Indian nuclear submarines
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How did you arrive at those calculations , please explain.
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ok finally some figure came, so is it underpowered or adequately powered?
p2prada
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Sorry all the figures are mixed up, I took a working non naval Nuclear reactor and kept the Thermal Power fixed, went wrong. so, ignore those numbers.
Consider Adux's claim of the reactor being similar to the OK-650 as in the Akula. New Figures: Let's take a Thermal Power of 190 MWt which is similar to Akula class. At 20% efficiency, it generates 38 MWe of electrical power.
Now, at 15% efficiency(too less) we get 28.5 MWe or power.
Good enough to run a submarine with 9000tons+ displacement.
Now consider the press quoted 85MWt. This is obviously the Thermal Power. So, at 20% efficiency it will generate 17MWe of electrical power and at 15% it will generate 12.75MWe of electrical power. This was the initial reactor design by BARC. And as you see it is too less and the sub will be underpowered.
BARC wanted to use 2 reactors while IN insisted on one reactor. IN decided to scale the 85MW to 100MW. This translates to 20MWe at 20% and 15MWe at 15%.
Our assumption is that, if we want to run a sub with a displacement of greater than 9000tons we will need something similar to the OK-650. And that's where the Russians come in. So, let's keep guessing till the official word is out. My bet(and I guess Adux too) is on an imported reactor design built in India. The most reasonable being the OK-650 core.
Consider Adux's claim of the reactor being similar to the OK-650 as in the Akula. New Figures: Let's take a Thermal Power of 190 MWt which is similar to Akula class. At 20% efficiency, it generates 38 MWe of electrical power.
Now, at 15% efficiency(too less) we get 28.5 MWe or power.
Good enough to run a submarine with 9000tons+ displacement.
Now consider the press quoted 85MWt. This is obviously the Thermal Power. So, at 20% efficiency it will generate 17MWe of electrical power and at 15% it will generate 12.75MWe of electrical power. This was the initial reactor design by BARC. And as you see it is too less and the sub will be underpowered.
BARC wanted to use 2 reactors while IN insisted on one reactor. IN decided to scale the 85MW to 100MW. This translates to 20MWe at 20% and 15MWe at 15%.
Our assumption is that, if we want to run a sub with a displacement of greater than 9000tons we will need something similar to the OK-650. And that's where the Russians come in. So, let's keep guessing till the official word is out. My bet(and I guess Adux too) is on an imported reactor design built in India. The most reasonable being the OK-650 core.
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Adux
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Prada,
There is huge time of more than a decade 1985-1998, During which we were trying to build our own Nuke Reactor at the said 85MW whatever reactor, now a decade after 1998-2009, and with DIRECT Russian help, if we still think we were doing the same reactor as the initial period of 1985-1998, then we Indians are the biggest DUD-HEADS in the world, I dont believe we are, "There is more than that meets the eye here"; All the DDM's as usual are conveniently using the pre-1998 data as well as the very convenient Charlie II lease.
There is huge time of more than a decade 1985-1998, During which we were trying to build our own Nuke Reactor at the said 85MW whatever reactor, now a decade after 1998-2009, and with DIRECT Russian help, if we still think we were doing the same reactor as the initial period of 1985-1998, then we Indians are the biggest DUD-HEADS in the world, I dont believe we are, "There is more than that meets the eye here"; All the DDM's as usual are conveniently using the pre-1998 data as well as the very convenient Charlie II lease.
India, Pakistan, INS Arihant and the Security Dilemma
As probably most readers of this blog know, the Security Dilemma is a concept much discussed in the field of international relations. Brought to wide attention (although not first described) by Robert Jervis in 1978 with his article "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," it describes a mechanic by which interstate conflict can arise or worsen. At its base, the proposition is that actions taken by states to increase their own security can, at the same time, result in a decrease (real or perceived) in the security of their rivals. Arms races can be a result of the security dilemma, as can wider security spirals.
Although India has been quick to declare that the INS Arihant is a deterrent weapon system, a second-strike capability, this may not be the case against all its potential targets. An important part of the 'utility' of a strategic weapon system is the target set it is applied to. While against a distant, heavily armed opponent such as China the Arihant's 12 K-15 missiles may be useful only as a countervalue deterrent, against an opponent with a smaller critical target set this may not be the case.
Pakistan's reaction to the sub has been mixed, with official statements decrying the launch as an arms racing move but editorials within Pakistan stating that the submarine poses no significant threat to Pakistan. Another series of articles has the Pakistani navy head stating that the submarine poses 'no security threat' - although that statement appears most often in Indian news reports such as this one, with a Beijing byline. Heh.
Let's take a quick look at capabilities and targets. Against Pakistan, a nation with a small and slow-reacting nuclear capability, the 12 SLBMs carried aboard the Arihant pose quite a different level of threat. The current range for the K-15 seems to be around 700 km with a 1,000kg payload, rising to 1,200 km with a 150kg payload. While a 700 km range isn't enough to reach the northern half of Pakistan from the ocean, a 1,200 km range certainly can hit nearly all of the country other than a small region north and west of Islamabad (and, of course, Jammu and Kashmir, although it seems highly unlikely that Pakistan would stage nuclear weapons out of these disputed territories). Most importantly, however, it can certainly reach Sargodha and the "Weapons Storage Complex" there.
The FAS estimated that Pakistan had enough fissile material for a force of approximately 60 warheads in 2007. If we assume that these are stored in groups of 5 or more weapons, we have a target set that the Arihant has a very good chance of eliminating. Probably not totally; 100% functionality on an SLBM loadout isn't likely, and 100% Pk for those weapons is even more unlikely - but as the number of storage locations drops, the feasibility of this targeting option goes up.
Unlike the U.S., Russia and most other nuclear nations, Pakistan is balancing a set of problems. On the one hand, nuclear weapons offer it a security 'hedge' against external intervention. India has visibly exercised restraint during prior crises due to the presence of credible nuclear response by Pakistan. However, Pakistan also suffers from internal security threats, most especially in the more desolate northern areas which would offer the greatest concealment and operational security for its small arsenal. In addition, many observers agree that for additional security, Pakistan stores its weapons disassembled, with cores separate from the remainder of the systems. Given the expertise and tools required to properly mate the components of these weapons as well as the requirements for securing them against sabotage and theft, there is pressure on Pakistani commanders to keep the number of such sites low to mitigate risk.
It's a delicate balance. Moreoever, it's one whose likely outcome, at present, would present Indian strategic planners with a small number of extremely high-value targets, at least so long as Pakistan maintains its forces in a low state of alert. And here lies the core of the security dilemma facing Pakistan. The Arihant's missiles, assuming India can engineer a 150kg warhead or boost their range slightly, offer Indian planners an opportunity for a 'splendid first strike' if they can acquire intelligence on the current location of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. While this may not (and probably wouldn't) be a tempting option during times of low tension, as tension begins to ratchet upwards for whatever reason, Indian planners may - no, I'll say will - begin to consider that a strategic first strike might be able to minimize their danger. It's their job. Whether or not policymakers act on this option is a completely different question - but at the very least, it gives India a potential option at an early phase of a crisis which Pakistan's only real defense against is to actively deploy and/or disperse its arsenal. That action, in turn, reduces Pakistan's nuclear force security against internal threat, and depending on the state of Pakistani Command and Control, may force Pakistan to delegate release authority to remote actors - with all the risk that that entails (those who are curious about that risk are encouraged to read Bruce Blair's classic "Strategic Command and Control" for operational risk, or Scott D. Sagan's "The LImits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons" for organizational risk).
This post has minimal numbers in it. I don't claim to have satisfied even myself that the Arihant provides an actual qualitative change in the strategic balance in the Indian Ocean. However, it certainly seems like a question worthy of further research. Perhaps one good starting point would be to examine the state of Pakistan's early warning systems, and their capability versus a near-offshore SLBM launch.
Information Dissemination: India, Pakistan, INS Arihant and the Security Dilemma
As probably most readers of this blog know, the Security Dilemma is a concept much discussed in the field of international relations. Brought to wide attention (although not first described) by Robert Jervis in 1978 with his article "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," it describes a mechanic by which interstate conflict can arise or worsen. At its base, the proposition is that actions taken by states to increase their own security can, at the same time, result in a decrease (real or perceived) in the security of their rivals. Arms races can be a result of the security dilemma, as can wider security spirals.
Although India has been quick to declare that the INS Arihant is a deterrent weapon system, a second-strike capability, this may not be the case against all its potential targets. An important part of the 'utility' of a strategic weapon system is the target set it is applied to. While against a distant, heavily armed opponent such as China the Arihant's 12 K-15 missiles may be useful only as a countervalue deterrent, against an opponent with a smaller critical target set this may not be the case.
Pakistan's reaction to the sub has been mixed, with official statements decrying the launch as an arms racing move but editorials within Pakistan stating that the submarine poses no significant threat to Pakistan. Another series of articles has the Pakistani navy head stating that the submarine poses 'no security threat' - although that statement appears most often in Indian news reports such as this one, with a Beijing byline. Heh.
Let's take a quick look at capabilities and targets. Against Pakistan, a nation with a small and slow-reacting nuclear capability, the 12 SLBMs carried aboard the Arihant pose quite a different level of threat. The current range for the K-15 seems to be around 700 km with a 1,000kg payload, rising to 1,200 km with a 150kg payload. While a 700 km range isn't enough to reach the northern half of Pakistan from the ocean, a 1,200 km range certainly can hit nearly all of the country other than a small region north and west of Islamabad (and, of course, Jammu and Kashmir, although it seems highly unlikely that Pakistan would stage nuclear weapons out of these disputed territories). Most importantly, however, it can certainly reach Sargodha and the "Weapons Storage Complex" there.
The FAS estimated that Pakistan had enough fissile material for a force of approximately 60 warheads in 2007. If we assume that these are stored in groups of 5 or more weapons, we have a target set that the Arihant has a very good chance of eliminating. Probably not totally; 100% functionality on an SLBM loadout isn't likely, and 100% Pk for those weapons is even more unlikely - but as the number of storage locations drops, the feasibility of this targeting option goes up.
Unlike the U.S., Russia and most other nuclear nations, Pakistan is balancing a set of problems. On the one hand, nuclear weapons offer it a security 'hedge' against external intervention. India has visibly exercised restraint during prior crises due to the presence of credible nuclear response by Pakistan. However, Pakistan also suffers from internal security threats, most especially in the more desolate northern areas which would offer the greatest concealment and operational security for its small arsenal. In addition, many observers agree that for additional security, Pakistan stores its weapons disassembled, with cores separate from the remainder of the systems. Given the expertise and tools required to properly mate the components of these weapons as well as the requirements for securing them against sabotage and theft, there is pressure on Pakistani commanders to keep the number of such sites low to mitigate risk.
It's a delicate balance. Moreoever, it's one whose likely outcome, at present, would present Indian strategic planners with a small number of extremely high-value targets, at least so long as Pakistan maintains its forces in a low state of alert. And here lies the core of the security dilemma facing Pakistan. The Arihant's missiles, assuming India can engineer a 150kg warhead or boost their range slightly, offer Indian planners an opportunity for a 'splendid first strike' if they can acquire intelligence on the current location of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. While this may not (and probably wouldn't) be a tempting option during times of low tension, as tension begins to ratchet upwards for whatever reason, Indian planners may - no, I'll say will - begin to consider that a strategic first strike might be able to minimize their danger. It's their job. Whether or not policymakers act on this option is a completely different question - but at the very least, it gives India a potential option at an early phase of a crisis which Pakistan's only real defense against is to actively deploy and/or disperse its arsenal. That action, in turn, reduces Pakistan's nuclear force security against internal threat, and depending on the state of Pakistani Command and Control, may force Pakistan to delegate release authority to remote actors - with all the risk that that entails (those who are curious about that risk are encouraged to read Bruce Blair's classic "Strategic Command and Control" for operational risk, or Scott D. Sagan's "The LImits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons" for organizational risk).
This post has minimal numbers in it. I don't claim to have satisfied even myself that the Arihant provides an actual qualitative change in the strategic balance in the Indian Ocean. However, it certainly seems like a question worthy of further research. Perhaps one good starting point would be to examine the state of Pakistan's early warning systems, and their capability versus a near-offshore SLBM launch.
Information Dissemination: India, Pakistan, INS Arihant and the Security Dilemma
p2prada
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10 years if you are ready to starve.
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p2prada
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I don't know when the Russians jumped in. But, news articles show that our own reactor was ready only in 2000-01 and became critical in 2004. And this was the reactor that was used on the first ATV. Maybe the reactor will be changed on a later date to a Russian/Indian design.
Even if its been 2 decades, building a reactor will still take a good part of a decade and atleast 3-4 years for it to reach its max power(critical). That's easily around 10-15 years. This is considering the naval reactor is our first try. After more experience it will take lesser time, probably half that and then even lesser.
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J
John
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i doubt this Akula claim, firstly the ATV is much smaller, much more stealthier and to an amateur all subs look alike. The ATV has similar features but is quite different than the Akula. The ATV can carry more and longer range weapons.
J
John
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more than the Akula bro, depending on the version the the Akula has 4 to 6 tubes and able to carry upto 40 misiles/torpedoes, it can deploy the Strfish missile range 45km or stallion missile with 120km range.
our ATV can drop 750km Sagarika which on a lighter payload can go as far as 2200km, The Agni-3SL with on its lightest payload can hit targets 8000km away. The ATV will be able to carry brahmos as well and probably brahmos-2 hypersonic cruise missiles.
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Sagarika with a lighter load will go 2200 kms? That's a first for me. As it is it's payload capacity is 500kgs. How much more can you drop to increase the range 3 times?
At best you can increase the range of any missile by 20-30 due to weight reduction. Not 2-3 times. Will you car with a full load of passengers giving say 12 to a litre give 35 with a single occupant?
At best you can increase the range of any missile by 20-30 due to weight reduction. Not 2-3 times. Will you car with a full load of passengers giving say 12 to a litre give 35 with a single occupant?
J
John
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Sagarika has max range of 700km with 1000kg warhead, it has max. range of 2200 km with a 150kg warhead. depends on the kinda of target we need to hit, we can adjust the fire power.
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