Witness: Col. Fornoff's assessment of the Su30 MKI during Red Flag. You can optimize avionics and ordnance, but what do you do about structural limitations? What do you do when your nose pivots, you lose tremendous altitude and fall vertically out of the sky in thrust-vectoring attempts?
i would agree avionics and ordnance upgrade is much easier but even structural architecture too goes thro' periodic stress analysis and the panels needing replacements are replaced via MLU and this is true for all forces. if you are referring to any structural defect or a weakness in SU 30MKIs i would like to hear on that.
Col.Fonaff (Red Flag) -
let's be pragmatic. one could look at those videos where the equivalent of a "group captain" Mr. Fornaff goes on a tirade lampooning, lambasting IAF pilots and the SU 30MKIs with cheers and mocking laughter from the retired AF pilot community. can any professional force or an MP can do that even with an adversary?? his tirade was based on many
wrong facts. an analysis of those comments summarised here -
About the speaker
Colonel Terrence Fornof (Colonel is equivalent to a Group Captain in the IAF) is an F-15 pilot and the Director of the Requirements and Testing office at the United States Air Force Warfare Center, Nellis AFB, Nevada. The lecture above is a private briefing in August 2008 to a group called the "Daedalians". The Daedalians are a local group of retired military pilots.
Per the press statement handed out by Nellis AFB: "Col. Fornof did not mean to offend any U.S. allied forces, as he knows firsthand the importance of training with allied forces and the awesome firepower they bring to the fight. His comments during this briefing were his personal opinions and not those of U.S. Air Force Warfare Center or of the Air Force. "
Comments and Analysis
Despite Col. Fornof having observed Red Flag up close, his comments should not be treated as the gospel truth - there is a possibility that he is 'playing to the gallery'. His comments carry weight since he is an operational pilot with the USAF but he certainly cannot cover the entire exercise and has no inside knowledge of the way IAF 'fought'. Nevertheless, even though his comments appear to be negative about the IAF to the uninformed listener; overall he has actually praised the IAF and its performance.
* The Su-30MKI did not use the data link in the exercise unlike the other air forces. The reason being the HAL supplied system is not compatible with NATO data links – neither is the system required to be compatible with NATO. The speaker clearly mentions that the high fratricide ratio in the kills was because of this reason. While NATO air forces are designed to inter operate with each other and carry out joint missions, the IAF is not.
* Su-30MKI is equipped with its own data link which can share target information across multiple fighters. IAF is presently inducting A-50EI Phalcon AEW&C aircraft. Red Flag and other exercises before it have seen IAF working very closely with the AWACS crew of the other air force. Operational Data Link (ODL) will be provided to all fighters in the IAF over the coming years.
*The IFF system used by IAF is not compatible with NATO standard, hence the need for verbal communication with the controller.
*The aircraft were operating their radars on training mode since the actual signals with which the Bars radar operates are kept secret.
*The high mix of highly experienced pilots in Ex Cope India, if true, cannot be consistent across all sqns that were involved in the exercise. During Cope India, the 24 Sqn operating Su-30K/MK was first Flanker unit in the IAF and only one of two Su-30 units in the entire IAF at that time. To find a concentration of senior pilots in these squadrons will not be unexpected given that these units will be forging doctrines and tactics and building up a pool of pilots. Per article on Cope India here; "Nor did U.S. pilots believe they faced only India's top guns. Instead, they said that at least in some units they faced a mix of experienced and relatively new Indian fighter and strike pilots.". Moreover, the mix of experience needs to be examined for the USAF squadrons as well. The aggressor squadron at Nellis and the F-22 attracts the best in the USA.
*MiG-21 Bison does not have an Israeli radar as noted in the lecture. The type is equipped with a Phazotron Kopyo (spear) unit. The Kopyo radar has a 57km detection range against a 5 m^2 (54ft^2) radar cross section, or fighter-sized target. It can track eight targets and shoot at two simultaneously.
*Su-30MKI is equipped with Saturn AL-31FP engines, not Turmansky as mentioned in the lecture
*Soviet era aircraft were designed to operate from poorly prepared airfields. For example; MiG-29 closes its intakes during taxi and take-off to avoid ingestion of FOD thrown up by the front wheels. In this state the engines are supplied air thru louvres located on upper surface of the leading edge. This design feature is at the cost of significant internal fuel capacity and hence has been eliminated in newer MiG-29 versions starting with the K/KUB variants. Flanker come with lighter anti-FOD grills in the intakes as well as wheel fenders that catch FOD. IAF has precautions built into their SOPs – which may be overlooked in case of war or any such exigency. Since the deployment was far away from home base in the USA, with no spares support and related infrastructure it was well worth to observe strict adherence to SOPs instead to being stuck with a grounded aircraft!
*This is not the first time the MiG-21 Bison has been praised for successes during dissimilar air combat training (DACT) – even during previous USAF exercise and internal IAF exercises pilots are known to have scored 'kills' against more advanced adversaries. The small size (lower visual signature) and inherently small radar cross section coupled with modern avionics, radar, effective jammers, precision guided munitions and missiles (R-73, R-77) make Bison one of the best fighters in IAF after Su-30 and Mirage-2000. IAF's has had good experience with small jets such as Gnat which earned the reputation of "Sabre Slayer" in the 1965 war with Pakistan. The under-development LCA Tejas promises to carry on this legacy when it replaces the Bison. Under the glare of the world's attention the IAF pilots, crew and their aircraft have clearly acquitted themselves well in Ex Red Flag 2008. This exercise was the most complex environment IAF worked in, even more than the Cope Thunder exercise in Alaska where Jaguar IS fighters had participated. The challenges faced were because of the operational environment, training rules and airspace restriction where the IAF is not expected to fight a war in any case. Shortcomings must have come up – but then that is exactly why IAF is training for.
Acknowledgements :
The transcribe is a improved version of the one posted on Bharat Rakshak Forum by George J, Jagan and gogna.
http://vayu-sena.tripod.com/exercise-cope-india-article02.html
there are the videos and the transcript there.even use of TVC use is determined by the pilot on the basis of the inputs and situational awareness and on both these counts SU 30MKI was
handicapped as per the link above.
wrt Col.Fornaff's comments on TVC, every force which takes part in exercises do take home some wisdom. USAF has learnt the tactical remedial course post exercises with IAF in the past and which may have been seen in the Red Flag. tactics keep evolving. even IAF will correct their own tactics based on the knowledge gained. even F-22 sports TVC because it allows superior turn rates and hence affords more maneurability.
here is Vishnu Som of the NDTV at the Red Flag where a USAF captain praises IAF.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mssPQb4TMSU&feature=player_embedded
Not so with structural integrity, and in the case of the Super Hornet, the modifications to improve those have only proved to be problems of their own.
i don't know which structural integrity you are speaking of. the Boston Globe article and the strategypage article spoke of similar problem wrt the wings and spoke of life coming down from 6000hrs to 3500hrs. now i gave you a link where
Super Hornet program manager Navy Capt. Don Gaddis rubbished it as "eggregious" and said that was sorted out long back. he went on to rubbish lot of other complaints too here -
http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2007/06/marine_superhornet_070617/
as to the structural stability of FA-18E/F here is an account of Carlo Kopp who flew it in 2006. the article is a little dated when even APG 79 was not on but worthy read particularly at 48 AOA
how the structural stability holds!!! a very detailed report.
http://www.ausairpower.net/SuperBug.html
besides USN is going ahead with more FA 18E/F's
-
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0610144720100506?type=marketsNews
why will they do it if it has serious structural integrity problem??
I think the point is what the best fighter is to fulfill a structurally integral, sound, capable and cost-effective combat aircraft for the IAF,
which FA 18E/F
is IMO and the same is true for Rafale at a higher cost.
not what the SH can or cannot do, for that role can be fulfilled by several others.
agree but cost wise Rafale will be more.
but i do not mind if that happens.
my choice of SH was based on it's strike capability and the best avionics it carries. but you have every right to disagree with me.
I'm confident it will, particularly since it is supposed to be an enhancement to the radar installed on the Naval Rafale, is already in production engineering, expects to start series production by late 2010, and will be delivered to the French Navy and Air Force by 2012.
agree.
The Chinese angle, IMO, not merely needs to be factored. It needs to be heavily factored. Because we certainly won't have the numbers to match them, and given the procurement delays that are a part of our system, our core competency will need to be maintained qualitatively, which I see increasingly difficult to do in the generations ahead. I don't think the Chinese threat ought to be discounted at all, or its perception otherwise "tempered". Pragmatic opinion would require that we be prepared for any eventuality, particularly against an adversary with whom we have already fought a war, indeed the worst plausible scenario: a two-front war, for only then could be call ourselves prepared.
no issue here.
ppgj, I'm assuming the Baaz as our secondary fighter with all the "radar upgrades", fuselage conformal tanks, increased ordnance, HOTAS controls, RD-33 ser.3 engines and the like. The present Mig-29's are verging upon obsolesence, and cannot hold a fig to our requirements, and most essentially, qualitative competencies. The radar upgrades were needed not merely as an enhancement of range, they were needed because of tropical-adaptability problems in several of our original radars.I hope I've made the point that reluctant reliance upon the Baaz, even as a secondary-fighter, stems from a reliance only upon its upgrades.
when i spoke of radar and range - the range, i was referring to was the "combat range" and not the radar range. with IFR on Mig 29s, it's perrenial short range problem will be addressed. also the previous radar on the Mig 29s were only A2A compliant and hence the role of escort missions and CAP role in IAF. this will change as the Zhuk Me radar is a MMR which will allow the Mig 29s to be multi role, which is what IAF has been emphasising post Kargill where the IAF lacuna was found wrt
strike role of it's crafts.
on the point of "obsolesence" i will have to partly agree. while i do admit they may not comparable to say Rafale or a Typhoon or a SH, they are still good to be around. there is still lot of life left as these were inducted in the early 80s. a 15 - 20 year stretch will give IAF an option in at least arresting the falling numbers. this is particularly important when Mig 21s and Mig 27s which are even older are still serving.
this is old news. post russian Mig 29 "cracks" IAF grounded it's Mig 29s and they went through a thorough checks but none was found and they started flying soon after.
Let me point you to an article from defenceindustrydaily:
The MiG-29's biggest weaknesses were short range, engines that produce telltale smoke (very bad in air combat) and lack of true multi-role capability; the MiG-35 largely fixes these issues, and may even add an AESA radar of its own if Phazotron-NIIR can have its new Zhuk-AE ready in time. Technology sharing and co-production are also considered to be strengths; as one Indian officer put it: "Russians have their problems of delayed projects and unreliable spare supply but they give access to everything, unlike the Americans." He's referring to the IAF's not-so-great experience with India's existing MiG-29s, which have had maintenance problems in addition to their other deficits.
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com...ndias-mrca-fighter-competition-changes-01989/
1. short range is being addressed with IFR.
2. i myself wonder why IAF did not go for the RD 33MK!!! i am not sure if RD 33 series 3 will address the smoke problem (marinised RD 33MK on Mig 29K is smokeless). if not, i am at a loss.
3. again on the radar i have been wondering myself why Zhuk AE was not opted for!! most probably i guess
2 issues.
a) power and the cooling requirement of the AESA radar.
b) may be russian AESA is not complete to be operational yet.
having said that Zhuk ME MMR should be more or less equivalent to EL 2032/RDY 2 and hence should be fine.
4. spares and maintainence was definitely a worry but IAF overcame that innovatively.
here is the story of 11 BRD Ojhar AFS. very interesting indeed.
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/Today/Unit-Articles/336-11BRD.html
Let me also point you to an even more detailed article about the Mig-29 experience, this time with input from our own Comptroller&Auditor General,
The Indian Air Force was already having '...extensive problems encountered in operational and maintenance due to the large number of pre-mature failures of engines, components, and systems. Of the total of 189 engines in service, 139 engines (74%) failed pre-maturely and had been withdraw from service by July 1992, thus effectively shutting down operations. 62 of these engines had not even accomplished 50% of their 300 hours first overhaul point. Thus the desired serviceability showed a steadily decreasing trend. (*2)
http://www.saunalahti.fi/fta/MiG-29-2b.htm
that is pretty serious. thanks for pointing that link. well let me
clear myself here. i am not defending the Mig 29s at all. just making a sense out of the upgrades and IAF's requirement of numbers.
In addition, the RMAF have also experienced problems with their Mig-29's and their maintenance. I don't know if you've ever been to an ADA facility. But its not pretty. I tend to think this is more of an airframe-issue, given that Singapore has fairly decent maintenance facilities. I also want to quote to you a relevant section about maintenance:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/baaz.htm
agree there were various issues related to Mig 29s which were serious and was related to events leading upto Soviet Union breaking up and post breakup upheavals.
still no justification for IAF "operational" readiness. i guess IAF must have studied everything before going in for the upgrades.
but i do agree with you on most of your points on Mig 29s being a
secondary fighter even post upgrades.
You've missed the point. The point being that the Mirage-2000's have been optimized for their role as A-2-G aircraft, and were designated the Nuclear Strike Squadron. The premise is not which aircraft will fullfil this purpose, but what the Mirage-2000H has been geared to particularly in its role within the IAF in the Kargil wars.
no i did not miss the point. during Kargill,
only Mirages had limited A2G role due to its "comparatively" superior radar and it was the
only fighter which had Atlis LDP which could fire laser guided munitions.
none of the other a/c's in IAF had them. hence it was a
natural choice which is no more the case. here is the Mirage story of the Kargill time -
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/Kargil/PCamp.html
even Nukes need to be precision guided and can't be thrown like dumb bombs, like the jaguars or Mig 27s would have been able to then. the natural choice hence was Mirage 2000s then and later Jaguars got LDPs too hence they too are optimised for the nukes. but now the situation is different. most IAF craft have/will have both A2A/A2G due to the MMRs and LDPs now and hence the point is moot now.
There is a certain level of institutional memory, I believe, that has geared the fighter more toward an A-2-G, and post-Kargil, toward a multi-role fighter, not toward a dedicated dog fighter which is my premise.
agree. but this is across the board and
not specific to the Mirages.
the biggest lesson IAF learnt due to Kargill was the "lack of" or "obsoleteness" of the avionics in terms of MMR/LDP/FLIR/DATALINKS etc..in the a/c's. IAF now wants all it's a/c's to be multirole. and the need for AWACS platform. all these are being addressed simultaneously. better late than never.
Stopgap certainly. Figuring into consideration both the length of time for signing of the MRCA contract and production rates for both the Mirage-2000HT. Infact, that's what France called it when they upgraded their Mirages to 2000-5 standard in 1993:
http://www.faqs.org/docs/air/avmir2k.html
Exactly, but a stop-gap does not need to plug
all the requirement. It could just as well be partial, which is what I believe the Mirage-2000H upgrade is, and to another degree, the Mig-29 SMT.
for the french, yes - it may have been a stop gap because Rafale was on the way. not so for india. 20 years of extension is by no means a stopgap. besides Mirages are well known for their trouble free maintainence. i have not heard of any crash in IAF due to any problem. infact India was planning to acquire more of these from Qatar AF. i love this aircraft.
I'd hate to go into the saga of the LCA, because this is not the place for it. The fact remains, that from inception to launch to prototype production, the programme has been grossly over schedule. And I extrapolate that development timeline to its full-production status. It may be a conservative estimate, but I think it is the right one.
this i have debated on the LCA thread. i too don't want to go into that again. it is too complex to be explained in simple words. Sanctions/IAF's no interest in the initial years/no infra/limited funds etc..
still an achievement considering it took ADA/DRDO 17 years - comparable to any.
I'm assuming the worst case scenarios <for us> in all these situations: Which includes a fully developed, stable chinese engine, an AESA capability that is atleast as competent as the Zhuk AE, and an aiframe that says it can do all it can do, in the backdrop of the need to maintain technological competency, because of the absence of parity in numbers. In the absence of any ful information, would you assume anything else?
agree.