India's military nuclear capability

[Chinmoy]

First time to hear such kind of category, very wired. I guess, it is your own interpretation or understanding. Did only 4 tests doesn't prove anything. Without a full scale nuclear test, how can you prove the accuracy of your simulation.

Actually Pokhran II was not the first time that India had done a nuclear test. During its first test "Smiling Buddha" the device weighted a whooping 1400 kg.
So basically all the 6 tests which India conducted are for design testing and yield comparison. Now when you have proven design, you could carry out simulation without doing the real field test. Now if you compare what US and Russia did in cold war era, the maximum tests were carried out to study the effects rather then the design. Moreover it was a race to establish one above another rather then carrying out scientific study in most of the cases. In case of US, the had dropped a untested design over Hiroshima rather then the plutonium device which they tested under Project Manhattan.

As far as thermo-nuclear test of US and USSR is concerned, you might be aware that US had carried out the first test, but USSR did tested the first practical device. So its basically the design study rather then tests which would give you a practical weapon. India does have the know how to create the bomb or design it. What is important for us is to study the design to enhance the yield. Now this could be carried out through simulation. One doesn't need a number of tests to verify it if you have a strong simulation program.

 

[Adioz]

Actually Pokhran II was not the first time that India had done a nuclear test. During its first test "Smiling Buddha" the device weighted a whooping 1400 kg.
So basically all the 6 tests which India conducted are for design testing and yield comparison. Now when you have proven design, you could carry out simulation without doing the real field test. Now if you compare what US and Russia did in cold war era, the maximum tests were carried out to study the effects rather then the design. Moreover it was a race to establish one above another rather then carrying out scientific study in most of the cases. In case of US, the had dropped a untested design over Hiroshima rather then the plutonium device which they tested under Project Manhattan.

As far as thermo-nuclear test of US and USSR is concerned, you might be aware that US had carried out the first test, but USSR did tested the first practical device. So its basically the design study rather then tests which would give you a practical weapon. India does have the know how to create the bomb or design it. What is important for us is to study the design to enhance the yield. Now this could be carried out through simulation. One doesn't need a number of tests to verify it if you have a strong simulation program.

Nuclear Nuances

Credible Deterrent Through Testing

By P K IYENGAR, August 2000

(The author is former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission)

AFTER a long period of indecision and ambivalence regarding its nuclear preparedness, India detonated five nuclear devices in May 1998. Consequently, it declared itself a nuclear weapons country. However, it is unlikely that we will be accepted as a weapons country under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), because there is no provision for threshold states maturing to become nuclear powers.

When Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visits the US next month, the CTBT will certainly be one of the important issues raised by the Americans. There may be political arguments both for and against signing the CTBT, but if we have decided to follow a policy of nuclear deterrence, which will require weaponisation, then, scientifically, we have no option but to continue testing. It is the scientific case that I wish to make here.

If one goes by the numbers for the total nuclear yield put out by the Department of Atomic Energy, which I see no reason to dispute, the yield of the thermonuclear device detonated on May 11, 1998 was around 40 kilotons. This is a rather low yield. If the yield was deliberately kept low to restrict damage to the nearby villages, then surely it would have been more sensible to test the thermonuclear device separately, and not along with the 15 kt fission device. Now, the thermonuclear device itself consisted of two parts: the fission trigger and the fusion core.

The crucial question is not what the total yield of the device was, but what was the ratio of fission energy to fusion energy? Clearly, for a given total yield, the greater the fraction of the fusion energy, the more efficient is your thermonuclear device. In my opinion, that ratio musts have been around 1:1, and no one has so far, to my knowledge either publicly or privately, disputed that number. Therefore, by my estimate, the fusion yield could not have been more than 20 kt. Further, it seems likely that a fission `spark-plug’ was used at the centre of the fusion core, in which case the actual fusion yield would have been even less.

Sticking to the larger number of a 20 kt fusion yield, one can easily calculate that the amount of LiD fusion material needed would be only around 400 grams or around 500 cc. This is a very small size for the fusion core, and the actual core used must certainly have been much larger. This suggests that the fusion core burnt only partially, perhaps less than 10 per cent. This can easily be checked; if the burn was only partial, there should have been a lot of tritium produced, which should have been detected after the explosions.

In such a complex system as a two-stage thermonuclear device, getting any burn at all is a credit to the abilities of the scientists and engineers of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). However, a thermonuclear device that only burns partially is certainly inefficient. Logically and scientifically, the next step would be to improve the design of the device to achieve greater efficiency. This is particularly important from the point of view of a weaponisation programme.

The government has declared a policy of maintaining a minimum nuclear deterrent. Nuclear deterrence means that we have a demonstrable nuclear capability that deters a potential adversary from attacking us. For us to have a nuclear deterrent we must weaponise. For this, we must have fusion weapons, because these are smaller, lighter, and more efficient than fission weapons. But for that deterrent to be viable, we must master all aspects of thermonuclear weapons, and demonstrate that expertise not just in one, but many thermonuclear designs, particularly those of greater efficiency.

Whether that should include a neutron bomb or not, is not of the essence. In a neutron bomb, one establishes a thermonuclear burn by igniting only a part of the core, and making the burn propagate. This is the crux of the matter in designing an efficient thermonuclear device. One may not have a neutron bomb in one’s arsenal, but it would strengthen our abilities if we successfully tested one.

Some people argue that we have benchmarked our computer simulations using the data from the Pokhran tests, and, therefore, further weapons can be designed based on those computer simulations. We should note that we have conducted only one thermonuclear test, and that too of low yield. It is, as mentioned before, likely that this device burnt only partially. Devices that are more efficient will have to be built. In order to weaponise, we will need missile-mountable devices, which will have a different geometry. They will also have to be of higher yield. Then these will have to be made compact, and integrated with delivery as well as command and control systems. Can our nuclear deterrent be credible if we go through this long process of weaponisation without a single additional test? The bottom line is that we just cannot hand over to the army, or deter potential aggressors with, weapons based on computer simulations.

It is unscientific to embark on a long programme of weaponisation, and develop elaborate plans for maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent, all based on just one, low yield, thermonuclear test. When we do not do this for the Agni or Prithvi missiles, why would we want to take this risk for nuclear weapons? I am sure that the BARC scientists themselves, like their DRDO counterparts, would prefer to take a more conservative approach and test further to refine their designs and their capabilities. This is the scientific way. It would be wrong for the government to pressure the scientists to put a premature end to nuclear tests, for political expediency.

In principle, India accepts nuclear disarmament, and hopes its problems will be solved if all countries accept non-discriminatory, global, nuclear disarmament. Yet, this is unlikely to happen, from what we see around us as well as in the `N5’ (five nuclear weapons) countries. In spite of long and friendly discussions with the US, we haven’t come to any concrete decision relating to a new status under the CTBT. If we are to maintain our independence in today’s world, it is essential for us to have a credible nuclear deterrent, and this requires us to continue testing.

SOURCE: Comments section of this page: http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/202445/indias-h-bomb-revisited/
^Its biased cause its trying to make a point, to allow India sufficient reason to continue testing.
Edit: ^ The comments section for this one is brilliant.

Unrelated, but interesting:-


INDIA’S BILATERAL OBLIGATIONS

A very interesting read.

The comments are very informative.
But I can't get over the hypocrisy of the Mark Hibbs (the author of the article). Grampian nailed it though (He has to be Indian).

 

[LordOfTheUnderworlds]

Can miniaturized devices be tested without getting detected on siesmometers?

 

[Cutting Edge 2]

Actually Pokhran II was not the first time that India had done a nuclear test. During its first test "Smiling Buddha" the device weighted a whooping 1400 kg.
So basically all the 6 tests which India conducted are for design testing and yield comparison. Now when you have proven design, you could carry out simulation without doing the real field test. Now if you compare what US and Russia did in cold war era, the maximum tests were carried out to study the effects rather then the design. Moreover it was a race to establish one above another rather then carrying out scientific study in most of the cases. In case of US, the had dropped a untested design over Hiroshima rather then the plutonium device which they tested under Project Manhattan.

As far as thermo-nuclear test of US and USSR is concerned, you might be aware that US had carried out the first test, but USSR did tested the first practical device. So its basically the design study rather then tests which would give you a practical weapon. India does have the know how to create the bomb or design it. What is important for us is to study the design to enhance the yield. Now this could be carried out through simulation. One doesn't need a number of tests to verify it if you have a strong simulation program.

Or we can buy design blueprints straight from black market. There are certain corrupt, former USSR countries where everything is for sale.

 

[Chinmoy]

Or we can buy design blueprints straight from black market. There are certain corrupt, former USSR countries where everything is for sale.

That could help you with the know how to create the bomb, but not on how to increase the yield. It would only come through proper simulation and study.

 

[Chinmoy]

Nuclear Nuances

Credible Deterrent Through Testing

By P K IYENGAR, August 2000

(The author is former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission)

AFTER a long period of indecision and ambivalence regarding its nuclear preparedness, India detonated five nuclear devices in May 1998. Consequently, it declared itself a nuclear weapons country. However, it is unlikely that we will be accepted as a weapons country under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), because there is no provision for threshold states maturing to become nuclear powers.

When Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visits the US next month, the CTBT will certainly be one of the important issues raised by the Americans. There may be political arguments both for and against signing the CTBT, but if we have decided to follow a policy of nuclear deterrence, which will require weaponisation, then, scientifically, we have no option but to continue testing. It is the scientific case that I wish to make here.

If one goes by the numbers for the total nuclear yield put out by the Department of Atomic Energy, which I see no reason to dispute, the yield of the thermonuclear device detonated on May 11, 1998 was around 40 kilotons. This is a rather low yield. If the yield was deliberately kept low to restrict damage to the nearby villages, then surely it would have been more sensible to test the thermonuclear device separately, and not along with the 15 kt fission device. Now, the thermonuclear device itself consisted of two parts: the fission trigger and the fusion core.

The crucial question is not what the total yield of the device was, but what was the ratio of fission energy to fusion energy? Clearly, for a given total yield, the greater the fraction of the fusion energy, the more efficient is your thermonuclear device. In my opinion, that ratio musts have been around 1:1, and no one has so far, to my knowledge either publicly or privately, disputed that number. Therefore, by my estimate, the fusion yield could not have been more than 20 kt. Further, it seems likely that a fission `spark-plug’ was used at the centre of the fusion core, in which case the actual fusion yield would have been even less.

Sticking to the larger number of a 20 kt fusion yield, one can easily calculate that the amount of LiD fusion material needed would be only around 400 grams or around 500 cc. This is a very small size for the fusion core, and the actual core used must certainly have been much larger. This suggests that the fusion core burnt only partially, perhaps less than 10 per cent. This can easily be checked; if the burn was only partial, there should have been a lot of tritium produced, which should have been detected after the explosions.

In such a complex system as a two-stage thermonuclear device, getting any burn at all is a credit to the abilities of the scientists and engineers of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). However, a thermonuclear device that only burns partially is certainly inefficient. Logically and scientifically, the next step would be to improve the design of the device to achieve greater efficiency. This is particularly important from the point of view of a weaponisation programme.

The government has declared a policy of maintaining a minimum nuclear deterrent. Nuclear deterrence means that we have a demonstrable nuclear capability that deters a potential adversary from attacking us. For us to have a nuclear deterrent we must weaponise. For this, we must have fusion weapons, because these are smaller, lighter, and more efficient than fission weapons. But for that deterrent to be viable, we must master all aspects of thermonuclear weapons, and demonstrate that expertise not just in one, but many thermonuclear designs, particularly those of greater efficiency.

Whether that should include a neutron bomb or not, is not of the essence. In a neutron bomb, one establishes a thermonuclear burn by igniting only a part of the core, and making the burn propagate. This is the crux of the matter in designing an efficient thermonuclear device. One may not have a neutron bomb in one’s arsenal, but it would strengthen our abilities if we successfully tested one.

Some people argue that we have benchmarked our computer simulations using the data from the Pokhran tests, and, therefore, further weapons can be designed based on those computer simulations. We should note that we have conducted only one thermonuclear test, and that too of low yield. It is, as mentioned before, likely that this device burnt only partially. Devices that are more efficient will have to be built. In order to weaponise, we will need missile-mountable devices, which will have a different geometry. They will also have to be of higher yield. Then these will have to be made compact, and integrated with delivery as well as command and control systems. Can our nuclear deterrent be credible if we go through this long process of weaponisation without a single additional test? The bottom line is that we just cannot hand over to the army, or deter potential aggressors with, weapons based on computer simulations.

It is unscientific to embark on a long programme of weaponisation, and develop elaborate plans for maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent, all based on just one, low yield, thermonuclear test. When we do not do this for the Agni or Prithvi missiles, why would we want to take this risk for nuclear weapons? I am sure that the BARC scientists themselves, like their DRDO counterparts, would prefer to take a more conservative approach and test further to refine their designs and their capabilities. This is the scientific way. It would be wrong for the government to pressure the scientists to put a premature end to nuclear tests, for political expediency.

In principle, India accepts nuclear disarmament, and hopes its problems will be solved if all countries accept non-discriminatory, global, nuclear disarmament. Yet, this is unlikely to happen, from what we see around us as well as in the `N5’ (five nuclear weapons) countries. In spite of long and friendly discussions with the US, we haven’t come to any concrete decision relating to a new status under the CTBT. If we are to maintain our independence in today’s world, it is essential for us to have a credible nuclear deterrent, and this requires us to continue testing.

SOURCE: Comments section of this page: http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/202445/indias-h-bomb-revisited/
^Its biased cause its trying to make a point, to allow India sufficient reason to continue testing.
Edit: ^ The comments section for this one is brilliant.

Unrelated, but interesting:-


INDIA’S BILATERAL OBLIGATIONS

A very interesting read.

The comments are very informative.
But I can't get over the hypocrisy of the Mark Hibbs (the author of the article). Grampian nailed it though (He has to be Indian).

I would not label it as a biased writing. Actually Mr Iyengar is right in what he had said and the period when he said that. He had made up his mind to show that the ThermoNuclear test during Pokhran II has not given the expected result on yield. He might be true in his concept and his knowledge and logic on the matter too is to the point.

But what he had totally missed is the point of designing the whole thing. When he said that if even a partial burnout of core has been achieved, it is commendable for BARC scientist to achieve it. But his emphasis was mainly on yield. Now testing a design time and again to refine it, is the logical step for any developer. But one would have to consider the fact that what they are testing. Nuclear weapons are more of political weapons rather then strategic weapons.

On his point of handing over weapons to army based on computer simulation, he might have missed out the fact completely, that the first Atom Bomb ever to be used in war is based on a design which had never been tested. In fact the blast over Hiroshima was more of a test, rather then deployment.

Nevertheless, I am with him on further testing for data collection.

 

[gekko]

If we have the ability to make a nuclear submarine with made in India nuclear reactor.....

Then we can also make nuclear weapons.....which is much more easy.

ISRAEL also never tested (officially ) their nuclear weapons.

Yup.

We didn't have a megaton yield thermonuclear weapon when we tested Smiling Buddha, but we have it now. Needs to be tested to put all speculation to rest.

 

[airtel]

So far, the rest of the world doesn't think India has not prove her H-bomb design yet.

The same foreign " experts " are worried about Indian thermonuclear weapons .

http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/16/india_nuclear_city_top_secret_china_pakistan_barc/

 

[Khagesh]

Or we can buy design blueprints straight from black market. There are certain corrupt, former USSR countries where everything is for sale.

And how do you know that the blueprints are not designs for a self-immolation bomb.

You really believe deep in your heart that something useful can be found for free merely because hawa pani free mein mil gaya. Nuke designs bhi muft ka mal hi hote honge.

 

[Cutting Edge 2]

And how do you know that the blueprints are not designs for a self-immolation bomb.

You really believe deep in your heart that something useful can be found for free merely because hawa pani free mein mil gaya. Nuke designs bhi muft ka mal hi hote honge.

Now were did I said free?

Black market and secret gov deals happen all the time. How do you think China got their first H2 nuke in 60's? They had secret dealings with USSR who handed over all classified materials. Chinese tests were pre calculated by scientists in USSR. We too received LOT of support from certain friendly countries for our nuclear program.

BTW when I say black market I don't mean flea market. There are many reliable sources out there.

That could help you with the know how to create the bomb, but not on how to increase the yield. It would only come through proper simulation and study.

Not just physical design but knowhow down to material level is available.

 

[Khagesh]

Now were did I said free?

Black market and secret gov deals happen all the time. How do you think China got their first H2 nuke in 60's? They had secret dealings with USSR who handed over all classified materials. Chinese tests were pre calculated by scientists in USSR. We too received LOT of support from certain friendly countries for our nuclear program.

BTW when I say black market I don't mean flea market. There are many reliable sources out there.


Not just physical design but knowhow down to material level is available.

Do you remember the Red Mercury? I think some countries with no indigenous capabilities actually tried that route.

There is a reason why all the NWS have huge establishments (BARC is 10000 scientists+engineers+designers) and yet it takes years. Chinese operations are several times bigger than ours. No point even citing Russian and American nuke establishments.

All countries that eschewed real domestic establishments and instead chased the import route to nukes (Libya+Syria+Saudis+Iran+North Korea) have either lost their countries or are boxed into a smallish region or are caught up in democrazy planting operations.

Pls feel free to form and bear opinions but things cannot just be imported. India has enjoyed some very close relations with the Soviets and now with Russians but we still had to hugely slog for our nukes.

Nuke research is the kind of field where even bichde bhai like USA and UK do not share. UK had to forgo its own nuke sub to be able to save its nuke warheads, and the negotiations involved the USA on the other side.

France has had to act like a porcupine with NATO for much of its existence to be able to retain whatever capabilities they have been able to build.

 

[Cutting Edge 2]

Do you remember the Red Mercury? I think some countries with no indigenous capabilities actually tried that route.

Yup.

There is a reason why all the NWS have huge establishments (BARC is 10000 scientists+engineers+designers) and yet it takes years. Chinese operations are several times bigger than ours. No point even citing Russian and American nuke establishments.

Sure. We are way behind US and Russia in building indigenous nuclear establishment. Most difficulty we are facing is at material level. Lack of uranium. inefficient enrichment process, old gen reactors, etc.

All countries that eschewed real domestic establishments and instead chased the import route to nukes (Libya+Syria+Saudis+Iran+North Korea) have either lost their countries or are boxed into a smallish region or are caught up in democrazy planting operations.

I am not suggesting importing warheads what I am taking about is getting certain know how by hook and crook and use that data in our indigenous program. Infect I'd be surpriced if we haven't done that already.

 

[Cutting Edge 2]

Can miniaturized devices be tested without getting detected on siesmometers?

When it comes to H bomb minimum yield is 50KT, so no we can't.

 

[Cutting Edge 2]

The same foreign " experts " are worried about Indian thermonuclear weapons .

View attachment 17938


http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/16/india_nuclear_city_top_secret_china_pakistan_barc/
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/16/india_nuclear_city_top_secret_china_pakistan_barc/

Also add this.

Mysore site may be covertly used to produce n-material: U.S. think tank

http://www.thehindu.com/news/intern...ce-nmaterial-us-think-tank/article6134367.ece

 

[no smoking]

So basically all the 6 tests which India conducted are for design testing and yield comparison. Now when you have proven design, you could carry out simulation without doing the real field test.

Yes, you don’t need to test the same design again which was proved already.

However, the main purpose of simulation is providing assistance in new design. Simulation is kind of summary of the existing knowledge about nuclear explosion, which is only gained through a series of real tests. By changing the experimental condition, combination of nuclear material, or even the structure/shape, you can accumulate your knowledge and rich your theory about nuclear reaction, which in return will be added into your simulation model. The more real tests you go through, the better the simulation will be. Any university physics student can design a nuclear simulation program, but of course their designs are simply useless in reality-there are too much details missed.

Now if you compare what US and Russia did in cold war era, the maximum tests were carried out to study the effects rather then the design. Moreover it was a race to establish one above another rather then carrying out scientific study in most of the cases.

No, the maximum tests were carried out to study the nuclear science, to improve their scientists’ nuclear physics theory which is the basis of the new design. Only a handful tests were made to boost their reputation. But these tests are the one receive most of public attention. That is why you have the impression that most of nuclear tests were for the purpose of propaganda. If you check the nuclear tests of each P5, the number of nuclear tests by each of them reflects the number of type of nuclear weapon they ever built.

In case of US, the had dropped a untested design over Hiroshima rather then the plutonium device which they tested under Project Manhattan.

The bomb dropped on Hiroshima was gun-type bomb, a very basic design. After the implosion device – gadget (more complicated) was tested successfully in July 1945, people had no doubt gun-type would work as well, just didn’t know how inefficient it is.

As far as thermo-nuclear test of US and USSR is concerned, you might be aware that US had carried out the first test, but USSR did tested the first practical device. So its basically the design study rather then tests which would give you a practical weapon.

USSR’s first thermos-nuclear test was carried out in 1953 with a layer-design which proved to be a bad idea. Within several months, Russian scientists came up with a brand new idea – “Sakharov’s third idea”. The rumour is they got the help from US again.

India does have the know how to create the bomb or design it. What is important for us is to study the design to enhance the yield. Now this could be carried out through simulation. One doesn't need a number of tests to verify it if you have a strong simulation program.

Where does your “strong simulation program” come from? What is the basis it is built on? Your knowledge and understanding about nuclear react! Where do you get these? I can guarantee you, you won’t find them in any textbook. Until today, all you can find is some rough and misleading description, the majority of details are still classified. Your scientists can only learn these knowledge through the observation of real tests.

And you got one thing wrong, simulation doesn’t replace real test completely. It just help in checking a part of your design and find the fault based on existing knowledge, but in those unknown areas such as new material, new component, it works based on your assumption. Whether your assumption is right, you still need real tests. The more assumptions you have, the less accurate your simulation will be.

 

[no smoking]

When it comes to H bomb minimum yield is 50KT, so no we can't.

No, some of US/Russia's tactic H-bomb can be under 10kt.

 

[Krusty]

Can miniaturized devices be tested without getting detected on siesmometers?

Nope. Today's seismographs are way WAAY too sensitive even for the smallest yield nukes. there are about 500 seismographs placed at strategic spots all around the globs specifically for detecting underground blasts.

Just to give an idea, even a 1kt nuke set off underground will record roughly the same as a 4.2 magnitude earthquake. And seismographs can pick up far FAR weaker tremors.


Also, earthquakes and underground blasts have completely different wave patterns which help singling out nuclear blasts underground. There is zero chance of escape.

Add to this you have aircrafts like the constant Phoenix which is specifically designed to detect blasts by collecting radiological and emissions data around blast sites. This same aircraft also was used to Gather data during the North Korean nuke test.

 

[Kshatriya87]

Civil nuclear cooperation: India-Japan pact comes into force

A landmark civil nuclear cooperation deal between India and Japan that provides for collaboration between their industries in the field came into force on Thursday, eight months after it was sealed. This allows the US and French nuclear firms, which have alliances with Japanese companies, to conduct nuclear commerce with India.

Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar and Japanese ambassador Kenji Hiramatsu exchanged diplomatic notes, marking operationalisation of the pact, the Ministry of External Affairs said on Thursday. The civil nuclear cooperation agreement was signed last November during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Tokyo.

“This agreement is a reflection of the strategic partnership between India and Japan and will pave the way for enhanced cooperation in energy security and clean energy,” the MEA’s official spokesperson Gopal Baglay said.

 

[Cutting Edge 2]

No, some of US/Russia's tactic H-bomb can be under 10kt.

Those are modified bombs for special roles. e.g. B61
They use variable yield technology sometimes completely shutting secondary stage. These devises can work as fission and/or fusion devises. For India to test H bomb (thermonuclear) we must use secondary stage. Minimum yield for a small thermonuke is 50KT.

 

[Khagesh]

Where does your “strong simulation program” come from? What is the basis it is built on? Your knowledge and understanding about nuclear react! Where do you get these? I can guarantee you, you won’t find them in any textbook. Until today, all you can find is some rough and misleading description, the majority of details are still classified. Your scientists can only learn these knowledge through the observation of real tests.

There is no need for 'strong simulation program' to ensure deterrence. Agni-3 and upwards are designed for 3x200kt or 10x25kt. While a true megatoner is not there but the area destruction will be the same.