11 army battalions — one for 34 residents. The police in Chhattisgarh, moreover, often confront Maoist formations that outnumber them 4 to 1. Most counter-insurgency doctrines call for government forces to outnumber their adversaries by at least 12:1, or higher — the levels exceeded in both Jammu and Kashmir, and Manipur.
More men alone, though, will not solve the problem. Phnom Penh, on the eve of the triumph of Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea, had one police officer for every 60 residents. The force, however, lacked tactical skills. It is also worth recalling that the United States dropped three times more ordnance on Indochina during the Vietnam war than all combatants put together did during World War II — but still lost.
In recent decades, Indian tacticians have come to realise that well-trained police forces are key to defeating insurgencies. Many have pointed out that the Army played a frontline role in decimating the Maoist insurgency that broke out in West Bengal in 1967. In October 1969, Lieutenant-General JFR Jacob led an offensive against the Maoist groups in the State, spearheaded by the 4 Infantry Division, the 9 Infantry Division and the 50 Parachute Brigade. No written account of the campaign was maintained by the Army's Eastern Command, but participants say intelligence provided by the West Bengal police led to the success. That lesson has been driven home in recent years: India's major counter-insurgency successes — whether against the tribal insurgents in Tripura, the Maoists in Andhra Pradesh, or Khalistan terrorists in Punjab — were all police-led.
"Occasional police operations timidly carried out with inadequate forces" the theoretician of counter-insurgency, Roger Trinquier, warned in his 1964 classic Modern War, "will fail pitifully." With the force levels and resources now available in areas like Bastar, defeat is certain. Winning the war against the Maoists doesn't need combat jets or artillery; it needs police forces with counter-insurgency capacities and training. Those forces can be raised — but New Delhi needs to get to work now, instead of wasting lives chasing the phantom of a quick victory.

http://beta.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article442994.ece?homepage=true

 

[nandu]

Mamata Bannerjee, Maoists and the Ministry of Home Affairs' Report Card with purchases

http://www.8ak.in/8ak_india_defence...-affairs-report-card-with-purchases.html#more

 

[RAM]

Maoists on military mind

New Delhi, June 1: Defence minister A.K. Antony today met the chiefs of the armed forces to be briefed on force levels and projections if the military's involvement in the offensive against Maoists is deepened.Antony's meeting with the chiefs of staff committee and the defence secretary comes ahead of a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) later this week. Last week, home minister P. Chidambaram also called the army chief, Gen. V.K. Singh, for his assessments and inputs as the security establishment carries out a review of the counter-Maoist operations.Currently, the Indian Air Force has deployed six helicopters in the rebel zones to transport police forces and evacuate casualties. The army's role is limited to training special units of central and state police forces.

The CCS will be meeting to review the situation in the counter-Maoist drive in the wake of the killing of civilians and policemen in Dantewada. There is also a deep suspicion that the Maoists or a front propped up by them had a hand in sabotaging railway tracks in last week's disaster in West Midnapore in which 150 people were killed.
Although Antony had in the past ruled out deploying the army or committing military assets in the offensive, he has been calibrating his position after successive strikes by the rebels took a heavy toll in the last two months.
At the National Defence Academy in Khadakvasla near Pune on Monday, the defence minister, asked if there was a difference of opinion in the government on the use of the military, had said: "There is no split mandate."¦ The issue of the use of armed forces"¦ will be discussed threadbare."
He said the government was "examining the pros and cons" of deploying the army in anti-Naxalite operations. Today's meeting with the chiefs of the armed forces is part of the assessment and policy-making exercise.
The decision will be taken by the CCS that comprises, apart from Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, finance minister Pranab Mukherjee, Chidambaram, external affairs minister S.M. Krishna and Antony. Krishna may not be present at the CCS because he is scheduled to visit the US.
"The armed forces will also accept whatever decision the government takes" and implement it with "vigour and commitment", Antony had said.
Defence ministry sources said that in today's meeting "Antony reviewed all dimensions of the security situation in the country". The meeting lasted an hour and a half.
The chiefs of staff committee comprises Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik, who is its chairman, army chief Gen. Singh, and the navy chief, Admiral Nirmal Verma. Defence secretary Pradeep Kumar was also there at the meeting.
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1100602/jsp/nation/story_12513705.jsp
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[nandu]

Govt looks at direct role for Army against Naxals

NEW DELHI: The government is veering around to expanding the role of the armed forces in the ongoing anti-Naxal operations, with a hard look even being taken at whether they should be "directly deployed'' in the fight against the Maoists.

While an enhancement of their present surveillance, logistical and training mandate is a certainty, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) meeting likely on Thursday will take the final call on whether to enlist the armed forces in a more direct combat role.

The decision will be influenced as much by political considerations as security imperatives. Yet, the possibility of armed forces being asked to take on the Left-wing extremists is no longer being summarily dismissed like before.

Defence minister A K Antony on Tuesday sounded out the three Service chiefs on the sensitive issue, with the 90-minute meeting with Air Chief Marshal P V Naik, Admiral Nirmal Verma and General V K Singh discussing "all dimensions'' of the security situation.

Independent of whether the government decides to push ahead with the idea, the very fact that direct engagement of armed forces is being looked as a serious option is significant.

It marks a critical shift on the part of the government, which had so far shied away from deploying soldiers in the Naxal battle. But a big cause for concern is the increasingly savage and audacious Maoist attacks, which have inflicted heavy casualties on paramilitary forces as well as non-combatants.

In May alone, as many as 172 civilians and 29 security personnel were killed by Naxals, if the derailing of the passenger train in West Midnapore on May 28 is also taken into account.

Though the meeting chaired by Antony examined the "pros and cons of different options'', it's for the CCS to decide on the exact mandate. "But one thing is certain even if the armed forces are deployed in a more direct role, it will be a limited mandate for a limited period,'' said a source.

One possible option could be to divert a few of the 63 battalions of Rashtriya Rifles, the Army's specialised counter-insurgency force operating in Jammu and Kashmir, "for selective missions'' in states worst-affected by Maoist depredations, said sources.

Successive governments have been averse to enlisting the Army in the fight because of the concern that it might lead to a perception about the Indian State not being in control of vast swathes in its own heartland.

There is also the issue of suitability of armed forces, which are trained to kill with heavy force, operating against an adversary who blends into the civilian population and is, in fact, adept at using them as shields.

The top military brass have their own reservations, extending from the lack of familiarity with the terrain and concrete ground-level intelligence to the armed forces being already overstretched in counter-insurgency in J&K and the North-East as well along the long unresolved borders with Pakistan and China.

But underlining the government's resolve to take the battle to Maoists, PM Manmohan Singh on Tuesday said, "In dealing with the challenge of Naxalism, we will pursue a policy that genuinely seeks to address developmental concerns at the grassroots, while firmly enforcing the writ of the state.''

But the dice could still fall either way in the CCS, with the home ministry keen to bolster the fight against the Maoists with "some more help'' from the armed forces but the defence establishment remaining largely reluctant about getting sucked into "yet another internal security duty''.

There has, however, been a significant shift in Antony's position in the last few days, from earlier being a strong opponent of deploying armed forces against Maoists in a direct role to now holding they will "accept'' the government's decision and "implement it with vigour and commitment''.

IAF, on its part, feels it can enhance its "air-support'' beyond the current four Mi-17 helicopters deployed in the region but continues to maintain the use of "offensive airpower'' is not a practical option since it can lead to collateral damage on the ground.

The armed forces, of course, are preparing for the worst-case scenario by finalising action plans to meet any contingency, as reported by TOI last week.

Having already trained around 47,000 paramilitary personnel since 2006 in its counter-insurgency and jungle warfare school in Vairengte and other institutions, the Army is also keen that a separate and dedicated counter-Naxalism training facility be established to train "homogeneous companies'' of police personnel.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...r-Army-against-Naxals/articleshow/6000189.cms

 

[nandu]

Terrorists in rebels' clothing

Days after the terrible turmoil of Lalgarh, this writer had in the same blog argued for the need to change the Centre's perception of Maoists, making a case for all to see the deep connection between anger and poverty, economics and politics, while acting against them.

After all, Bengal had since long stopped creating any wealth, opportunity or even employment for its people. For a state which was one of India's richest in the 1960s, its per capita income at Rs 20,896 (2003-04 figures) is today much below those of Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Sikkim, Chandigarh, Delhi, Puducherry. The IT revolution and India's economic boom conveniently skirted large parts of Bengal and it suited the politics in comrade country to ``keep `em poor and burning''.

The Centre, relying on intelligence reports on Lalgarh that suggested it may just be the beginning of other protracted battles along similar lines in Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and other simmering, discontented swathes within India, had quickly banned the CPI (Maoist), calling it a terrorist organization.

But many, including this writer, had then seen a fundamental problem in banning such "indigenous rebel groups'' instead of engaging with them. I had then said that by ``outlawing Maoists under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, the Union government has clubbed it with the likes of Lashkar-e-Taiba and SIMI, outfits that wage a war against India, its democratic set-up, its citizens and its resources. These are outfits that want to undermine the very foundations of the country, break it up into a million units and then hang each piece by the tree. They are fanatics who have built themselves up on the ideology of hatred, divisiveness and totalitarianism, making unmitigated killings as we have seen in Mumbai, Bangalore, Delhi, Jaipur, Ahmedabad – the list is endless – their only tool to put their point of view across. On the other hand, what drives the Maoists, who are mostly poor, tribal villagers? In Lalgarh, it was hunger, years of discrimination, poverty and injustice. These are not people waging a war against the country. In case the Indian government failed to notice, they don't want to secede. Instead, they are desperate to integrate. And unlike the LeT with their fancy weaponry, Maoists and Naxals still raise a hand in protest that is armed not with an AK-56 but a bow and arrow, a sickle, country made guns. They don't want to break or butcher the nation, all they want is that the shackles that keep them starving, poor and illiterate should be broken.''

A lot has changed since Lalgarh happened. India's Maoists have mutated into a terror group that doesn't hesitate to target, maim and murder innocents in its battle against the state. They have and are steadily losing whatever little sympathy there was towards them in some sections of India's society and polity. Scores of poor civilians, in buses blown up by explosives, in trains derailed, have been its unsuspecting victims. And it doesn't look like any of this is going to stop. Desperate to be taken seriously as an outfit capable of inflicting great damage – to life and property – there will be newer victims, and more of them.
And helping their bloody agenda will be the state and central government's complete inefficacy and lack of understanding in dealing with the homegrown terrorists. Attacks on security forces posted in Chhattisgarh, like the April massacre of 75 in Dantewada, make it evident those fighting terror in Maoist terrain are little more than sitting ducks – with no infrastructure or jungle warfare training, questionable leadership and pathetic perks for going into the battlefield. Add to that politicians like Mamata Banerjee.

Yes, the government's perception of Maoists must change, treating them completely as members of a terror group no different from the Lashkar-e-Taiba or Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, as most of India would agree today, and no more as ``our own rebels''. The time for that has come.

http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/onefortheroad/entry/terrorists-in-rebels-clothing