The U.S. and India have been conducting increasingly sophisticated naval exercises – in the Malibar series – since the mid-1990s. However, the multilateral operations that have taken place under the aegis of CTF 150 are different and have provided some highly useful experience in operating with multiple sets of rules of engagement, communications capabilities, and operating concepts. It is difficult to see a situation where the oil flow from the Persian Gulf region is threatened where the United States, European navies, Australia and Japan are not involved in assuring the safety and security of the maritime traffic flow. If India is also planning to undertake operations to assist in this effort, it is losing a valuable training opportunity at the moment. Again, the reasons for this lack of participation are not clear and may be as simple as the bureaucratic divide of the U.S. military – where India falls under the U.S. Pacific command’s area of responsibility while the operations of CTF 150 fall under that of the U.S. Central Command. India is not unaware of this issue, and is pursuing other combined exercise opportunities to test its ability to operate with advanced navies in areas vital to protecting sea lanes of communication.
23) Regardless, India’s future operations in this mission area are likely to be multilateral and are almost certainly going to involve the United States, Japan, and European navies. Naval Diplomacy The Indian Navy has been conducting naval diplomacy almost since its inception. It had a period of higher activity levels in the 1980s – in part supporting the government’s more assertive foreign policy at the time, but that tapered off in the early 1990s. Since that point, the IN has again been increasing its exercises with other navies, its port calls, operations designed to project a positive image of India, and activities such as the circumnavigation voyage of the INS Tarangini. In the past year, India’s aircraft carrier Viraat visited ports in Southeast Asia for the first time – providing visible evidence of Indian interest in the region and also showing off a capability not possessed by China, the other great power vying for influence in that subregion.
24) For the most part, naval diplomacy does not require specific capabilities as much as it does adequate resources for operations and the political will and vision to use naval assets in support of broader foreign and security policy objectives. The most recent example of the IN’s activities in this role was its tsunami relief activities. It is a mission that the IN rightfully proud of, and its senior leadership uses it as an example of the type of naval diplomacy that should be continued and expanded over time. The operations was the largest peace-time mission every undertaken by the IN with thirty-two ships, thirty aircraft and helicopters, and over 5,500 personnel mobilized.
25) IN ships, aircraft, and personnel assisted in locating survivors, evacuating victims, removing salvage and debris, conducting hydrographic surveys to reopen ports and harbors, restoring drinking water facilities and power generation. These activities supported the governments and peoples of Sri Lanka, Maldives and Indonesia in addition to those Indian citizens in locations such as the Andaman and Nicobar islands who were also affected by the tsunami. India’s naval diplomacy – in the form of deployments and bilateral exercises – has been focused on both the navies in key SLOC regions of the Indian Ocean and on those navies with capabilities to operate in or influence maritime activities in the Indian Ocean. India has used its carrier capabilities in exercises with U.S. and French carriers in the past year – something that can only be done by a handful of countries around the world. In addition, the IN has conducted bilateral patrols of the Straits of Malacca with the Royal Thai Navy and the Indonesian Navy – something that the United States had proposed several years ago but which was turned down as too politically sensitive by the nations in the region. India has also set up a joint military cooperation committee with Oman, a structure that will lay the groundwork for more extensive military, and particularly maritime, ties.
26) The combination of India’s standing in the region, its maritime capabilities, and its renewed willingness to put naval assets in support of diplomacy allowed it to make diplomat inroads that may, in the future, enable other operations. Forward Presence Forward presence is a more difficult role to define than the three discussed above. In some senses, it is at times difficult to distinguish between forward presence and naval diplomacy. Measuring forward presence is also more problematic in part because some of the activities undertaken by a navy under the forward presence rubric may not be in the public eye. The ostensible purposes of forward presence are: to demonstrate interest in a specific area, to demonstrate capability to deploy and operate in that region, to familiarize forces with operating in that area, to reassure friends and allies in the region of ones ability to deploy and operate, and to potentially deter or dissuade potentially hostile powers from operating in that area. In today’s security parlance, forward presence is deemed to be a necessary part of “shaping” the international environment to be more amenable to a state’s interests. India is certainly interested in shaping its Indian Ocean region environment and has come to realize the utility of its military forces as a tool to help do so. In the U.S. case, forward presence has also been used in the past to help justify force structure levels for the navy. Some analysts have argued that the forward presence mission is a burden for U.S. forces and has driven force structure decisions and operations tempo to the detriment of other missions and more sensible resource allocations.
27) For the Indian Navy, this is not yet a concern, and in fact adopting a specific forward presence mission may assist it in its budgetary battles with the other services. For such a budgetary justification strategy to be useful, however, the IN will have to develop a specific plan of forward presence, be able to distinguish it from its other roles and be able to link it to force structure and operational requirements. Some discussion of the presence mission has been linked to anti-piracy and general protection of sea lanes, but this may prove a thin reed upon which to hang significant force structure requirements. A more politically robust argument may be the need to counter China’s growing naval power and presence in the Indian Ocean region and particularly in Southeast Asia.
28) Conclusions
India’s maritime power no longer mirrors the saying attributed to Charles de Gaulle about Brazil – that it is a country of the future and always will be. The IN has done an admirable job since its birth with a difficult set of political, financial, and technological circumstances. While it is still suffering from the budgetary issues of the 1980s and early 1990s, its platforms and associated capabilities are on the upswing. The IN is also beginning to operate confidently in a political environment, both domestic and international, that provides it with much greater opportunity for influence and latitude. India’s foreign policy these days is marked much more by a willingness to use its military capabilities in pursuit of its interests. Given India’s geographic location, this willingness provides much more latitude for action by its maritime forces than any of the other services. Internationally, India is no longer constrained by the policies of the superpowers during the Cold War nor does it feel that it has to carve out a third way between the two former giants. India’s relationship with Russia has much more of a business tone as supplier and recipient of defense technologies. Its growing strategic partnership with the United States represents a significant departure from its past policies. The high level political impetus behind this new partnership will push it along at a significant pace, and cooperation between naval forces is a logical way to advance the relationship. As noted above, maritime cooperation has been mixed – with much more advanced exercises and an operation in the Straits of Malacca on the one hand but with a relative lack of cooperation in the Northern Arabian Gulf on the other. This sporadic progress is likely to continue, with at least two factors holding back full cooperation. One is reports of remaining differences of views among mid-level and senior officers and national security officials.
29) The second is the ongoing balance of relationships between the U.S. and Pakistan on the one hand and between India and Pakistan on the other. While the U.S. relationship with India has indeed become de-hyphenated from that with Pakistan, there will continue to be some tensions in the maritime realm, especially to the degree that the U.S. continues to provide Pakistan with military technology and works with it in the maritime realm. This international element, however, will likely have less influence on the direction and pace of India’s overall maritime capabilities and strategy
than the ongoing tensions that exist in New Delhi’s modernization program between the forces favoring indigenization and those willing to use foreign purchases to obtain capabilities sooner. :dozey:Associated with this dilemma is the issue of privatization and reform of the Indian defense industry.
30) The pace and scope of this reform will have a significant impact on India’s ability to quickly fulfill its requirements for modern and capable maritime forces. Regardless of the open questions about the full pace and scope of the growth of India’s maritime capabilities,
India will be a significant player in Asian waters outside of its immediate neighbors for the first time in its history:sun_bespectacled:.
Sitting astride key sea lines of communication for energy security – especially for China and Japan -- and projecting power for purposes as varied as tsunami relief and strategic deterrence, the other Asian maritime powers will have to take India’s capabilities and not just its potential into account:2guns:
1 The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the views or policies of the Naval War College, the U.S. Navy, or the U.S. Department of Defense.
2 Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, India’s Maritime Security, New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2000, p. 125.
3 James Goldrick, No Easy Answers, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs, No. 2 New Delhi: Lancer Publishers and Distributors, 1997, pp. 19-20
4 Goldrick’s book provides an excellent history of the emergence of the navies of India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka and the challenges they have faced both politically and in terms of resources.
5 Roy-Chaudhury, p. 127.
6 Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine, August 17, 1999,
Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine - August 17, 1999 , Accessed January 12, 2006.
7 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “India's nuclear forces, 2005,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists September/October 2005 pp. 73-75 (vol. 61, no. 05)
8 Indian Navy, Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defense, “Indian Maritime Doctrine,” INBR 8, April 25, 2004, p. 49.
9 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “India's nuclear forces, 2005.”
10 Roy-Chaudhury, p. 141.
11 “Submarine Forces,” Jane's Underwater Warfare Systems, September 19, 2005.
12 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “India’s nuclear forces”.
13 Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, New Delhi: MacMillan India Limited, 2002.
14 Integrated Headquarters (Navy), Ministry of Defense, Indian Maritime Doctrine April 25, 2004, p. 56.
15 Ibid., pp. 63-64.
16 Ibid., p. 64.
17 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - South Asia, Procurement, Submarines, March 13, 2005.
18 Rahul Bedi, “India rejects P3-C option,” Jane’s Navy International, MARCH 01, 2006. 19 Rahul Bedi, “India moves to boost airborne surveillance,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, March 15, 2006.
20 Rahul Bedi, “Indian Navy strives for regional dominance,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, December
21, 2005. 21 Mrityunjoy Mazumdar, “Indian Navy regenerates its fleet air arm, Jane’s Naval Intelligence December 1, 2005.
22 Hans de Vreij, “Terrorist hunt on high seas,” Radio Netherlands, March 3, 2006,
Terrorist hunt on high seas - Radio Netherlands Worldwide - English . Accessed: March 22, 2006.
23 “India, France begin joint naval exercises,” Deccan Herald, February 27, 2005,
http://www.deccanherald.com/deccanherald/feb272005/i20.asp , Accessed: March 3, 2006.
24 P S. Suryanarayana, “Aircraft carrier on a friendly mission,” The Hindu August 3, 2005.
25 CNS Press Conference on Navy Day, New Delhi, December 2, 2005.
26 Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Ministry of Defence, “India and Oman Set up Joint Military Cooperation Committee,” March 11, 2006.
27 Daniel Goure, “The Tyranny of Forward Presence,” Naval War College Review Summer 2001.
28 Sudha Ramachandran, “Delhi all ears in the Indian Ocean,” Asia Times, March 3, 2006.
29 Juli A. MacDonald, Indo-U.S. Military Relationship: Expectations and Perceptions, Washington DC: Booz Allen Hamilton, 2002. 30 Rahul Bedi, “Is privatization the panacea for India as it grapples with the spectre of obsolescence?” International Defence Review, December 1, 2005.
could serve as a substitute platform for a sea-based nuclear deterrent force, but this would raise some operational issues. 
