III. THE ATTACK
The Israeli strike on Osiraq ranks among the most important aerial bombardments
of the twentieth century. Every nation seeking to acquire nuclear weapons took notice,
especially those in the Middle East. This strike added fuel to a region already ablaze with
turmoil. According to Jason Burke, "In 1979"¦several massive events shook the Muslim
world: a peace deal between Israel and Egypt, the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, and the occupation of the grand mosque at Mecca by a radical
Wahhabi group."26 In 1981, Israel's strike was yet another unsettling event in a region
still marred by conflict. This chapter examines how Israel attacked Osiraq, and why the
means and timing Israel chose for this attack are important. The chapter first examines
Israeli political pressures influencing the attack timing. Next, it examines the alternatives
Israel had to carry out this strike and the problems involved in each choice. Finally, the
chapter describes Israel's tactical execution of the attack and its immediate strategic
impact. The chapter concludes that Israel was the only country in the region that had the
means to accomplish this demanding strike and chose the timing of the strike primarily in
response to domestic political pressures.
A. SETTING THE STAGE
Israel can take virtually no action without significant ramifications beyond its
borders. It must constantly weigh domestic political demands against regional threats
and U.S. Middle East policies.
Israel had no shortage of international and domestic political constraints as it
contemplated, planned, and executed the strike on Osiraq. Mired by the first Intifada,
growing tensions in Lebanon, surface-to-air-missiles in the Beka'a valley, the volatile
Egyptian peace process, and facing enormous inflation domestically, Israeli policymakers
found each decision crucially interconnected. Israel faced Knesset elections in 1981
amidst these building security concerns.
26Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda : Casting the Shadow of Terror (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003), 54.
26
1. Prime Minister's Role in Foreign Policy
Israeli Foreign Policy is usually opaque and reactive. Driven by a myriad of
factors, the primary author of Israeli Foreign Policy is the Prime Minister. According to
Lewis Brownstein, "Since the establishment of the state in 1948, Israeli foreign policy
decision making has tended to be highly personalized, politicized, reactive, ad hoc, and
unsystematic."27 The Prime Minister's relative power within the Israeli coalitional
government is the prevailing feature on foreign and security matters.
The Prime Minister's control is a function of personality, political authority vis-Ã vis
other Israeli political elites, public confidence and publicly perceived security
environment. Brownstein implies the formative years of Prime Minister David Ben-
Gurion established the dominant role of the Prime Minister in Israel's foreign policy
formulation. "Improvisation was the rule because it was the only choice. There can be
no question that the memory of those years and of the monumental successes"¦resulted
in a collective memory on the part of the leadership. It would be difficult to
overemphasize the influence of those years on the pattern of Israel's decision-making in
foreign policy."28 Consequently, Israeli foreign policy ebbs and flows primarily with
Prime Ministerial decisions.
The Prime Minister's decisions are responsive to his coalitional government.
Therefore, domestic political factors within Israel drive foreign policy, counter to
Brownstein's theory. However, the Prime Minister is the pre-eminent member of the
policy elite with the foremost say on the direction of foreign policy, but his power
extends only as far as the Knesset allows. According to Juliet Kaarbo, "Executive power
is concentrated in the prime minister and the cabinet. While legitimacy lies with the
parliament and the cabinet must maintain the confidence of the legislative assembly, the
power to initiate and carry out policy making is to be found in the cabinet." For
parliamentary democracies Kaarbo contends, "Power and resources are more fragmented
27Lewis Brownstein, "Decision Making in Israeli Foreign Policy: An Unplanned Process," Political
Science Quarterly 92, no. 2 (Summer 1977): 260.
28Ibid.: 267.
27
and are divided along policy or ideological party lines."29 The Prime Minister must
constantly weigh driving security matters against his resident authority within the
coalition government.
2. Israeli Political Pressures
Prime Minister Menachem Begin drove Israeli Foreign Policy starting in 1977.
His Likud party came to power in Israel after several smaller political parties won enough
seats in the 1977 Knesset elections to overthrow the Labor majority. Rabin lost due to
allegations of corruption, political in-fighting and mediocre policy decisions. Zachary
Lockman states, "[Begin's] new talent and new policies were to replace the stagnations
and entrenched machinery of the Labor Party bureaucracy which had dominated Israel for
decades."30 Begin gained the confidence of the National Religious Party based on his
uncompromising foreign policy stance.
Israeli Foreign Policy in 1981 reflected the hard-line attitude of Prime Minister
Begin. Indeed, Begin kept his hard-line policy direction throughout his time in office.
He could remain relatively sheltered in his foreign policy for several reasons. According
to Brownstein, "Israel has no independent 'think tanks' or councils where academics and
government officials can come together to exchange views."31 In addition, the Likud
party had virtually none of the academic communication links the Labor party possessed.
Nor, did the Likud party foster any interaction among academia and government
decisionmakers. The cabinet remained moderately sheltered and the Prime Minister was
one-step further secluded than his cabinet. Hence, Menachem Begin deserved his
reputation as an autocratic leader who rarely sought advice from his cabinet.
3. Domestic Political Timing of the Attack
Domestic political factors within Israel affected many Foreign Policy directives.
Although Begin kept his hard-line policy posture, he could not act with impunity.
According to Melvin Friedlander, "because Begin enjoyed only a narrow majority in the
Knesset those right-wing groups and their representatives in the cabinet possessed a
29Juliet Kaarbo, "Power and Influence in Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Role of Junior Coalition
Partners in German and Israeli Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly 40, no. 4 (Dec 1996): 503.
30Zachary Lockman, "Israel at a Turning Point," MERIP Reports, no. 92 (Winter 1980): 3.
31Brownstein, "Decision Making in Israeli Foreign Policy: An Unplanned Process," 275.
28
virtual veto over government decisions."32 A junior party, the National Religious Party,
established foreign policy as an area of influence under its coalitional agreement with
Begin and the Likud party. This junior party demonstrated its power in 1979 during
negotiations with Egypt. According to Kaarbo, "the autonomy talks were the second part
of the Camp David Peace Treaty. The junior party"¦in coalition with Likud was
successful at getting hard-line conditions adopted for these talks in May 1979 and
subsequently deadlocking them."33 Therefore, domestic political factors were the
primary influence on Israeli foreign policy
Israel had a Knesset election scheduled for November 1981. The Labor party,
lead by Shimon Peres, was gaining ground on Begin's Likud party. Prime Minister
Begin faced difficulties from unrest in Lebanon, dissatisfaction over the Palestinian issue,
and a severe economic crisis. Inflation in Israel was over 120 percent during 1980.
According to Zachary Lockman, "The Begin government, on the advice of such
luminaries as Milton Friedman, has revised long-standing Labor policies that subsidized
consumer goods, protected local industry, encouraged exports and controlled currency
exchanges."34 This economic predicament combined with the increasing frustration over
security issues did not bode well for the Likud party.
In May 1981, Begin lagged behind Labor party leader Shimon Peres in voter
polls. Although the Labor party offered no significant change to policies enacted by
Begin, public opinion saw Menachem Begin as ineffective. His political capital was in
decline and a military action could bolster his hard-line reputation. In late 1980,
Lockman guesses, "Begin might choose to gamble on a major military adventure, perhaps
against the Syrians and Palestinian forces in Lebanon. Other scenarios are also
possible."35 Indeed, Begin readied plans for striking Osiraq as pressure of the Knesset
election mounted.
Begin's desire to solidify his political position by a strike on Osiraq coincided
with a strong opinion on Israeli defense measures. Indeed, from the outset of his tenure
as Prime Minister, Begin revealed concern over the Iraqi nuclear program. However,
32Melvin A. Friedlander, Sadat and Begin : The Domestic Politics of Peacemaking (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press, 1983), 310.
33Kaarbo, "Power and Influence in Foreign Policy Decision Making," 526.
34Lockman, "Israel at a Turning Point," 4.
35Ibid.: 6.
29
Begin held strong memories of atrocities done to the Jews from World War II. Shlomo
Nakdimon states, "But above all, what shaped Begin's course, and his personal
philosophy, was the Holocaust -- that national calamity in which his own father and
mother perished, as did most of his family."36 He saw the Iraqi nuclear program as
another potential means to destroy the nation. In late 1977, Begin issued clear guidance
within his cabinet that no belligerent states in the region could threaten Israel with
nuclear weapons.
4. The Political Costs of Osiraq
A strike against Osiraq would serve multiple purposes. A successful strike could
sway voters to view Begin as a decisive man of action willing to buck world opinion to
protect Israel. Additionally, a strike destroying another potential holocaust device before
it could be unleashed on Israel matched Begin's personal philosophy. If the strike was a
failure, Begin stood no chance at retaining his role as Prime Minister.
Furthermore, Begin believed Peres would opt for diplomatic means over action
against Iraq. Shimon Peres was close friends with French President Francois Mitterrand,
who opposed French involvement in Iraqi nuclearization. Four years of diplomatic
exertion to prevent France from delivering a nuclear reactor to Iraq, however, yielded
only failure. In addition, Begin believed Peres would not risk launching the strike even if
diplomatic efforts fell short. Prime Minister Begin, therefore, saw this state of affairs as
solely his responsibility. It was his job to protect Israel's right to exist, but time was
running out - for him and for Israel.
The strike on Osiraq came about in this background of intense domestic political
pressure and steady Iraqi nuclear advance. The domestic political payoffs for Begin
offered significant rewards compared to the risks. Thus, Israeli domestic political
pressure acted as Begin's primary impetus for ordering the strike.