India's Nuclear Doctrine

[Indx TechStyle]

@Indx TechStyle Although a 2009 article but worth reading;-
'India has simulation capability, N-tests not needed'

I just got something interesting. Currently on duty, so will post it later.

 

[Navnit Kundu]

I just got something interesting. Currently on duty, so will post it later.

The US was pressurizing India to abandon the supercomputer project Param. They knew that we were using it for testing purposes. They were saying, if you want to do nuclear simulation, we will give you the computers, you will use just that, do not build your own. They tried all types of tricks to stop our supercomputer project, assassinated computer scientists, imposed sanctions during Kargil were for this lesser know fact as well. Last year there was a blast targeting Chinese supercomputer, it was believed to have been done by CIA to stall Chinese progress in computing.

Let us keep parroting the vasudhaiva kutumbakam and keep the powder dry for a nuclear test at short notice. We must do a thermonuclear test in real life. Ideally AFTER Balochistan liberation. Doing it before will give an excuse to US to intervene. As Doval has said that there is no nuclear aspect involved in Balochistan liberation, so let us get that done first. The real reason we need nukes is because of the big sharks like China and US so even after Pakistan is broken, we must not pretend that we have no other enemies. 10 years down the line, the economy of India and west and China will be so integrated that imposing a sanction would mean disallowing their own companies from selling in India, which will become unaffordable.

Liberate Balochistan and Sindh in the coming 3 years, then shift national focus towards a nuclear test. Balochistan must become national priority now. Spend all the defense budget on acquiring the weapons for a full fledged war, and finish the task once and for all. Subhraminian Swamy has said that it will take 2 years for the Indian army to acquire all the weapons and troops for a full scale 2 front war. I hope we wind up everything before 2019.

 

[jadoogar]

The US was pressurizing India to abandon the supercomputer project Param. They knew that we were using it for testing purposes. They were saying, if you want to do nuclear simulation, we will give you the computers, you will use just that, do not build your own. They tried all types of tricks to stop our supercomputer project, assassinated computer scientists, imposed sanctions during Kargil were for this lesser know fact as well. Last year there was a blast targeting Chinese supercomputer, it was believed to have been done by CIA to stall Chinese progress in computing.

Let us keep parroting the vasudhaiva kutumbakam and keep the powder dry for a nuclear test at short notice. We must do a thermonuclear test in real life. Ideally AFTER Balochistan liberation. Doing it before will give an excuse to US to intervene. As Doval has said that there is no nuclear aspect involved in Balochistan liberation, so let us get that done first. The real reason we need nukes is because of the big sharks like China and US so even after Pakistan is broken, we must not pretend that we have no other enemies. 10 years down the line, the economy of India and west and China will be so integrated that imposing a sanction would mean disallowing their own companies from selling in India, which will become unaffordable.

Liberate Balochistan and Sindh in the coming 3 years, then shift national focus towards a nuclear test. Balochistan must become national priority now. Spend all the defense budget on acquiring the weapons for a full fledged war, and finish the task once and for all. Subhraminian Swamy has said that it will take 2 years for the Indian army to acquire all the weapons and troops for a full scale 2 front war. I hope we wind up everything before 2019.

It is very likely and must be assumed to be true that China is testing continuously via North Korea.

 

[Navnit Kundu]

It is very likely and must be assumed to be true that China is testing continuously via North Korea.

Let them test, China is not invincible. There is a very large threshold for the situation to actually escalate into war between India and China. This is why there is not a single bullet fired on the LAC because both know that escalation will be costly. China is not suicidal unlike the Umma pigs in the Muslim world. China has big dreams of becoming a legitimate superpower with fast trains, good roads, fast internet and global recognition.

They only try to augment their deployments to scare us into spreading our attention thin during a clash with Pakistan. That is why, even before we started pounding Pakistan, we sent 100 tanks on China border to keep them pacified and to send a signal to Pakistan that 'your patron is pinned down'.

We cannot win a full fledged war with China but there is never going to be a full fledged war, neither nuclear nor conventional, there might be a Kargil type skirmish at the most. We are prepared to tackle that with asymmetric responses (Brahmos) and international pressure in South China Sea. Do we still believe in the hogwash story that China will invade Bihar if Indian attacks Pakistan? Why didn't they do so during Kargil? Don't let anything come in the way of your resolve now. A large machine has been set in motion, let it trample over Pakistan. Let USA and China keep whining about possible escalation scenarios cooked up by think tanks in Washington.

 

[republic_roi97]

I just got something interesting. Currently on duty, so will post it later.

What is it ??????

 

[no smoking]

Whats wrong in his personal belief about our NFU doctrine.

If he is just an ordinary keyboard warrior like you and me, no one gives shit about he says. But as a minister, his "personal belief" can be interpreted as a change of India national policy.

Please care to explain. Why should we stick to age old doctrine when geo politics are shifting considerably.

First, because the world, especially US and Russia won't allow third country to build up a nuclear force over 1000 warheads;
Second, yes, geo polictics are shifting considerably, but against nuclear weapon. All P5 are shifting their military focus from nuke to precise striking weapon;
Third, that is the only policy can keep a country like India have both a decent nuclear force and financial health.

When people above believe en say that NFU doesn't matter in war like scenario. Then why consider NFU itself.

Since you are going to die one day, so it doesn't matter how you live today?

Atleast modified doctrine will help added psychological parameters in crisis which extends enemy overview and overburden them in event of misadventure. Sometimes it even contributes to stalemate between adverseries.

There is one thing you ignore, enemy won't wait until crisis coming. They will start responding to your modified doctrine from the day one. You are trying to overburden them while their reacting will backfire you as well. When they lift up their armed force level, you also need to increase your military spending. So, in return, you are also overburdened somehow.
Furthermore, abolish NFU is not simply empty words, it means hundreds billion dollars additional spending, ANNUALLY.

 

[IndianHawk]

If he is just an ordinary keyboard warrior like you and me, no one gives shit about he says. But as a minister, his "personal belief" can be interpreted as a change of India national policy.


First, because the world, especially US and Russia won't allow third country to build up a nuclear force over 1000 warheads;
Second, yes, geo polictics are shifting considerably, but against nuclear weapon. All P5 are shifting their military focus from nuke to precise striking weapon;
Third, that is the only policy can keep a country like India have both a decent nuclear force and financial health.



Since you are going to die one day, so it doesn't matter how you live today?



There is one thing you ignore, enemy won't wait until crisis coming. They will start responding to your modified doctrine from the day one. You are trying to overburden them while their reacting will backfire you as well. When they lift up their armed force level, you also need to increase your military spending. So, in return, you are also overburdened somehow.
Furthermore, abolish NFU is not simply empty words, it means hundreds billion dollars additional spending, ANNUALLY.

You are right on many counts .
All in all it was a political message to Pakistan which keeps ratching up nuclear rhetoric.

Policy in India will change only after considerable deliberation not to forget parliamentary approval too will be necessary.

But the financial math is not very precise.
If Russia with its small economy can maintain thousands of warheads India with much bigger economy can certainly too!

However India neither has need nor enough uranium for that purpose.

Regarding warhead count nobody knows how many warheads India or other countries have . There are just estimates which have little practical significance.

Precision strike weapons are useful in a limited conflict scenario. They are not a substitute for nuclear deterrence.

 

[jadoogar]

Let them test, China is not invincible. There is a very large threshold for the situation to actually escalate into war between India and China. This is why there is not a single bullet fired on the LAC because both know that escalation will be costly. China is not suicidal unlike the Umma pigs in the Muslim world. China has big dreams of becoming a legitimate superpower with fast trains, good roads, fast internet and global recognition.

They only try to augment their deployments to scare us into spreading our attention thin during a clash with Pakistan. That is why, even before we started pounding Pakistan, we sent 100 tanks on China border to keep them pacified and to send a signal to Pakistan that 'your patron is pinned down'.

We cannot win a full fledged war with China but there is never going to be a full fledged war, neither nuclear nor conventional, there might be a Kargil type skirmish at the most. We are prepared to tackle that with asymmetric responses (Brahmos) and international pressure in South China Sea. Do we still believe in the hogwash story that China will invade Bihar if Indian attacks Pakistan? Why didn't they do so during Kargil? Don't let anything come in the way of your resolve now. A large machine has been set in motion, let it trample over Pakistan. Let USA and China keep whining about possible escalation scenarios cooked up by think tanks in Washington.

I left unsaid that we would be able to justify testing if it was necessary to test - because of continuous Chinese testing via North Korea.

Also I believe that China is a paper tiger and will not invade anyone that can fight back. An invasion into India via Tibet would invite retaliation via severance of supply lines followed by slaughter of invading troops.

China is an existential threat to SE Asia via damming of their rivers - those guys need nuclear weapons that USA + Russia need to provide.

The actual size of the Chinese economy is unknown. If that $10 trillion figure is true, then a substantial chunk is construction (housing, infrastructure) which is already overbuilt. Debt is astronomical and growing fast. A collapse of Chinese currency is possible.

It is difficult to boycott Chinese goods. For example it is not widely known that in USA many Chinese made goods (like dog / cat food, packaged foods, chocolates, cosmetics) are either not labeled with country of origin or routed through Canada with a made in Canada label. The EU-27 and Canada are about to finalize their free trade agreement so also expect those exports to Europe to increase substantially. Otherwise no one in their right minds would buy marmalade if it was labeled with its true country of origin

 

[republic_roi97]

I just got something interesting. Currently on duty, so will post it later.

I am still waiting sir.....

 

[Indx TechStyle]

I am still waiting sir.....

Here, do we go.
I wanted to collect more content and create a dedicated thread for Indian Cold Testing Capabilities but just for you, posted it earlier. I will create thread later with much more info.
http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/...present-and-future.35184/page-14#post-1231768

 

[Indx TechStyle]

Disclaimer: Not posting the graphic which falsely depicts Indian Map.
India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Time For A Review? – Analysis

The fragile security environment in Southern Asia is marked by territorial disputes and radical extremism, among other threats and challenges to peace and stability. The security environment has been further vitiated by the proxy war being waged against India (and against Afghanistan) by the Pakistan army and the ISI – the ‘deep state’ – through terrorist organisations like the LeT and the JeM.

While the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks at Mumbai in November 2008 are still to be brought to justice by the authorities in Pakistan, recent terrorist attacks in India have occurred at Gurdaspur, Udhampur, Pathankot, Pampore and Uri. India’s patience had worn thin and the public outcry to punish Pakistan was growing by the day when the Indian army launched surgical strikes across the LoC in September 2016.

In case there is a major terrorist strike in India (on a politically sensitive target, with damage to critical infrastructure and large-scale casualties) with credible evidence of state sponsorship from Pakistan, the Indian government will have no option but to retaliate militarily. Though the Indian response will be carefully calibrated, any military retaliation runs the risk of escalation to a larger conflict with nuclear overtones.

Most Indian analysts believe that there is space for conventional conflict below the nuclear threshold as long as care is taken to avoid crossing Pakistan’s nuclear red lines (space, military, economic and political). Pakistani analysts aver that Pakistan has a low nuclear threshold and that Indian forces ingressing into Pakistani territory will be confronted with tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) to stop their advance and force them to retreat.

It must be noted that the term ‘TNW’ is used in a colloquial sense as it is widely in use. There is no such thing as the ‘tactical’ use of nuclear weapons; their impact is strategic and their consequences are likely to be geo-strategic. Perhaps the term ‘battlefield’ use of nuclear weapons would be preferable.

Pakistan has been developing what it calls ‘full spectrum deterrence’ from the strategic to the tactical, from IRBMs (Shaheen 1, 2 and 3) and nuclear glide bombs delivered by fighter-bomber aircraft, cruise missiles (Babar and Ra’ad) to surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) launched from surface ships. The 60 km range, Hatf-9, Nasr SRBM is claimed to be tipped with a TNW.

India’s ‘credible minimum deterrence’ nuclear doctrine professing a ‘no first use’ posture is predicated on massive retaliation to a nuclear first strike. While the doctrine suffices to deter a first strike on Indian cities due to the certainty of massive retaliation, its efficacy in a contingency resulting in the use of TNWs against Indian troops on Pakistani territory needs to be debated.

After the Pokhran tests of May 1998, a draft nuclear doctrine was prepared by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) headed by K Subrahmanyam. It was handed over to the government on 17 August 1999. The draft doctrine was debated within the government by various stakeholders. After several meetings of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), the government issued a statement on 4 January 2003, spelling out India’s nuclear doctrine and expressing satisfaction with the operationalisation of its nuclear deterrent. The government statement included the following salient features:

• India will build and maintain a credible minimum deterrent; follow a No First Use posture; and, will use nuclear weapons only “in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere”

• It was also affirmed that nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage

• Retaliatory attacks will be authorised only by the civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority

• Nuclear weapons will not be used against non-nuclear weapon states

• India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons in the event of a major attack against it with biological or chemical weapons

• Continuance of strict controls on export of nuclear and missile-related materials and technologies, participation in FMCT negotiations, continued moratorium on nuclear testing

• Continued commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world, through global, verifiable and non-discriminatory disarmament.

In the decade and a half since the nuclear doctrine was unveiled by the government, several organisations and individuals have commented on it. Some of them have been critical of the NFU posture. Among them, Bharat Karnad (author of Nuclear Weapons and India’s Security, Macmillan, 2004) has consistently questioned the NFU posture. He has written: “NFU may be useful as political rhetoric and make for stability in situations short of war. But as a serious war-planning predicate, it is a liability. NFU is not in the least credible, because it requires India to first absorb a nuclear attack before responding in kind.”

Former PM Manmohan Singh, while speaking at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, on 2 April 2014, called for a global ‘no first use’ norm. He said, “States possessing nuclear weapons… [must] quickly move to the establishment of a global no-first-use norm…” This was followed by the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) promising in its election manifesto to review India’s nuclear doctrine to “study in detail India’s nuclear doctrine, and revise and update it, to make it relevant to challenges of current times…” and to “maintain a credible minimum deterrent that is in tune with changing geostrategic realities.” Some BJP leaders hinted that the NFU posture would also be reviewed. However, sensing the international criticism that was bound to follow, Narendra Modi, BJP’s PM candidate, emphasised that there would be ‘no compromise’ on no first use. Regardless of election-time rhetoric, it is necessary that important government policies must be reviewed periodically with a view to examining and re-validating their key features.

Criticism of the nuclear doctrine has mainly been centred on the following key issues:

• The NFU posture is likely to result in unacceptably high initial casualties and damage to Indian cities and infrastructure;

• The threat of ‘massive’ retaliation lacks credibility, especially in retaliation to first use of TNWs against Indian forces on the adversary’s own territory;

• Nuclear retaliation for a chemical or biological attack would be illogical, as such attacks could be launched by non-state actors with or without state support;

• And, it would be difficult to determine what constitutes a ‘major’ chemical or biological strike.

Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar said recently that he wondered whether India’s nuclear doctrine should be constrained by a no first use posture. He mentioned the advantages of unpredictability and said, “If a written strategy exists…you are giving away your strength. Why should India bind itself [to no first use]? India is a responsible nuclear power and…[it should suffice to say that] we will not use nuclear weapons irresponsibly.”

The essence of the Defence Minister’s introspection was that ambiguity enhances deterrence. This view has been expressed by several nuclear strategists. However, he emphasised several times that there was no change in India’s nuclear doctrine and that he was expressing a personal view. While he has been criticised, there can be no doubt that fresh thinking is invaluable to the discourse on the subject.

As almost fourteen years have passed since the doctrine was first enunciated, in the debate that followed the Defence Minister’s comments on no first use, several analysts have suggested that the nuclear doctrine needs to be reviewed. In fact, a review should be carried out every five years. The government should initiate the process to review the nuclear doctrine, but the review should not be confined to official circles only. It should include a wider debate with participation by think-tanks and individual analysts. Each facet pertaining to the doctrine must be discussed.

 

[Indx TechStyle]

More, Mr Parrikar
He is duty-bound to confound assessments of India’s nuclear deterrent.
WRITTEN BY BHARAT KARNAD |Published On:November 21, 2016 12:01 AM

Deterrence is a mind game. Nuclear deterrence is even more psychologically weighted because at stake, quite literally, is a nation’s survival as a “social organism”, to use the words of the geopolitical theorist Halford Mackinder.

What makes nuclear deterrence work is the ambiguity and opacity shrouding its every aspect. These range from weapons/warheads, delivery systems, their deployment pattern, command and control system to details about storage, reaction time, and physical, electronic and cyber security schemes, the weapons production processes, the personnel involved and policies relating to all these elements. The more anything remotely connected with nuclear hardware and software, strategy, policies, plans and posture is a black hole, the greater is the uncertainty in the adversary’s mind and the unpredictability attending on the deterrent. Moreover, pronouncements emanating from official quarters that obfuscate matters and generate unease, especially about India’s nuclear weapons-use initiation and nuclear response calculi, enhance the sense of dread in the minds of adversary governments. Dread is at the heart of successful nuclear deterrence.

It is the responsibility of the Indian government to make the ambiguity-opacity-uncertainty-unpredictability matrix denser, not make it easier for adversaries to plumb its political will and to read its strategic intentions by clarifying nuclear issues. The adversaries one needs to keep in mind are as much the obvious ones — China and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan — as the “friendly” countries, such as the US. The US, in particular, was at the forefront of preventing India from crossing the nuclear weapons threshold, failing in which enterprise, it has done everything to ensure India stays stuck at the low-end of the nuclear weapons technology development curve. It insisted that India does not resume underground nuclear testing, or depart from the US understanding of limited nuclear deterrence. It may also be recalled that, for geopolitical reasons of containing India to the subcontinent during the Cold War, Washington disregarded its own proliferation concerns and watched China nuclear missile-arm Pakistan even as it preached responsible behaviour to New Delhi.

In this context, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar’s wondering why no-first-use (NFU) is assumed to be a restraint on the Indian nuclear forces is just the monkey wrench that needed to be thrown into the Western considerations of this country’s nuclear security. American think-tanks help the US government to achieve its nuclear non-proliferation objectives, propagating, for instance, the hollow India-Pakistan “nuclear flashpoint” thesis that Washington has often used to pressure a usually diffident and malleable New Delhi. Pakistan naturally supports this thesis as a means of legitimating its fast-growing nuclear arsenal, as do many Indian analysts for their own reasons.

No surprise, then, that Parrikar’s stray thoughts on NFU have shocked the large community of flashpoint believers and acted as bait for George Perkovich, one of the stalwart proponents of this idea, to rise to it. He uses the morality card — the loss of India’s supposed “high ground” which has been sufficient by itself in the past to subdue the Indian government — and labels Parrikar’s statements as “superficial, perhaps, dangerously so” (see his “Impolitic musings”, The Indian Express, November 15). The truth, however, is that Perkovich — and by extension, Washington — is worried that Parrikar has upended the US-qua-Western nuclear construct for South Asia.

But NFU is less of an issue for Perkovich than his desire to get Parrikar to explain “whether and how” India means to enlarge its nuclear forces and infrastructure and “revise its operational plans” contingent on New Delhi’s apparent jettisoning of NFU. In this respect, it is pertinent to note that besides its intelligence agencies, Washington has always relied on American think-tankers and gullible Indians to help winkle out details of the Indian nuclear deterrent — Perkovich’s primary intent. I recall that at a 1.5 track meet held under the US government’s aegis in San Diego in December 1998 the hosts called in a surviving Manhattan Project biggie, Herbert York, to impress on the Indians there the dangers of the nuclear course India was embarked upon. They banked on an Indian patsy — the joint secretary (Americas), MEA — to repeatedly ask K. Subrahmanyam and me to speculate about what weapons strength constituted a “minimum” deterrent.

Indeed, far from being under any obligation to throw light on NFU or any other nuclear issue, Parrikar is almost duty-bound to air his “personal views” more frequently on the subject and thus keep confounding assessments regarding India’s deterrent.

 

[Indx TechStyle]

Nuclear security is domain of national sovereignty: India

India is ready to provide more financial and human resources to this task, not least by setting an example.

VIENNA: India today called for strengthening of the global nuclear security framework to prevent "malignant actors" from getting access to atomic and radiological material, even as it asserted that nuclear security is the domain of national sovereignty.

Speaking at the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Security here, Minister of State for External Affairs M J Akbar also reiterated India's commitment to global nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

"The sane world wants to prevent malignant actors from getting access to nuclear and radiological material and facilities. Recent developments show that terrorist use of WMD materials is not a theoretical concern. A breach of nuclear security could lead to unimaginable consequences," Akbar said.

"Our meeting is therefore critical, urgent and essential. It underlines the Agency's central role in strengthening the global nuclear security framework, in facilitating national efforts on nuclear security, in fostering effective international cooperation, in setting future priorities and in forging technical and policy guidance," he said.

He stated that the meeting must carry forward the legacy of the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process.

Akbar asserted that India has always held that nuclear security is the domain of national sovereignty but this national prerogative demands national responsibility.

"All states must assume this responsibility and should scrupulously abide by their respective international obligations. Responsible national actions and effective international cooperation should be pursued together to prevent non-state actors and other malignant forces from threatening the lives of innocents on a mass scale, destabilising regional stability and international peace," Akbar said.

Akbar's remarks came after International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Yukiya Amano said "nuclear terrorists" can strike anywhere.

"Ensuring effective nuclear security is important for all countries, including those which possess little or no nuclear or other radioactive material," Amano said at the start of a week-long ministerial conference on preventing misuse of radioactive materials and attacks on facilities.

Akbar, in his remarks said, "As a regular participant in the IAEA's Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB), we encourage active participation of all member states in this network for sharing of information on illicit trafficking and other unauthorised activities or events involving nuclear and radioactive material."

India is ready to provide more financial and human resources to this task, not least by setting an example, he said.

"The security of nuclear and radiological material in India is constantly ensured through robust oversight by India's Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB). IAEA's peer review mechanisms like the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) have acknowledged the strength of AERB's regulatory practices and capabilities," he pointed out.

 

[Indx TechStyle]

Remember, I have pointed about Indian torpedo testing facility in Kyrgyzstan?
http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/...h-station-indian-military.77872/#post-1237773
The report states that India may be developing nuclear torpedoes there.
http://mobile.wnd.com/2011/10/357753/

If news is correct, India may be world's third country after USSR and USA to have nuclear torpedoes.:biggrin2:

But somehow, I think it's a tactical weapon. So, doesn't fit in our NFU policy.

 

[prohumanity]

Get out of Gandhian idealism as other powers do not care about it.
Get real ...and do what Russia does....just like Russia ,India should declare that if any nation attacks India with any type of weapons ..India has right to respond with any type of weapons including nuclear weapons.

 

[Chinmoy]

Remember, I have pointed about Indian torpedo testing facility in Kyrgyzstan?
http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/...h-station-indian-military.77872/#post-1237773
The report states that India may be developing nuclear torpedoes there.
http://mobile.wnd.com/2011/10/357753/

If news is correct, India may be world's third country after USSR and USA to have nuclear torpedoes.:biggrin2:

But somehow, I think it's a tactical weapon. So, doesn't fit in our NFU policy.

Highly unlike for India. India could very well go for super cavitating torpedoes, but nuclear ones? Unlikely.

 

[Indx TechStyle]

Indian Army Will Soon Have NBC Protection Suits To Counter Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapon
The acquisition will cost the exchequer Rs 1265 crore.

AFP/GETTY IMAGES
The acquisition will cost the exchequer Rs 1265 crore.

A U.S. Trooper wearing a NBC protective suit

NEW DELHI-- Keeping an eye on Pakistan's nuclear tipped non-strategic battle-field missile, India will soon acquire 1500 advanced Nuclear Biological and Chemical (NBC) protection suits for its Armored Personnel Carriers (APC).

An APC – carrying about 10 fully armed soldiers- is an offensive platform. It is used to carry troops in and to the battlefront. India has over 36 Mechanized Infantry Regiments and has nearly 1800 APC.

The acquisition will cost the exchequer Rs 1265 crore. This decision to acquire the NBC protection suits was taken at Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) meeting that is chaired by the Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar.

Pakistan has recently developed the Hatf-9 (Nasr) – a Short Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM). Hatf-9 is equipped with a tactical nuclear warhead (TNW) – non strategic nuclear weapon - and is intended for use in the battlefield as a weapon for war fighting.

Using TNWs is Pakistan's response to India 'Cold Start' doctrine (Proactive Offensive Operations) - mobilizing quickly to carry out immediate but limited retaliatory attacks.

The NBC protection suits will be built by Bharat Electronics Limited and will be designed by the Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO), sources said. "APC we use now have a manually operated NBC suits, there is need for better and full automated advanced NBC suits". The advanced NBC protection suits will have censors that will detect in coming threats and take action on its own to protect the solider, the officer added.

 

[Superdefender]

Watch this thoughtful debate on Rajya Sabha TV.
Anchor : Cmdr. Uday Bhaskar.

 

[busesaway]

What is India's policy on making a deal with the United States where it would host nuclear weapons on Indian soil, which could be used to defend India, albeit they would be under the command of the United States.

It could be a useful defense against Chinese and Middle Eastern aggression, it would pour money into Indian nuclear research, and it would allow India to learn more about western technologies.

 

[Flame Thrower]

What is India's policy on making a deal with the United States where it would host nuclear weapons on Indian soil, which could be used to defend India, albeit they would be under the command of the United States.

It could be a useful defense against Chinese and Middle Eastern aggression, it would pour money into Indian nuclear research, and it would allow India to learn more about western technologies.

Hell no....

We should not host any foreign country's nuclear weapon.

We have enough nukes to ensure MAD.