Modernisation of Indian Army Infantry

[WolfPack86]

OFB Looks at Replacing Ageing INSAS Rifles; to Get 1.86 lakh 7.62-mm Automatic Rifles
Kolkata: The Ordnance Factories Board (ODB) on Monday said it was set to receive orders for around 1.86 lakh of its newly developed 7.62-mm automatic rifles from the Army to replace the ageing INSAS rifles.

The Army has sought approximately 8 lakh 7.62x51 mm assault rifles, out of which 72,000 rifles will be immediately purchased through global tender, OFB member (Weapons, Vehicles and Equipment) Hari Mohan said.

"Of the remaining nearly 7.3 lakh rifles, the armed forces will go for Request for Proposal (RFP) route from around the globe for 75 per cent of its requirement, while the OFB will get orders for the rest 25 per cent," he told newspersons in Kolkata.

He said the OFB would also participate in the RFP tendering process.

OFB chairman S K Chourasia said, "Ordnance factories would receive orders for approximately 1.86 lakh of the Army's 7.62 mm rifle requirement".

The nodal factory for the purpose would be Rifle Factory, Ishapore, West Bengal, he said.

"Trials for the newly developed rifle has been completed and the Army is happy with the weapon," Mohan said.

He said further trials of the prototype developed by OFB in a larger scale will be done soon, following which production of the rifle will commence.

Chourasia said the Army and paramilitary forces at present use the 5.56 mm INSAS rifles, which are built for the purpose of shooting to incapacitate.

"But now with the changing security scenario and requirements, the Army has sought a rifle for 'shoot to kill' purpose to replace the INSAS," Chourasia said, adding the forces now need guns of higher calibre which are more lethal like the 7.62x51 mm assault rifles.

The INSAS rifles were introduced by OFB in 1992-93 and has undergone 23 improvements, with the latest version being the 1B1 model.

OFB member Saurav Kumar said the organisation had received orders of Rs 250 crore for exports of different weapons and equipments in 2017-18 and has so far supplied items worth Rs 190 crore.

He said the exports have been to Gulf and South-East Asian countries, but did not specify the countries to which the weapons were being sold owing to confidentiality reasons.

Speaking on the occasion of its 217th foundation day, Chourasia said the goal of OFB, which has achieved 87 per cent overall indigenisation, is of transformation from an importer to that of an exporter.

"There has been a paradigm shift in defence procurement in our country and we have to compete with the private sector to get orders for weaponry and other equipments," he said.

The OFB chairman said for the purpose of meeting the present day requirements, all the 41 ordnance factories spread across the country were being constantly upgraded with an emphasis on research and development.

Ordnance Factories Board (OFB) consisting of the Indian Ordnance Factories is an industrial organisation, functioning under the Department of Defence Production of Ministry of Defence.

https://www.news18.com/news/india/ofb-looks-at-replacing-ageing-insas-rifles-to-get-1-86-lakh-7-62-mm-automatic-rifles-1694201.html

 

[Corvus Splendens]

OFB Looks at Replacing Ageing INSAS Rifles; to Get 1.86 lakh 7.62-mm Automatic Rifles
Kolkata: The Ordnance Factories Board (ODB) on Monday said it was set to receive orders for around 1.86 lakh of its newly developed 7.62-mm automatic rifles from the Army to replace the ageing INSAS rifles.

The Army has sought approximately 8 lakh 7.62x51 mm assault rifles, out of which 72,000 rifles will be immediately purchased through global tender, OFB member (Weapons, Vehicles and Equipment) Hari Mohan said.

"Of the remaining nearly 7.3 lakh rifles, the armed forces will go for Request for Proposal (RFP) route from around the globe for 75 per cent of its requirement, while the OFB will get orders for the rest 25 per cent," he told newspersons in Kolkata.

He said the OFB would also participate in the RFP tendering process.

OFB chairman S K Chourasia said, "Ordnance factories would receive orders for approximately 1.86 lakh of the Army's 7.62 mm rifle requirement".

The nodal factory for the purpose would be Rifle Factory, Ishapore, West Bengal, he said.

"Trials for the newly developed rifle has been completed and the Army is happy with the weapon," Mohan said.

He said further trials of the prototype developed by OFB in a larger scale will be done soon, following which production of the rifle will commence.

Chourasia said the Army and paramilitary forces at present use the 5.56 mm INSAS rifles, which are built for the purpose of shooting to incapacitate.

"But now with the changing security scenario and requirements, the Army has sought a rifle for 'shoot to kill' purpose to replace the INSAS," Chourasia said, adding the forces now need guns of higher calibre which are more lethal like the 7.62x51 mm assault rifles.

The INSAS rifles were introduced by OFB in 1992-93 and has undergone 23 improvements, with the latest version being the 1B1 model.

OFB member Saurav Kumar said the organisation had received orders of Rs 250 crore for exports of different weapons and equipments in 2017-18 and has so far supplied items worth Rs 190 crore.

He said the exports have been to Gulf and South-East Asian countries, but did not specify the countries to which the weapons were being sold owing to confidentiality reasons.

Speaking on the occasion of its 217th foundation day, Chourasia said the goal of OFB, which has achieved 87 per cent overall indigenisation, is of transformation from an importer to that of an exporter.

"There has been a paradigm shift in defence procurement in our country and we have to compete with the private sector to get orders for weaponry and other equipments," he said.

The OFB chairman said for the purpose of meeting the present day requirements, all the 41 ordnance factories spread across the country were being constantly upgraded with an emphasis on research and development.

Ordnance Factories Board (OFB) consisting of the Indian Ordnance Factories is an industrial organisation, functioning under the Department of Defence Production of Ministry of Defence.

https://www.news18.com/news/india/ofb-looks-at-replacing-ageing-insas-rifles-to-get-1-86-lakh-7-62-mm-automatic-rifles-1694201.html

 

[Fire and groove]

with that statement of yours you just proved what an ignorant you are. You have competently ignored IA’s decades of counterinsurgency experience, 4 wars, and numerous skirmishes. Not to mention the annual combat training exercises they have undertaken.

You know nothing about IA. So before you make another stupid asinine comment about the IA I strongly encourage you to read up IA’s battle history and avoid putting your foot into your mouth.

Decades of combat experience yet we just figured out the importance of theaterisation and combined arms like half a decade ago. Still no joint training centers for standardised combined arms training for brigade level operations either, the only thing coming close being the occasional scripted excercises. Also as part of our extensive counter-insurgency experience, the military still hasn't realised the importance of a proper special operations apparatus.
Personal experience is pointless and lost as soon as those troops leave unless institutionalised, which doesn't happen because there is no importance attached to tactical research and doctrinal development, or white papers, or staff officers and their development period. There's barely even a field manual out there and standards are up in the wind, built on anecdotal experience alone instead of scientific methodology.
Troops are poorly trained under outdated methodology and curriculum where they're beaten into submission through "ragdas". They're trained in pointless bayonet combat yet critical fundamentals like radio communication and signals ettiquete isn't taught unless you're working signals, albiet the proper SOP and terminology surrounding comms itself is mostly non-existent. Combat shooting within the wider infantry is so shoddy it's not even funny, importance of footwork isn't even acknowledged, recoil control isn't taken seriously at all, there's no urgency or sense of timing in the maneuvers either.

 

[karn]

Depends on who the infantryman is. NCOs are usually versed enough having attended additional courses but jawans tend to struggle.

Lol .. keep your gyan to your self ..
flanking and plunging fire are taught as additional courses ?

 

[SGOperative]

Decades of combat experience yet we just figured out the importance of theaterisation and combined arms like half a decade ago.

We figured that out long time ago, Alot of delay from all sides, stuff like this are not forced up so easily considering our active borders.

Also as part of our extensive counter-insurgency experience, the military still hasn't realised the importance of a proper special operations apparatus

The Special Operation Apparatus for us has been largely the same keeping in mind the overall combat scenario which we could face and the roles are rightly assigned till now in a broader context.

Personal experience is pointless and lost as soon as those troops leave unless institutionalised, which doesn't happen because there is no importance attached to tactical research and doctrinal development, or white papers, or staff officers and their development period

War College ever heard of that? Your Corps battle schools were a result of early insurgency.

There's barely even a field manual out there and standards are up in the wind, built on anecdotal experience alone instead of scientific methodology

Anecdotal Experiences are as important as the Scientific ones, If Multiple guys are having same experience you might wanna revisit your methodology again.

Troops are poorly trained under outdated methodology and curriculum where they're beaten into submission through "ragdas"

A strong statement you are putting out, also Ragdas serve a very different purpose than you think.

They're trained in pointless bayonet combat

Battle of Tololing ka naam suna hai?

yet critical fundamentals like radio communication and signals ettiquete isn't taught unless you're working signals, albiet the proper SOP and terminology surrounding comms itself is mostly non-existent

Every team has their radio guy

Combat shooting within the wider infantry is so shoddy it's not even funny, importance of footwork isn't even acknowledged, recoil control isn't taken seriously at all, there's no urgency or sense of timing in the maneuvers either

And on what basis you are claiming this?

hawa me kuch bhi imaginary scenarios banake bol na hai bas

 

[Angel of War]

Decades of combat experience yet we just figured out the importance of theaterisation and combined arms like half a decade ago. Still no joint training centers for standardised combined arms training for brigade level operations either, the only thing coming close being the occasional scripted excercises. Also as part of our extensive counter-insurgency experience, the military still hasn't realised the importance of a proper special operations apparatus.
Personal experience is pointless and lost as soon as those troops leave unless institutionalised, which doesn't happen because there is no importance attached to tactical research and doctrinal development, or white papers, or staff officers and their development period. There's barely even a field manual out there and standards are up in the wind, built on anecdotal experience alone instead of scientific methodology.
Troops are poorly trained under outdated methodology and curriculum where they're beaten into submission through "ragdas". They're trained in pointless bayonet combat yet critical fundamentals like radio communication and signals ettiquete isn't taught unless you're working signals, albiet the proper SOP and terminology surrounding comms itself is mostly non-existent. Combat shooting within the wider infantry is so shoddy it's not even funny, importance of footwork isn't even acknowledged, recoil control isn't taken seriously at all, there's no urgency or sense of timing in the maneuvers either.

My god you havent done your research . Itni saari assumptions ! Things don't work on assumptions dear .

 

[vidhwanshak]

I don't think there is problem with training methadology.

 

[Angel of War]

Still no joint training centers for standardised combined arms training for brigade level operations either,

JTCs ? Are bhai mere During war games we divide our Brigades into brigade battle groups . These are formed by splitting divisional support elements and integrating them with brigades ! Abhi Abhi Exercise dakshin Shakti mei kar ke dikhaya hai ! We've been doing this for 15 years atleast !

the only thing coming close being the occasional scripted excercises.

Only a person who hasn't done his research would say that . Firstly , these exercises aren't occasional , all corps do it once an year . Secondly , these are done in Realistic scenarios where multiple divisions/brigades are pitted against one another as a part of corps level exercises. Each with their own tactics and plan. One side plays as the enemy . After these war games are over their results are thoroughly compiled and analysed and then measures are taken to improve performance and new tactics are evolved .

Also as part of our extensive counter-insurgency experience, the military still hasn't realised the importance of a proper special operations apparatus.

Army's Job isn't counter insurgency , it was a role we were forced to take due to the prevailing circumstances , it still remains a secondary concern and is not viewed seriously by the south block , army still expects CAPFs to improve their capabilities so that they can take over CI ops duties from army. Our job is fighting wars not militia men ! Our SFs were meant to do sabotage ope behind enemy lines not CI ops .

Personal experience is pointless and lost as soon as those troops leave unless institutionalised, which doesn't happen because there is no importance attached to tactical research and doctrinal development, or white papers, or staff officers and their development period.

That's An insult for all Specialist warfare schools that we've setup be it HAWS or Commando school , belgaum or Army War college . These institutions develop the doctrines For land warfare strategies and are extensively involved in tactical research.

There's barely even a field manual out there and standards are up in the wind, built on anecdotal experience alone instead of scientific methodology.

Which army in this world operates without a field manual for it's ground troops ? Just because you can't get it on internet dosen't mean that it does not exist !

Troops are poorly trained under outdated methodology and curriculum where they're beaten into submission through "ragdas".

What do you mean by outdated methodology? Define it.

They're trained in pointless bayonet combat yet critical fundamentals like radio communication and signals ettiquete isn't taught unless you're working signals, albiet the proper SOP and terminology surrounding comms itself is mostly non-existent.

What do you think the corps of signals exists for ? PS - Every Infantry battalion has a signals platoon.

Combat shooting within the wider infantry is so shoddy it's not even funny, importance of footwork isn't even acknowledged, recoil control isn't taken seriously at all, there's no urgency or sense of timing in the maneuvers either.

Blah blah all nonsense so shoddy this and that ! You're gonna teach them ?



Thodi research karlo pehle

 

[Angel of War]

I don't think there is problem with training methadology.

Ofcouse bro , He dosen't know half the stuff . Jo internet pe nahi mila wo exist hi nahi karta is his logic. He should've done research about the army before writing such a long and inaccurate post

 

[Love Charger]

Ofcouse bro , He dosen't know half the stuff . Jo internet pe nahi mila wo exist hi nahi karta is his logic. He should've done research about the army before writing such a long and inaccurate post

Jisne kabhi bandook na uthai ho , usko army ki training ne nuks nai nikalne chaiye
Aisa mera manna hai , aap sab ki raaye alag ho sakti hai

 

[SGOperative]

Compared with the small-caliber rifle bullets used by China, the United States and Russia, the 7.2×39 bullet is almost completely backward.

We are talking about the Effective range for a Infantry man on the western border of India and the advantage and disadvantages of either wont make that big of a difference there.

I think the reason for India to re-use the 7.62×39 cartridge as a future rifle cartridge is that the production process is simpler and easier to mass-produce

Some MOD guy liked it nothing else, you can stop thinking

 

[Fire and groove]

JTCs ? Are bhai mere During war games we divide our Brigades into brigade battle groups . These are formed by splitting divisional support elements and integrating them with brigades ! Abhi Abhi Exercise dakshin Shakti mei kar ke dikhaya hai ! We've been doing this for 15 years atleast !

Excercises/war games that offer value in subjective scenarios and training courses which have your tactics built around your doctrine are vastly different. Excercises are meant to evaluate first and foremost and offer course corrections, they cannot replace actual training itself. If excercises were all that was needed, no one would waste time and money building up multiple training centers for combined arms operations.

Army's Job isn't counter insurgency , it was a role we were forced to take due to the prevailing circumstances , it still remains a secondary concern and is not viewed seriously by the south block , army still expects CAPFs to improve their capabilities so that they can take over CI ops duties from army. Our job is fighting wars not militia men ! Our SFs were meant to do sabotage ope behind enemy lines not CI ops .

So trivial that the military raised an entire unit to spearhead COIN ops and has invested it's best equipment into it along with mandatory service for officers. COIN ops have been at the very center of discussion in the Indian military, it's never been a "sidepiece" of an issue. SOF are meant for unconventional operations and exceed in COIN when used properly, direct action operations behind enemy lines is just one facet of that job which ignores several other roles including FID.

Which army in this world operates without a field manual for it's ground troops ? Just because you can't get it on internet dosen't mean that it does not exist !

Ours? And it certainly doesn't exist mate. A field manual would be the centralisation of training standards and TACSOP which in turn requires an existing and comprehensive doctrine, which doesn't really exist. And there's nothing secretive about small unit tactics and radio operational protocols, which have been well established for decades now if you're looking and wouldn't require jumpimg through hoops to access. Hell you can even find american field manuals for JTAC protocols pretty easily, a certification that doesn't even exist in the Indian military.

What do you think the corps of signals exists for ? PS - Every Infantry battalion has a signals platoon.

We're not talking about battalion level communications here. EVERY infantryman should be equipped and trained to communicate with radios over an intra-squad net bare minimum. Communication and coordination is quite literally central to tactical and operational effectiveness. The signals platoon should exist as the battalions TOC itself, not just as a glorified carrier pigeon.

What do you mean by outdated methodology? Define it.

Physically beating and humiliating troops into submission as a form of "discipline" as i mentioned before, emphasis on regimental training without existing oversight leading to standards and curriculum being all over the place with ARTAC being responsible solely for basic training, officers being trained through tactical excercises without troops in the academy, no proper grading system and tracking, emphasis on superficial skills (marching, bayonet training etc.) Under-developed JCOs and over-emphasis of officers in tactical operations, lack of specialisation courses and roles etc.

Blah blah all nonsense so shoddy this and that ! You're gonna teach them ?

That's not a rebuttal, and it doesn't take a genius to teach rifle marksmanship. Hell, 2-3 days of consistent training with safety manipulation and dry firing alone would reap great benefits.

 

[Angel of War]

Excercises/war games that offer value in subjective scenarios and training courses which have your tactics built around your doctrine are vastly different. Excercises are meant to evaluate first and foremost and offer course corrections, they cannot replace actual training itself. If excercises were all that was needed, no one would waste time and money building up multiple training centers for combined arms operations.

So you're saying army should abandon all war games and make it's personnel sit on a table to study . War games is what validates your strategy and it is what promotes institutional changes after compilation of results ! Combined arms ops are exactly what is validated during war games !
Itne doubt hai to kisi fauji se puchlo

So trivial that the military raised an entire unit to spearhead COIN ops and has invested it's best equipment into it along with mandatory service for officers. COIN ops have been at the very center of discussion in the Indian military, it's never been a "sidepiece" of an issue.

COIN ops have never been the centre of discussion at army HQ , never was , never will be . RR was raised because of inability of CAPFs to handle the Kashmir insurgency , now the insurgency is down to managable levels so army is planning to downsize RR and in time wil abandon it's CI ops doctrine altogether once our CAPFs are capable enough . We have seen how an RR Force was moved to Ladakh for conventional role recently , they are essentially leaving their CI duties to take up a more important role .
Who told you CI ops is mandatory for officers ?

SOF are meant for unconventional operations and exceed in COIN when used properly, direct action operations behind enemy lines is just one facet of that job which ignores several other roles including FID.

SFs are meant to do sabotage of enemy lines of communication and long range recce of enemy troop concentations , not CI ops ! They are meant to do something like chachro not nagrota !

Ours? And it certainly doesn't exist mate. A field manual would be the centralisation of training standards and TACSOP which in turn requires an existing and comprehensive doctrine, which doesn't really exist.

Again I'll say aapko pata kuch hai nahi aur baate karte ho. You think army is full of fools who haven't made this stuff ?

And there's nothing secretive about small unit tactics and radio operational protocols, which have been well established for decades now if you're looking and wouldn't require jumpimg through hoops to access.

My god , I have already told you the answer , every unit has a signals platoon responsible for providing communication to all the platoons and companies in the unit and relaying information to higher HQ . Every platoon has a radio operator too

not talking about battalion level communications here. EVERY infantryman should be equipped and trained to communicate with radios over an intra-squad net bare minimum. Communication and coordination is quite literally central to tactical and operational effectiveness. The signals platoon should exist as the battalions TOC itself, not just as a glorified carrier pigeon.

We are already doing that , I've told you that and so has @SGOperative about this radio thing . There are troops in the battalion specifically assigned for this job . You sholddn't Waste your Time writing these inaccurate replies if you don't know a thing about the army . We have platoon level communications and our battalions have 24*7 situational awareness because of BFSRs and Drones .

Physically beating and humiliating troops into submission as a form of "discipline" as i mentioned before, emphasis on regimental training without existing oversight leading to standards and curriculum being all over the place with ARTAC being responsible solely for basic training, officers being trained through tactical excercises without troops in the academy, no proper grading system and tracking, emphasis on superficial skills (marching, bayonet training etc.)

That Physical Punishment is ragda and it's an absolute Must , Ragdga is not beating ok , you don't even know what ragda is , it is doing something like road rolling , night Time route march With heavy load , getting into maharaja position . Ragda isn't about slapping or kicking. You're uninformed and your views are highly delusional

Under-developed JCOs and over-emphasis of officers in tactical operations, lack of specialisation courses and roles etc.

Do you how many years a Soldier has to work to become a JCO ? They are the mpst experienced people in any unit And are highly respected by all thr Officers In a unit . Yes , we rely on officers for tactical Operations And it's importAnt to Keep doing this so that control over a unit is maintained By Officers , but officers Are not engaged in section level ops .
we are not the US army Which has strong NCO culture .

That's not a rebuttal, and it doesn't take a genius to teach rifle marksmanship. Hell, 2-3 days of consistent training with safety manipulation and dry firing alone would reap great benefits.

What makes you think they aren't doing that ? Do you think that we are some ragtag militia or what ! You Know absolutely Nothing !

 

[SGOperative]

We have platoon level communications and our battalions have 24*7 situational awareness because of BFSRs and Drones

Every section which goes out has the communication tool, according to Jay a good portion (1/3rd or 1/2 cant remember) of the the Helmets ordered from MKU had integrated communication set

 

[Fire and groove]

So you're saying army should abandon all war games and make it's personnel sit on a table to study . War games is what validates your strategy and it is what promotes institutional changes after compilation of results ! Combined arms ops are exactly what is validated during war games !
Itne doubt hai to kisi fauji se puchlo

No part of my paragraph stated that war-games and excercises should be abandoned, i stated the difference in their value compared to a joint training center. Read carefully.

COIN ops have never been the centre of discussion at army HQ , never was , never will be . RR was raised because of inability of CAPFs to handle the Kashmir insurgency , now the insurgency is down to managable levels so army is planning to downsize RR and in time wil abandon it's CI ops doctrine altogether once our CAPFs are capable enough . We have seen how an RR Force was moved to Ladakh for conventional role recently , they are essentially leaving their CI duties to take up a more important role .
Who told you CI ops is mandatory for officers ?

RR was raised because the army was bogged in COIN operations over maintaining borders, it arguably failed in that respect since the RR ended up ballooning anyway and consumes a significant portion of combat personnel. Officers have mandatory obligations to serve in RR or AR at some point in their career. Somebody apparantly as omniscient about the Indian military as you would know that. Putting that aside, the entirety of nothern command has it's attention devoted to managing the border and planning out COIN fundamentals in mutual support, there's mountains of public media and publications by former and active servicemen in that regard. If the entire restructuring and raising of a CI unit, formulation of operational phases on the strategic level and heavy emphasis of service in these units especially by officers isn't convincing enough then it's pointless going any further.

SFs are meant to do sabotage of enemy lines of communication and long range recce of enemy troop concentations , not CI ops ! They are meant to do something like chachro not nagrota !

That doesn't make a unit a special operations force, it just makes it an elite commando unit. Special operations are nuanced and include roles and skills that conventional militaries aren't capable of. Rear area disruption alone ISN'T a special operations role, if it was then the Para airborne reg and Ghatak platoons alone would be sufficient in that role. The most blaring counter to your arguement is that CAG, one of the most prominent special operations units across the world was raised as a premiere CT unit; or that the US Army Special Forces exist primarily for FID. And you're scope of viability of the SF in COIN is extremely limited, where instead of operating in land the SF could be disrupting insurgent logistics and C&C across the border, collecting intel through CTR and developing/exploiting assets.

My god , I have already told you the answer , every unit has a signals platoon responsible for providing communication to all the platoons and companies in the unit and relaying information to higher HQ . Every platoon has a radio operator too

Which is completely missing the point, which had to do with the fact that if field manuals existed you wouldn't have seen the Indian military try to hide protocols for what is an already extremely fleshed out aspect of combat. Field manuals exist to set a base standard for protocols and training and as reference and require a doctrinal foundation to be built off of, if people have trouble accessing them then it's kinda pointless. Your arguement hinges on "the military would have thought of something as obvious as that", but then again of that was salient the military would have also thought of something far more obvious as building a doctrine on how it aims to fight wars in the first place, which it only started very recently with the underdeveloped Land Warfare Doctrine.

We are already doing that , I've told you that and so has @SGOperative about this radio thing . There are troops in the battalion specifically assigned for this job . You sholddn't Waste your Time writing these inaccurate replies if you don't know a thing about the army . We have platoon level communications and our battalions have 24*7 situational awareness because of BFSRs and Drones .

How do you not comprehend "inter-section/inter-squad communications" and their necessity in small unit tactics, instead repeating the same old line of battalion communications architecture? Like according to you, how is a section meant to communicate with individual teammates when they split into fireteams? Telepathy? You do realise that for complex small unit tactics every soldier needs to have access to a radio right? So that fireteams can coordinate over a distance?

That Physical Punishment is ragda and it's an absolute Must , Ragdga is not beating ok , you don't even know what ragda is , it is doing something like road rolling , night Time route march With heavy load , getting into maharaja position . Ragda isn't about slapping or kicking. You're uninformed and your views are highly delusional

There's a tendency in the Indian military to take ragda too far beyond meaningful gain. The purpose of "breaking" a person in the military is so that they can be remolded. This requires extreme amounts of mental, not physical stress, which can otherwise impede the development of a candidate. For instance, rolling on the asphalt shirtless for hours doesn't bring any value beyond as punishment. On the other hand, being forced to do the same obstacle course till you can barely stand or being verbally assaulted by multiple instructors has value. This doesn't even cover all my other points.

Do you how many years a Soldier has to work to become a JCO ? They are the mpst experienced people in any unit And are highly respected by all thr Officers In a unit . Yes , we rely on officers for tactical Operations And it's importAnt to Keep doing this so that control over a unit is maintained By Officers , but officers Are not engaged in section level ops .
we are not the US army Which has strong NCO culture

That in no way counters my points. JCOs are indeed the most experienced personnel in a platoon, but they're still underdeveloped for their role. JCOs should be in charge if managing all aspects of the tactical sphere, while the officers managing the command and control aspect of the operations. Instead you have a system where officers quite literally lead from the front and end up forgoing their most important role. JCOs are very much the back-bone of a modern army and have continued to be ever since the days of Moltke.

What makes you think they aren't doing that ? Do you think that we are some ragtag militia or what ! You Know absolutely Nothing !

There isn't training in active safety manipulation when ready to shoot, nor is there training in proper utilisation of cover for instance. Keep in mind safety manipulation here means switching from safe to semi-auto when you're about to shoot, not when you're in combat conditions itself. Some serious force on force would probably be a wake-up call.

 

[Angel of War]

No part of my paragraph stated that war-games and excercises should be abandoned, i stated the difference in their value compared to a joint training center. Read carefully.

You said that Exercises were Occasional and scripted , don't change your words . You don't even know what army exercises are . And you keep talking about JTCs , you yourself don't know heck about what are combined arms operations and how they are coordinated . Combined arms training is carried out in these exercises . NATO JTC focuses on joint and combined training at the tactical level. and that is what we essentially do in a field exercise !

RR was raised because the army was bogged in COIN operations over maintaining borders, it arguably failed in that respect since the RR ended up ballooning anyway and consumes a significant portion of combat personnel.

RR was raised because CAPFs failed to deliver good performance in CI ops , RR was formed to overcome the shortcomings and gaps left by the CAPFs and Interior forces in Kashmir .

Officers have mandatory obligations to serve in RR or AR at some point in their career. Somebody apparantly as omniscient about the Indian military as you would know that.

lol , some 30% of officers I know have served the RR . No one is obligated to serve RR or AR once in their career , especially not in Combat Support arms which form the largest portion of the officer corps .

Putting that aside, the entirety of nothern command has it's attention devoted to managing the border and planning out COIN fundamentals in mutual support, there's mountains of public media and publications by former and active servicemen in that regard.

Northern Command is primarily tasked with maintaining a detterence posture along the LoC and LAC . CI ops is again a role they were forced to take up because of the circumstances at that time . Ask any general what CI ops mean for the army . They'll tell you what I am telling you .

If the entire restructuring and raising of a CI unit, formulation of operational phases on the strategic level and heavy emphasis of service in these units especially by officers isn't convincing enough then it's pointless going any further.

Service in these units isn't mandatory as I've clarified . What Do you mean by" formation of operational phases at strategic level ? " CI ops aren't something which make a difference at the strategic level of operations . They are purely tactical in nature .

That doesn't make a unit a special operations force, it just makes it an elite commando unit.

That's what they were meant to do and that's what they should be doing . Para SF was even raised as an elite commando unit before the designation was changed to SF. Either you raise a true elite tier 1 force free from the army's control which can actually do that .

Special operations are nuanced and include roles and skills that conventional militaries aren't capable of. Rear area disruption alone ISN'T a special operations role, if it was then the Para airborne reg and Ghatak platoons alone would be sufficient in that role. The most blaring counter to your arguement is that CAG, one of the most prominent special operations units across the world was raised as a premiere CT unit; or that the US Army Special Forces exist primarily for FID. .

What exactly do we have in common with the US army that you are comparing us with them ? We aren't the guys who hunt for Osamas and Baghdadis . We are a force which can only project power in it's neighborhood . If you want a Pure Field intervention SF force then create one , para SF has the same role as PLA SOFs . They are attatched with corps for special Operations during ops at the Corps level . Example - 10 para SF is meant to be supporting XII corps in its operations .let's say they are supossed to carry out a recce of the deployment patterns of the mechanised brigades of 25 mech division under V corps and identify potential gaps between the brigades which can be used as a thrust point for launching an armoured assault into their territory .

kinda pointless. Your arguement hinges on "the military would have thought of something as obvious as that", but then again of that was salient the military would have also thought of something far more obvious as building a doctrine on how it aims to fight wars in the first place, which it only started very recently with the underdeveloped Land Warfare Doctrine.

We do have a land warfare doctrine and anyone who is well informed about the military would know that . We have had doctrines since the time we came into existence and they have been changing over time . What we don't have is a National Security Strategy .

How do you not comprehend "inter-section/inter-squad communications" and their necessity in small unit tactics, instead repeating the same old line of battalion communications architecture?

Communications already exist at thr Squad Level as @SGOperative has clarified twice or thrice !

Like according to you, how is a section meant to communicate with individual teammates when they split into fireteams?
Telepathy? You do realise that for complex small unit tactics every soldier needs to have access to a radio right? So that fireteams can coordinate over a distance?

What part of my previous replies you haven't umderstood in this regard ! I have clarified that all tacitcal formations including platoons and Sections have access to communication Equipment ! I am sick of telling you this multiple times .

There's a tendency in the Indian military to take ragda too far beyond meaningful gain. The purpose of "breaking" a person in the military is so that they can be remolded. This requires extreme amounts of mental, not physical stress, which can otherwise impede the development of a candidate. For instance, rolling on the asphalt shirtless for hours doesn't bring any value beyond as punishment. On the other hand, being forced to do the same obstacle course till you can barely stand or being verbally assaulted by multiple instructors has value. This doesn't even cover all my other points.

By your logic SAS should abandon it's recuitment process since it's too tough for recruits to withstand mentally and physically.

That in no way counters my points. JCOs are indeed the most experienced personnel in a platoon, but they're still underdeveloped for their role. JCOs should be in charge if managing all aspects of the tactical sphere,
while the officers managing the command and control aspect of the operations. Instead you have a system where officers quite literally lead from the front and end up forgoing their most important role.

Junior Officers are supposed to lead operations at the platoon level and JCOs advise them and guide them in these operations , do you think an officer who hasn't ever even led a platoon in operations can have the experience to lead a Battalion ?

JCOs are very much the back-bone of a modern army and have continued to be ever since the days of Moltke.

Not in all cases unless you are talking about NATO armies which have sadly become undisciplined due to loss of control over soldiers by the officer corps . If you want a disciplined military you need officers capable of controlling jawans at the grassroot level .

There isn't training in active safety manipulation when ready to shoot, nor is there training in proper utilisation of cover for instance.

No training for proper utilisation of cover ? Heck ! now I am convined you haven't ever witnessed their training . This is one of the basic things taught at the Corps Battle school

 

[Angel of War]

Every section which goes out has the communication tool, according to Jay a good portion (1/3rd or 1/2 cant remember) of the the Helmets ordered from MKU had integrated communication set

@Fire and groove isn't able to understand this , he keeps insisting on building imaginary communications capabilities at squad level when we already have them . I don't have trust on some of our military hardware but I have Complete trust on the Communications capabilities of our units . Remember how 16 bihar assembled troops from the nearby medium regiment despite not being at the same location and that too in not a very long time

 

[karn]

Similar to the state of China in the past, the equipment is very cheap, but China will at least equip the front-line troops with bulletproof vests, although the quality is not good,
One of the advantages of India is that it allows soldiers to purchase their own equipment. The Chinese army does not allow it. There are strict regulations on what to put in each position on the tactical vest.

You see this as an advantage.. the members here see it very differently

 

[Angel of War]

Similar to the state of China in the past, the equipment is very cheap, but China will at least equip the front-line troops with bulletproof vests, although the quality is not good,
One of the advantages of India is that it allows soldiers to purchase their own equipment. The Chinese army does not allow it. There are strict regulations on what to put in each position on the tactical vest.

The chinese army is going the right way . There should be a standard set of equipment available for each soldier . This is not a drawback , rather an advantage

 

[Blademaster]

The chinese army is going the right way . There should be a standard set of equipment available for each soldier . This is not a drawback , rather an advantage

Makes it for ease of supply & logistics. A professional army think of logistics first while an amateur army think of tactics and latest capabilities.