Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs)
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Cant people (who design those graphics) atleast replicate the missiles properly ? Agni V does not have any open inter-stages...Conceptual designs before the missile was revealed is ok..But even after it was revealed, people sticking to their imaginations is
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MIRVs | Shashank Joshi
Agni-V, Indian nuclear weapons, and arms racing: a wrap-up
Three pieces of my writing on India's new 5,000km-range ballistic missile, along with a few by others. Writing for RUSI with Frank O'Donnell (of the Department of War Studies at King's College London), I looked at the general implications:
An Agni-V deployed in modest numbers, and accompanied by political signals that the system's development represents the maturity of India's nuclear forces, would most closely accord with the initial spirit of credible minimum deterrence. By contrast, if the Agni-V is seen as a 'bridge' to a much more diverse and sizeable Indian arsenal, and its production and deployment eventually takes place in large numbers, this could herald a strengthening of the more assertive strand in Indian nuclear thinking. This is not about India adopting a nuclear posture of counterforce and embracing nuclear war-fighting. Rather, this is about a longstanding debate, pioneered in the United States, between the view that 'deterrence can be achieved only through difficult choices, sustained with intelligent effort, and will depend very much on the technical details' and the opposing view 'that, beyond a certain point, all of this is crazy talk, and the technical details don't matter very much at all'. India's approach to nuclear weapons is, and is likely to remain, closer to the second of these – but that is not to say that the 'technical details' of nuclear deterrence will not assume greater prominence in India's security policy.
At the Times of India, we suggest that the missile test reflects a shift in the US-India relationship:
In 1994, the United States pressured India to suspend testing of the Agni series after just three test flights. India formally suspended the programme at the end of 1996, although it resumed testing in 1997. The muted American response to the test of the Agni V, despite Washington's concern over the missile programmes of Iran and North Korea, is indicative of the rapid improvement in the US-India bilateral relationship over the past 15 years. Some Indians sneer at the efforts made by successive Indian governments to improve ties with Washington. These sceptics should consider the diplomatic nightmare that India would have faced had it conducted this test 15 years ago.
We also look at two risks:
The first is that bureaucrats and scientists, rather than elected politicians and a well-informed public, make these choices [about India's nuclear future]. Last year, MIT professor Vipin Narang "¦ warned that "DRDO's press releases and post-test comments unnecessarily – and dangerously – confuse India's nuclear posture". Perhaps India should build on the Agni V test to make longer-range missiles, as DRDO director V K Saraswat promised to do last week, but this has big financial, diplomatic and strategic implications – and is therefore a matter for political leaders. A national security strategy and nuclear posture review – like those we see in other nuclear weapons states – would be a good start. The second danger is that we begin to see all technological advances as desirable. To be sure, anything that makes India's missiles more survivable – for example, increasing their mobility on the ground – is unambiguously a good thing. But other improvements mentioned by Saraswat, like MIRV technology that puts multiple warheads on a single missile, presents trade-offs: the missiles will pack a greater punch, but could generate fears that India is abandoning credible minimum deterrence.
Then, at the New York Times' India Ink, responding in part to the newspaper's own reporting of the Agni-V test, I questioned the prevalent thinking that an "arms race" is now underway:
Of the Agni 5, the Hindustan Times' foreign editor, Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, estimates that India will add, "at best, two such missiles to its arsenal every year." This will have virtually zero impact on China's retaliatory capacity. There is, therefore, no reason to suppose that Beijing will scramble to respond in the way that Washington and Moscow would have done in response to one another. Under these conditions, having more survivable and robust means of retaliation, like the Agni 5, can be stabilizing. Such missiles can be moved around by road or rail, which makes them less vulnerable than those in fixed silos. This enables India to shift away from less reliable and more trigger-happy delivery systems like aircraft. The more confident India feels in its ability to respond, the calmer it can be in handling crises.
The BBC asked this same question last week, and quoted Jeffrey Lewis along the same lines (emphasis added):
"Beijing tends to focus much more on the United States, rather than India. Indian officials talk about China much more than their Chinese counterparts talk about them. I doubt very much that China and India will engage in an arms race, scaled-down or otherwise. Both countries tend to pursue the same specific capabilities, but neither produces large numbers of nuclear weapons or nuclear-capable missiles." He suggests that both China and India seem to be pursuing what he calls a "possession" oriented approach to nuclear modernisation: "They are developing in turn small numbers of ever more advanced capabilities held by other power. Neither country, however, has produced anywhere near the number of nuclear weapons or nuclear-capable missiles that each is capable of producing".
The article by Vipin Narang (the one that we cited in the Times of India) was published with the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA) last year. It's available here, and is well worth reading in light of last week's flurry of post-test commentary:
Certainly, the engineers at DRDO who have developed these capabilities should be proud of their contribution to India's strategic capabilities, but their post-test commentary risks adjusting or crafting Indian nuclear doctrine on the fly and in ad hoc ways—carrying the danger of dragging the cat by its own tail. Leaving aside the larger direction and drivers of DRDO's strategic missile developments, these seemingly public relations details can have tremendous implications for future crisis stability on the Subcontinent. The DRDO commentary presumes that political and strategic decisions about future missile role-assignment have been made. But, if the NCA and SFC decide, for example, that the naval variant of the Shourya will have a nuclear role but the land-based cousin will not, those subtleties may be lost on adversaries because of these DRDO statements, possibly generating misperceptions and miscalculations about India's movements during a crisis.
Last year, Michael Krepon also reflected on the broader question of an arms race (or "arms crawl"), and comes to more mixed conclusions with which I wouldn't agree:
Ashley [Tellis] was right about New Delhi's limited enthusiasm for nuclear weapons [when he wrote in 2000-1], but he was off the mark in assuming that Pakistan's nuclear requirements would be influenced by India's restraint and deep ambivalence about the Bomb. Instead, Pakistan's military leadership appears intent to outpace India's nuclear capabilities. China is also moving forward with strategic modernization programs. Situated between two more serious regional nuclear competitors, New Delhi has done "the needful." India, like Pakistan, has reportedly doubled the size of its nuclear arsenal over the past decade, while still lagging behind its neighbors "¦ Pakistan and India are entering a less stable phase of offsetting, growing, and more diversified nuclear capabilities, one that is complicated by China's strategic modernization programs. This is par for the course after rivals with serious security concerns move from covert to overt nuclear weapon capabilities and, then later, when they build out their force structure. If one of the competitors in southern Asia seeks advantage, or worries about being disadvantaged, the result will look more like a nuclear arms competition than an arms crawl.
At his blog, Rohan Joshi warned against triumphalism:
However, it is important to exercise caution and not get unduly carried away with yesterday's successful test. Unfortunately, India's mainstream media has displayed misguided, almost vulgar bellicosity in its reporting of the success of Agni-V. The same mainstream media that claimed that India wasn't even prepared for war against Pakistan just two weeks ago, was all set to launch a punitive nuclear attack against China yesterday. Some TV news channels also featured animated videos of Agni-V hitting targets in China! This shrillness, rhetoric and lack of credible analysis does a tremendous disservice to the profession of journalism and to the people of India.
Nitin Pai, writing for DNA, was also cautious:
It is fashionable to argue that India's fractious democratic system does not allow it to pursue long term inter-generational projects. This is only partly true. India's nuclear strategy contradicts this argument — the minimum credible deterrent has been pursued for at least the last three decades. Will Agni-V change the balance of power in the broader Asian region? Not quite. For that India will need to regain the economic growth trajectory that it fell out of over the last decade. What remains to be seen is whether the security the missile provides will make us even more complacent about implementing the second-generation reforms necessary to accumulate power.
Also in DNA, Radhakrisha Rao demanded an ICBM. Why? Well "¦
an ICBM capability is vital for India to be recognised as a military power of global standing. India should look beyond the Chinese threat to build a sturdy ICBM muscle to showcase Indian technological prowess that cannot be browbeaten by the technology denial regime.
Agni-V, Indian nuclear weapons, and arms racing: a wrap-up
Three pieces of my writing on India's new 5,000km-range ballistic missile, along with a few by others. Writing for RUSI with Frank O'Donnell (of the Department of War Studies at King's College London), I looked at the general implications:
An Agni-V deployed in modest numbers, and accompanied by political signals that the system's development represents the maturity of India's nuclear forces, would most closely accord with the initial spirit of credible minimum deterrence. By contrast, if the Agni-V is seen as a 'bridge' to a much more diverse and sizeable Indian arsenal, and its production and deployment eventually takes place in large numbers, this could herald a strengthening of the more assertive strand in Indian nuclear thinking. This is not about India adopting a nuclear posture of counterforce and embracing nuclear war-fighting. Rather, this is about a longstanding debate, pioneered in the United States, between the view that 'deterrence can be achieved only through difficult choices, sustained with intelligent effort, and will depend very much on the technical details' and the opposing view 'that, beyond a certain point, all of this is crazy talk, and the technical details don't matter very much at all'. India's approach to nuclear weapons is, and is likely to remain, closer to the second of these – but that is not to say that the 'technical details' of nuclear deterrence will not assume greater prominence in India's security policy.
At the Times of India, we suggest that the missile test reflects a shift in the US-India relationship:
In 1994, the United States pressured India to suspend testing of the Agni series after just three test flights. India formally suspended the programme at the end of 1996, although it resumed testing in 1997. The muted American response to the test of the Agni V, despite Washington's concern over the missile programmes of Iran and North Korea, is indicative of the rapid improvement in the US-India bilateral relationship over the past 15 years. Some Indians sneer at the efforts made by successive Indian governments to improve ties with Washington. These sceptics should consider the diplomatic nightmare that India would have faced had it conducted this test 15 years ago.
We also look at two risks:
The first is that bureaucrats and scientists, rather than elected politicians and a well-informed public, make these choices [about India's nuclear future]. Last year, MIT professor Vipin Narang "¦ warned that "DRDO's press releases and post-test comments unnecessarily – and dangerously – confuse India's nuclear posture". Perhaps India should build on the Agni V test to make longer-range missiles, as DRDO director V K Saraswat promised to do last week, but this has big financial, diplomatic and strategic implications – and is therefore a matter for political leaders. A national security strategy and nuclear posture review – like those we see in other nuclear weapons states – would be a good start. The second danger is that we begin to see all technological advances as desirable. To be sure, anything that makes India's missiles more survivable – for example, increasing their mobility on the ground – is unambiguously a good thing. But other improvements mentioned by Saraswat, like MIRV technology that puts multiple warheads on a single missile, presents trade-offs: the missiles will pack a greater punch, but could generate fears that India is abandoning credible minimum deterrence.
Then, at the New York Times' India Ink, responding in part to the newspaper's own reporting of the Agni-V test, I questioned the prevalent thinking that an "arms race" is now underway:
Of the Agni 5, the Hindustan Times' foreign editor, Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, estimates that India will add, "at best, two such missiles to its arsenal every year." This will have virtually zero impact on China's retaliatory capacity. There is, therefore, no reason to suppose that Beijing will scramble to respond in the way that Washington and Moscow would have done in response to one another. Under these conditions, having more survivable and robust means of retaliation, like the Agni 5, can be stabilizing. Such missiles can be moved around by road or rail, which makes them less vulnerable than those in fixed silos. This enables India to shift away from less reliable and more trigger-happy delivery systems like aircraft. The more confident India feels in its ability to respond, the calmer it can be in handling crises.
The BBC asked this same question last week, and quoted Jeffrey Lewis along the same lines (emphasis added):
"Beijing tends to focus much more on the United States, rather than India. Indian officials talk about China much more than their Chinese counterparts talk about them. I doubt very much that China and India will engage in an arms race, scaled-down or otherwise. Both countries tend to pursue the same specific capabilities, but neither produces large numbers of nuclear weapons or nuclear-capable missiles." He suggests that both China and India seem to be pursuing what he calls a "possession" oriented approach to nuclear modernisation: "They are developing in turn small numbers of ever more advanced capabilities held by other power. Neither country, however, has produced anywhere near the number of nuclear weapons or nuclear-capable missiles that each is capable of producing".
The article by Vipin Narang (the one that we cited in the Times of India) was published with the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA) last year. It's available here, and is well worth reading in light of last week's flurry of post-test commentary:
Certainly, the engineers at DRDO who have developed these capabilities should be proud of their contribution to India's strategic capabilities, but their post-test commentary risks adjusting or crafting Indian nuclear doctrine on the fly and in ad hoc ways—carrying the danger of dragging the cat by its own tail. Leaving aside the larger direction and drivers of DRDO's strategic missile developments, these seemingly public relations details can have tremendous implications for future crisis stability on the Subcontinent. The DRDO commentary presumes that political and strategic decisions about future missile role-assignment have been made. But, if the NCA and SFC decide, for example, that the naval variant of the Shourya will have a nuclear role but the land-based cousin will not, those subtleties may be lost on adversaries because of these DRDO statements, possibly generating misperceptions and miscalculations about India's movements during a crisis.
Last year, Michael Krepon also reflected on the broader question of an arms race (or "arms crawl"), and comes to more mixed conclusions with which I wouldn't agree:
Ashley [Tellis] was right about New Delhi's limited enthusiasm for nuclear weapons [when he wrote in 2000-1], but he was off the mark in assuming that Pakistan's nuclear requirements would be influenced by India's restraint and deep ambivalence about the Bomb. Instead, Pakistan's military leadership appears intent to outpace India's nuclear capabilities. China is also moving forward with strategic modernization programs. Situated between two more serious regional nuclear competitors, New Delhi has done "the needful." India, like Pakistan, has reportedly doubled the size of its nuclear arsenal over the past decade, while still lagging behind its neighbors "¦ Pakistan and India are entering a less stable phase of offsetting, growing, and more diversified nuclear capabilities, one that is complicated by China's strategic modernization programs. This is par for the course after rivals with serious security concerns move from covert to overt nuclear weapon capabilities and, then later, when they build out their force structure. If one of the competitors in southern Asia seeks advantage, or worries about being disadvantaged, the result will look more like a nuclear arms competition than an arms crawl.
At his blog, Rohan Joshi warned against triumphalism:
However, it is important to exercise caution and not get unduly carried away with yesterday's successful test. Unfortunately, India's mainstream media has displayed misguided, almost vulgar bellicosity in its reporting of the success of Agni-V. The same mainstream media that claimed that India wasn't even prepared for war against Pakistan just two weeks ago, was all set to launch a punitive nuclear attack against China yesterday. Some TV news channels also featured animated videos of Agni-V hitting targets in China! This shrillness, rhetoric and lack of credible analysis does a tremendous disservice to the profession of journalism and to the people of India.
Nitin Pai, writing for DNA, was also cautious:
It is fashionable to argue that India's fractious democratic system does not allow it to pursue long term inter-generational projects. This is only partly true. India's nuclear strategy contradicts this argument — the minimum credible deterrent has been pursued for at least the last three decades. Will Agni-V change the balance of power in the broader Asian region? Not quite. For that India will need to regain the economic growth trajectory that it fell out of over the last decade. What remains to be seen is whether the security the missile provides will make us even more complacent about implementing the second-generation reforms necessary to accumulate power.
Also in DNA, Radhakrisha Rao demanded an ICBM. Why? Well "¦
an ICBM capability is vital for India to be recognised as a military power of global standing. India should look beyond the Chinese threat to build a sturdy ICBM muscle to showcase Indian technological prowess that cannot be browbeaten by the technology denial regime.
LETHALFORCE
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This maybe intentional showing too much power may change the view of the program as a threat
beyond the immediate neighborhood.
LETHALFORCE
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MIRVing tech not tested | Security Wise
MIRVing tech not tested
The barrage of media reports (no doubt prompted by DRDO sources) about MIRVs on the Agni, was mystifying. Just got off an early evening television program (Headlines Today TV) with Dr Selvamurthy, one of the senior most DRDO brass, who clarified matters, but only after I had publicly raised doubts about the MIRV aspect. Being quite certain there were no MIRVs on-board, I wondered if the MIRVing technology had actually been tested, when in fact the initial test of such eqpt is a couple of years away. Dr Selvamurthy, in response, confirmed that such tech had not been "demonstrated" in this first test, but added it was MIRV-capable, design-wise, which is what I wrote in my 2008 book – 'Ãndia's Nuclear Policy'.
The question that really bothers me is the DRDO tendency to overstate (the less polite word is, exaggerate) its achievements. The Agni-5 is a superlative capability, but it isn't MIRV-ed yet. Why make such a claim then? Similarly, Agni-5 is an IRBM, why call it an ICBM? It fools nobody, least of all our adversaries, who have a good fix on our strategic programs and are sufficiently nonplussed by its progress to assist our strategic cause. These missiles don't need official embellishment. But then that's a carryover from the nuclear realm where despite not having tested, proven, and reliable thermonuclear and boosted fission designs in our inventory, the Govt claims they have an entirely serviceable weapon with fusion warheads. How can such a claim be sustained on the basis of only simulation, component and sub-system testing, escapes me. As far as I'm concerned, it erodes the credibility of the nuclear (business) end, of the country's deterrent.
MIRVing tech not tested
The barrage of media reports (no doubt prompted by DRDO sources) about MIRVs on the Agni, was mystifying. Just got off an early evening television program (Headlines Today TV) with Dr Selvamurthy, one of the senior most DRDO brass, who clarified matters, but only after I had publicly raised doubts about the MIRV aspect. Being quite certain there were no MIRVs on-board, I wondered if the MIRVing technology had actually been tested, when in fact the initial test of such eqpt is a couple of years away. Dr Selvamurthy, in response, confirmed that such tech had not been "demonstrated" in this first test, but added it was MIRV-capable, design-wise, which is what I wrote in my 2008 book – 'Ãndia's Nuclear Policy'.
The question that really bothers me is the DRDO tendency to overstate (the less polite word is, exaggerate) its achievements. The Agni-5 is a superlative capability, but it isn't MIRV-ed yet. Why make such a claim then? Similarly, Agni-5 is an IRBM, why call it an ICBM? It fools nobody, least of all our adversaries, who have a good fix on our strategic programs and are sufficiently nonplussed by its progress to assist our strategic cause. These missiles don't need official embellishment. But then that's a carryover from the nuclear realm where despite not having tested, proven, and reliable thermonuclear and boosted fission designs in our inventory, the Govt claims they have an entirely serviceable weapon with fusion warheads. How can such a claim be sustained on the basis of only simulation, component and sub-system testing, escapes me. As far as I'm concerned, it erodes the credibility of the nuclear (business) end, of the country's deterrent.
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Trident II D5 Missile Achieves 143 Successful Test Flights
The U.S. Navy supported the Oct. 23 launch of a U.K. Royal Navy Trident II D5 Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) built by Lockheed Martin (NYSE: LMT). The unarmed missile was launched from the submerged Royal Navy submarine HMS Vigilant in the Atlantic Ocean. The test marked the 143rd successful test flight of the Trident II D5 missile since design completion in 1989 - a reliability record unmatched by any other large ballistic missile or space launch vehicle.
Trident II D5 Missile Achieves 143 Successful Test Flights
The U.S. Navy supported the Oct. 23 launch of a U.K. Royal Navy Trident II D5 Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) built by Lockheed Martin (NYSE: LMT). The unarmed missile was launched from the submerged Royal Navy submarine HMS Vigilant in the Atlantic Ocean. The test marked the 143rd successful test flight of the Trident II D5 missile since design completion in 1989 - a reliability record unmatched by any other large ballistic missile or space launch vehicle.
Trident II D5 Missile Achieves 143 Successful Test Flights
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The Arms Race Myth - NYTimes.com
China has understandable concerns about developments that could blunt its retaliatory capacity. One example is missile shields, which both India and other Asian counties are exploring. Another is MIRV technology that could be fitted to the Agni missiles. MIRVs refer to multiple accurate warheads that fit onto a single missile. India does not need them for deterrence, and they could slightly heighten China's fears that its own weapons might be wiped out before they get off the ground.
China has understandable concerns about developments that could blunt its retaliatory capacity. One example is missile shields, which both India and other Asian counties are exploring. Another is MIRV technology that could be fitted to the Agni missiles. MIRVs refer to multiple accurate warheads that fit onto a single missile. India does not need them for deterrence, and they could slightly heighten China's fears that its own weapons might be wiped out before they get off the ground.
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The Rise and Semi-Fall of MIRV
The Rise and Semi-Fall of MIRV
By Adam J. Hebert
Executive Editor
In its Nuclear Posture Review, DOD unveiled its decision to convert all Minuteman IIIs into single-warhead ICBMs. Today, USAF has 450 of them. Many have one warhead, but some are "MIRVed," meaning their nosecones have multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles. These have up to three warheads.
Not for long, though, as plans call for USAF to "de-MIRV" them all. "This step," claimed the NPR, "will enhance the stability of the nuclear balance by reducing the incentives for either side to strike first."
How will "downloading" US silo-based missiles substantially reduce the nuclear threat? In weighing the answer, it is useful to review some history.
Writing in 1953 about the two nuclear superpowers, J. Robert Oppenheimer, former scientific director for the Manhattan Project (turned harsh nuclear critic), observed, "We may be likened to two scorpions in a bottle, each capable of killing the other, but only at risk of his own life."
In the 1950s and 1960s, though, weapons were inaccurate. Because one had to commit several weapons to be sure to cover a single target, the attacker would run out of weapons before he wiped out the enemy's nukes. The foe's second strike was assured, so neither side wanted to go first.
MIRVing upset that stability. The US flight-tested a MIRVed system in 1968 and began deploying the triple-warhead Minuteman III in 1970. The USSR soon followed, catching and up with and then far surpassing the US by the early 1980s. On both sides, accuracies sharpened, too.
As MIRVed ICBMs proliferated, Oppenheimer's scorpions-in-a-bottle metaphor moved closer to reality, for two reasons:
Capability. Stacking multiple warheads on each missile dramatically increased each ICBM's firepower and its usefulness in mounting a disarming counterforce strike. An attacker could fire off a portion of his own ICBM force while still keeping some in reserve.
Incentive. Missiles with many warheads instantly became lucrative targets. A single enemy silo might now hold three, six, or more warheads. Even if an attacker had to expend two warheads per silo, the offense would still enjoy the benefits of a favorable exchange ratio.
It was this push-pull combination that made the late Cold War nuclear balance precarious. In a crisis, either side—though still very fearful—might be tempted to go first in hopes of gaining a war-winning advantage.
One of the great ironies of the times was the central role played by arms control in promoting this upward spiral of nuclear danger. While the superpowers probably would have gone MIRV at some point, that day was hastened by SALT talks in the late 1960s. The push was to limit launchers—bombers and missiles—not warheads. The logical response was to make the fullest use of each launcher by piling on warheads.
Arms negotiator Paul C. Warnke memorably, and mistakenly, compared the superpowers to "apes on a treadmill," with both "jogging in tandem on a treadmill to nowhere." There was only one ape, though. Former Defense Secretary Harold Brown had it right when he said, "When we build, they build; when we stop building, they build."
According to Natural Resources Defense Council estimates, the US and Soviet Union in 1975 each had roughly 2,200 warheads atop their ICBMs.
Over the next five years, the US total didn't change, but Moscow more than doubled its MIRV force, winding up with 5,630 warheads fitted to its 1,400 or so land-based missiles. A huge number of these—more than 3,000 warheads—were found on the monster, 10-warhead SS-18 missiles. The Soviets had 308 of them.
In Western strategic circles, it was thought that the SS-18 force was powerful enough to destroy 65 to 80 percent of US ICBM silos, using two nuclear warheads against each, with more than 1,000 SS-18 warheads left over for further counterforce strikes.
Over time, as the arsenals grew, officials began to see the drawbacks of MIRVing, while it became clear single-warhead ICBMs were actually stabilizing. Such weapons reversed the push-pull dynamic set in motion by MIRVing.
"The principal cause of instability with current weapons systems is the disproportion between warheads and launchers," wrote Henry A. Kissinger in 1983. "There is no effective or intellectually adequate solution to this problem except to seek to eliminate multiple warheads."
Still, backing away from MIRV has been difficult. Washington took the first step in the 1980s, limiting deployment of its premier 10-warhead Peacekeeper to only 50 weapons. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the US moved to retire that big ICBM. The last was withdrawn in 2005.
Moscow has also reduced its reliance on MIRVed missiles. Some reports claim it retains in service only about 60 out of the 308 SS-18 missiles, and plans to go down to about 40.
According to the White House, USAF's Minuteman III force has 550 warheads. Administration plans would cap the fleet at 420 deployed ICBMs, all with a single warhead.
In Russia, however, the situation is different. It has 331 functioning ICBMs, with about 1,100 warheads, an excess of 750 warheads. That is to say nothing about the US and Russian strategic submarine fleets, which are also equipped with high-performance MIRVed missiles.
It makes sense to end MIRVing and go to a single-warhead Minuteman force. Clearly, though, the golden age of single-warhead peace won't arrive unless Russia follows suit.
The Rise and Semi-Fall of MIRV
By Adam J. Hebert
Executive Editor
In its Nuclear Posture Review, DOD unveiled its decision to convert all Minuteman IIIs into single-warhead ICBMs. Today, USAF has 450 of them. Many have one warhead, but some are "MIRVed," meaning their nosecones have multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles. These have up to three warheads.
Not for long, though, as plans call for USAF to "de-MIRV" them all. "This step," claimed the NPR, "will enhance the stability of the nuclear balance by reducing the incentives for either side to strike first."
How will "downloading" US silo-based missiles substantially reduce the nuclear threat? In weighing the answer, it is useful to review some history.
Writing in 1953 about the two nuclear superpowers, J. Robert Oppenheimer, former scientific director for the Manhattan Project (turned harsh nuclear critic), observed, "We may be likened to two scorpions in a bottle, each capable of killing the other, but only at risk of his own life."
In the 1950s and 1960s, though, weapons were inaccurate. Because one had to commit several weapons to be sure to cover a single target, the attacker would run out of weapons before he wiped out the enemy's nukes. The foe's second strike was assured, so neither side wanted to go first.
MIRVing upset that stability. The US flight-tested a MIRVed system in 1968 and began deploying the triple-warhead Minuteman III in 1970. The USSR soon followed, catching and up with and then far surpassing the US by the early 1980s. On both sides, accuracies sharpened, too.
As MIRVed ICBMs proliferated, Oppenheimer's scorpions-in-a-bottle metaphor moved closer to reality, for two reasons:
Capability. Stacking multiple warheads on each missile dramatically increased each ICBM's firepower and its usefulness in mounting a disarming counterforce strike. An attacker could fire off a portion of his own ICBM force while still keeping some in reserve.
Incentive. Missiles with many warheads instantly became lucrative targets. A single enemy silo might now hold three, six, or more warheads. Even if an attacker had to expend two warheads per silo, the offense would still enjoy the benefits of a favorable exchange ratio.
It was this push-pull combination that made the late Cold War nuclear balance precarious. In a crisis, either side—though still very fearful—might be tempted to go first in hopes of gaining a war-winning advantage.
One of the great ironies of the times was the central role played by arms control in promoting this upward spiral of nuclear danger. While the superpowers probably would have gone MIRV at some point, that day was hastened by SALT talks in the late 1960s. The push was to limit launchers—bombers and missiles—not warheads. The logical response was to make the fullest use of each launcher by piling on warheads.
Arms negotiator Paul C. Warnke memorably, and mistakenly, compared the superpowers to "apes on a treadmill," with both "jogging in tandem on a treadmill to nowhere." There was only one ape, though. Former Defense Secretary Harold Brown had it right when he said, "When we build, they build; when we stop building, they build."
According to Natural Resources Defense Council estimates, the US and Soviet Union in 1975 each had roughly 2,200 warheads atop their ICBMs.
Over the next five years, the US total didn't change, but Moscow more than doubled its MIRV force, winding up with 5,630 warheads fitted to its 1,400 or so land-based missiles. A huge number of these—more than 3,000 warheads—were found on the monster, 10-warhead SS-18 missiles. The Soviets had 308 of them.
In Western strategic circles, it was thought that the SS-18 force was powerful enough to destroy 65 to 80 percent of US ICBM silos, using two nuclear warheads against each, with more than 1,000 SS-18 warheads left over for further counterforce strikes.
Over time, as the arsenals grew, officials began to see the drawbacks of MIRVing, while it became clear single-warhead ICBMs were actually stabilizing. Such weapons reversed the push-pull dynamic set in motion by MIRVing.
"The principal cause of instability with current weapons systems is the disproportion between warheads and launchers," wrote Henry A. Kissinger in 1983. "There is no effective or intellectually adequate solution to this problem except to seek to eliminate multiple warheads."
Still, backing away from MIRV has been difficult. Washington took the first step in the 1980s, limiting deployment of its premier 10-warhead Peacekeeper to only 50 weapons. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the US moved to retire that big ICBM. The last was withdrawn in 2005.
Moscow has also reduced its reliance on MIRVed missiles. Some reports claim it retains in service only about 60 out of the 308 SS-18 missiles, and plans to go down to about 40.
According to the White House, USAF's Minuteman III force has 550 warheads. Administration plans would cap the fleet at 420 deployed ICBMs, all with a single warhead.
In Russia, however, the situation is different. It has 331 functioning ICBMs, with about 1,100 warheads, an excess of 750 warheads. That is to say nothing about the US and Russian strategic submarine fleets, which are also equipped with high-performance MIRVed missiles.
It makes sense to end MIRVing and go to a single-warhead Minuteman force. Clearly, though, the golden age of single-warhead peace won't arrive unless Russia follows suit.
LETHALFORCE
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There other weapons now that can devastate like nuclear weapons without the^^ Sanity is rarely appreciated in a nuclear conflict. More MIRVs. That should be the call of the hour.
radiation or fallout and at ICBM speeds:
https://csis.org/blog/future-conventional-prompt-global-strike
The Future of Conventional Prompt Global Strike
By Matthew Fargo
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has increasingly moved nuclear weapons to the periphery of its defense posture and has amplified the importance of its conventional forces in their stead. This shift has been facilitated by the continuous evolution of precision guided munitions (PGMs), which have been used extensively in recent conflicts.
In response to perceived conventional capability gaps, the United States began a program in 2002 designed to develop a conventionally-armed weapon which could strike targets anywhere in the world in about one hour – a degree of responsiveness currently only achievable with nuclear weapons. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report detailed the requirements for prompt global strike (PGS) capabilities: "[to strike] fixed, hard and deeply buried, mobile and re-locatable targets with improved accuracy." In addition, it is hoped that prompt global strike technology could serve as a more credible deterrent than existing nuclear weapons against non-nuclear powers or non-state actors. This mission has gained more prominence as the United States must increasingly balance the competing trends of restructuring its global military presence in the face of fiscal austerity and the escalatingmission requirements placed on conventional American military assets.
Proposed Systems
Some of the first concepts designed to satisfy the newly-defined PGS mission involved retrofitting existing Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles or Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles with conventional warheads – systems which could be made operational by the mid-2010s. Congress balked at funding the former proposal, however, citing concerns about inadvertent Russian retaliation in the event that a PGS launch was mistaken for a nuclear first-strike.
In the intervening years, support has gathered behind the concept of highly maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicles. Hypersonic vehicles could satisfy the promptness criterion and would be capable of penetrating sophisticated air and missile defense systems without putting American military personnel at risk. The politically delicate question of whether or not they would pass the "discrimination test" – whether they would threaten to provoke a nuclear response from Russia, which the Conventional Trident Modification program was deemed to have failed – will depend on the eventual method of deployment. The most prompt option would still require rocket boosters which would still conspicuously resemble ballistic missiles upon take-off. Although test failures have delayed the Air Force's projected deployment date, hypersonic reentry vehicles remain a funding priority in Congress and may someday serve an important role in the PGS mission.
Strategic Implications and Future Trends
The advancements made by the United States in its conventional war-fighting capabilities have already impacted how Russia, China, and other nations pursue their strategic aims. By trying to further limit the role of nuclear weapons through the development and deployment of unmatched conventional military capabilities, the U.S. risks severely degrading the global security environment of other nations which cannot hope to match American defense spending. This may inadvertently lead other nations to view unconventional weapons proliferation as a potential defense against American conventional military superiority. The deployment of global strike weapon systems will undoubtedly impact this calculus in the minds of putative adversaries.
Weighing the costs and benefits of developing new prompt global strike capabilities in these contexts will be necessary as the Pentagon and Congress continue to push American strategic conventional capabilities forward.
The overall trend toward the increased use of precision guided munitions will likely continue in the near-term as the relative importance of nuclear weapons to the national security strategy of the U.S. continues to decline and as existing PGMs are enhanced and improved to become more accurate, more powerful, and more adaptable.
Obstacles and Alternatives
Although the PGS mission may have merit in concept, in practice global strike weapons will require extraordinary intelligence in order to prove viable. Stationary targets, such as missile silos, could certainly be held at risk by such systems – according to Russian Major General Vladimir Dvorkin, "The growing counterforce capability of U.S. PGMs may present a considerable threat to the survivability of Russia's strategic forces." But the idea of pursuing fleeting targets, otherwise out of the reach of American military assets, is one which has failed spectacularly in the past.
Perhaps the most critical dilemma which will face the development of prompt global strike capabilities will be its future role in a new American security strategy. With the growing strategic focus on the Asia Pacific and increasing concerns over sophisticated anti-access area-denial technologies being developed by China and other potential rivals, PGS may serve a role in destroying heavily defended targets or neutralizing defensive systems so that other assets can be safely deployed in-theater. Although it is infrequently discussed, it is in this context that the argument in favor of developing PGS capabilities is most compelling, and it is in this limited role that PGS offers the greatest potential against future threats. However, unproven and potentially destabilizing prompt global strike systems are not the only weapons which could accomplish this mission.
With the conversion of four Ohio-class submarines to cruise missile submarines – each submarine can carry up to 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles – the American military has at least developed an interim global strike capability which could be deployed in the event of a crisis, though a gap still remains in the theoretical cases of immediate need.
Unlike the currently planned prompt global strike systems, however, existing precision guided munitions have the ability to loiter in a target area for hours and can provide intelligence via on-board cameras and can be reprogrammed to engage more important targets as they arise. Given the importance of accurate intelligence to accomplish any global strike mission, this capability could prove decisive in helping to identify and eliminate potential targets.
Even as the United States continues to spend billions of dollars on ballistic missile defense systems, the development of cruise missile defenses has been slower to materialize. The absence of effective cruise missile defenses against even unsophisticated and antiquated Chinese-built Seersuckers cruise missiles during the early stages of the Iraq War (let alone more advanced terrain-hugging and stealthy) proved problematic for the United States. Although some progress has been made since then, cruise missiles will continue to pose significant challenges to potential defenders for the foreseeable future.
Conclusion
These trends may indicate that the usefulness of more advanced (and less destabilizing and less costly) cruise missiles and other precision guided conventional munitions may obviate the need for prompt global strike weapons in all but the most extreme circumstances in the future.
Determining the relative value of different capabilities of future PGMs will be a complex undertaking – attributes ranging from responsiveness, radar cross section, payload variability, range, and launch platform will all be important factors – but these developments will not occur in a vacuum. Russia and China already feel threatened by American conventional superiority – convincing them that the deployment of future conventional weapons will not threaten their strategic positions will prove challenging. Any guarantees to the contrary will ring hollow – especially as the U.S. continues to move forward with missile defense deployments in both Europe and Asia. Proponents of prompt global strike – both in and out of Congress – must keep this in mind.
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Interesting. Point to note; Conventional warheads which would deliver force equivalent to tactical nukes are much bigger in size than the constraints would allow for the present missile designs which are optimised for small nuclear delivery packages. How does the US/Russia plan to solve that?
Both MOAB and FOAB are big bombs and they can be delivered by strategic bombers only. However, if the submarine fails to pack such punches as MOABs are able to deliver, do you think replacing nukes with conventional warheads would be a viable option from the strategic POV? @LETHALFORCE
Both MOAB and FOAB are big bombs and they can be delivered by strategic bombers only. However, if the submarine fails to pack such punches as MOABs are able to deliver, do you think replacing nukes with conventional warheads would be a viable option from the strategic POV? @LETHALFORCE
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LETHALFORCE
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Global strike is a vehicle designed to strike anywhere in the world within 1 hour.
It does not carry the traditional explosives or nuclear material but shoots down
tungsten rods over a given area.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41464.pdf
Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background
and Issues
It does not carry the traditional explosives or nuclear material but shoots down
tungsten rods over a given area.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41464.pdf
Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background
and Issues
LETHALFORCE
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MIRV: India's technological solution for minimum nuclear deterrence | Simply Decoded
MIRV: India's technological solution for minimum nuclear deterrence
With lots of ifs and buts and long delay in project, Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP) gives country a milestone in its missile development program by successful test of Agni-5 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM).With this successful test at starting of this year India joined the elite club of countries that posses ICBM missiles.
Programme Director V. K. Saraswat discussing about technical aspects announces Agni-5 have MIRV "Capability" which the majority of the listeners understood as Agni-5 "Poses" MIRV capability. This article comprehensively talks about the ability and capability of having MIRV in Indian context.
Minimum Nuclear Deterrence?
After successful nuclear test at Pokhran India was considered as emerging nuclear threat by many western and neighboring countries especially Pakistan and China. Defending country's stand on issue under Prime Minster Atal Bihari Vajpayee India declared its nuclear doctrine in United Nation. Which contain clause of having "Minimum Nuclear Deterrence" under which India will posse minimum nuclear warheads just as to defend its boundaries and prestige.
Recommence of MIRV:
The most vital component of missile technology in recent years is the deployment of Multiple Independently targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRVs). The fundamental characteristic of deploying MIRVs is ability to deliver several warheads along separate trajectories, which confers its flexibility of multiple targeting. The independent targeting capability enhances missile's ability by exhausting the missile defence, providing deep penetration and potential of destruction of larger area, effectively and precisely. The vital advantage of MIRVs in terms of nuclear capability is very high yield, which, facilitate hitting hard targets and wide area. With same amount of nuclear warhead MIRV can increase yield upto 8 times the normal yield. With minimum nuclear warhead capability we can have exponential area damage.
Why India needs MIRVs?
India recently tested its first ever Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), called Agni-5, with a range of 5000 Km . It was estimated that Agni-5 is capable of launching 4-5 multiple warhead, whose yield is unknown[1]. Although head of India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), V.K. Saraswat, noted that several Agni variants could eventually be mated with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), or multiple nuclear warheads — while later conceding that it was not yet government's policy to do so[2]. The three vital reasons why India should possess MIRV technology could be, the potential threat from hostile neighboring countries, secondly strengthen its futuristic nuclear triad and thirdly its minimum nuclear deterrence nuclear policy. Pakistan's aggressive attitude and China's fairly strong degree of skepticism toward India and its well tested MIRV technology necessitate India's step toward this technology. Secondly with single missiles carrying more warheads, denigrate problem of minimum nuclear deterrence policy and constructing more missile, silos and launchers. Thirdly MIRV technology can also strengthen India's aspiration toward completing its nuclear triad.
Do we encompass the technology?
In contemporary technology MIRVs could be designed to have separate guidance system and propulsion packages on each re-entry vehicle. The maneuvering final stage of missile, also called Post Boost Control System (PBCS) or 'bus', carries both missile re-entry bodies (RV) and guidance and control system[3]. This bus has ability to change orientation and trajectory. It is also estimated that most of the countries such as US (Titan III Trans stage and Minuteman), China (DF-31A) etc, followed the footprint of their space program by conceptualizing the technology of delivering multiple satellite payloads into orbit[4]. Although ISRO successfully launched PSLV C-7 multiple satellite on January 10, 2007 and used Dual launch Adapter (DLA) to dispense four satellites, this technology adaptation in India's future MIRV program is unpredictable[5]. Final stage of PSLV C-7 has Trans-stage Post Boost Control System (PBCS) equivalent to US multiple launch technology. After the boost phase and orientation of bus suitably towards target, the minute rocket engines in each RV ignite[6]. These vernier rockets are used for precise positioning, changing orientation and moving bus away from free falling RVs. This critical technology was used in upper stage of ISRO Geosynchronous Launch Vehicle (GSLV) which placed 2 ton satellite into orbit by maneuvering using liquid propellant vernier rockets[7].
What is holding Us??
Deployment of such technology is very complicated task and expensive one too. The bus guidance system, mechanism of holding RVs, and releasing them with nuclear warhead accounts for half the cost of each MIRV missile produce[8]. The warhead technology has evolved over the period and can sustain a very high yield-to-weight ratio[9]. The real challenge for India lies in miniaturizing the warhead and increasing the yield for integration onto MIRV platform. If India aspires to achieve high yield thermo nuclear warhead, then challenges is substantially greater. The thermonuclear test in 1998 might not have yielded desired result[10]; the credibility of fabricating such high yield warhead is questionable.
In addition each re-entry has to sustain substantially high aerodynamic stress and aerodynamic heating, hence it is made of advance materials. Although ISRO and DRDO has robustly worked on aero-thermal structure and thermal protection system design over the past decade in its space and missile programs, but its effective use on MIRV platform is yet to be determined. Guidance and control computers must have enough memory and computational speed for guidance equation. Re-entry vehicle must have inertial component (Gyroscope and accelerometers) for precise and reliable targeting. This also becomes significant due to sudden change in mass distribution after disengaging from bus, which creates sudden oscillations and vibrations[11]. India has indigenously developed Redundant Strap down Inertial Guidance System (RESINS) which employ Dynamically Tuned Gyros (DTG) and Servo Accelerometer (SA)[12] for its space program. The entire attachment should be small and light enough to constitute in missile due to its weight and size constrain, created challenges for engineers.
Way Ahead:
The history over a decade has shown close interrelation and extents of interchangeability of technology between Indian space program and Indian missile program. These two programs have a profound base for India's aspirations of futuristic technology. India so far has achieved great heights in its indigenous missile dreams and has all infrastructure and indigenous technology to materialise its MIRV dream. The bigger challenges in current scenario are the quality of nuclear arsenal, miniaturizing warhead, atmospheric reentry and expertise in military application of guidance and control in re-entry vehicle to integrate MIRV. Although for the latter part DRDO has worked substantially and its all missile tests so far are precise and accurate, but combining this accuracy with MIRV integration is a great challenge in itself.
MIRV: India's technological solution for minimum nuclear deterrence
With lots of ifs and buts and long delay in project, Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP) gives country a milestone in its missile development program by successful test of Agni-5 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM).With this successful test at starting of this year India joined the elite club of countries that posses ICBM missiles.
Programme Director V. K. Saraswat discussing about technical aspects announces Agni-5 have MIRV "Capability" which the majority of the listeners understood as Agni-5 "Poses" MIRV capability. This article comprehensively talks about the ability and capability of having MIRV in Indian context.
Minimum Nuclear Deterrence?
After successful nuclear test at Pokhran India was considered as emerging nuclear threat by many western and neighboring countries especially Pakistan and China. Defending country's stand on issue under Prime Minster Atal Bihari Vajpayee India declared its nuclear doctrine in United Nation. Which contain clause of having "Minimum Nuclear Deterrence" under which India will posse minimum nuclear warheads just as to defend its boundaries and prestige.
Recommence of MIRV:
The most vital component of missile technology in recent years is the deployment of Multiple Independently targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRVs). The fundamental characteristic of deploying MIRVs is ability to deliver several warheads along separate trajectories, which confers its flexibility of multiple targeting. The independent targeting capability enhances missile's ability by exhausting the missile defence, providing deep penetration and potential of destruction of larger area, effectively and precisely. The vital advantage of MIRVs in terms of nuclear capability is very high yield, which, facilitate hitting hard targets and wide area. With same amount of nuclear warhead MIRV can increase yield upto 8 times the normal yield. With minimum nuclear warhead capability we can have exponential area damage.
Why India needs MIRVs?
India recently tested its first ever Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), called Agni-5, with a range of 5000 Km . It was estimated that Agni-5 is capable of launching 4-5 multiple warhead, whose yield is unknown[1]. Although head of India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), V.K. Saraswat, noted that several Agni variants could eventually be mated with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), or multiple nuclear warheads — while later conceding that it was not yet government's policy to do so[2]. The three vital reasons why India should possess MIRV technology could be, the potential threat from hostile neighboring countries, secondly strengthen its futuristic nuclear triad and thirdly its minimum nuclear deterrence nuclear policy. Pakistan's aggressive attitude and China's fairly strong degree of skepticism toward India and its well tested MIRV technology necessitate India's step toward this technology. Secondly with single missiles carrying more warheads, denigrate problem of minimum nuclear deterrence policy and constructing more missile, silos and launchers. Thirdly MIRV technology can also strengthen India's aspiration toward completing its nuclear triad.
Do we encompass the technology?
In contemporary technology MIRVs could be designed to have separate guidance system and propulsion packages on each re-entry vehicle. The maneuvering final stage of missile, also called Post Boost Control System (PBCS) or 'bus', carries both missile re-entry bodies (RV) and guidance and control system[3]. This bus has ability to change orientation and trajectory. It is also estimated that most of the countries such as US (Titan III Trans stage and Minuteman), China (DF-31A) etc, followed the footprint of their space program by conceptualizing the technology of delivering multiple satellite payloads into orbit[4]. Although ISRO successfully launched PSLV C-7 multiple satellite on January 10, 2007 and used Dual launch Adapter (DLA) to dispense four satellites, this technology adaptation in India's future MIRV program is unpredictable[5]. Final stage of PSLV C-7 has Trans-stage Post Boost Control System (PBCS) equivalent to US multiple launch technology. After the boost phase and orientation of bus suitably towards target, the minute rocket engines in each RV ignite[6]. These vernier rockets are used for precise positioning, changing orientation and moving bus away from free falling RVs. This critical technology was used in upper stage of ISRO Geosynchronous Launch Vehicle (GSLV) which placed 2 ton satellite into orbit by maneuvering using liquid propellant vernier rockets[7].
What is holding Us??
Deployment of such technology is very complicated task and expensive one too. The bus guidance system, mechanism of holding RVs, and releasing them with nuclear warhead accounts for half the cost of each MIRV missile produce[8]. The warhead technology has evolved over the period and can sustain a very high yield-to-weight ratio[9]. The real challenge for India lies in miniaturizing the warhead and increasing the yield for integration onto MIRV platform. If India aspires to achieve high yield thermo nuclear warhead, then challenges is substantially greater. The thermonuclear test in 1998 might not have yielded desired result[10]; the credibility of fabricating such high yield warhead is questionable.
In addition each re-entry has to sustain substantially high aerodynamic stress and aerodynamic heating, hence it is made of advance materials. Although ISRO and DRDO has robustly worked on aero-thermal structure and thermal protection system design over the past decade in its space and missile programs, but its effective use on MIRV platform is yet to be determined. Guidance and control computers must have enough memory and computational speed for guidance equation. Re-entry vehicle must have inertial component (Gyroscope and accelerometers) for precise and reliable targeting. This also becomes significant due to sudden change in mass distribution after disengaging from bus, which creates sudden oscillations and vibrations[11]. India has indigenously developed Redundant Strap down Inertial Guidance System (RESINS) which employ Dynamically Tuned Gyros (DTG) and Servo Accelerometer (SA)[12] for its space program. The entire attachment should be small and light enough to constitute in missile due to its weight and size constrain, created challenges for engineers.
Way Ahead:
The history over a decade has shown close interrelation and extents of interchangeability of technology between Indian space program and Indian missile program. These two programs have a profound base for India's aspirations of futuristic technology. India so far has achieved great heights in its indigenous missile dreams and has all infrastructure and indigenous technology to materialise its MIRV dream. The bigger challenges in current scenario are the quality of nuclear arsenal, miniaturizing warhead, atmospheric reentry and expertise in military application of guidance and control in re-entry vehicle to integrate MIRV. Although for the latter part DRDO has worked substantially and its all missile tests so far are precise and accurate, but combining this accuracy with MIRV integration is a great challenge in itself.
LETHALFORCE
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Given DRDO's track record with the Arjun, a likely timeframe for MIRV IOC is probably 2030...
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This is bad news, cause ASAT is a non lethal(no deaths) but a strategic weapon, by taking out satellites we could blind our enemies. While MIRV is a priority, but i think ASAT is a much bigger weapon, i hope DRDO not delay this.
