Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs)

[sayareakd]

Indian-developed technology to boost range of missiles and protect re-entry vehicles news



Bangalore: Agni III, which is India's longest-range missile with a capability of striking targets 3,500 km away, may now have an extended range of around 5,000 km thanks to a unique solution discovered by Indian scientists at the prestigious Indian Institute of Science (IISc) here. The technology will increase the range of not just missiles but also other satellite launch vehicles.

The technology also has the exciting possibility of reducing the risk of occurrence of a Columbia space shuttle-type of tragic accident.

The enhanced range of an Indian re-entry vehicle or missile will now be due to a special-purpose coating of chromium metal applied to the blunt nose cone of missiles and launch vehicles, for which international patents have been sought for by the team of IISc scientists (See: Indigenous technology to increase range of Indian missiles by a third)

The prestigious IISc is celebrating its centenary this year.

''Objects such as missiles fly at hypersonic velocities which are more than five times the speed of sound and encounter atmospheric drag because of friction. The chromium coating works by adding temporary heat and pushing the stagnating gas away to create an easier path,'' G Jagadeesh, an assistant professor at the IISc here said.

The findings of the IISc team, which also includes Vinayak Kulkarni of IIT (Guwahati) and GM Hegde, E Arunan and KPJ Reddy, have been reported in the latest issue of the Physics of Fluids journal published by the American Institute of Physics.

Laboratory experiments have shown that atmospheric drag because of the coating fell by 47% and Jagadeesh said a ''conservative estimate'' was that this would result in range going up by at least 40%.

''The measurements show about 47% reduction in the drag coefficient for a 60° apex angle blunt cone in a Mach 8 flow of 3.4 MJ/kg specific enthalpy,'' reads an extract from the article in the journal.

Scientists say the breakthrough also has potential to avert disasters of the type that struck space shuttle Columbia in 2003, which resulted in the death of seven astronauts, including Indian-born astronaut Kalpana Chawla. The shuttle burned out as it was re-entering the earth's atmosphere as there were problems it's thermal protection system.

The special-purpose coating developed at the IISc could likely replace the tiles and panels which currently protect orbiters against extreme heat during re-entry into the atmosphere.

''The coating evaporates once the object has re-entered the atmosphere. This novel method is path-breaking because additional energy is not required to reduce drag; objects which travel into space need to carry a much lower fuel load,'' Jagadeesh said.

IISc team...................................................................:clap::clap::clap:

 

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http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-n...or-first-test-of-5000-km-range-agni-v-missile

Indian decks cleared for first test of 5000-km range Agni-V missile

NEW DELHI: India has begun final preparations for the first test of its most-ambitious strategic missile, the 5,000-km Agni-V, which will prove to be both a technical as well as logistical challenge.

The Agni-V, which will bring the whole of Asia, 70% of Europe and other regions under its strike envelope, will be tested from Wheeler Island off the Odisha coast towards end-March to early-April, top defence sources said.

"We are almost ready for the test. There are no technical glitches or problems. It's more of a scheduling and logistical issue now since the missile will travel halfway across the Indian Ocean," said a source.

"Countries like Indonesia and Australia as well as international air and maritime traffic in the test zone will have to be alerted a week or 10 days before the test. Moreover, our warships, with DRDO scientists, tracking and monitoring systems, will have to be positioned midway and near the impact point in southern Indian Ocean,'' he added.

The nuclear-capable Agni-V, about 50-tonne in weight and 17.5-metre tall, is bound to generate waves. Once the three-stage missile becomes operational by 2014-2015 after "four to five repeatable tests", as promised by DRDO, India will break into the exclusive ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) club that counts just US, Russia, China, France and UK as its members.

India could have gone for a higher strike range but believes the solid-fuelled Agni-V is "more than adequate'' to meet current threat perceptions and security concerns. The missile can, after all, even hit the northernmost parts of China.

With a canister-launch system to impart higher road mobility, the missile will give the armed forces much greater operational flexibility than the earlier-generation of Agni missiles. "The accuracy levels of Agni-V and the 3,500-km Agni-IV (first tested in November 2011), with their better guidance and navigation systems, are far higher than Agni-I (700-km), Agni-II (2,000-km) and Agni-III (3,000-km),'' said the source.

India, of course, cannot match China in terms of its vast nuclear and missile arsenals, with missiles like the 11,200-km range Dong Feng-31A even unnerving the US. But missiles like Agni-IV and Agni-V will certainly add teeth to its credible minimum nuclear deterrence posture.

The Agni missiles will get deadlier once MIRV (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles) payloads for them are developed. An MIRV payload on a missile carries several nuclear warheads, which can be programmed to hit different targets. A flurry of such missiles can hence completely overwhelm BMD (ballistic missile defence) systems.

 

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India Developing MIRVs - SP's Aviation

India Developing MIRVs
By Air Marshal (Retd) V.K. Bhatia

India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is reportedly validating technologies that will help India deploy multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV) warheads on its missiles. The DRDO has confirmed it has made significant progress over the past few years in developing an indigenous technology for the single-rocket-multiple-warhead system, and DRDO expects this ultimate war machine will be ready in another three to four years. Scientists of the organisation claim the guidance system will have a high degree of accuracy to offset even a small circular error of probability or a negligible deviation from the intended target.

VIEWS
If true, India would indeed join the elite club of the first five 'Nuclear Haves' countries—the US, Russia, China, UK and France—which also possess MIRV warheads in their respective nuclear arsenals. It would also greatly enhance the country's nuclear deterrence capability. But what exactly is an MIRV? The multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle is a type of payload fitted on long-range guided missiles. An MIRV payload allows a single missile to carry several nuclear warheads and attack a number of targets in quick succession in the enemy territory. The concept was initially conceived in the early 1960s by the US to enhance the limited capacity of its nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles. It triggered a major escalation of arms race between the US and Russia (then USSR), the two major adversaries of the Cold War period. The Soviets retaliated by developing a similar technology but placing the warheads on larger rockets. This enabled them to put more/heavier warheads into one missile with much higher individual and collective weapon yields. Subsequently, the remaining 'nuclear weapon countries' also followed suit by developing indigenous capabilities of their own.

Today, all Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and some Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) of the US are fitted with MIRV warheads. Russia uses MIRVs on its ICBMs and SLBMs as well, whereas France and UK operate only SLBMs with MIRV warheads. China has developed MIRV technology for use on its ICBMs. It may also be extending this capability to its SLBMs.

An MIRV payload separates from an ICBM/SLBM as the missile reaches the top, or apex, of the ballistic arc. The individual warheads can then be directed to a number of different targets as the warheads fall toward earth. The use of MIRV makes it much more difficult to defend against a ballistic missile attack. Even if some warheads malfunction or are intercepted by anti-ballistic missile defences, the increased number of warheads provided by the MIRV payload greatly increases the chances of destroying the intended targets. In the same vein, several MIRVs may be aimed at a single, heavily defended target, in an attempt to ensure its destruction.

 

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N-powered submarine puts India in big league, Agni-5 next leap - Hindustan Times

N-powered submarine puts India in big league, Agni-5 next leap

After completing the acquisition and induction of the nuclear-powered submarine INS Chakra from Russia on Wednesday, India will strengthen its strategic security further by testing the 5,000-kilometre-range Agni-5 missile around April 15.

The nuclear-capable missile will have Beijing within its reach and is designed to send a strong deterrent signal to China, which is expanding its India-centric missile and land forces capabilities in the Tibet and Xinjiang regions.

The 50-tonne and 17.5-meter-long three-stage missile with a 2-meter-diameter is solid fuelled with multiple independent targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV), which means one missile can target several areas simultaneously, with one tonne nuclear warhead.

Official sources said the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) was initially planning to time the Agni-5 test with the acquisition of the INS Chakra but that had to be postponed.

The INS Chakra was inducted into the navy on Wednesday, acquired on a 10-year lease for almost $1 billion (Rs 5,000 crore).

The Chakra cannot deliver nuclear warheads in its current configuration. It will carry torpedoes, land-attack cruise missiles and anti-ship missiles.

India will complete its nuclear triad (ability to launch strategic weapons from land, air and sea) only when it inducts the indigenous nuclear-powered submarine INS Arihant, which will kick off sea trials this year. The Arihant will be equipped with K-15 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 700 km.

 

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cross posted

Agni-V, INS Chakra give India a deadly punch - India News - IBNLive


Agni-V, INS Chakra give India a deadly punch


New Delhi: Agni-V, the 5000-km range surface-to-surface Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capable of carrying multiple nuclear warheads, has catapulted India into an extremely select club of countries possessing such a deadly weapons platform. Agni-V gives India the much-needed muscle and a strong deterrence against its nuclear-armed adversaries as the missile can not only target every city of China, but is also capable of reaching Australia, Eastern Europe, North Eastern and Eastern Africa.
Coupled with the induction of the first operational nuclear attack submarine the Akula II class Nerpa rechristened INS Chakra into the Indian Navy on April 4, Agni-V gives India the power to deliver the knock out punch to the enemy in the event of hostilities breaking out. Only five other countries - China, Russia, France, the United States and the United Kingdom - have such long distance missiles.
Agni-V and INS Chakra are the biggest and the most deadly symbol of India's military might and while Army Chief General VK Singh's letter to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on the war preparedness, lack and obsolescence of vital weapons systems and ammunition made a lot of news in the last few weeks, what went unnoticed is that the defence forces have been slowly adding muscle to counter the threat of a two-front war. In the past few months the government and the defence forces have taken several steps to plug in the gaps in India's defence, particularly in relation with China.

Along with the earlier missiles of the Agni series - Agni-I (range: 700 km), Agni-II (2,000 km), Agni-III and IV (3,000 plus km) range - the ICBM gives India a wide array of potent weapons platform to take on the enemy. The 17 m long, 2 m wide and 50 tonne Agni-V is a generation ahead of the other surface-to-surface missiles in India's inventory and what makes the missile extremely effective and deadly is that it can carry Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MITRV) capable of delivering multiple warheads at different targets at long distances.
Such missiles when fired in large numbers can penetrate a ballistic missile shield and devastate the intended target or targets. After the missile is inducted into the strategic forces by 2014-2015, India will acquire a strong deterrent capacity against China as the entire country would come under its range.
Although Agni-V will need to undergo several more trials before it can be formally inducted into India's arsenal, the test-firing has sent out a strong statement to the world, particularly to the country's adversaries.
The induction of INS Chakra, the impending sea trials of the indigenous nuclear submarine INS Arihant that will be armed with torpedoes and the 700-km range nuclear K-15 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the shortlisting of the Rafale for Indian Air Force's (IAF) 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA), induction of two squadrons of the front-line Sukhoi-30 MKI fighter jets in the North East at the Tezpur and the Chabua air bases are just some of the moves the government and defence forces have taken to counter the Chinese threat.
India will have an assured second strike capability once Agni-V and INS Arihant become operational as the country has already a declared policy of no first use of nuclear weapons. INS Arihant will complete the crucial third leg of nuclear triad as a nuclear-powered submarine can stay underwater for a very long duration, remain undetected and file a submarine launched nuclear missile.
The Indian Navy is gearing up to operate five nuclear submarines by the end of this decade, including two leased from Russia and three Arihant Class underwater warships built indigenously.
With six Scorpene submarines being constructed at Mazagon Dockyards in Mumbai in collaboration with French DCNS and six more planned to be built under the Project-75 India, the Navy is also getting ready for the induction of the 44,500-tonne INS Vikramaditya or the refitted Admiral Gorshkov from Russia in early-2013. INS Vikramaditya will have MiG-29Ks, the first-ever naval supersonic fighters, on board giving the carrier battle group a lethal edge. The Navy will operate 45 MiG-29K fighters out of which 16 will be based on INS Vikramaditya.
India is also getting ready to induct the 40,000-tonne indigenous aircraft carrier (IAC), being constructed at Cochin Shipyard. The carrier is slated to be battle-ready by 2015 and will give a big boost to the Navy's plans of operating three carrier battle groups with one on in the Arabian Sea and the other in the Bay of Bengal and the third in reserve. Both the INS Vikramaditya and the IAC will also carry India's indigenously designed naval version of the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft.
According to Navy Chief Admiral Nirmal Verma the second indigenous aircraft carrier called IAC-II will be a much bigger warship than the IAC, displacing 50,000 tons. If the Cochin Shipyard adheres to the schedule then the Navy will operate three operational carrier battle groups by 2020.
The fifth-generation Sukhoi T-50/ PAK FA, which is being developed in collaboration with Russia, will also give India a potent fighter in the sky. The fighter jet is undergoing tests and is expected to enter into service with the IAF by 2017. The IAF is planning to induct 250 Sukhoi T-50/ PAK FA.
Even the Army, in the news for having an arsenal of obsolete weapons, is moving fast to match up to the Chinese threat on the Eastern front. China has been modernising and building the infrastructure and is now capable of outnumbering the Indian forces by almost 3:1 by moving almost 30 divisions with over 15,000 soldiers each to the disputed 4,057km long Line of Actual Control.
The Army is already raising a new mountain strike corps comprising of almost 70,000 soldiers along with two mountain infantry divisions with 1,260 officers and 35,011 soldiers to be based in the North East. Equipped with M-777 ultra-light howitzers, 145 of which are being procured from the US, the mountain strike corps will give the Army the boots on the grounds.
With the new regiment of BrahMos supersonic cruise missile (the Block-III version that can scale mountainous terrain and then dive steeply) already deployed in the North East, the Army has plugged a major hole in India's defence.
Taken together these measures reveal that India is indeed taking the threat from both the Eastern and the Western fronts seriously and taking measures to counter it. All the three wings of the military – the Army, Navy and IAF – are not only adding the latest weapons platforms in their arsenal, but also upgrading their existing arsenal to thwart any misadventure by the nuclear armed adversaries.

 

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Agni-V has many more milestones to reach

Agni-V has many more milestones to reach

New Delhi, Apr 19, 2012,DHNS
Missile might: It is capable of delivering nuclear warhead anywhere in China
The platform was successfully tested in a textbook flight. But the killer warhead — called multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle — to be fitted finally atop the 17 metre Agni-V missile is still under development and will take more time before it comes for trial.

"Defence Research and Development Organisation is working on the MIRV. I cannot tell you when we are going to test it but it is in an advanced stage of development," Agni project director Tessy Thomas told Deccan Herald over telephone from Wheeler's Island.

A MIRV is a collection of nuclear weapons fitted on a platform known as post-boost (or bus) stage, which dispenses individual warheads against multiple targets over a broad area, thereby rendering the enemy's missile defence system useless. The number of weapons attached to the bus can vary.

"MIRV is an extraordinary jump in technology and capability as one missile can carry 5-8 independent warheads for separate targets. The DRDO programme on MIRV is in an advanced stage of design and development and will be tested in a few years," Bharat Karnad, professor at Centre for Policy Research said.

Open source literature suggests that an US MIRV can carry 3-12 nuclear warheads whereas Russian MIRV houses 3-10 such warheads. Not many countries are known to possess MIRV technology.

"MIRV is the right way to go," said Rajaram Nagappa, professor of strategic and security studies at National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore. "Its a brilliant technology," said S K Tyagi, former chief of Indian Air Force. Developed first in the USA in the 1970s — MIRV — provides greater target damage.

"MIRV technology is similar to Indian Space Research Organiation's multiple satellite injection technology. The defence scientists have to militarise it and install better guidance system to ensure that warheads hit the targets," said Karnad, admitting it was a challenging task for scientists.

Scientists in Agni project encountered several other challenges in realising Agni-V that can fly a distance of 5000 km. "Guiding the missile all through its trajectory and navigating it was a key challenge. As it was a three stage rocket, we had to install new (the third one) motor and still had to manage the overall mass," said Thomas.

Fuel efficiency

Reduction of structural mass and maximise fuel efficiency would be another important problem which defence scientists had solved, said Nagappa, who specialised in aerospace propulsion and worked extensively in design and development of solid propellant rockets at Indian Space Research Organisation's Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre at Thiruvananthapuram.

Otherwise managing a two stage rocket – like Agni-II, Agni-III and Agni-IV – would not be more complicated than a three stage rocket, Nagappa said, adding Agni-V was as good as any other contemporary vehicle.

In India's neighbourhood, China has its Dong Feng-31 and DF-31A, both three stage rockets, reportedly with a range of 10000 km and 7000 km respectively. The DF 31A is suspected to have been carrying a MIRV. Pakistan on the other hand does not have any three stage rocket so far

 

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Arms race between China and India? | Russia & India Report

Arms race between China and India?

Mr. Yevstafiev, what do you think about various reactions of the successful Agni-V Indian intercontinental?

The first test launch was basically successful. It is a great achievement of the Indian research technology and we have to admit that India has become one of the major missile countries in this world. And it was developed for a number of years. Initially the idea was to develop Agni-III into number IV and number V, but then number IV somehow has not been tested yet and now we have Agni-V. This is a formidable missile with the range of, some people say it is 5000 kilometers, but I'm afraid they are misleading the public opinion because there are people who believe that it has a potential of 8000 kilometers. And of course the range of throw is a classified information but nevertheless between 5000 and 8000, this makes it intercontinental strategic missile.

The missile was coming under the Strategic Forces command. So, it is in a proper hands and it has been launched from a traditional place, there is a Wheeler Island where Defense Research and Development Organization of India has its sights. And it would take a number of test flights, not less than four or five, before a missile itself will become operational. Now it is a success but it is not yet operational and it will also take three or four years before they really develop what they say. They want to have at top of this missile MIRV system – Multiple Independently Targeted Vehicles with a number of, between two and ten, separately targeted nuclear bombs. And it will take some time, this technology is not yet ready.

And what we have of course it is a huge missile, it is almost 18 meters, and its diameter is 2 meters, it is really a robust and solid mechanism. It can carry about 1500 kilos of weight of load and it is enough to carry a vessel with a nuclear bomb or to have four or five MIRV bombs which could present a very serious difficulty for missile defense. And we have to give credit to Indians, they have mastered, which has taken more time in bigger countries like the United States and Russia, they right from the beginning have put the missile into a canister which is sealed and the missile could be kept for quite some time before it is being thrown out from a canister and after that it starts moving. Of course we know the Indians have serious successes in navigational systems, in GPS systems that's why as far as guidance is concerned that's quite a reliable thing because the standard of Indian electronics and space technology evokes respect.

So, having fired this missile Indians have stated by the firing test that they have joined the club of the great missile powers. Being the nuclear state they have declared that they have a very universal weapon for the future developments because of course they have their own threats perceptions and risks. And that's why it has been done according to their view of developing situation. If you have a look on how far it can fly – it covers all China and it can come up to Europe. I wonder if these people in Europe, would they think about a threat from a third world country and what do they think about their missile defense system because it is much more developed than anything we have in Korea or in Iran for that matter.

Indian researcher Bahukutumbi Raman says that Agni-V is, like he put it, a Chinese centric missile. And he says that once it is put on operation, it can reach those parts of Eastern China on which its economic prosperity depends. Now, if that is really so? Are we going to see something like arms race between China and India?

The arms race between China and India is going on for the last 15-20 years. The range of Agni-V covers the whole of China, not only the areas on which the Chinese prosperity depends.

In terms of Indian perception of threats of course in the Indian General Headquarters, among the military China is the major threat and that's why they have found now, say by 2015 they will have a reliable weapon to respond to Chinese threat. But on the other hand I think it will make the whole situation, as far as stability is concerned, more predictable and both sides, I would say, would be very cautious about playing with muscles.

But it is a certain warning to other countries around India, in the Indian Ocean and in other places that India has a potential and they have to deal with India very cautiously, they should not irritate India and it has Indian Ocean at her disposal because with this kind of missiles, they will have a number of them, they would control the whole area. And it happens, interestingly enough, it happens in times when Americans are trying to develop their assets and potential in Australia. And America is preparing for some sort of a showdown with China sooner or later. In this situation we have a new player, very important player who has got something to say.

And is the player going to take sides in that situation?

No, I don't think India will take any sides in this because Indian policy is very mature. Indians know the border of their national interests and they won't go a step over this border. They know the Chinese points of aim, so to say, which they should not step on. But in a long run I think it would play well in containing the United States.

Containing the United States?

Yes, in the long run, especially if China and India would agree among themselves and would really divide the spheres of interests, it could be a very serious reminder to the United States that they have to behave in this area because they are not the only one country which possesses this kind of formidable arsenal of weapons.

But interestingly enough India has close cooperation with the United States in nuclear matters. So, do you think that could be a leverage for the United States to apply some pressure to India?

No, I don't think so. You know, the agreement with Bush Administration signed with India about scientific cooperation, but mainly in a nuclear field, in 2007 is of the particular interest to the United States because they know the Indians have a huge energy program which is based mostly on, due to rather poor energy resources, it is based mostly on the development of the nuclear industry. We benefit from this idea of Indians develop nuclear industry, Kudankulam which we are going to convert into something very spectacular.

But the Indian request is huge because Indians are planning within 20-25 years to build about 50 nuclear energy reactors and American industry which is not producing nuclear reactors now for the use in the United States, they have stopped producing them to the United States industry, they badly need some market for the advanced technologies in that. By the way, French are in the same boat, though of course French industry is of a much smaller size. That's why the fight for Indian market in nuclear technology is basically a commercial fight for the share of Indian market. But the market is going to be so big that for the next 15 years there will be enough space for everybody to work on this market.


Mind you that Indians are very serious customers and they demand a lot of set benefits when they sign agreements and these set benefits would of course sponsor the Indian industry in developing their own technologies. And sooner or later they will produce more than 50% of what they need for themselves.

And now of course the final question based on your assessment. Just how good are the chances, the way you see, that eventually India and China might come to terms? Because now we've got more than half a century standing conflict between the two. And on the other hand there are so many forces which would be trying to prevent the two countries reaching any kind of agreement.

That's true. And for example America very cautiously but they do have the share of really provoking the rift between the two countries, but very carefully. They don't want to be caught red handed.

This is very difficult to predict but both countries are quite mature in their diplomacy and foreign policy. Both countries understand the level of their pretensions over the influence in this world and that's why unless there is something very special, and very special in this case might be Pakistan which is an ally of China. But Indians are cautious with Pakistan, they don't want to take upon themselves the burden of handling the affairs of this almost fail state and they really don't mind the Chinese working there and having their share of influence in Pakistan.

But on the other hand there is no serious problem of fighting for resources up to now between China and India because China is trying to master the situation in the Pacific Ocean zone, and especially on those islands like Paracel or on other kinds of isles, and these are the priorities for the Chinese. They don't show much their flag in the Indian Ocean. From time to time they come but just to show that there is the Chinese Fleet and so on. But they understand and they see that the Indian Ocean is the zone of influence of India, and they don't provoke India for all kinds of responses.

The same thing with India, it is quite far from this Pacific Ocean area. It has a lot of things to do around the Indian Ocean and that's why they are not a competitor for Chinese in the area. Whereas the United States, Japan, maybe even Indonesia, Vietnam, these countries are more anti-Chinese in a sense that they are afraid of Chinese, they don't want to have the increased Chinese influence. And that brings me to some sort of a hope that understanding this Chinese and Indians, especially in times of possible Chinese-American tensions, they would keep quite good relationships among themselves.

Well, let's hope so. Though there is the painful issue of Tibet.

Tibet of course is a point of disagreement but with the course, the way things develop, Indians will soon be deprived of their hope to have something in Tibet which would be more favourable to their heart then what is now. Chinese are moving there slowly but I would say resolutely and I don't think Tibet is having some chance of independence.

And what about the new port which the Chinese are building in Pakistan?

Pakistan is a different thing. And Pakistan basically strategically is surviving on the strategic partner agreement with China. But times change. I believe that Pakistan in many respects is a fail state. And Indians do understand this and they don't want to touch Pakistan in terms of military invasion.

But still, are the Chinese interested in getting the port and getting access into the Indian Ocean ultimately?

Not now. Time will come but now they have different priorities. I think they have a priority of China Sea oil resources and in the surrounding countries. In American opposition to this, they have the priority of Taiwan, deciding the future of Taiwan in some way which would be acceptable and they are very flexible on the way how to decide. So, for the next 15-29 China has enough to do in this area and if it is not going to provoke anybody on the other side of their borders, and they would prefer to have some sort of détente with India, this will work.

 

[sferrin]

GUYS DO WATCH THIS, VERY EXCITING.......


After seeing this I think the AGNI V being MIRV is not a rumor....

That shot is of a Peacekeeper bus and is about 30 years old.

Rocketdyne Archives

 

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Plans to equip Agni-V with multiple warheads: DRDO chief - India - DNA

Plans to equip Agni-V with multiple warheads: DRDO chief

Agni-V, India's most powerful missile with a strike range of over 5,000 kms, is set to get substantially higher destruction capabilities with plans to equip it with multiple warheads.

"We are working in this area. It will take time for us to develop but our work is on," DRDO Chief Dr VK Saraswat told PTI when asked whether the agency is developing capabilities to produce a variant of Agni-V missile which can hit multiple targets.

Known as Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV), the missile would be capable of carrying multiple warheads to destroy several targets.

Asked about the plans in that regard, he said, "Basic vehicle (missile) will remain the same. The first three stages will also remain the same and only the kill vehicle or the payload delivery system will need changes."

Terming it as a "force multiplier", the DRDO chief said, "If I am able to do force multiplication with this... where I was using four missiles, I may use only one missile. So it becomes a force multiplier given the damage potential."

Such a capability exists only with a select few countries such as the US, Russia and China.

Comparing Agni-V missile to the best in the world, Saraswat said, "It is a game changer missile... It has taken the missile technology to the highest level and matches with the best and the current world standards."

MIRV missiles are equipped with small on-board rocket motors and computerised inertial guidance system which manoeuvres warheads to several different trajectories.

On plans to develop missiles with 8000 km or even longer range, the DRDO chief said that will be done according to the evolving threat perception.

"Whenever the need arises, we will develop... Right now we feel, 5000 km-class of system meets our threat perception and threat requirement. But that does not mean that we will not develop a longer range missile. We will develop, but depending on the evolving threat perception," Saraswat said.

He said that the successful test flight of Agni-V missile has given the country the necessary capability to design and develop missiles of longer ranges as well.

"As far as the capability of doing that kind of work (developing longer range missiles) is concerned, this missile (Agni-V) gives you the capability to build any missile of a range on the higher side," he said.

Talking about the ongoing efforts to develop an array of tactical missiles, Saraswat said, "Work is going on a number of tactical missiles such as the long and medium-range surface-to-air missiles. The Mark-I version of Astra Long Range Air-to-Air Missile will be ready by 2015."

He said that the long-range surface-to-air missile would be ready by 2014 while its medium-range version will take a year more. Astra Mark-I will be an 80-km range missile.

Saraswat refused to divulge the range of the Mark-II version of Astra missile.

On development of 150 to 180-km range Prahaar missile for the Army, the DRDO Chief said the project has now matured and demonstrations were given to the force.

"We have demonstrated it (Prahaar missile) to the Army. It is a fully developed missile including its launcher and cannister. It is ready and, if the Army makes a choice then we can take it from the present demonstration stage to the production stage," Saraswat said.

Prahaar is a derivative of the interceptor missile designed by DRDO as part of its project to develop Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) shield.

"Prahaar is a matured missile as it is a derivate of the endo-atmospheric interceptor of the BMD programme. We modified that and converted it into Prahaar," he said.

Saraswat said that Prahaar can be used to launch different kinds of warheads, giving the commanders flexibility to choose from various options.

"It is a very good missile and gives you accuracy, range and capability to use different types of warheads. It gives tremendous flexibility to the commander. This will be a 150-180-km range missile," he said.

 

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India must be clear about MIRV plans

India must be clear about MIRV plans

Vipin Narang and Christopher Clary

India must be transparent about its MIRV plans to avert a nuclear arms race in Asia. After the maiden test of the Agni V, the head of India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), V.K. Saraswat, noted that several Agni variants could eventually be mated with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), or multiple nuclear warheads — while later conceding that it was not yet government policy to do so. On May 10, he explained: "Where I was using four missiles, I may use only one missile. So it becomes a force multiplier given the damage potential."

MIRV'd arsenals can be more destabilising than their solo-warhead counterparts. First, accurate MIRVs can enable a state to potentially disarm an opponent completely with only a fraction of the single-warhead missiles that might be required. Coupled with a missile defence system that might intercept any residual forces unhit by MIRVs, a state might be in a position to achieve "nuclear superiority". As during the Cold War, this is a blueprint for a nuclear arms race, since adversaries must ensure that they have enough nuclear forces to survive a MIRV'd first-strike attempt and saturate any missile defences. Second, against MIRVs, an adversary has an incentive to preemptively destroy a missile force while it is still on the ground, since it can destroy multiple warheads for each hit, as opposed to just trading one-for-one. This gives an advantage to the side that launches its missiles first, the very definition of nuclear instability.

DRDO is attempting to develop accurate MIRVs as well as a multi-layered ballistic missile defence architecture. Saraswat has boasted that such a system will have a 99.8 per cent hit-to-kill probability. Even if this is inflated, to an adversary like China or Pakistan, repeated claims about MIRVs and ballistic missile defences may look like anything but a "credible minimum deterrent" strategy. But India has a no first use pledge, which makes its pursuit of MIRVs and any thought of attempting a disarming first strike puzzling. So why would India want MIRVs?

There are several possible explanations. Since authoritative views from the government, particularly senior national security officials, on technological developments relating to nuclear strategy have not been aired in the public domain, we — and India's adversaries — can only speculate.

The first possible explanation is that deploying MIRVs is not official government policy. Instead, to enhance its organisational prestige, DRDO seeks to indigenously develop the same capabilities, including MIRVs, as the superpowers, without giving much thought to the strategic implications. Some scholars have explained such trajectories as technological determinism: if a state can build it, it will try to do so, whether the technology fulfils a particular requirement or not.

Unfortunately, if this is the case, DRDO's pursuit of its own prestige may upset Asian strategic stability by triggering concerns in Beijing and Islamabad that India's nuclear posture is no longer one of "assured retaliation" but one of "nuclear superiority" that threatens the survivability of China's and Pakistan's nuclear forces. Such fears might force them to re-evaluate their nuclear requirements and rapidly expand their nuclear arsenals to make any disarming attempt by MIRV'd Indian missiles impossible. While China has historically been relaxed about this possibility, Pakistani nuclear planners have suggested publicly that they account for possible first strikes in how they size and deploy their nuclear arsenal. It may push China and Pakistan toward more dangerous postures emphasising preemptive launches, since they might fear that their nuclear forces face a "use them or lose them" dilemma in a potential crisis. This is incredibly destabilising.

The second possibility is that India has quietly decided to abandon its nuclear posture of assured retaliation and no first use in favour of seeking nuclear superiority, and that deploying MIRVs and missile defences are, in fact, government policy. Since all public signals continue to point to an assured retaliation strategy and continued reaffirmation of the no first use pledge, this is unlikely.

The third explanation is that the government may approve the development of MIRVs, but in order to enhance the survivability of India's second-strike deterrent. If India's civilian nuclear managers and Strategic Force Command maintain warheads separate from missiles, and anticipate that an adversary may try to target Agnis in a conflict to degrade India's nuclear retaliatory capability, MIRVs enable one to retain sufficient retaliatory throw-weight even with a few surviving missiles. Suppose India has 100 nuclear warheads and 100 various Agnis in its future force posture. If three-fourths of the Agni force is disabled by strikes, the remaining 25 Agnis with multiple warheads can achieve the same retaliatory throw-weight as a full complement of single-warhead Agnis. Such a strategy is not entirely irrational, assuming India believes its warheads are survivable but its missile force will be small or vulnerable.

If this is indeed the strategy, the problem lies in convincing China and Pakistan that India's MIRVs, and potential missile defences, are defensive rather than offensive. If so, the government should clarify exactly how deploying these capabilities are consistent with its longstanding strategy of assured retaliation. A MIRV'd sea-based force makes a lot of sense for an assured retaliation strategy. But the argument for a MIRV'd land-based force is harder to make. Especially since, at first glance, dispersed single-warhead missiles seem more stable than a MIRV'd force for an assured retaliation strategy: it optimises survivability by requiring an adversary to hit many more targets to disarm your force, still assures the ability to inflict massive damage, and minimises incentives to be struck first since it does not pose a disarming threat to the adversary.

India finds itself in a strategically awkward position: advertising the development of a potentially destabilising capability that it does not yet possess and for which it has not yet articulated a clear rationale. If the government does not envision a role for MIRVs, it should enforce greater discipline on DRDO messaging. Alternatively, if there is a clear role for MIRVs, it should articulate it publicly to alleviate Chinese and Pakistani fears of a tectonic shift in Indian nuclear strategy. Developing capability without a strategy is a recipe for disaster. There are both malign and benign explanations for developing MIRVs and missile defences. In this case, there is virtue in the government being transparent about its intended course, lest Asia quickly find itself in an unnecessary and dangerous nuclear arms race.

The Indian Express, 22 May 2012

 

[sukhish]

yes, only India should worry about the destablinsing impact and no other country should. actually it's an unsaid thing that India wants to be number one, but responsibly.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

Indian Defence News - Agni-5 missile is being modified for MIRV capability: Saraswat

Agni-5 missile is being modified for MIRV capability: Saraswat

India has a very ambitious missile programme. With the launch of Agni-4 and Agni-5 ballistic missiles, India has already demonstrated its immense capabilities in this field. Dr. V. K. Saraswat, the Scientic Advisor to the Defence Minister and DG, DRDO, in an exclusive and first of its kind video interview to Sushil Sharma, Managing Editor of the news portal Bharat Defence Kavach speaks about India's missile programme. Here are the excerpts of a long interview divided into 11 parts.

SS: Welcome Dr. V.K. Saraswat to news portal Bharat Defence Kavach.com. Dr. Saraswat, it's a moment of pride for the nation, first Agni-3, then Agni-4 and finally Agni-5 which made the country very proud. Congratulations for that. I just wanted to know that whatever missiles we have in our arsenal, do you think they are enough to counter any threat from any corner, or we need to something more? And also please tell us about the MIRV capable Agni-5, when it will be ready for tests?

VKS: I would like to make the position of our country very clear on the development of missiles. Our missile development programme is based upon the threat as it exists today and how we are coping with that threat.

If you recall the history of development of missile development in India we started with very short range missiles like Prithvi and Dhanush. Agni was only a technology demonstrator. Over a period of time as we found the threat was evolving, we started building missiles like Agin-1, Agni-2 and then Agni-3, Agni-4 and now Agni-5. So it is based upon the threat profile. The way the threat has emerged and what the nation needs to keep itself secured. The development program keeps its emphasis on.

As far as our readiness in this respect is concerned, I must say that launch of Agni-5 and the capability to reach distances of more than 5000 kilometers, I think we have come to a standard or a label where we are satisfied. But it does not mean that the threats will not evolve further or we will not build missile of better capabilities. We will continue to evolve as the threat evolves. That program we will launch as and when it is required.

So far as the MIRV is concerned, yes that's a natural progression from Agni-5. The MIRV is a force multiplier. That means better efficiency in countering the threat.

We have already launched the program and we are working on its realisation. There are certain technologies which have to be developed. It will only take some time. As soon as we finish that technology development phase, we will be in a position to give you an accurate statement with respect to its availability.

SS: Sir, you had said that the Agni-5 can also be used to launch micro-satellites for small duration. Are you planning to demostrate this capability in near future?

VKS: Agni five has the capability to launch satellites but with certain modifications. Certain modification means the early entry stage, because for launching satellites you don't have to re-enter the atmosphere. You only have to go in the higher atmoshphere. She upper stages will be modified. Then a mechanism for releasing the satellites. That development programme is initiated. We would be carrying out this capability test in the years to come.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

Agni-V has many more milestones to reach

Agni-V has many more milestones to reach



Missile might: It is capable of delivering nuclear warhead anywhere in China
The platform was successfully tested in a textbook flight. But the killer warhead — called multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle — to be fitted finally atop the 17 metre Agni-V missile is still under development and will take more time before it comes for trial.

"Defence Research and Development Organisation is working on the MIRV. I cannot tell you when we are going to test it but it is in an advanced stage of development," Agni project director Tessy Thomas told Deccan Herald over telephone from Wheeler's Island.

A MIRV is a collection of nuclear weapons fitted on a platform known as post-boost (or bus) stage, which dispenses individual warheads against multiple targets over a broad area, thereby rendering the enemy's missile defence system useless. The number of weapons attached to the bus can vary.

"MIRV is an extraordinary jump in technology and capability as one missile can carry 5-8 independent warheads for separate targets. The DRDO programme on MIRV is in an advanced stage of design and development and will be tested in a few years," Bharat Karnad, professor at Centre for Policy Research said.

Open source literature suggests that an US MIRV can carry 3-12 nuclear warheads whereas Russian MIRV houses 3-10 such warheads. Not many countries are known to possess MIRV technology.

"MIRV is the right way to go," said Rajaram Nagappa, professor of strategic and security studies at National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore. "Its a brilliant technology," said S K Tyagi, former chief of Indian Air Force. Developed first in the USA in the 1970s — MIRV — provides greater target damage.

"MIRV technology is similar to Indian Space Research Organiation's multiple satellite injection technology. The defence scientists have to militarise it and install better guidance system to ensure that warheads hit the targets," said Karnad, admitting it was a challenging task for scientists.

Scientists in Agni project encountered several other challenges in realising Agni-V that can fly a distance of 5000 km. "Guiding the missile all through its trajectory and navigating it was a key challenge. As it was a three stage rocket, we had to install new (the third one) motor and still had to manage the overall mass," said Thomas.

Fuel efficiency

Reduction of structural mass and maximise fuel efficiency would be another important problem which defence scientists had solved, said Nagappa, who specialised in aerospace propulsion and worked extensively in design and development of solid propellant rockets at Indian Space Research Organisation's Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre at Thiruvananthapuram.

Otherwise managing a two stage rocket – like Agni-II, Agni-III and Agni-IV – would not be more complicated than a three stage rocket, Nagappa said, adding Agni-V was as good as any other contemporary vehicle.

In India's neighbourhood, China has its Dong Feng-31 and DF-31A, both three stage rockets, reportedly with a range of 10000 km and 7000 km respectively. The DF 31A is suspected to have been carrying a MIRV. Pakistan on the other hand does not have any three stage rocket so far.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

India must be clear about MIRV plans

India must be clear about MIRV plans


India must be transparent about its MIRV plans to avert a nuclear arms race in Asia. After the maiden test of the Agni V, the head of India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), V.K. Saraswat, noted that several Agni variants could eventually be mated with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), or multiple nuclear warheads — while later conceding that it was not yet government policy to do so. On May 10, he explained: "Where I was using four missiles, I may use only one missile. So it becomes a force multiplier given the damage potential."

MIRV'd arsenals can be more destabilising than their solo-warhead counterparts. First, accurate MIRVs can enable a state to potentially disarm an opponent completely with only a fraction of the single-warhead missiles that might be required. Coupled with a missile defence system that might intercept any residual forces unhit by MIRVs, a state might be in a position to achieve "nuclear superiority". As during the Cold War, this is a blueprint for a nuclear arms race, since adversaries must ensure that they have enough nuclear forces to survive a MIRV'd first-strike attempt and saturate any missile defences. Second, against MIRVs, an adversary has an incentive to preemptively destroy a missile force while it is still on the ground, since it can destroy multiple warheads for each hit, as opposed to just trading one-for-one. This gives an advantage to the side that launches its missiles first, the very definition of nuclear instability.

DRDO is attempting to develop accurate MIRVs as well as a multi-layered ballistic missile defence architecture. Saraswat has boasted that such a system will have a 99.8 per cent hit-to-kill probability. Even if this is inflated, to an adversary like China or Pakistan, repeated claims about MIRVs and ballistic missile defences may look like anything but a "credible minimum deterrent" strategy. But India has a no first use pledge, which makes its pursuit of MIRVs and any thought of attempting a disarming first strike puzzling. So why would India want MIRVs?

There are several possible explanations. Since authoritative views from the government, particularly senior national security officials, on technological developments relating to nuclear strategy have not been aired in the public domain, we — and India's adversaries — can only speculate.

The first possible explanation is that deploying MIRVs is not official government policy. Instead, to enhance its organisational prestige, DRDO seeks to indigenously develop the same capabilities, including MIRVs, as the superpowers, without giving much thought to the strategic implications. Some scholars have explained such trajectories as technological determinism: if a state can build it, it will try to do so, whether the technology fulfils a particular requirement or not.

Unfortunately, if this is the case, DRDO's pursuit of its own prestige may upset Asian strategic stability by triggering concerns in Beijing and Islamabad that India's nuclear posture is no longer one of "assured retaliation" but one of "nuclear superiority" that threatens the survivability of China's and Pakistan's nuclear forces. Such fears might force them to re-evaluate their nuclear requirements and rapidly expand their nuclear arsenals to make any disarming attempt by MIRV'd Indian missiles impossible. While China has historically been relaxed about this possibility, Pakistani nuclear planners have suggested publicly that they account for possible first strikes in how they size and deploy their nuclear arsenal. It may push China and Pakistan toward more dangerous postures emphasising preemptive launches, since they might fear that their nuclear forces face a "use them or lose them" dilemma in a potential crisis. This is incredibly destabilising.

The second possibility is that India has quietly decided to abandon its nuclear posture of assured retaliation and no first use in favour of seeking nuclear superiority, and that deploying MIRVs and missile defences are, in fact, government policy. Since all public signals continue to point to an assured retaliation strategy and continued reaffirmation of the no first use pledge, this is unlikely.

The third explanation is that the government may approve the development of MIRVs, but in order to enhance the survivability of India's second-strike deterrent. If India's civilian nuclear managers and Strategic Force Command maintain warheads separate from missiles, and anticipate that an adversary may try to target Agnis in a conflict to degrade India's nuclear retaliatory capability, MIRVs enable one to retain sufficient retaliatory throw-weight even with a few surviving missiles. Suppose India has 100 nuclear warheads and 100 various Agnis in its future force posture. If three-fourths of the Agni force is disabled by strikes, the remaining 25 Agnis with multiple warheads can achieve the same retaliatory throw-weight as a full complement of single-warhead Agnis. Such a strategy is not entirely irrational, assuming India believes its warheads are survivable but its missile force will be small or vulnerable.

If this is indeed the strategy, the problem lies in convincing China and Pakistan that India's MIRVs, and potential missile defences, are defensive rather than offensive. If so, the government should clarify exactly how deploying these capabilities are consistent with its longstanding strategy of assured retaliation. A MIRV'd sea-based force makes a lot of sense for an assured retaliation strategy. But the argument for a MIRV'd land-based force is harder to make. Especially since, at first glance, dispersed single-warhead missiles seem more stable than a MIRV'd force for an assured retaliation strategy: it optimises survivability by requiring an adversary to hit many more targets to disarm your force, still assures the ability to inflict massive damage, and minimises incentives to be struck first since it does not pose a disarming threat to the adversary.

India finds itself in a strategically awkward position: advertising the development of a potentially destabilising capability that it does not yet possess and for which it has not yet articulated a clear rationale. If the government does not envision a role for MIRVs, it should enforce greater discipline on DRDO messaging. Alternatively, if there is a clear role for MIRVs, it should articulate it publicly to alleviate Chinese and Pakistani fears of a tectonic shift in Indian nuclear strategy. Developing capability without a strategy is a recipe for disaster. There are both malign and benign explanations for developing MIRVs and missile defences. In this case, there is virtue in the government being transparent about its intended course, lest Asia quickly find itself in an unnecessary and dangerous nuclear arms race.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

The Hindu : Opinion / Editorial : The 'game-changer'

The 'game-changer'


Agni V, India's most powerful long-range ballistic missile, has lived up to the hopes of its creators at the Defence Research & Development Organisation. In its maiden flight on Thursday morning, the missile demonstrated that it could accurately lob a dummy warhead weighing slightly over one tonne to a distance of over 5,000 km. India already has nuclear-capable missiles that can reach all of Pakistan and Agni V is clearly intended to provide a similar deterrent capability with respect to China. More test flights will be necessary before the missile is inducted into the country's strategic arsenal. V.K. Saraswat, Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister, has called the missile "a game-changer" that can perform different roles, from carrying multiple warheads to providing anti-satellite capability and even launching tiny satellites into orbit. Like its progenitor, Agni III, this missile has a two-metre diameter (as compared to the one-metre diameter of Agni I and II). Agni III and V are therefore the first Indian missiles that can potentially be equipped with several warheads each (known as Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicles or MIRV). MIRVs, however, pose their own technological challenges, especially the need to considerably shrink the size and weight of nuclear warheads. Despite China's earlier start, its ballistic missiles are still thought to be equipped with single warheads, not MIRVs. This suggests that developing an operational MIRV capability is not easy and will take time for both countries. Which is just as well because mutual security — as the superpowers discovered during the Cold War — does not lie in going down that path.

Both China and Pakistan possess formidable nuclear-armed missiles of their own. The former is in the process of replacing its liquid-fuelled ballistic missiles with more modern solid propellant ones. From bases in Qinghai and Yunnan provinces, these missiles can reach all of India. In addition, in 2004, China launched the first of its second-generation Type 094 Jin-class nuclear-powered submarines that will carry JL-2 solid-propellant ballistic missiles. Islamabad too has a number of long-range missiles in its armoury. An assessment carried out by an Indian strategic studies group found that Pakistan had a "credible deterrent structure" organised around the solid-propellant Shaheen-1 and -2 missiles. However, responsible possession of nuclear-armed missiles for the purposes of deterrence also requires working assiduously to remove sources of friction that can erupt into open conflict. It is also important that India and China start talking to each other on nuclear matters.

 

[The Messiah]

India must be clear about MIRV plans

India must be clear about MIRV plans


India must be transparent about its MIRV plans to avert a nuclear arms race in Asia. After the maiden test of the Agni V, the head of India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), V.K. Saraswat, noted that several Agni variants could eventually be mated with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), or multiple nuclear warheads — while later conceding that it was not yet government policy to do so. On May 10, he explained: "Where I was using four missiles, I may use only one missile. So it becomes a force multiplier given the damage potential."

MIRV'd arsenals can be more destabilising than their solo-warhead counterparts. First, accurate MIRVs can enable a state to potentially disarm an opponent completely with only a fraction of the single-warhead missiles that might be required. Coupled with a missile defence system that might intercept any residual forces unhit by MIRVs, a state might be in a position to achieve "nuclear superiority". As during the Cold War, this is a blueprint for a nuclear arms race, since adversaries must ensure that they have enough nuclear forces to survive a MIRV'd first-strike attempt and saturate any missile defences. Second, against MIRVs, an adversary has an incentive to preemptively destroy a missile force while it is still on the ground, since it can destroy multiple warheads for each hit, as opposed to just trading one-for-one. This gives an advantage to the side that launches its missiles first, the very definition of nuclear instability.

DRDO is attempting to develop accurate MIRVs as well as a multi-layered ballistic missile defence architecture. Saraswat has boasted that such a system will have a 99.8 per cent hit-to-kill probability. Even if this is inflated, to an adversary like China or Pakistan, repeated claims about MIRVs and ballistic missile defences may look like anything but a "credible minimum deterrent" strategy. But India has a no first use pledge, which makes its pursuit of MIRVs and any thought of attempting a disarming first strike puzzling. So why would India want MIRVs?

There are several possible explanations. Since authoritative views from the government, particularly senior national security officials, on technological developments relating to nuclear strategy have not been aired in the public domain, we — and India's adversaries — can only speculate.

The first possible explanation is that deploying MIRVs is not official government policy. Instead, to enhance its organisational prestige, DRDO seeks to indigenously develop the same capabilities, including MIRVs, as the superpowers, without giving much thought to the strategic implications. Some scholars have explained such trajectories as technological determinism: if a state can build it, it will try to do so, whether the technology fulfils a particular requirement or not.

Unfortunately, if this is the case, DRDO's pursuit of its own prestige may upset Asian strategic stability by triggering concerns in Beijing and Islamabad that India's nuclear posture is no longer one of "assured retaliation" but one of "nuclear superiority" that threatens the survivability of China's and Pakistan's nuclear forces. Such fears might force them to re-evaluate their nuclear requirements and rapidly expand their nuclear arsenals to make any disarming attempt by MIRV'd Indian missiles impossible. While China has historically been relaxed about this possibility, Pakistani nuclear planners have suggested publicly that they account for possible first strikes in how they size and deploy their nuclear arsenal. It may push China and Pakistan toward more dangerous postures emphasising preemptive launches, since they might fear that their nuclear forces face a "use them or lose them" dilemma in a potential crisis. This is incredibly destabilising.

The second possibility is that India has quietly decided to abandon its nuclear posture of assured retaliation and no first use in favour of seeking nuclear superiority, and that deploying MIRVs and missile defences are, in fact, government policy. Since all public signals continue to point to an assured retaliation strategy and continued reaffirmation of the no first use pledge, this is unlikely.

The third explanation is that the government may approve the development of MIRVs, but in order to enhance the survivability of India's second-strike deterrent. If India's civilian nuclear managers and Strategic Force Command maintain warheads separate from missiles, and anticipate that an adversary may try to target Agnis in a conflict to degrade India's nuclear retaliatory capability, MIRVs enable one to retain sufficient retaliatory throw-weight even with a few surviving missiles. Suppose India has 100 nuclear warheads and 100 various Agnis in its future force posture. If three-fourths of the Agni force is disabled by strikes, the remaining 25 Agnis with multiple warheads can achieve the same retaliatory throw-weight as a full complement of single-warhead Agnis. Such a strategy is not entirely irrational, assuming India believes its warheads are survivable but its missile force will be small or vulnerable.

If this is indeed the strategy, the problem lies in convincing China and Pakistan that India's MIRVs, and potential missile defences, are defensive rather than offensive. If so, the government should clarify exactly how deploying these capabilities are consistent with its longstanding strategy of assured retaliation. A MIRV'd sea-based force makes a lot of sense for an assured retaliation strategy. But the argument for a MIRV'd land-based force is harder to make. Especially since, at first glance, dispersed single-warhead missiles seem more stable than a MIRV'd force for an assured retaliation strategy: it optimises survivability by requiring an adversary to hit many more targets to disarm your force, still assures the ability to inflict massive damage, and minimises incentives to be struck first since it does not pose a disarming threat to the adversary.

India finds itself in a strategically awkward position: advertising the development of a potentially destabilising capability that it does not yet possess and for which it has not yet articulated a clear rationale. If the government does not envision a role for MIRVs, it should enforce greater discipline on DRDO messaging. Alternatively, if there is a clear role for MIRVs, it should articulate it publicly to alleviate Chinese and Pakistani fears of a tectonic shift in Indian nuclear strategy. Developing capability without a strategy is a recipe for disaster. There are both malign and benign explanations for developing MIRVs and missile defences. In this case, there is virtue in the government being transparent about its intended course, lest Asia quickly find itself in an unnecessary and dangerous nuclear arms race.

The author of this article is retarded.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

The author of this article is retarded.

I said the same thing when i read it. I posted it because it presents a view different from
what most on this forum believe. Probably a communist writing it. Many things he claims are
false waiting to see if members spot them.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

CROSS POSTED

Broadsword: DRDO: Intercontinental ballistic missiles well within reach

Advanced Systems Laboratory (ASL) is the deceptively bland name that obscures from public view the Defence R&D Organisation's (DRDO's) most glamorous laboratory. At the DRDO missile complex here in Hyderabad, ASL develops the ballistic missiles that, in the ultimate nuclear nightmare, will carry Indian nuclear weapons to targets thousands of kilometres away. Foreign collaboration is seeping into many areas of R&D, but ASL's technological domain --- the realm of strategic ballistic missiles --- is something that no country parts with, for love or for money. No foreigner would ever set foot in ASL.

But Business Standard has been allowed an exclusive visit. The erudite, soft-spoken director of ASL, Dr VG Sekharan, describes the technologies that were developed for the DRDO's new, 5,000-kilometre range Agni-5 missile, which was tested flawlessly in April. He reveals that nothing except restraint stood between India and an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that could strike a target anywhere on the globe.

ICBMs have ranges above 5,500 kilometres, a threshold that the Agni-5 already sits on. For India, a more strategically relevant range would be about 7,500 kilometres, which would cover the world except for the Americas.

"Going up from 5,000 kilometres to, let us say, 7,500 kilometres requires only incremental changes, which we have already assessed. We would need a more powerful booster, which we could make ourselves at ASL; and we would need to strengthen some of the systems, such as heat shielding, that are already flying on the Agni-5," says Sekharan.

For now, however, ASL is not developing an ICBM. Instead, its focus is on "operationalising" the Agni-5, which involves putting it into a canister and conducting 3-4 test-launches from the canister. When the Agni-5 enters service with the Strategic Forces Command (SFC), which operates India's nuclear deterrent, it will be delivered in hermetically sealed canisters that safeguard the road-mobile missiles for over a decade, while they are transported and handled.

Launching a ballistic missile from a canister is a technological feat that ASL has perfected with smaller missiles, and will now modify for the bigger Agni-5. Since the missile's giant rocket motors cannot be fired while it is inside the canister, a gas-generation unit at the bottom of the canister, below the missile, generates a massive boost of gas that ejects the missile from the canister.

"The gas pushes the Agni-5 out, like a bullet from the barrel of a gun. In less than half a second, the 50-tonne missile clears the canister by 15 metres, and that is when the rocket motor can safely ignite. In 30 seconds, the Agni-5 breaks the sound barrier and, in 90 seconds, it has left the atmosphere," explains Sekharan.

The DRDO has promised the armed forces that the Agni-5 will be test-fired from a canister in early 2013. ASL is on track to achieve that target, says Sekharan. Within a couple of months, a "pop-up test" will be conducted with a canister, in which the gas generator ejects a dummy missile. Meanwhile, the actual missile is being integrated with the canister.

The Agni-5 project funding has already been cleared by the Political Council of the union cabinet, a fast-track procedure for strategic projects that eliminates cumbersome MoD sanctions. This allows ASL to place orders for the materials and sub-systems that will go into the first few Agni-5 missiles, taking care of production lead times. ASL scientists recount that "maraging steel" for the canister takes two years to be delivered by specialist defence PSU, Midhani. The rocket motor casings take another one year.

On the question that exercises strategic analysts the world over --- is ASL developing "multi independently-targetable re-entry vehicles", or MIRVs --- Sekharan remains ambiguous: "I can say that we are working on MIRV technologies. The key challenge --- the "post-boost vehicle", which carries the multiple warheads --- is not a technology challenge, merely an engineering one. DRDO will acquire and demonstrate the capability for MIRVs by 2014-15. But the decision to deploy MIRVs would be a political one."

MIRVs are multiple warheads, up to ten, which would be fitted atop a single Agni-5. These would be a mix of nuclear bombs and dummy warheads to confuse enemy air defences. Each warhead can be programmed to hit a different target; or multiple warheads can be directed at a single target, but with different trajectories.

Interestingly, Sekharan reveals that the DRDO does not need sanction to begin work on such technologies. "The decision-making works like this: we demonstrate the technology and the capability. Then the government decides, keeping in mind the big picture."

"In the Agni-5, the government didn't say, 'we have a threat perception"¦ I need a long-range missile.' It was the DRDO that said that we now have the capability to enhance the Agni-3 to 5,000 kilometres, and so the government sanctioned the project."

 

[LETHALFORCE]

 

[LETHALFORCE]

USI of India | An article by USI

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF AGNI V

Dr Roshan Khaniejo*

Introduction

19 April 2012 is a red letter day in the history of India's scientific research. Agni V the Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) with a range of 5000 + kilometer was successfully test fired from Wheeler Island.The17.5-meter long missile which has the capacity to carry1 to1.5 tons of conventional and nuclear warheads will be the most formidable missile in India's strategic military arsenal. Scientists claim that there has been a "giant leap" in the missile development programme from a single stage liquid propelled surface-to-surface Prithvi Missile (first launched in 1988) to the present three stage solid propelled Agni V(launched on 19 April, 2012). Eulogies from scientists, politicians and the media both print and electronic continue to pour in. After the initial hype and euphoria it is now time to analyse its strategic implications.

Reactions

Considering the fact that the world was vociferously criticizing North Korea for its failed missile launch, the timing of India's launch of Agni V was a little inappropriate. Though the two countries could not be compared as North Korea is considered a rogue state and India with her nonproliferation record is a major developing country. China, however, was more vocal in their reactions claiming on one hand to be India's "cooperative partner" and on the other hand releasing statements saying that India should not have any "missile delusion", "China's nuclear power is stronger and more reliable". These contrasting statements depict a dichotomy in their approach towards India. Unlike previous occasions when the major nuclear countries went in for embargoes and financial cuts this time the response was generally muted. Although the United States urged for restraint, they still praised India for her solid nonproliferation track record .The dual reasoning behind this change in posture can be seen as economic and strategic. Economically the United States government recognizes India's stable economic growth and it sees India as a potential market for its companies. The Indo-US Bilateral trade agreements are getting stronger. Strategically the emergence of an economically and militarily strong China is a cause of concern for the world community. Its aggressive posture in the South China Sea, Taiwan, Indian Ocean and its manipulation of International Organizations to its own interest is a cause of anxiety. Although the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) claim that Agni V "is not any country specific" the fact remains that the missile can reach most parts of China including Beijing and Shanghai. Once it is inducted it can not only target the western sector of China but also the economically and industrially strong eastern sector (hitting the enemy hard where it counts). Secondly Chinese media had projected the ranges of Agni V to be much higher than what has been claimed. It has the potential to hit even Europe .In the long run if India plays its card properly it can emerge as a security provider to a lot of countries in Asia /Africa especially the ASEAN countries. This subtle shift in the power nexus will go a long way in maintaining the multipolarity of power structure.

No First Use

India's nuclear doctrine has a declared no-first-use policy, but it also states that it will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail. In case of no first use ,Agni V may be a deterrent ,but for a punitive retaliation one not only requires accurate nuclear weapons to inflict damage, unacceptable to the aggressor, but also to survive the first kill sufficiently , a number of survivable and operationally prepared silos and well trained nuclear forces are essential. Agni V with its three stage solid propellant is claimed to be a "game changer" as it will be a great asset in developing ICBM with MIRV (Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle). But Agni V is just a delivery system, its operational feasibility in India's triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based missiles from ships and other moving platforms, anywhere in India is still to be tested its terminal phase accuracy on land and air is yet to be assessed. Lastly the payload which it is going to carry is also debatable as after 1998, because of India's self-imposed moratorium, no tests have been conducted in India, unlike in China and the United States with their advanced technology, they are constantly working on miniaturizing their nuclear warheads.

Indigenization

The question now arises is how indigenous is our space programme? DRDO has emphasized that 80 per cent of Agni V is indigenously built but what is the nature of the remaining 20 per cent? Does it comprise vital sub systems like solid propellant rocket motor, or high precision guidance system? It has taken India more than 24 years to advance from Prithvi to Agni V stage. The reasons for such a slow progress are multifarious. Firstly it is due to the expensive and time consuming import of key components like electronic devices such as computer processor chips, radio frequency devices, electro hydraulic components, composite fibers etc. Secondly the infrastructure is not conducive for indigenization for example there are no " System Integrators" to integrate all the sub systems also the Public Sector Units(PSUs) face resource crunch due to lack of finances and delayed clearance of projects. These two reasons can be addressed by partially allowing the private sector to manufacture a few of the vital components which are feasible. Thirdly there is no synergy between the scientists, the assembly liners that is the PSUs, and the end users the defence forces. To rectify this, services of retired / serving vertical specialists should be used during the conceptualization of projects in defence service specific missions keeping security aspects paramount. There should be insistence of user trails (no waver) in the fields and not confining only to laboratories. The manufacture/design observations by the defence forces should be liquidated in order to yield optimum result in a focused manner rather than being disjointed with critical gaps. This would require systemic changes .The defence may require a special task force comprising specialists from all the three services, so that its representatives could be available at all the stages. Finally efforts should also be made to improve and drastically increase the financial budget for Research and Development wing of the government to keep abreast with the technology as it is changing at a very fast pace. This detailed assessment of our strengths and weaknesses along with strategic direction, increased financial budgets requires a political forethought both externally in terms of active diplomatic and economic collaborations with friendly nuclear power states and internally by creating various systemic changes which will enhance our indigenous missile and space development programme.

Space

Neutralizing enemy satellites and protecting our own is the key to space research. India has been doing endo and exoatmospheric missile defence intercept tests. Agni III had the capacity to hit a satellite. Agni V will enable us to intercept target missiles with a longer range thus giving India the ability to intercept ICBMs. India is already working on an Advanced Air Defense (AAD) system, however, a full multi layered defence against Ballistic missiles requires both terrestrial as well as space based surveillance and kill system which is very difficult to achieve due to its cost and advanced technology. India is trying to adapt existing Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) technologies to the ASAT role but there is ambiguity in declaring whether India's ASAT capacity can be used either for weapons programme or simply a capability ancillary to missile defense. Though Agni V has been a milestone for our scientists but the operational aspect that is the actual induction in our armed forces and the ABM system is still far off.

Conclusion

Until India achieves a credible nuclear deterrence she should be cautious in her approach towards China. Overemphasizing the significance of Agni V is not desirable as history proves how an ill judged albeit, unintended provocation of China could spell disaster for the region. India should take advantage of the declaration made by China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Weimin stating that India and China were not "competitors but partners". A mature approach now would be to organize a series of dialogues with special reference to nuclear issues, to reassure each other about their intentions, along with CBM (Confidence Building Measures). This would be beneficial to both as a stable external environment is necessary for the economic growth of each country. India should also reassure the world about its peaceful intentions and its historical nonproliferation track record. As India's erstwhile Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had rightly said that India's foreign policy would "continue to reflect a commitment to the sensibilities and obligation of an ancient civilization, a sense of responsibility and restrain".

* Dr Roshan Khaniejo is Associate Research Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation, USI.

(Article uploaded on May 10, 2012).

Disclaimer : The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the organisation that he belongs to or of the USI.