Naxals/Maoists Watch

[badguy2000]

well, it will be a tragedy,if Maosim movement is upgraded to a civil war.....
Naxal movement has shown tremendous grit

Mahendra Kumawat

From an agrarian movement to 'Jan Militia', the Naxal movement has assumed worrying proportions for the State today. Veteran cop Mahendra Kumawat, in a write-up in the Seminar magazine, assesses the Naxal phenomena and states that negating the romantic appeal of Maoism and convincing the teeming millions that their problems would be addressed could lead to a lasting solution to the issue.

http://news.rediff.com/slide-show/2...-1-veteran-cop-mahendra-kumawat-on-naxals.htm

 

[Singh]

There is a flaw in our Anti-Naxal ops from what I have understood.

The Home Ministry (Central Government) provides Paramilitary forces to the respective State Governments to tackle security threats. The Maoist threat as we know is spread over several states ruled by different political parties. Some State governments/political parties are vehemently anti-Naxals while others are seen to be sympathetic towards Naxals. So there is a dim hope of concerted action by the affected states. Contrast the situation with successful COIN ops.

What do you guys think of this suggestion ?

1. Take away Policing and Security duties from the respective state governments and instead use the Armed Forces Special Act
2. Armed forces are brought into the theater to fight back the Maoists.
3. Paramilitary and Reserve Police are then shunted in to Bite and Hold Territory. Army moves onto the next battle theater.
4. Declare Presidents Rule in these states. Use Govt in a box approach like ISAF's in Astan. Quickly setup State Institutions.
5. Institute an empowered groups of Ministers for Naxal Affected States who take over governance in the affected districts and all the while police and state administrative remain with the EGOM.
6. State Governments are slowly handed over control.

 

[Singh]

well, When Maoism is popular in Nepal and India, it ironically has been abandoned by CCP government in homeland.

Anyhow, I find that rural India /Nepal today is really quite like rural CHina before the revolution in 1949 ------- either of them has/had extreme unfair rural land distribution system and lots of poverty ,which are the fertile soil of Maoism.

pls study why Mao could come into power in China with Maoism guerilla. it is very useful for You indian "mid-class" here to take a lesson,if you really want to prevent Maoism in India.

only two ways can cure Maosim:
1. land reform,which can give peasants a piece of land.
2.Industrializaiton ,which can lift peasants from poverty and agriculture section;

There is no irony, Maoism doesn't have much support. They are feared and not loved.

 

[badguy2000]

There is no irony, Maoism doesn't have much support. They are feared and not loved.

Obviously, poor peasants have a understanding of Maosim different from "mid class" such as you. Otherwise, Maoism can not get fertile soil in rural India while having little influence in urban India.

In fact, Mao took over CHina in 1949 with the support of CHinese poor peasant too,although many Chinese "mid class" also opposed Maosim like you at that time.

Guy, when 50%+ of all populaition are poor peasants, the opposition of "mid class" is not as important as you think.

 

[Rage]

well, When Maoism is popular in Nepal and India, it ironically has been abandoned by CCP government in homeland.

Anyhow, I find that rural India /Nepal today is really quite like rural CHina before the revolution in 1949 ------- either of them has/had extreme unfair rural land distribution system and lots of poverty ,which are the fertile soil of Maoism.

pls study why Mao could come into power in China with Maoism guerilla. it is very useful for You indian "mid-class" here to take a lesson,if you really want to prevent Maoism in India.

only two ways can cure Maosim:
1. land reform,which can give peasants a piece of land.
2.Industrializaiton ,which can lift peasants from poverty and agriculture section;

By any standard, Maoism as an ideology is not 'popular' in India. The ever-abrogating performance of the CPI-M, which, as a political party espouses that ideology, is testament to that fact.

As is the June 2009 ban on their Naxal offshoot, supported by all political parties unanimously, under the UAPA.

There are an estimated 12,000 maoist cadres in India, a small fragment of a total population of 1.18 billion.

Rural India is similar to rural China of the late 1940's/early 50's in only one respect: land division, which is the cause of farmer suicides, inability of debt repayment and exploitation by zamindars in some states. It is not nearly as wracked by violence as China was in the 1940's, and a large number of farmers are turning to collective cooperatives started by India's large conglomerates as a means to pool their resources and increase yields. The following might be helpful:

http://www.agriculture-industry-india.com/agro-programme-schemes/cooperation10.html
http://www.cababstractsplus.org/abstracts/Abstract.aspx?AcNo=20016785170
http://beta.thehindu.com/business/article291344.ece

Mao could come into power in China with "Maoism guerilla" because of a plethora of factors, not least of which because there was an internecine war ongoing, an occupation by a Japanese imperial power, that killed untold numbers of millions, rampant warlordism, a far greater degree of poverty and massive famines exacerbated by a world war, and foreign 'proxy backers' for both sides of the ideological schism, the more proximate of which was the Soviet Union, which was right next door. And more importantly, because of a charismatic 'people mover' or rabble-rouser, as you see fit, in the form of Mao. Do acquaint yourself with the state of the Maoists top leaders in India:

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...ars-rifts-hit-Maoists/articleshow/5752423.cms

Land reform and industrialization are the key to solving India's rural woes, but that is only the half of it. The maoists are averse to industrialization of any kind, atleast to the kind of which can provide mass employment and resource-exploitation in the areas, such as Dantewada, which they control. These areas also happen to be mineral-rich, which is their most ideal and recognizable comparative advantage. Until these 12,000 are exterminated, or give up, we will not have the opportunity to achieve that industrialization in the 'Maoist corridor' in which they have a presence, or at least in the two districts: Dantewada and Bastar, which they control. Even as the rest of India surges ahead and the income-gap grows wider, which contributes to greater animosity and feelings of inequitableness among the local population. Quite like your 'Xinjiang' and 'Tibet problem' during the early 90's, and to some extent, today as well.

 

[Singh]

Obviously, poor peasants have a understanding of Maosim different from "mid class" such as you.

Either you know something that I don't in that case please share or stop trolling .I don't see what's obvious in this.Maoism is restricted to a few districts.
There are 400+ other districts in India full of "poor peasants" who haven't even heard of Mao but they do understand "freedom".

 

[thakur_ritesh]

There is a flaw in our Anti-Naxal ops from what I have understood.

The Home Ministry (Central Government) provides Paramilitary forces to the respective State Governments to tackle security threats. The Maoist threat as we know is spread over several states ruled by different political parties. Some State governments/political parties are vehemently anti-Naxals while others are seen to be sympathetic towards Naxals. So there is a dim hope of concerted action by the affected states. Contrast the situation with successful COIN ops.

What do you guys think of this suggestion ?

1. Take away Policing and Security duties from the respective state governments and instead use the Armed Forces Special Act
2. Armed forces are brought into the theater to fight back the Maoists.
3. Paramilitary and Reserve Police are then shunted in to Bite and Hold Territory. Army moves onto the next battle theater.
4. Declare Presidents Rule in these states. Use Govt in a box approach like ISAF's in Astan. Quickly setup State Institutions.
5. Institute an empowered groups of Ministers for Naxal Affected States who take over governance in the affected districts and all the while police and state administrative remain with the EGOM.
6. State Governments are slowly handed over control.

Paaji, there are points to which i do not agree on.

1 you do not want a near one third of the country under armed forces special act, possibly the territory covered will be more when NE, and J&K are added upto the naxal infested areas.

2 Armed forces do not look keen and the primary reason is the complexity that pak army faced when they took on the ttp. You saw desertions, the lower ranks objected to take on their own people, at a time of conflict the army suspects this could mean people not voluntarily willing to join the armed forces, and possibly with the naxals up the ante against the state if India were to get involved in a conflict with pakistan.

Pak army could turn the tide by putting in the Indian angle where they started painting the ttp as a India backed militia force, we cant do the same because of the likes of arundhati roy’s and the human right activists who have a strangle hold on media is bound to create a backlash from the people who help create a public opinion and put the government in a dock and as a suspect. We also don’t want to stretch the army when they already have been big time.

One just had to watch ndtv late at night when 6/4 happened, timing I think was around 2-3 am and they did a hour long report absolutely similar to the essay arundhati roy did for outlook, painting the security forces as the real culprits, in the process portraying naxals as the innocents and this when 76 of our men had been massacred and the time gone by was not even 24hours.

3 i have possibly not read about the naxal movement as much as i have in the past one week and seriously the more i read and the more I hear of the experts the more convinced I get this is a state subject to be fully supported by the center and which can be easily quashed by the state police. At least sarabjit sen, ex dgp Andhra, under whom the naxal movement was wiped off, though not completely since these naxals are now suspected to be behind the tenangana movement, but still right from 2006 onwards up till 2009 they did away with this nuisance. And they did it without any outside support, be it the army or the para military. It all boils down to political will, which sadly is missing, and leadership by the cops.

Yes, we have all been shaken and taken over by the sheer enormity of this massacre but the thing is the security personnel are certainly not on the back foot and things have changed to what they were when shivraj patil was around, though initially chidu was focused on the terrorism directed from Pakistan but he has got his act together on the naxal menace. For the first time these naxals are surrendering in other states, so it is not only that one kills them but there remain other ways as well to get over them. things are not as bad as have been portrayed, its just that media is talking about it for the first time at such a level (media coverage equated to 26/11....??) so we get a feel as if the earth has shaken.

4, 5, 6 yes this is something I completely agree with and two states where this needs to be done is jharkhand where 20 of the 24 districts are infested and that idiot cm is not even ready to acknowledge this menace, the second one bihar, nitish is acting too pricy because the state elections are round the corner. But for presidents rule you need the support in the parliament which will be hard to come by because if this is done in these two states then that will make the left jittery and that will cast a doubt in the minds of the left in WB and they might suspect that they will be the next to go, so they will not support and with bjp in the government in both bihar and jh, they are sure to create a ruckus and not let this happen.

no state government will give up the power, they are all too greedy, and all the infested states are ones governed by non-congress political outfits.

 

[thakur_ritesh]

Obviously, poor peasants have a understanding of Maosim different from "mid class" such as you. Otherwise, Maoism can not get fertile soil in rural India while having little influence in urban India.

In fact, Mao took over CHina in 1949 with the support of CHinese poor peasant too,although many Chinese "mid class" also opposed Maosim like you at that time.

Guy, when 50%+ of all populaition are poor peasants, the opposition of "mid class" is not as important as you think.

You got any idea of what is happening?

The poor in these naxal infested area vote for the democracy, guess what in the previous state elections a huge 76% of these poor from these naxal infested area voted in state elections when in other parts which had no naxal movement the average was around 60%, which is a reflection to the extent these people are fed up of these Maoists and don’t worry if the center was to get its act together it is a matter of just 3-4years and there wont be any naxal left.

Ever heard of Andhra Pradesh, and how badly this state was effected, in fact at that point in time this state was the worst effected state of India. Starting 2006 and ending 2009 all these were wiped out. It just took them 3 years, think about it when all the top so called command comes from Andhra and that place was known as their den.

lastly you stop trolling on this thread because i wont take any of your BS in this thread, get it drilled in your head or all the posts you have made in this thread will all get deleted.

 

[Singh]

Paaji, there are points to which i do not agree on.
1 you do not want a near one third of the country under armed forces special act, possibly the territory covered will be more when NE, and J&K are added upto the naxal infested areas.

Admittedly it would be a daunting task but lets see the problems-solutions and positives of the same.
Problem: Armed Forces are inapt at policing and maintaining good civil relationships. They are not trained for law and order. Armed forces would be given excessive sweeping powers, state government would be reduced to a puppet and growing disaffection will sweep in.
Solution: Let Armed Forces be given a specific short time frame. Say 3-6 months. A Maj General would directly report to the EGOM chaired by the PM. Since Army is not prone to meddling and with a clear mandate given to them they can concentrate on the job on hand whole heartedly.
Problem: Armed Forces are not good at holding territories indefinitely, they have lower psychological threshold for casualities.
Solution: Our armed forces have vast experience in successful COIN ops, in similar territories as such their personnel our best suited for tackling Maoist insurgencies. Comparatively the Paramilitary services staffed with personnel with IPS training are not as efficient at COIN. So there can be a few mixed brigades where Paramilitary men participate with the army and gain valuable combat experience and hasten their learning curve.
Armed Forces are also the only ones with huge budgets and high levels of equipment. Equipping state government would be a long arduous task. Armed forces can rush in tanks, APCs, use Napalm bombs to clear wooded areas etc. They can break the maoist ranks even before the fighting begins.

2 Armed forces do not look keen and the primary reason is the complexity that pak army faced when they took on the ttp. You saw desertions, the lower ranks objected to take on their own people, at a time of conflict the army suspects this could mean people not voluntarily willing to join the armed forces, and possibly with the naxals up the ante against the state if India were to get involved in a conflict with pakistan.

Don’t forget Taliban have fought side by side Pak soldiers in Astan.
Indian Army has been involved in COIN earlier and it has been successful at it too. Indian Govt for the sake of integrity of the republic has never hesitated to (kill or) “be killed”. This is the difference b/w Pak and India.
The Government of India’s threshold to suffer causalities is inordinately high, the civilians not so much. A look at the statistics of the lives lost in insurgencies will confirm this.
The Army is however incapable of providing a “government”. It can make matters worse if it stays for long. They need to be replaced with Paramilitary and Reserve Police as soon as they have liberated the territory. By providing a short term deployment of the Armed Forces we can test out our real world multi-front approach too.

Pak army could turn the tide by putting in the Indian angle where they started painting the ttp as a India backed militia force, we cant do the same because of the likes of arundhati roy’s and the human right activists who have a strangle hold on media is bound to create a backlash from the people who help create a public opinion and put the government in a dock and as a suspect. We also don’t want to stretch the army when they already have been big time.
One just had to watch ndtv late at night when 6/4 happened, timing I think was around 2-3 am and they did a hour long report absolutely similar to the essay arundhati roy did for outlook, painting the security forces as the real culprits, in the process portraying naxals as the innocents and this when 76 of our men had been massacred and the time gone by was not even 24hours.

Thakur sahib, the killing of 76 soldiers has turned the tide against Maoists. For a long time they have stayed under the radar. By committing small acts they were treated as a nuisance as their escapades rarely made it to the news. This news has been a wake up call for the slumbering India and also “internationalised” the issue.
Civil Society has made it clear before that Maoists need to be routed and after this incident is clear that they need to be routed “yesterday”. Government is a better judge of people’s mood.

3 i have possibly not read about the naxal movement as much as i have in the past one week and seriously the more i read and the more I hear of the experts the more convinced I get this is a state subject to be fully supported by the center and which can be easily quashed by the state police. At least sarabjit sen, ex dgp Andhra, under whom the naxal movement was wiped off, though not completely since these naxals are now suspected to be behind the tenangana movement, but still right from 2006 onwards up till 2009 they did away with this nuisance. And they did it without any outside support, be it the army or the para military. It all boils down to political will, which sadly is missing, and leadership by the cops.

Agree but then again a problem comes. Maoists easily slip into neighbouring states. Either all states come onboard which is tough because of the dominance of regional, ethnic, caste parties in these states.

Yes, we have all been shaken and taken over by the sheer enormity of this massacre but the thing is the security personnel are certainly not on the back foot and things have changed to what they were when shivraj patil was around, though initially chidu was focused on the terrorism directed from Pakistan but he has got his act together on the naxal menace. For the first time these naxals are surrendering in other states, so it is not only that one kills them but there remain other ways as well to get over them. things are not as bad as have been portrayed, its just that media is talking about it for the first time at such a level (media coverage equated to 26/11....??) so we get a feel as if the earth has shaken.

Absolutely. I mean stories of Yuvraj Singh’s nightly escapades used to get more coverage than Naxal movement till before this ghastly incident.

4, 5, 6 yes this is something I completely agree with and two states where this needs to be done is jharkhand where 20 of the 24 districts are infested and that idiot cm is not even ready to acknowledge this menace, the second one bihar, nitish is acting too pricy because the state elections are round the corner. But for presidents rule you need the support in the parliament which will be hard to come by because if this is done in these two states then that will make the left jittery and that will cast a doubt in the minds of the left in WB and they might suspect that they will be the next to go, so they will not support and with bjp in the government in both bihar and jh, they are sure to create a ruckus and not let this happen.
no state government will give up the power, they are all too greedy, and all the infested states are ones governed by non-congress political outfits.

Yes this is a major problem. Chidambaram is a capable fellow but unfortunately as I had pointed out that he is powerless to do anything. He can only provide security he can’t direct them. All the states have to be brought onboard but how ? And Congress lacks the numbers at the centre to do anything to radical too. But this is the same govt which risked all for the nuclear deal, can this govt risk itself for fighting the Red Menace?

 

[Iamanidiot]

Regarding Maos

Thatkur_Ritesh and Paaji

IT took AP 30 years to solve the problem.Precisely from 1983 onwards.Precisely when NTR came to power

The problem was the Maoist ceased to be a threat in AP since 1990.They were never a threat on the scale of Dantewada or Jharkhand.Ritesh Maoism was a nuisance to AP never a threat

 

[thakur_ritesh]

Paaji,

COIN ops have been handled by both the state police and by the army.

Punjab, Tripura, Andhra saw the state police do it and with grand success with completely wiping out the menace in these states.

Army has done an excellent job in J&K, and have been fairly successful with the NE ops, so coin is not something that just the army can do.

In case we do want to engage the army then it was sighted in one of the articles that has been posted in this thread that get in short service commissioned chaps along with retirees from the army ( a jawan retires much early and there is a huge number of them), get them to take up jobs with the paramilitary, right from trainers to actively taking part in this ops with command handled by an IPS officer which happened to be the recommendations post kargil but then with our politicians not willing to make paramilitary at par with the army they declined the offer for some weird inherent fears or politicians have. BJP which likes to do big talk on the security of the nation was the one who shunned this proposal.

What is seriously missing is the leadership on part of the IPS officers and having seen them from close quarters all my life I know these people have time for every damn thing other than their job, they can party the whole night but will hardly ever be seen in their offices before 12 noon and all gone by 6 in most cases much earlier, same is the case with the IAS officers. Now when there is no work culture then who is going to do the clean up job, and who is interested to do on field stuff and this is where the home minister comes into picture, seriously one has to listen to DG crpf, and understand what I am trying to say, all these shifarish walas have to make way with a more efficient lot.

I was under the impression that a lot of cleaning up had happened post 26/11 since I personally know a lot of heads rolled with a big number of IPS officers forced to take jobs at positions lower to what they were previously reporting at, but it seems the holes are much deeper, and if this cant be controlled then I agree we need the army in place.

Thakur sahib, the killing of 76 soldiers has turned the tide against Maoists. For a long time they have stayed under the radar. By committing small acts they were treated as a nuisance as their escapades rarely made it to the news. This news has been a wake up call for the slumbering India and also “internationalised” the issue.
Civil Society has made it clear before that Maoists need to be routed and after this incident is clear that they need to be routed “yesterday”. Government is a better judge of people’s mood.

Completely agree paaji, no disputing that, let alone us discussing this even the media wouldn’t have bothered but we also need to thank chidu for this for the media campaign he has taken for the past 6 months or so which made sure our prominent civil society was not able to broom it under the carpet.

I am in fact pleasantly surprised to see the coverage a channel like ndtv has given to this episode, never expected it to go this far.

Agree but then again a problem comes. Maoists easily slip into neighbouring states. Either all states come onboard which is tough because of the dominance of regional, ethnic, caste parties in these states.

Yes this is a major problem. Chidambaram is a capable fellow but unfortunately as I had pointed out that he is powerless to do anything. He can only provide security he can’t direct them. All the states have to be brought onboard but how ? And Congress lacks the numbers at the centre to do anything to radical too. But this is the same govt which risked all for the nuclear deal, can this govt risk itself for fighting the Red Menace?

Completely agree and it is for this reason that I don’t feel confident that these politicians will support any sort of army intervention given when there is too much at stake for them, imagine a party like jmm, or bjd or lalu’s party which are regional in their appeal, will they let go their hold on the government for even a day let alone 3-6 months, I seriously doubt we have honest politicians in our country barring a few who think country over politics.

Absolutely. I mean stories of Yuvraj Singh’s nightly escapades used to get more coverage than Naxal movement till before this ghastly incident.

Lol you forgot sania-shoaib.

 

[san]

During the hight of militancy in Assam, 1991 - 92, I have seen a distinct difference between the army & paramilitary operation. Army has more specific intelligence of a militant hideout, we can say like 2-3 houses inside a village & when the militant try to flee, he is caught or get killed. In the case of paramilitary, BSF or CRPF will start from 2-3 direction of the village searching houses & by the time they approach the hideout the militant fleed between them or vanished somewhere inside the villgae. Some of them have their eye fixed on womens rather than the target & when they come to konw that the jackel had fleed, they will round up whole menflock of the village into school or common place & will take 3-4 youth with them as militant to have the operation sucess.
I have given above example just to show that there is deficiency as part of CRPF somewhere & they can learn a lot from army in counter insurgency. I salute to the brave CRPF jawans & their families who lost their lives in dantewada.

 

[ajtr]

China working on Maoist-SIMI nexus in South India?
From Arun Lakshman in Thiruvananthapuram

Sources in the intelligence agency told this reporter that the Chinese interpreters in the Indian intelligence establishment have already got vital evidences that make it quite apparent that the Chinese have already prepared a blueprint for the operation in South India and would in the immediate future create several human interest think tanks in South India for garnering support from the intellectual community and to take the state’s intelligentsia as a major propaganda machinery for its sinister operations.

The Indian intelligence agencies are on the trail of a sinister plan of Chinese for integrating the operations of the Maoist groups with the banned Islamist organisation SIMI. A top official of the Intelligence Bureau while speaking to this reporter said that a meeting between some middle-level leaders of the two organisations was held in Bengaluru recently at the behest of a foreign intelligence agent and a Kerala-based former Naxalite leader is given the charge of the operation in South India.

The former SIMI chief Safdar Nagori during his interrogation has revealed to the Madhya Pradesh Police that his organisation has floated a 200-member suicide squad of which 40 are from Kerala.

The Chinese intelligence, it is learnt, is bent on creating an Islamist-Maoist nexus in South India, which, according to the experts, could prove to be a major force to destabilise the law and order situation in South India. The intelligence official also informed that the Chinese organisations have not yet come to the forefront but are pulling the strings using certain elements of the Pakistani intelligence as a camouflage. However sources in the agency told this reporter that the Chinese interpreters in the Indian intelligence establishment have already got vital evidences that make it quite apparent that the Chinese have already prepared a blueprint for the operation in South India and would in the immediate future create several human interest think tanks in South India for garnering support from the intellectual community and to take the state’s intelligentsia as a major propaganda machinery for its sinister operations.

It may be recalled that the CPI-M of Kerala, which has been the political party that attracted the left intellectuals, is now in the grip of a fierce factional war and several intellectuals have been shown the door by the official faction of the party because of their solidarity with the Chief Minister Achuthanandan, who is now functioning in the party without proper wings.

These elements, according to the experts in the intelligence agencies, have already been roped in by the Maoist and other dalit movements to set up their base among the intellectual community of the state.

The state police have already cracked the case relating to the brutal killing of a middle-aged person while he was on a morning walk and have found a dalit outfit-Dalit Human Rights Forum-behind the murder. After a close observation, it was established that the organisation formed less than two years ago in Aluva has gained momentum in several dalit hamlets in Kerala and that it is flush with funds. A top official of the Intelligence Bureau, who is in the state in connection with the probe on this organisation, told this reporter that they are ascertaining the role played by the external intelligence agencies in creating such an outfit.

The Intelligence Bureau, in its report presented before the Union Home Minister and the National Security Advisor a few weeks ago, has said that the situation in Kerala has gone out of control and that more and more youth are getting involved in terror operations with unabated support from certain mainstream political parties. The report also pointed out that there is a large presence of terror-trained youths in the coastal districts of Kerala and that the state police is not acting properly to the extent they should have acted. The Intelligence Bureau has made its probe deeper into Kerala following the death of four Islamic terrorists in Kashmir, who were all from Kerala.

 

[jayadev]

'States responsible for growing Maoists menace'

Patna, Apr 10: Coming in support of Home Minister P Chidambaram, a senior Union Cabinet Minister on Saturday, Apr 10, has blamed the states for the upsurge in Maoists menace.

"Chidambaram sought to resign owning moral responsibility for the Dantewada incident...But there is no justification for it as states have to rein in the growing Naxal-related incidents," Union Food Processing Minister Subodh Kant Sahay told reporters here.


Sahay said that inorder to put an end to Maoists related incident, the states must realise that there has been increase in the number of Naxalites because of existing socio-economic problems.

"States have failed to achieve the desired development and unless these problems are properly addressed, the Maoists won't be uprooted," he said.

He stressed upon proper coordination between the state and the central force personnel to make anti-Maoists operations effective.

"The non-cooperation of the states with the Centre is evident from the absence of chief Ministers of Bihar and Jharkhand at a crucial meeting called by Chidambaram in Kolkata recently," Sahay said.

Chidambaram, had offered to resign over the gruesome Dantewada massacre on Apr 6, in which 76 CRPF personnel were killed. However, the resignation letter was rejected by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.
http://news.oneindia.in/2010/04/10/states-responsible-for-growing-maoists-menace.html

 

[Singh]

Thatkur_Ritesh and Paaji

IT took AP 30 years to solve the problem.Precisely from 1983 onwards.Precisely when NTR came to power

The problem was the Maoist ceased to be a threat in AP since 1990.They were never a threat on the scale of Dantewada or Jharkhand.Ritesh Maoism was a nuisance to AP never a threat

I disagree. Maoists had a firm grip over AP and ran a parallel government in vast swathes of the land. AP is the posterboy of anti-Naxal ops.

Paaji,

COIN ops have been handled by both the state police and by the army.

Punjab, Tripura, Andhra saw the state police do it and with grand success with completely wiping out the menace in these states.

Army has done an excellent job in J&K, and have been fairly successful with the NE ops, so coin is not something that just the army can do.

The problem here is that Naxals are spread over several states, and one of the powers which the states enjoy in our federation is that of security.

A successful anti-naxal ops by AP doesn't mean much to the Naxal movement when those same Naxals can setup base in neighbouring Orissa.

In case we do want to engage the army then it was sighted in one of the articles that has been posted in this thread that get in short service commissioned chaps along with retirees from the army ( a jawan retires much early and there is a huge number of them), get them to take up jobs with the paramilitary, right from trainers to actively taking part in this ops with command handled by an IPS officer which happened to be the recommendations post kargil but then with our politicians not willing to make paramilitary at par with the army they declined the offer for some weird inherent fears or politicians have. BJP which likes to do big talk on the security of the nation was the one who shunned this proposal.

What is seriously missing is the leadership on part of the IPS officers and having seen them from close quarters all my life I know these people have time for every damn thing other than their job, they can party the whole night but will hardly ever be seen in their offices before 12 noon and all gone by 6 in most cases much earlier, same is the case with the IAS officers. Now when there is no work culture then who is going to do the clean up job, and who is interested to do on field stuff and this is where the home minister comes into picture, seriously one has to listen to DG crpf, and understand what I am trying to say, all these shifarish walas have to make way with a more efficient lot.


I was under the impression that a lot of cleaning up had happened post 26/11 since I personally know a lot of heads rolled with a big number of IPS officers forced to take jobs at positions lower to what they were previously reporting at, but it seems the holes are much deeper, and if this cant be controlled then I agree we need the army in place.

The proposal you have mentioned is sound as well as it addresses one of the fundamental issues ie the lack of training. There was another proposal. Send the jawans to the paramilitary for couple of years for every 7 years served in the Army.

You answered my only concern yourself. The operations must be led by an Army guy. They are free from meddling, have extensive experience and lead from the battlezone. They are aware of the logistics of carrying out an operation over 6 states with MRAPs, armour, artillery, UAVs, Chopper gunships etc.

Whereas in the case of the operations led by an IPS guy, there will be 6 IPS heads for each state and some incompetent and many already in their defined political camps towing to their masters. And not to mention their perhaps lack of inexperience in conducting such a large op. Any service led by an IPS with army jawans would also suffer from a leadership crisis.

Not to say there won't be bright officers but the sheer odds are weighed against IPS.

---

Edit

A few Things I wish to stress on are
1. Its futile to draft army recruits or even bring in the army until they are given powers and authority. (ie trained soldiers need effective leadership)
2. Concerted effort is necessary. (AP's success don't count for much on a national scale for eg)
3. Ultimately there has to be a lasting situation in the form of effective governance. (hearts and minds)

 

[Iamanidiot]

Paaji
Iam from Andhra literally lived all my life in andhra and I have to disagree with your opinion.Maos never ran a parllel government.You can even ask tarunraju also even he hails from AP

 

[Singh]

Paaji
Iam from Andhra literally lived all my life in andhra and I have to disagree with your opinion.Maos never ran a parllel government.You can even ask tarunraju also even he hails from AP

I will not dispute your own experiential findings but this is what I've read in many a reports.

For eg.

Dandakaranya is the the forest tract in the central-southern part of the country that cover parts of Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, the Bastar region of Chhattisgarh and Maharashtra where CPI (Maoist) virtually run a parallel government envisioning a "liberated" zone.

http://www.dnaindia.com/india/repor...o-and-hidma-mastermind-in-crpf-attack_1368592

 

[Iamanidiot]

Paaji
Dandakranya in AP is the graveyard for naxals.By the GoAP did not neglect Adilabad,Warangal .
HINTaaji Salwa judum is the biggest obstacle to eleminate naxalism

 

[Rage]

Dantewada attack: My resignation a closed chapter, says Chidambaram

PTI, Apr 10, 2010, 05.20pm IST


PUDUCHERRY: Calling his resignation episode a closed chapter, Home Minister P Chidambaram today said he decided to quit because the CRPF came under his charge but that does not mean state governments have no role in tackling the Maoists.

"The resignation was indeed tendered. The Prime Minister has rejected it. The matter is a closed chapter," he told reporters declining to talk further on the issue.

Chidambaram said in the horrific tragedy in Dantewada in Chhattisgarh hit the CRPF whose 74 personnel were killed. "It (CRPF) is under my charge. This tragedy has happened under my watch.

"Therefore, I said the buck stops at my desk. It does not mean that the state governments have no role. They have a role, they acknowledge it, recognise and according to me, all the state governments are fully aware of this responsibility."

When a journalist told him that his score card has been neat in the Ministry and whether Dantewada attack was a blot on it, he said "any attack is indeed a blot".

The Home Minister said it was an intra-Chhattisgarh operation and not an inter-state operation. The exercise was planned by the State Inspector General of Police and DIG and DIG of CRPF.

It was conveyed to the Police Headquarters and they were aware of the exercise, he said adding "but something went wrong. Something went very badly wrong".

He said precious lives were lost and the government has appointed an inquiry committee to go into it. "Let the report of the inquiry committee come and we will take corrective action."

Asked about the role of the Centre in anti-naxal operations, the Home Minister said the Central government's role, according to the mandate given to the Ministry of Home Affairs, is to provide paramilitary forces to state governments to help them carry out anti-naxal operations to regain control over the area where the Naxals are dominating and to restore civil administration for development.

"I have said this many times and I have said this three days ago in Jagdalpur (in Chhattisgarh) that this is our role and state governments have an important role to play.

"I think all the Chief Ministers recognise that they have an important role to play," he said


http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...pter-says-Chidambaram/articleshow/5782302.cms

 

[ajtr]

Counter-Insurgency: Use of Air Power Vs Use of Air Force

By B. Raman

There is a confusing debate in our electronic media about the pros and cons of using air power against the Maoist insurgents. The debate has been triggered off by remarks made by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Home Minister P.Chidambaram about all options remaining open, including the use of air power. These comments were made after the Maoists succeeded in butchering 75 personnel of the Central Reserve Police Force plus one member of the District Police in a deadly ambush in the forests of the Dantewada District of Chattisgarh on April 6, 2010.

2. There are three concepts involved---use of air power, use of air strikes and use of the Air Force in the operations against the insurgents. Air power is a wide term implying the use of air-borne assets such as aircraft, helicopters and armed or unarmed Drones (pilotless planes) for performing various operational tasks such as intelligence collection, electronic monitoring of ground signals, logistics, humanitarian relief and attacks on the ground positions of the insurgents.

3. Air strike is a restricted term meaning the use of air-borne assets only for the purpose of attacking the insurgents' ground positions. Use of the Air Force means using the air-borne assets of the Air Force.

4. In the history of India's counter-insurgency, we have used air strikes by the Air Force only once----in 1966 when the Mizo National Front (MNF), in a surprise attack, overran practically the whole of Mizoram, including Aizawl, its capital. To dislodge the MNF insurgents from Aizawl, air strikes by the Air Force of a limited duration were ordered. Apart from that we have not used air strikes by the Air Force for dealing with internal security situations. A basic principle followed by many countries is that one cannot resort to air strikes in one's own territory against one's own people.

5. Air strikes on one's own nationals tend to aggravate an insurgency situation by causing casualties of civilians, damaging the environment in forest areas and driving more people to join the ranks of the insurgents. They also attract the attention and criticism of international human rights organisations such as the Amnesty International and humanitarian relief organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

6. There are cases of some nations resorting to air strikes by their Air Force against their own nationals for dealing with an insurgency. Examples: Pakistan's use of its Air Force against the Baloch nationalists and the Pakistani Taliban, Russia's use of the Air Force against the Chechens and Sri Lanka's use of its Air Force against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In Pakistan and Russia it has aggravated the insurgency problem. In Sri Lanka, the air strikes helped in crushing the insurgency, but it has been facing an embarrassing sequel in the form of international demands for an enquiry into the way it crushed the LTTE.

7. The use of air strikes by our Air Force against the Maoist positions on the ground would be inadvisable. It could brutalise our counter-insurgency operations. Over the years, India has made for itself a name as a role-model in its restrained counter-insurgency approach. We have dealt with serious situations without resorting to air strikes and the use of heavy artillery. We should not deviate from our exemplary record of the past in dealing with alienated sections of our population who have taken to arms against the State.

8. Use of air power without air strikes is permissible in counter-insurgency situations. We are already using air power for dealing with internal security situations. For special interventions for terminating a terrorist attack, we use aircraft under the control of the Aviation Research Centre (ARC), a civilian organisation, piloted by Air Force officers taken on deputation by the ARC. They go into action not on behalf of the Air Force, but on behalf of a civilian wing of the Government (the ARC). Similarly, even in Dantewada on April 6, we used air power for logistics and humanitarian purposes such as the evacuation of the injured.

9. Similarly, for years, we have been using the surveillance aircraft of the ARC for intelligence collection purposes while dealing with an insurgency through methods such as aerial photography, electronic monitoring of ground signals etc. It is totally in order for us to continue to use air power for such purposes. It will be equally in order for us to undertake a post-mortem of the adequacy of the airpower available for use in counter-insurgency situations. If there are deficiencies, how to remove them?

10. There are two ways of removing the deficiencies--- augment the air power of para-military organisations such as the CRPF and the Border Security Force (BSF) and supplement their air power by using the air-borne assets of the Air Force. After 1966, we have not used the air-borne assets controlled by the Air Force in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism situations. If we want to use the assets of the Air Force in future on a regular basis, procedural complications might arise because the assets of the Air Force were sanctioned and acquired for use against external adversaries and not for use in internal security situations. That is why the Air Force chief seems to have some reservations on this issue.

11. A correct solution, which will not prove controversial, will be to undertake a crash programme for augmenting the air power of the para-military forces and the ARC.

12. Barring the example of Operation Blue Star in the Golden Temple at Amritsar in 1984, we have avoided using the Armed Forces for counter-insurgency situations in areas away from the border. In the bordering areas, the cross-border dimensions make the use of the armed forces for an active role become unavoidable. But we do avoid in other areas. We should continue doing so. We would not like the Maoists, who have taken to arms against the police and the para-military forces, to start looking upon the armed forces also as their enemies and begin attacking them.

13. The Armed Forces should be used only in a desperate ground situation. The situation in the Maoist-controlled areas is serious, but not desperate. Chidambaram's image as a no-nonsense professional to the core has taken a beating after the way he mishandled the case for the extradition of David Coleman Headley, of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), and the Maoist insurgency. Instead of drawing the right lessons from the set-backs suffered by him so far, he is tending to lose patience and embark on even more escalatory methods. This could prove counter-productive.

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: [email protected])