bhramos
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those ex-RN Harrier were already scraped and sold as spares to US Marines...., so dont ever think of them...I hope that the harriers are not scraped after the Viraat is retired. I think we can operate them from the 4 LPD/LPH that we are going to acquire. This is more reason why we should have gotten the ex Royal Navy harriers. It was in our first five year plan after independence to have 2 fleet carriers and 4 escort carriers. with the LPH/LPD operating 6 harriers each they could act as escort carriers. what do the experts think?
Originally launched in 1944 as the Diablo, a long-range Tench-class submarine built by the Portsmouth Navy Yard. She was launched on 1 December 1944, and commissioned on 31 March 1945. In 1962, her hull classification symbol was changed to AGSS-479.
PNS Ghazi - Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaPNS Ghazi (SS 479) was Pakistan Navy (PN)'s first ever submarine, leased from United States in 1963. It saw action in the 1965 and 1971 wars between India and Pakistan. The submarine could be armed with up to 28 torpedoes and, in later years, was re-fitted in Turkey for mine-laying capability. Starting from being the only submarine in the war theater in 1965, it remained the PN's flagship submarine until it sank near the eastern coast of India during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War enroute to the Bay of Bengal under mysterious circumstances.[SUP][7][/SUP] Indian Navy credits Ghazi's sinking to the destroyer INS Rajput;[SUP][2][/SUP][SUP][3][/SUP][SUP][4][/SUP] however, Pakistani sources state that the submarine sank due to either an internal explosion or accidental detonation of mines being laid by the submarine off the Vishakapatnam harbour with neutral sources confirming INS Rajput still in its port when it sank.[SUP][8][/SUP][SUP][5][/SUP][SUP][9][/SUP][SUP][10][/SUP]
The Officer in Command of Submarine Service Branch of Pakistan Navy and the junior officers and commander of Ghazi, had objected the plan as it was proposed by the Army and Naval officers during the briefing session.And, it was difficult to sustain such naval operations in a distant area of Bay of Bengal, in the total absence of repair, logistics, and recreational facilities in the vicinity. At this time, submarine repair facilities were totally absent at Chittagong — the only sea port in the east during this period. To her earlier commanders, the mission was considered highly dangerous and impossible to achieve by sending an obsolute submarine behind enemy lines. The commanders at NHQ overruled the objections, and instead planned a reconnaissance operation, which led to launching of the Submarine operations in the eastern theater. Per the recommendation of senior naval officers and commanders, Ghazi's command was changed immediately to the newer and younger naval officers. On 14 November 1971, Ghazi sailed out from her base under the new command of Commander Zafar Muhammad Khan, who was promoted to this rank prior to 4 days ago, with 92 men aboard.
[h=2][edit] Fate[/h] The mysterious sinking of PNS Ghazi took place somewhere around 4 December 1971 during Pakistani Navy's submarine assault on the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant and/or mine-laying mission on Vishakapatnam Port, Bay of Bengal.[SUP][13][/SUP]
On 14 November 1971, Ghazi sailed out of harbour on a reconnaissance patrol mission under the command of Cdr. Zafar Muhammad Khan with 93 hands on board. It was expected to report on 26 November.[SUP][13][/SUP] Deployment of Ghazi was part of Pakistan Navy reconnaissance operations in Arabian sea and Bay of Bengal.
The Ghazi was 400 miles off Bombay on 16 November, off Ceylon on 19 November, and entered the Bay of Bengal on 20 November 1971. She started looking for the Vikrant on 23 November off Madras but was not aware that she was 10 days too late and the Vikrant was actually somewhere near the Andaman islands. Vice Admiral Krishnan sent for Captain Inder Singh, the Commanding officer of the Rajput for detailed briefing at about 16:00 on 1 December and told him that a Pakistani submarine had been sighted off Ceylon and was absolutely certain that the submarine would be somewhere around Madras/Vishakaptanm. He made it clear that once Rajput had completed refueling, she must leave the harbor with all navigational aids switched off.[SUP][14][/SUP]
At 23:40 on 3 December, taking on board a pilot, Rajput moved through the channel to the exit from Vishakhapatnama.[SUP][14][/SUP][SUP][15][/SUP]
Exactly at midnight, shortly after passing the entrance buoy, starboard lookout reported breaker on the surface of the water right on the nose. Singh, changing the course at full speed across the specified point and ordered to lose at this point, two depth charges, and that was done. The explosions were "stunning", and the ship suffered a serious concussion. However, visible results of this attack are not given. Rajput for some time surveyed the area dumping bombs, no longer found any contact — either visual or acoustic. A few minutes later the destroyer continued on her way to the coast of East Pakistan.[SUP][14][/SUP][SUP][15][/SUP]
PNS Ghazi sank with all 92 hands on board due to unknown circumstances[SUP][13][/SUP] off the Vishakapatnam coast, allowing the Indian Navy to effect a naval blockade of then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).
[h=3][edit] Intelligence and deception[/h] According to Indian Vice Admiral Mihir K. Roy, who was Director of Intelligence during this period, its existence was revealed when signal addressed to naval authorities in Chittagong was intercepted, requesting information on a lubrication oil only used by submarines and minesweepers.[SUP][16][/SUP][SUP][13][/SUP]
Management from the Indian Navy began to realize that the Pakistanis would inevitably be forced to send in the Bay of Bengal their submarine Ghazi as the sole ship which could operate in these waters. At that time, Vice Admiral N. Krishnan was the Flag officer Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Navy's eastern Naval Command. From his point of view, it was pretty clear that Pakistan would have deployed the Ghazi in the Bay of Bengal and a part of its plan was an attempt to sink the Indian aircraft carrier carrier Vikrant. Fearing a possible attack primarily against its own aircraft carrier deployed in the region, Indian commanders had taken early action, in the period preceding the outbreak of hostilities, to slip Vikrant aircraft carrier groups at a secret anchorage in the Andaman Islands, designated as "X-Ray". On 13 November, Vikrant with escort ships went from Madras to this point. At the same time concerted action was taken to disseminate information designed to mislead the enemy about the true location of the aircraft carrier, and to instill confidence in the Pakistani people that the carrier was stationed at Visakhapatnam.[SUP][14][/SUP]
Contracts were placed for delivery in Visakhapatnam of large quantities of food, especially meat and fresh vegetables, allegedly destined for the Eastern Fleet ships. A private telegram was allegedly sent from Vishakhapatnam from one of the sailors of the aircraft carrier, inquiring about the health of his ailing mother. All these activities were apparently successful in deceiving the enemy — as already mentioned. 25 November, the Pakistani command sent communication to the Ghazi saying that "intelligence indicates the finding of an aircraft carrier in port".[SUP][15][/SUP]
[h=3][edit] Aftermath[/h] Ghazi was expected to report back to Karachi Naval dockyard on November 26 of 1971. Commanding officer of Ghazi, Commander Zafar Muhammad Khan was ordered to submit a report over the mission's course. On November 26, Ghazi failed to return to her base, and the base commander had repeatedly sent communication signals to Ghazi, but they weren't answered. Anxiety grew day by day at the Naval Combatant Headquarter, The NHQ. Desperate for her return to the base, the NHQ had pressed frantic efforts to establish communications with the Ghazi, but they too failed. Before the 1971 Naval hostilities broke out, earlier commanding officers and submariners of Ghazi had doubted about the fate of the submarine had already begun to agitate the minds of submariners and many senior officers at Naval Headquarters (NHQ). The NHQ Commanders attributed to their junior officers that several reasons could, however, be attributed to the failure of the submarine to communicate.
On December 9, Indian Navy strangely issued a statement about the fate of Ghazi. The first indication of Ghazi's tragic fate came when a message by NHQ of India, claiming sinking of Ghazi on the night of 3 December, was intercepted. The Indian NHQ issued the statement few hours before the loss of INS Khurki, and prior to launch of Operation Python.
[h=4][edit] Neutral Witnesses[/h] An independent testimony stems from an Egyptian officer who claimed that the Indian ships were docked at the Visakhapatnam harbour when the explosions from the supposed Indian sinking of Ghazi occurred, and that "it was not until about an hour after the explosion that two Indian naval ships were observed leaving harbour".[SUP][8][/SUP][SUP][17][/SUP]
[h=4][edit] Pakistani version[/h] According to Pakistan, the Ghazi sank when the mines it was laying were accidentally detonated.[SUP][18][/SUP] Another more plausible theory, also favored by Pakistan, is that the explosive shock from one of the depth charges set off the torpedoes and mines (some of which may have been armed for laying) stored aboard the submarine. The Pakistani Naval Command counter argued: the PNS Ghazi itself may have inadvertently passed over the mines during the mine laying operations; patrolling Indian vessels or Indian depth charges may also have tripped the count mechanism of one or more mines. One of the reasons to believe this as true is that Indian divers found the damaged parts of the submarine to be blown inside out.[SUP][14][/SUP][SUP][19][/SUP]
The Hamoodur Rahman commission was constituted by Pakistan Government to investigate the military and political causes of the country's defeat in the 1971 war never carried out any investigation into the incident.[SUP][20][/SUP]
[h=4][edit] Indian version[/h] After the war India undertook an investigation into the incident. India claimed that the submarine was sunk following a series of successful manoeuvres by the Indian Navy. Later some items of the ship like the logbook and official Pakistani tapes, were displayed in India's Eastern Naval Command.[SUP][21][/SUP] A submarine rescue vessel, INS Nishtar was sent to check the debris. India later built a "Victory Memorial" on the coast near where the Ghazi was sunk.[SUP][22][/SUP]
The official history of Indian Navy 'Transition to Triumph', authored by Vice-Admiral (Retd) G M Hiranandani, quotes naval records and top naval officials who commanded operations on the eastern waterfront as saying that INS Rajput was sent from Vizag to track down Ghazi. The book also noted that the time of dropping of the charges, the explosion which was heard by the people of Vizag and that of a clock recovered from Ghazi, matched.[SUP][23][/SUP]
Admiral Roy of India states: "The theories propounded earlier by some who were unaware of the ruse de guerre(attempt to fool the enemy in wartime) leading to the sinking of the first submarine in the Indian Ocean gave rise to smirks from within our own (Indian) naval service for an operation which instead merited a Bravo Zulu (flag hoist for bravery)".[SUP][16][/SUP]
Admiral S. M. Nanda, who commanded the Indian Navy during the 1971 Indo-Pak War, states : "In narrow channels, ships, during an emergency or war, always throw depth charges around them to deter submarines. One of them probably hit the Ghazi. The blow-up was there, but nobody knew what it was all about until the fisherman found the lifejacket".[SUP][24][/SUP]
[h=3][edit] Recovery of sunk vessel[/h] Following this both the United States and the Soviet Union offered to raise the submarine to the surface at their own expense. The Government of India, however, rejected these offers and allowed the submarine to sink further into the mud off the fairway buoy of Vishakapatnam.[SUP][16][/SUP]
[h=2][edit] References[/h]
- ^ Friedman, Norman (1995). U.S. Submarines Through 1945: An Illustrated Design History. Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute. pp. 285–304. ISBN 1-55750-263-3.
- ^ [SUP]a[/SUP] [SUP]b[/SUP] http://www.orbat.com/site/cimh/navy/kills(1971)-2.pdf
- ^ [SUP]a[/SUP] [SUP]b[/SUP] "Rediff On The NeT: End of an era: INS Vikrant's final farewell". Rediff.com. Retrieved 2011-12-16.
- ^ [SUP]a[/SUP] [SUP]b[/SUP] "The Sunday Tribune - Spectrum - Lead Article". Tribuneindia.com. Retrieved 2011-12-16.
- ^ [SUP]a[/SUP] [SUP]b[/SUP] Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-first Century By Geoffrey Till
- ^ .S. Submarines Through 1945 pp. 305–311.
- ^ Till, Geoffrey (2004). Seapower: a guide for the twenty-first century. Great Britain: Frank Cass Publishers. p. 179. ISBN 0-7146-8436-8. Retrieved 2010-05-28.
- ^ [SUP]a[/SUP] [SUP]b[/SUP] http://www.harpoondatabases.com/encyclopedia/Entry1885.aspx
- ^ Joseph, Josy (12). "Now, no record of Navy sinking Pakistani submarine in 1971". TOI website (Times Of India). Retrieved 28 May 2010. "Pakistani authorities say the submarine sank because of either an internal explosion or accidental blast of mines that the submarine itself was laying around Vizag harbour."
- ^ "The truth behind the Navy's 'sinking' of Ghazi". Sify News website. Sify News. 25. Retrieved 29 May 2010. "After the war, however, teams of divers confirmed that it was an internal explosion that sank the Ghazi."
- ^ Roy, Mihir K. (1995). War in the Indian Ocean. Lancer Publishers. pp. 83–85. ISBN 978-1-897829-11-0. Retrieved 8 November 2011.
- ^ See the article of Genesis of Break away at Indo-Pakistani Naval War of 1971
- ^ [SUP]a[/SUP] [SUP]b[/SUP] [SUP]c[/SUP] [SUP]d[/SUP] [SUP]e[/SUP] Till, Geoffrey (2004). Seapower: a guide for the twenty-first century. Great Britain: Frank Cass Publishers. p. 179. ISBN 0-7146-8436-8. Retrieved 2010-05-28.
- ^ [SUP]a[/SUP] [SUP]b[/SUP] [SUP]c[/SUP] [SUP]d[/SUP] [SUP]e[/SUP] "BHARAT RAKSHAK MONITOR: Volume 4(2) September–October 2001". Bharat-rakshak.com. Retrieved 2011-12-16.
- ^ [SUP]a[/SUP] [SUP]b[/SUP] [SUP]c[/SUP] "п▓п╬п╧п╫Ñâ–€, п╦Ñ│Ñ┌п╬Ñ─п╦п╦, Ñ└п╟п╨Ñ┌Ñâ–€. п░п╩Ñ▄п╪п╟п╫п╟Ñ┘". Almanacwhf.ru. Retrieved 2011-12-16.
- ^ [SUP]a[/SUP] [SUP]b[/SUP] [SUP]c[/SUP] Mihir K. Roy (1995) War in the Indian Ocean, Spantech & Lancer. ISBN 978-1897829110
- ^ http://ussseaowl.com/PDFFolder/Newsletter12-2007.pdf
- ^ .: PAKISTAN NAVY :. A Silent Force to Reckon with... [ a 4 dimensional force]
- ^ Transition to triumph: history of the Indian Navy, 1965-1975 By G. M. Hiranandani
- ^ http://www.pppusa.org/Acrobat/Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report.pdf
- ^ Trilochan Singh Trewn (July 21, 2002). "Naval museums give glimpse of maritime history". The Tribune. Retrieved May 16, 2007.
- ^ "India/Andhra Pradesh/Visakhapatnam". WikiMapia. Retrieved May 16, 2007.
- ^ Vice-Admiral (Retd) G M Hiranandani, Transition to Triumph: Indian Navy 1965–1975. ISBN 1897829728
- ^ Sengupta, Ramananda (22 January 2007). "The Rediff Interview/Admiral S M Nanda (retd) 'Does the US want war with India?'". Interview. India: Rediff. Retrieved 26 March 2010.
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