Abhijeet Dey
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You forgot F-INSAS
Mountain Strike Corps - 17
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ladder
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Re: So it's going to be 17 Mountain Corps?
here's more
Army gets final nod to deploy 80,000 troops along China border - The Times of India
Army gets final nod for raising corps along China border - India - DNA
Conflicting reports.
here's more
Army gets final nod to deploy 80,000 troops along China border - The Times of India
Army gets final nod for raising corps along China border - India - DNA
happy
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Re: So it's going to be 17 Mountain Corps?
Army gets final nod to deploy 80,000 troops along China border
NEW DELHI: The ball has been set rolling for the Army to raise a new mountain "strike" corps with two "independent" infantry brigades and two "independent" armoured brigades, totalling over 80,000 soldiers, along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China.
While the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) on July 17 had cleared the new mountain corps and brigades, as was then reported by TOI, the defence ministry has now issued the "government sanction letter" to the Army for the new raising to be undertaken.
The new corps — the 1.13-million strong Indian Army already has three "strike" corps among the 13 such formations but they are largely geared towards Pakistan - will eventually have its headquarters at Panagarh in West Bengal.
The new formation to be called 17 Corps, along with its infrastructure, will come up over seven years at a cost of around Rs 90,000 crore. "Officers and soldiers are already being earmarked for posting to the new corps," said an official.
With additional armoured regiments and infantry units based in Ladakh, Sikkim and Uttarakhand, the new mountain corps will for the first time give India the capability to also launch a counter-offensive into Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in the event of a Chinese attack.
As part of the overall plan for "major force accretion" along the "northern borders" with China, two new infantry divisions (35,000 soldiers and 1,260 officers), have already been raised at Lekhapani and Missamari in Assam in 2009-10. Their operational tasking is the defence of Arunachal Pradesh, which China often claims as its territory.
The new corps, with two specialized high-altitude divisions for "rapid reaction force capability in mountains", will add to all this. This will give India, which for long has focused on the land borders with Pakistan, some offensive teeth against China as well.
This is critical because China has "aggressively'' strengthened its military capabilities in TAR, with at least five fully-operational airbases, an extensive rail network and over 58,000-km of roads. This allows China to move over 30 divisions (each with over 15,000 soldiers) to the LAC, outnumbering Indian forces by at least 3:1 there.
Army gets final nod to deploy 80,000 troops along China border - The Times of India
Army gets final nod to deploy 80,000 troops along China border
NEW DELHI: The ball has been set rolling for the Army to raise a new mountain "strike" corps with two "independent" infantry brigades and two "independent" armoured brigades, totalling over 80,000 soldiers, along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China.
While the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) on July 17 had cleared the new mountain corps and brigades, as was then reported by TOI, the defence ministry has now issued the "government sanction letter" to the Army for the new raising to be undertaken.
The new corps — the 1.13-million strong Indian Army already has three "strike" corps among the 13 such formations but they are largely geared towards Pakistan - will eventually have its headquarters at Panagarh in West Bengal.
The new formation to be called 17 Corps, along with its infrastructure, will come up over seven years at a cost of around Rs 90,000 crore. "Officers and soldiers are already being earmarked for posting to the new corps," said an official.
With additional armoured regiments and infantry units based in Ladakh, Sikkim and Uttarakhand, the new mountain corps will for the first time give India the capability to also launch a counter-offensive into Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in the event of a Chinese attack.
As part of the overall plan for "major force accretion" along the "northern borders" with China, two new infantry divisions (35,000 soldiers and 1,260 officers), have already been raised at Lekhapani and Missamari in Assam in 2009-10. Their operational tasking is the defence of Arunachal Pradesh, which China often claims as its territory.
The new corps, with two specialized high-altitude divisions for "rapid reaction force capability in mountains", will add to all this. This will give India, which for long has focused on the land borders with Pakistan, some offensive teeth against China as well.
This is critical because China has "aggressively'' strengthened its military capabilities in TAR, with at least five fully-operational airbases, an extensive rail network and over 58,000-km of roads. This allows China to move over 30 divisions (each with over 15,000 soldiers) to the LAC, outnumbering Indian forces by at least 3:1 there.
Army gets final nod to deploy 80,000 troops along China border - The Times of India
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Abhijeet Dey
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Re: So it's going to be 17 Mountain Corps?
self delete
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Re: So it's going to be 17 Mountain Corps?
Panagarh air base in West Bengal, a step that will boost the striking range of its fighter planes like Su-30 MKIs based along the China border.With the deployment of these tanker aircraft in Panagarh, the striking range of fighter planes like Su-30 MKIs based in Tezpur and Chhabua (both in Assam) will be enhanced as these can get fuel mid-air.
Panagarh Airport - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
"We want to start full-fledged operations in Panagarh by the end of next year," Air Marshal S. Varthaman, the air officer commanding-in-charge of the Eastern Air Command said today on the sidelines of an event at the Barrackpore airbase in North-24 Parganas. "We have all the necessary infrastructure, including land. It should not be a problem."
Once Panagarh becomes fully operational, it will not only bolster the IAF's operations in the east but also serve as an important base from where mid-air refuelling could be carried out, sources said.
Airbase at Panagarh by next year
Actually, what is to be known is whether the divisions will get raised there (raising and being operational are two different kettles of fish) and then located forward in North Bengal/ Assam, with the HQs at Panagarh or what.
It actually is not as little as is generally felt. In fact, it is quite adequate.
Patna has no space. Danapur is as ancient a military cantt as Panagarh and maybe that is where some elements maybe.
Rarely does a Division have adequate land to be located at the same place. They are dispersed.
Panagarh air base in West Bengal, a step that will boost the striking range of its fighter planes like Su-30 MKIs based along the China border.With the deployment of these tanker aircraft in Panagarh, the striking range of fighter planes like Su-30 MKIs based in Tezpur and Chhabua (both in Assam) will be enhanced as these can get fuel mid-air.
Panagarh Airport - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
"We want to start full-fledged operations in Panagarh by the end of next year," Air Marshal S. Varthaman, the air officer commanding-in-charge of the Eastern Air Command said today on the sidelines of an event at the Barrackpore airbase in North-24 Parganas. "We have all the necessary infrastructure, including land. It should not be a problem."
Once Panagarh becomes fully operational, it will not only bolster the IAF's operations in the east but also serve as an important base from where mid-air refuelling could be carried out, sources said.
Airbase at Panagarh by next year
Actually, what is to be known is whether the divisions will get raised there (raising and being operational are two different kettles of fish) and then located forward in North Bengal/ Assam, with the HQs at Panagarh or what.
It actually is not as little as is generally felt. In fact, it is quite adequate.
Patna has no space. Danapur is as ancient a military cantt as Panagarh and maybe that is where some elements maybe.
Rarely does a Division have adequate land to be located at the same place. They are dispersed.
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happy
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Re: So it's going to be 17 Mountain Corps?
Maybe they are playing a guessing game with china
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Re: So it's going to be 17 Mountain Corps?
The 17 Corps, the latest and the 14th such formation of the Army, will be initially based at Ranchi in Jharkhand and after development of infrastructure, will be moved to Panagarh in West Bengal. This will be the first corps with strike elements to be deployed close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC)
Army gets final nod to deploy 80,000 troops along China border
Defence News - Army gets final nod to deploy 80,000 troops along China border
he ball has been set rolling for the Army to raise a new mountain "strike" corps with two "independent" infantry brigades and two "independent" armoured brigades, totalling over 80,000 soldiers, along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China.
While the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) on July 17 had cleared the new mountain corps and brigades, as was then reported by TOI, the defence ministry has now issued the "government sanction letter" to the Army for the new raising to be undertaken.
The new corps — the 1.13-million strong Indian Army already has three "strike" corps among the 13 such formations but they are largely geared towards Pakistan - will eventually have its headquarters at Panagarh in West Bengal.
The new formation to be called 17 Corps, along with its infrastructure, will come up over seven years at a cost of around Rs 90,000 crore. "Officers and soldiers are already being earmarked for posting to the new corps," said an official.
With additional armoured regiments and infantry units based in Ladakh, Sikkim and Uttarakhand, the new mountain corps will for the first time give India the capability to also launch a counter-offensive into Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in the event of a Chinese attack.
As part of the overall plan for "major force accretion" along the "northern borders" with China, two new infantry divisions (35,000 soldiers and 1,260 officers), have already been raised at Lekhapani and Missamari in Assam in 2009-10. Their operational tasking is the defence of Arunachal Pradesh, which China often claims as its territory.
The new corps, with two specialized high-altitude divisions for "rapid reaction force capability in mountains", will add to all this. This will give India, which for long has focused on the land borders with Pakistan, some offensive teeth against China as well.
This is critical because China has "aggressively'' strengthened its military capabilities in TAR, with at least five fully-operational airbases, an extensive rail network and over 58,000-km of roads. This allows China to move over 30 divisions (each with over 15,000 soldiers) to the LAC, outnumbering Indian forces by at least 3:1 there.
Defence News - Army gets final nod to deploy 80,000 troops along China border
he ball has been set rolling for the Army to raise a new mountain "strike" corps with two "independent" infantry brigades and two "independent" armoured brigades, totalling over 80,000 soldiers, along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China.
While the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) on July 17 had cleared the new mountain corps and brigades, as was then reported by TOI, the defence ministry has now issued the "government sanction letter" to the Army for the new raising to be undertaken.
The new corps — the 1.13-million strong Indian Army already has three "strike" corps among the 13 such formations but they are largely geared towards Pakistan - will eventually have its headquarters at Panagarh in West Bengal.
The new formation to be called 17 Corps, along with its infrastructure, will come up over seven years at a cost of around Rs 90,000 crore. "Officers and soldiers are already being earmarked for posting to the new corps," said an official.
With additional armoured regiments and infantry units based in Ladakh, Sikkim and Uttarakhand, the new mountain corps will for the first time give India the capability to also launch a counter-offensive into Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in the event of a Chinese attack.
As part of the overall plan for "major force accretion" along the "northern borders" with China, two new infantry divisions (35,000 soldiers and 1,260 officers), have already been raised at Lekhapani and Missamari in Assam in 2009-10. Their operational tasking is the defence of Arunachal Pradesh, which China often claims as its territory.
The new corps, with two specialized high-altitude divisions for "rapid reaction force capability in mountains", will add to all this. This will give India, which for long has focused on the land borders with Pakistan, some offensive teeth against China as well.
This is critical because China has "aggressively'' strengthened its military capabilities in TAR, with at least five fully-operational airbases, an extensive rail network and over 58,000-km of roads. This allows China to move over 30 divisions (each with over 15,000 soldiers) to the LAC, outnumbering Indian forces by at least 3:1 there.
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The new corps — the 1.13-million strong Indian Army already has three "strike" corps among the 13 such formations but they are largely geared towards Pakistan - will eventually have its headquarters at Panagarh in West Bengal
Army gets final nod to deploy 80,000 troops along China border - The Times of India
Army gets final nod to deploy 80,000 troops along China border - The Times of India
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ninja85
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Current Orbat of 101st
is this india's or america's ?.
ninja85
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Re: India plans 'mountain strike' to counter China!!!
like more corruption of corrupt congress.
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Between 14.000 to 15000.
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New strike corps in the Indian North East
Sarwar Jahan Chowdhury
THERE has been a very important military-strategic development in our region, more specifically in eastern Indian sub-region, with obvious trans-regional implications. We have hardly noticed that. In mid-July this year the Indian cabinet committee on security headed by Indian Premier Dr. Manmohan Sing approved the proposal to raise a 50,000 strong new mountain strike corps for the Indian army, to be located in the north east. The headquarters of this corps would be located in Panagarh, West Bengal.
From the military strategic standpoint the larger armies of some countries are subdivided into holding corps, the prime purpose of which is defence, and strike corps which are designated for large scale offensives. In India it's called Sundarji Doctrine as it was conceptualised and operationalised by former Indian chief of army staff and eminent military thinker General Krishnaswami Sundarrajan, popularly known as General Sundarji.
The Sundarji doctrine called for a set of holding corps maintained close to the borders to hold off against an advancing enemy and a set of strike corps, kept at a safe distance from any preemptive enemy actions, which would be moved to deliver enormous conventional retaliation. This would be expected to lead to the complete nullification of the enemy. In a nuclear situation, this doctrine may not be optimal due to a prospect of nuclear reprisal if the attackers feel that they are facing an existential calamity.
But during Operation Parakram, when Indian mobilised about 500,000 strong army formations in the Indo-Pak border alleging Pakistan connection in the December terrorist attack on Indian Parliament, the other flaw of Sundarji Doctrine was evident. It was found that it takes a long time — about 27 days — to move the strike corps close to the frontline. As a result, the idea of Cold Start military doctrine came up in Indian the strategic fraternity, despite official denial by India, where the holding corps would have attacking elements within them called Embedded Battle Groups (EBG). They would consist of hi-tech armour, mechanised infantry and self-propelled artillery that would be able to launch limited yet sharp and strong attacks within 48 hours.
While Cold Start had been talked about in the case of Indian western theatre, it may not be possible in the mountainous north east, not only for the terrain but also for India's caution in not antagonising China too much. Therefore, it seems that instead of forwardly located EBGs, the Indian army would stick to the conventional idea of distantly located strike corps.
The northern and north eastern boundaries have always been a concern for India, given their boarder dispute ever since Communist China disagreed with the MacMahon line agreed as boundary between the Raj and the then Tibetan authority in 1914. The territory south of this line, which is the Indian province of Arunachal of about 65,000 sq km area that China calls South Tibet, was a battleground in 1962 Sino-Indian clashes.
China never gave up the claim and often shows that chunk of mountains as a part of its territory in the official maps. There were also some minor incursions by the Chinese border patrols in the area. Indians, with their memory of the setbacks of 1962 war, get alarmed at every little incident in that area. But the Indians had learned their military lessons in 1962. The resultant overhaul and shift in attention and approach paid them dividends in 1965 and 1971.
Would the addition of this new bite in the Indian land force make a great difference in that theatre? Would that swing the balance of military power in that sub-region (including Tibet) in favour of the Indians? Perhaps not much, given the Chinese force level already there in Tibet and China's ability to send or raise more army formations there. But it would definitely reduce anxiety in Indian defence and national security community to a significant degree.
Some Indian strategists argued to make this investment in the Indian navy instead of the army so as to counterbalance Chinese threat from the northern land border by threatening their vital energy and trade supply line in the Indian Ocean. But Indian national security experts went the army way considering that the vital territory battles, which have immediate consequence, can't be fought in a different front with delayed impact.
What's our stake in these developments? The chief purpose of this new strike corps is evidently to have an edge over, or at least parity with, the Chinese military might in the sub-region. Yet with the presence of a huge militarised zone of an aspiring continental power right in its backyard shouldn't Bangladesh worry? Well, it's true that traditionally Indian national security philosophy had been defensive. India doesn't normally fancy military engagement unless it is compelled to do so. Its internal diversity is both, strength and weakness.
But socio-political landscape of India is dynamic these decades. Lots of changes are taking place. Threat to a country's national security may lurk in the political sphere and stem from political developments in its neighbours. There had been the rise of right wing Hindu nationalist as a formidable political force in the otherwise secular India. These forces aren't that benevolent towards India's smaller neighbours. They could make much headway in eastern India. Picking up contentious issues with Bangladesh just to make shallow electoral gains can't be ruled out going by their political behaviour, which has often been opportunistic rather that propriety driven.
If there is a movement in India on a contentious issue with Bangladesh, be it their allegation against Bangladesh of supporting north eastern insurgents or alleged movement of economic migrants from Bangladesh to India or alleged cross border movement of Islamist terrorists, the political masters may be compelled to yield to their own Frankenstein. A large military, properly prepared, could be a readymade tool of utility for limited or bigger action. The Indian military had been and still is subservient to the political masters, as it is supposed to be.
But, even in such worst case scenario for Bangladesh, unleashing of the big neighbour's military would be constrained by their conventional worries in the West and in the North, and other international factors. A full scale conventional offensive normally requires 3:1 force ratio in favour of the attacker. In 1971, the allied forces won with about 2:1 force ratio in their favour; the lack of critical numbers were made up for by the supporting guerilla activities of the freedom fighters and the mass popular support. If there is any aggression against Bangladesh with whatever better force ratio the aggressor can muster, the latter two crucial factors would be in the defender's side. Those could be Bangladesh's game changer in a worst case scenario.
Bangladesh doesn't have to react too strongly at this upcoming raising of the new India strike corps in the sub-region, neither should it turn a blind eye to that for we don't want to be caught off-guard at any time in future, like India itself was in 1962. Diplomacy and defence preparation, including contingency strategic planning and suitable geo-strategic posturing, must work in synergy to avoid any probability of national security debacle — albeit fairly remote, yet not impossible. Therefore, the recent expansion and hardware purchase schemes declared for the Bangladesh armed forces seemingly has another angle to be looked at, albeit incidental, apart from the pervasive suspicion about the incumbent government's attempt to appease this perceptibly powerful state organ in this divisive political environment.
New strike corps in the Indian North East
Sarwar Jahan Chowdhury
THERE has been a very important military-strategic development in our region, more specifically in eastern Indian sub-region, with obvious trans-regional implications. We have hardly noticed that. In mid-July this year the Indian cabinet committee on security headed by Indian Premier Dr. Manmohan Sing approved the proposal to raise a 50,000 strong new mountain strike corps for the Indian army, to be located in the north east. The headquarters of this corps would be located in Panagarh, West Bengal.
From the military strategic standpoint the larger armies of some countries are subdivided into holding corps, the prime purpose of which is defence, and strike corps which are designated for large scale offensives. In India it's called Sundarji Doctrine as it was conceptualised and operationalised by former Indian chief of army staff and eminent military thinker General Krishnaswami Sundarrajan, popularly known as General Sundarji.
The Sundarji doctrine called for a set of holding corps maintained close to the borders to hold off against an advancing enemy and a set of strike corps, kept at a safe distance from any preemptive enemy actions, which would be moved to deliver enormous conventional retaliation. This would be expected to lead to the complete nullification of the enemy. In a nuclear situation, this doctrine may not be optimal due to a prospect of nuclear reprisal if the attackers feel that they are facing an existential calamity.
But during Operation Parakram, when Indian mobilised about 500,000 strong army formations in the Indo-Pak border alleging Pakistan connection in the December terrorist attack on Indian Parliament, the other flaw of Sundarji Doctrine was evident. It was found that it takes a long time — about 27 days — to move the strike corps close to the frontline. As a result, the idea of Cold Start military doctrine came up in Indian the strategic fraternity, despite official denial by India, where the holding corps would have attacking elements within them called Embedded Battle Groups (EBG). They would consist of hi-tech armour, mechanised infantry and self-propelled artillery that would be able to launch limited yet sharp and strong attacks within 48 hours.
While Cold Start had been talked about in the case of Indian western theatre, it may not be possible in the mountainous north east, not only for the terrain but also for India's caution in not antagonising China too much. Therefore, it seems that instead of forwardly located EBGs, the Indian army would stick to the conventional idea of distantly located strike corps.
The northern and north eastern boundaries have always been a concern for India, given their boarder dispute ever since Communist China disagreed with the MacMahon line agreed as boundary between the Raj and the then Tibetan authority in 1914. The territory south of this line, which is the Indian province of Arunachal of about 65,000 sq km area that China calls South Tibet, was a battleground in 1962 Sino-Indian clashes.
China never gave up the claim and often shows that chunk of mountains as a part of its territory in the official maps. There were also some minor incursions by the Chinese border patrols in the area. Indians, with their memory of the setbacks of 1962 war, get alarmed at every little incident in that area. But the Indians had learned their military lessons in 1962. The resultant overhaul and shift in attention and approach paid them dividends in 1965 and 1971.
Would the addition of this new bite in the Indian land force make a great difference in that theatre? Would that swing the balance of military power in that sub-region (including Tibet) in favour of the Indians? Perhaps not much, given the Chinese force level already there in Tibet and China's ability to send or raise more army formations there. But it would definitely reduce anxiety in Indian defence and national security community to a significant degree.
Some Indian strategists argued to make this investment in the Indian navy instead of the army so as to counterbalance Chinese threat from the northern land border by threatening their vital energy and trade supply line in the Indian Ocean. But Indian national security experts went the army way considering that the vital territory battles, which have immediate consequence, can't be fought in a different front with delayed impact.
What's our stake in these developments? The chief purpose of this new strike corps is evidently to have an edge over, or at least parity with, the Chinese military might in the sub-region. Yet with the presence of a huge militarised zone of an aspiring continental power right in its backyard shouldn't Bangladesh worry? Well, it's true that traditionally Indian national security philosophy had been defensive. India doesn't normally fancy military engagement unless it is compelled to do so. Its internal diversity is both, strength and weakness.
But socio-political landscape of India is dynamic these decades. Lots of changes are taking place. Threat to a country's national security may lurk in the political sphere and stem from political developments in its neighbours. There had been the rise of right wing Hindu nationalist as a formidable political force in the otherwise secular India. These forces aren't that benevolent towards India's smaller neighbours. They could make much headway in eastern India. Picking up contentious issues with Bangladesh just to make shallow electoral gains can't be ruled out going by their political behaviour, which has often been opportunistic rather that propriety driven.
If there is a movement in India on a contentious issue with Bangladesh, be it their allegation against Bangladesh of supporting north eastern insurgents or alleged movement of economic migrants from Bangladesh to India or alleged cross border movement of Islamist terrorists, the political masters may be compelled to yield to their own Frankenstein. A large military, properly prepared, could be a readymade tool of utility for limited or bigger action. The Indian military had been and still is subservient to the political masters, as it is supposed to be.
But, even in such worst case scenario for Bangladesh, unleashing of the big neighbour's military would be constrained by their conventional worries in the West and in the North, and other international factors. A full scale conventional offensive normally requires 3:1 force ratio in favour of the attacker. In 1971, the allied forces won with about 2:1 force ratio in their favour; the lack of critical numbers were made up for by the supporting guerilla activities of the freedom fighters and the mass popular support. If there is any aggression against Bangladesh with whatever better force ratio the aggressor can muster, the latter two crucial factors would be in the defender's side. Those could be Bangladesh's game changer in a worst case scenario.
Bangladesh doesn't have to react too strongly at this upcoming raising of the new India strike corps in the sub-region, neither should it turn a blind eye to that for we don't want to be caught off-guard at any time in future, like India itself was in 1962. Diplomacy and defence preparation, including contingency strategic planning and suitable geo-strategic posturing, must work in synergy to avoid any probability of national security debacle — albeit fairly remote, yet not impossible. Therefore, the recent expansion and hardware purchase schemes declared for the Bangladesh armed forces seemingly has another angle to be looked at, albeit incidental, apart from the pervasive suspicion about the incumbent government's attempt to appease this perceptibly powerful state organ in this divisive political environment.
New strike corps in the Indian North East
Dinesh_Kumar
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Re: New strike corps in the Indian North East
Wat is ORBAT for Strike Corps in IA, compared to holding corps?
Wat is ORBAT for Strike Corps in IA, compared to holding corps?
