Indian Navy Developments & Discussions

[pulakeshi]

ya true at that..but isnt it inefficient on the whole and over a long run that things that are bought at great expense from outside could have been made at home for comparable or even less prices..

even if not financially does it really make sense to rely on foreign expertise for critical systems..knowing that we have been betrayed numerous times in the past..and also the exponential cost overruns and delivery delays of certain projects(eg: the INS Vikramaditya, BOFORs, MiGs, etc etc

while it is true that certain things cannot be built overnight..there could at least be a legit attempt in place. I really like the new TATA howitzer which has better range than the Bofors and the best part is that its got our own ballistics..but look at the irony that there was no R & D input from the Government.. it was all privately sponsored by TATA..!!

and to make things worse relying on outside goods only makes us dependent, and when you are dependent you dont have a lot of leverage or say. Basically they decide the terms and you follow.. and this exploitation just keeps getting worse.

Idea is to focus on things which is denied to us, like Missiles, nuke subs, nuke weapons etc. Things which are available in open market like artillery guns, AC, etc we have not used our own resources. Only now we have move to this new area. We are making our own AC and artillery guns. Hope this will answer your question.

 

[Abhijeet Dey]

Now the question is should 7% of India's defense budget (or 10% probably) be allocated in R&D to DRDO? China was spending some 20 per cent, and the US 16 per cent of their defense budgets on R&D as mentioned by Dr. V.K. Saraswat.

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Corruption since 1948..

Imports are major source of corruption in defense sector, that is one major reason you see paid media reports, continual bashing of few failures and absolutely silence over success..

Lack of funds provided by gov to National defense sector and holding them responsible for delays and discourage them, Indian Government does not have willing to make National defense sector on its knees, Its a miracle that we are where we are..


A good Brain storming..

===================

There is corruption is National defense sector also but that is a grain compare to what involved in imports..

 

[Coalmine]

reason is corruption. Almost in all defence procurements,JVs,TOTs, 5 to 10 percent is certainly going in babu and politician pocket.
Second will be our inability to bring Drdo and armed forces to bring to same table.

 

[pulakeshi]

i personally feel like this allocation must be put on private entities(which are in many cases more efficient and competitive) instead of government entities which though glorious have been quiet inefficient in management of resources and intellectual personnel..another case where a government organization has fallen prey to bureaucracy and sometimes personal egos and ambitions.

I am not against spending on government organizations but i feel like private entities bring out more competitive spirit and involvement. this has been proven in various countries,,like the US, Britain, Japan, the rest of the EU, Russia and even China to that matter (ofc there is a lot of control)

The Indian government should perhaps invest in a semi-private centered organization where you private competitiveness in the design and building phases but stringent quality control and operational trials conducted by the government organizations (Like DRDO or the Army itself)

While it would be awesome to see 10 to 15 % investments by India in R&D (in line with others mentioned above), I dont see that happening anytime soon..so baby steps first..like opening the defense to private sectors(increasing competition and efficiency) , encouraging private efforts(India must encourage the TATA howitzers if they are worthy and must not bow to personal and vested interests) ; and then keep increasing domestic investment steadily say start at 7% then go up to say 10 or 11% in couple years and keep the steady increased going..!

Now the question is should 7% of India's defense budget (or 10% probably) be allocated in R&D to DRDO? China was spending some 20 per cent, and the US 16 per cent of their defense budgets on R&D as mentioned by Dr. V.K. Saraswat.

 

[Blackwater]

Why not Indigenous Air-Craft Carrier?


Question is "" WHY"" ???, if you can''t ,why to waste time

example of LCA and Arjun is in front of you

Why not ask our new friend Ameerika to make nuke power aircraft carrier with super hornet on it. iam sure it will be faster and cheaper than time waste and money waste on indegenious and russia

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Must surgically implant these words, When talking about national security..

At the end of the day, Troops need unlimited supply of arms and ammo from inside manufacturing, Let it be Gov or Private..

 

[Snuggy321]

DRDO chief wants 7% of defence budget for R&D
By Ajai Shukla
Business Standard, 19th Apr 13

With Defence Minister AK Antony demanding that less weaponry be imported and a greater percentage of India's military requirements be developed and built in the country, the Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO) wants a significantly higher budget and has spelt out a three-fold roadmap for indigenization.

In an exclusive interview to Business Standard, DRDO chief Dr VK Saraswat, who is also Scientific Advisor to the Raksha Mantri, has said that DRDO's funding must be raised from the current 5.2 per cent of defence expenditure to at least 7-8% of the defence budget.

"We need a minimum of 7-8% of the defence budget to successfully deliver the systems that the armed forces need. The current gap of 2% of defence budget will have a serious impact, forcing us to prioritize between our development projects," says Saraswat.

The DRDO's allocation of Rs 10,610 crore for 2013-14, would have been higher by Rs 3,650 crore if it had been allocated 7 per cent of the defence budget. The DRDO's highest funding levels were in 2007, when it received 6.2 per cent of the defence budget.

Pointing out that China was spending some 20 per cent, and the US 16 per cent of their defence budgets on R&D, Saraswat said, "Developing world-class military technologies would require an R&D allocation of minimum 10% of the defence budget."

Besides enhanced funding, Saraswat outlined three important steps that the defence ministry (MoD) and the military needed to implement. Firstly, the military must plan ahead in order to allow the DRDO enough time to develop the equipment that soldiers need.

"The military cannot raise a new requirement and say that it must be imported immediately unless the DRDO delivers it in 18-24 months. Most complex defence systems take 7-8 years to develop and we must be allowed that time. Besides, we have seen that the time needed for importing a defence system is between 4-6 years. So the army must plan ahead," says Saraswat.

As Business Standard has reported (Apr 13, 2013, "Ministry's initiative to push indigenous development") the forthcoming Defence Procurement Procedure of 2013 is likely to address this demand. DPP-2013 will require the military to provide the DRDO and Indian defence companies with adequate time to develop the equipment that it requires.

The second major change that the DRDO chief wants is for the armed forces to accept the concepts of "spiral development" and "capability based deployment" of equipment being developed.

"Spiral development" rests on the fact that that military equipment capabilities gradually improve as design and development continues. Saraswat explains that if the military wants a radar system that can detect enemy fighter aircraft 500 kilometres away, and the DRDO develops one that can see 300 kilometres, the military should accept and deploy that radar. While soldiers develop expertise in operating the radar and provide valuable feedback, the scientists would enhance the capability to 500 kilometres. "Capability based deployment" means bringing into operational use a "Mark I" radar, while a "Mark II" version, with better performance is developed.

The DRDO chief's third recommendation for boosting indigenization is an investment fund through which the MoD can fund selected technology projects by private sector companies, especially small and medium enterprises (SMEs).

"The fact is that private sector defence R&D is close to non-existent. We need a venture capital investment system, which will fund and promote research and promote an R&D culture in these companies. We have to cover their risk," says Saraswat.

There are several government models for funding private sector defence R&D, most notably in Israel, and the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) model in the US, in which the Pentagon chooses from amongst futuristic projects that private sector players propose, and funds them even when there is no certainty of success.

A similar thought process is evident in the Kelkar Committee, which has recommended setting up a Defence Technology Development Fund, with a corpus of Rs 100 crore. So far the MoD has not taken any concrete steps to implement this.

Finally, the DRDO chief would like the setting up of Defence Equipment Manufacturing Zones, on the lines of Special Economic Zones (SEZs), where defence industries benefit from quality infrastructure, funding and locational synergy. In Pune, a group of electronics companies have set up the Defence Electronics Manufacturers' Association (DEMA).

"Defence electronics is an advanced field which requires special qualification and certification. DEMA is a successful experiment that has led to about 25-30 good defence industries coming up around Pune itself," says Saraswat.

BS! Dont pump more money into the @**es of the DRDO scientists!

Indigenous capabilities are crucial! But we can only achieve world class standards if those DRDO guys work under more pressure. Its simple human nature:

Currently the DRDO gets money no matter what happens, those scientists will keep their jobs, no matter whether the armed forces actually accept their stuff or not. They will keep getting their fixed budget..

And thats the problem. There is hardly any competition.... yes, the military will go for foreign products if the DRDO fails... but they will keep receiving money.

So the MoD needs to somehow create a more competitive environment for organizations like the DRDO....

Allowing more private participation and the threat that the DRDO might get less funds if they dont deliver in time or build what the military wants might help.

 

[Kunal Biswas]

The article talks about Infrastructure ( LABs & Test facility ) mainly..

Besides, 10k is basic pay-grade same as school teacher, With same qualification the person can earn more, Have some respect..

=================

There are level of scientists from B to Z ..

BS! Dont pump more money into the @**es of the DRDO scientists!

But we can only achieve world class standards if those DRDO guys work under more pressure. Its simple human nature: .

 

[RedDragon]

BS! Dont pump more money into the @**es of the DRDO scientists!

Indigenous capabilities are crucial! But we can only achieve world class standards if those DRDO guys work under more pressure. Its simple human nature:

Currently the DRDO gets money no matter what happens, those scientists will keep their jobs, no matter whether the armed forces actually accept their stuff or not. They will keep getting their fixed budget..

And thats the problem. There is hardly any competition.... yes, the military will go for foreign products if the DRDO fails... but they will keep receiving money.

So the MoD needs to somehow create a more competitive environment for organizations like the DRDO....

Allowing more private participation and the threat that the DRDO might get less funds if they dont deliver in time or build what the military wants might help.

As a researcher myself, I think you need to show some respect for your scientists. The technical gap between a developed country and a developing country is huge, often decades of years. It can't be overcomed in one night.

 

[DivineHeretic]

It is not as simple as some people point out. Blaming DRDO for evey delay has become a national passtime for the security establishment. Nobody bothers to understand why those delays occured in the first place.

Lets start with the Arjun MBT. When it was first conceptualised in 1970s, it was to be similar to the contemporary soviet tanks of the period, with certain enhancements. The requirements demanded by the army for the tank had already been standard equipments across Soviet and NATO armies for some years, and indeed would approach obsolescence by the time the Arjun was to be inducted in 1984.

The army had a glaring lack of even short term vision when issuing the original GSQR, which ensures that when Arjun became a reality in 1980s, it was already an obsolete platform with a 105mm gun, when the rest had moved onto 120mm and 125mm bore guns. Even then the blame was put squarely on DRDO, who had just followed the GSQR set.

Then the Army was faced with the spectre of the heavy American M1 Abrahams being supplied to the PA, with significantly superior armor protection and a newer main Gun, the army turned to the DRDO and issued a completely new set of requirements. It now wanted a western style tank with superior firepower and protection. In a single move, the army changed the requirements from medium tank to a heavy tank, and then set a weight limit of 50 tons, which was impractical from the start given the four man crew.

The DRDO was left with no option but to accede to army. The entire tank had to be designed anew. The engine, the suspension, the tracks, the track width, the electronics, the FCS, the transmission had to be redesigned from the start. None had been designed for the new requirements the army issued. The entire previous years had gone to waste.

So why is it that everyone blames the DRDO for the long development time of the Arjun. Essentially, the DRDO developed two tanks, one a medium Arjun with a 105mm gun and the heavy second with a 120mm gun and considerably thicker armor.

It is standard practise when issuing GSQR for any new large project to take into account the development time of the object. The requirements set are set according to what the army will want 10-15 years from now, what will be standard when the equipment comes into service. The IA everytime put forward a requirement according to what they wanted immediately. There was no consideration to the time needed for developing the project. As if it was halwa to develop a new gen tank.

 

[pmaitra]

It now wanted a western style tank with superior firepower and protection. In a single move, the army changed the requirements from medium tank to a heavy tank, and then set a weight limit of 50 tons, which was impractical from the start given the four man crew.

I remember a Dilbert cartoon, where the marketing department was asking for a new cell phone, that would be small enough to be hidden in the human palm, but should also have a 21" LCD screen.

To add to the above quote, when they laid down the requirements, they did not consider upgrading the numerous bridges, and now, again, some people are complaining that the Arjun cannot go over the bridges.

Same with INSAS. Even after the 1999 Kargil War, when defects were being rectified, the Army should have been working on a GSQR, as to what kind of rifle we would need now (2013), so that by 2001, the final GSQR would be with OFB, and by now we would have had a new rifle.

The Army was sitting all this while and now they are on a foreign weapon procurement spree.

I think the first step would be to make sure every person involved in issuing the GSQR has a Masters Degree in some field of Science. One who does not satisfy this requirement, should be politely asked to leave the company of people issuing the GSQR.

 

[santosh_g]

ohk... it's this way every one should take responsibility for this delay. Starting from people who are not paying taxes properly to our minister babus and DRDO too.. yes there is delay in LCA and Arjun projects. But problem lies here. instead of learning lessons from these two projects and identify why these projects have extended time periods , GOI and all these R&D organization making the same stupid mistake again. one thing our R&D orgs need to learn is to be specific. "Ask how much investment you need for completion of project. Ask for how much exactly you want if GOI provides all those resources properly. Ask for early freeze of specifications. Ask for any thing and every thing you want specifically and clearly". And GOI should increase pressure on R&D's to deliver product properly. Nothing is organized. In US if a private defence firm fails to reach their deadline what will happen??? that responisbility and liability lacks for indian efence R&D's.

 

[DivineHeretic]

I think the first step would be to make sure every person involved in issuing the GSQR has a Masters Degree in some field of Science. One who does not satisfy this requirement, should be politely asked to leave the company of people issuing the GSQR.

I fully agree with the rest of your post. But,

I'm not so sure that a Masters Degree is the solution. No degree can match the experience gained by the infantry guy who has used his rifle for a decade. A tank crews experience in handling and maintaining their tank cannot be substituted by theoretical knowledge. It is the same for every unit and their equipment.

The best way IMHO is to form three teams.

One composed of retired/highly experienced soldiers who have extensive experience in the current equipments. This team will be best placed to know the equipment and its weakness, the difficulties facing it and even any jugaad that was used to solve the problem. This group forms a detailed study.

The second group is composed of skilled analysts, maintainance crews and senior commanders who are responsible for developing battle doctrines and tactics. The will present the picture of how the future battle is to be conducted and the role of the equipment in that context. This will help to develop the future requirements of the equipment, when it enters service. This group is also tasked with forming additional futuristic requirements that the military would like in the new equipment

The reports generated by these two groups will then be sent t the third team, composed of innovative developers and technicians. They will have to develop the new equipments to replace the defect of the current ones while at the same time make them fit for use on the future battlefield, when the equipment will finally enter service.

The 2nd group is similar to DARPA in putting forward futuristic requirements, while the 3rd group is responsible for actual designing of prototypes. The 2nd & 3rd group will also compose of industry leaders who are knowlegeable in the latest technology hitting the market or in the process of development.

 

[sayareakd]

I think the first step would be to make sure every person involved in issuing the GSQR has a Masters Degree in some field of Science. One who does not satisfy this requirement, should be politely asked to leave the company of people issuing the GSQR.

once GSQR for Sniper rifle was issued asking for bayonet in Sniper rifle. I think most of time they just copy post Jane articles.

 

[DivineHeretic]

once GSQR for Sniper rifle was issued asking for bayonet in Sniper rifle. I think most of time they just copy post Jane articles.

Hats off to the Army GSQR requirements....they managed to make a spear of the sniper rifle....lol. Next they'll ask for a lightweight gun so that the rifle can be thrown at the enemy

I doubt anyone in Jane is stupid enough to ask for a bayonet on a sniper rifle.

But seriously, maybe the title of this thread should be changed to something more generic, maybe about the Army GSQR. It is a better topic IMHO for debate:.

 

[TrueSpirit]

reason is corruption. Almost in all defence procurements,JVs,TOTs, 5 to 10 percent is certainly going in babu and politician pocket.
Second will be our inability to bring Drdo and armed forces to bring to same table.

Right. But the percentage you quoted is somewhat on a lower side. Actual "cut" varies in all deals, but the range is way higher than most of us would like to imagine.
Source: Personal knowledge derived from Horse's mouth (if you know what I mean).

Now, the biggest tragedy I see is that the direct kith & kin's of senior Armed forces commanders (read, Generals, Air-Marshals & Admirals- not taking names here) are at the forefront of such dealings. Agree that the convoluted system of arms-procurement world over creates lot of scope of such malfeasance but why are they supposed to be involved in the first place. We can understand politicians & bureaucrats indulging in that & they are suitable reviled for that.

But why immediate members of relatively well-off & influential defence families have to be involved in such a loot?

I am not talking of a one-off case but a trend that has been an open secret in full public glare, long before many on DFI would care to admit. There are well-entrenched lobbies in armed forces themselves (not just in oft-reviled Defence ministry) who are out to kill indigenization at all costs. Those who differ & try charting an independent course without getting influenced are suitably sidelined. Gen. VK Singh, Adm. Vishnu Bhagwat were victims of these very lobbies, inside the armed forces. No matter what the media would like you to believe.

Guess, they are also human beings after all, no matter what we would like to believe. So, they are not above ubiquitous human vices like greed.

Guess, the deteriorating civil-military equations, the relentless bureaucratic intrigues hellbent on degrading the Armed forces in power-hierarchy has something to do with this. Also, the absolute control wrested in politicians' hands, when it comes to all appointments above Brigadier-level. Now, here the business gets really dirty & I would prefer not going there for obvious reasons.

My point is: apart from babu & neta, individuals within armed forces (serving, as well as ex-servicemen" in equal proportion) are hand-in-glove. No one should be above reproach.

When questioned individually, their standard response is: "What can we do, we have been rendered emasculated/sterile" . I tend to believe them, here.

And then, there comes the ultimate pearl of wisdom from their stable: "Better to swim along with the drift & flourish, rather than doing otherwise & perish".
Not Acceptable

Food for thought......something to ponder over ?

 

[Kunal Biswas]

The issue with GSQR is they are not filled with Right knowledgeable people, I am not saying technical but how they express there needs..

What need to be said is they need P-rail attachment for bayonet / UBGL / Light / Lasers, It is simple to understand then ..

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Bayonet is important, when going for head on assault ( Hand on hand fight ) every man is needed including sniper so there is a bayonet need, ( Kargil is a good example of hand to hand fight / bayonet fight )

once GSQR for Sniper rifle was issued asking for bayonet in Sniper rifle.

Hats off to the Army GSQR requirements....

 

[Abhijeet Dey]

It is not as simple as some people point out. Blaming DRDO for evey delay has become a national passtime for the security establishment. Nobody bothers to understand why those delays occured in the first place.

Lets start with the Arjun MBT. When it was first conceptualised in 1970s, it was to be similar to the contemporary soviet tanks of the period, with certain enhancements. The requirements demanded by the army for the tank had already been standard equipments across Soviet and NATO armies for some years, and indeed would approach obsolescence by the time the Arjun was to be inducted in 1984.

The army had a glaring lack of even short term vision when issuing the original GSQR, which ensures that when Arjun became a reality in 1980s, it was already an obsolete platform with a 105mm gun, when the rest had moved onto 120mm and 125mm bore guns. Even then the blame was put squarely on DRDO, who had just followed the GSQR set.

Then the Army was faced with the spectre of the heavy American M1 Abrahams being supplied to the PA, with significantly superior armor protection and a newer main Gun, the army turned to the DRDO and issued a completely new set of requirements. It now wanted a western style tank with superior firepower and protection. In a single move, the army changed the requirements from medium tank to a heavy tank, and then set a weight limit of 50 tons, which was impractical from the start given the four man crew.

The DRDO was left with no option but to accede to army. The entire tank had to be designed anew. The engine, the suspension, the tracks, the track width, the electronics, the FCS, the transmission had to be redesigned from the start. None had been designed for the new requirements the army issued. The entire previous years had gone to waste.

So why is it that everyone blames the DRDO for the long development time of the Arjun. Essentially, the DRDO developed two tanks, one a medium Arjun with a 105mm gun and the heavy second with a 120mm gun and considerably thicker armor.

Ha Ha Ha.............. Next the Indian Army will ask for 155 mm/52 calibre guns for Arjun MBTs (same as Artillery gun). If possible they may also ask for Tanks with hover technology.

 

[Abhijeet Dey]

HAL's trainer aircraft headed for disaster as development costs soar
By GAUTAM DATT
PUBLISHED: 00:30 GMT, 27 May 2013

The plan to build a Basic Trainer Aircraft (BTA) at home is headed for a nosedive as defence ministry has to take a crucial call on going ahead with the project because of high costs involved and a shaky delivery deadline promised by the aircraft maker Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL).

The IAF, which is in dire need of basic trainers for rookie pilots, had projected requirement for more than 180 of these aircraft to smoothly run its problem-ridden flying training programme.

The government gave the go-ahead to buy 75 BTAs from foreign vendor and the remaining was to be delivered by Bangalore-based HAL which attempted to make a new aircraft, named HTT-40.

The IAF ordered 75 Swiss Pilatus PC-7 trainers last year of which 14 have been delivered on a fast-track basis as they were required urgently.
These aircraft would be formally inducted into IAF on May 31 by junior defence minister Jitender Singh, paving the way for starting training from July onwards.
All 75 aircraft are expected to be delivered by 2015, as per the contract terms.
The delay
Even as the new aircraft started arriving, the HAL's plan to build the basic trainer has not made much headway.
As per the project report submitted by the company in 2011, it had promised to deliver two aircraft by 2019 and 10 by 2021.
At this rate, the IAF can begin training on home-built BTAs only by 2022. The delay has already forced IAF to begin the process to exercise "option clause" with Pilatus to buy another 38 aircraft.
The Defence Acquisition Council had mandated IAF to exercise the clause to buy more aircraft from the foreign vendor only if HAL's HTT-40 does not take off before the delivery of first Pilatus PC-7.
With first Pilatus arriving in February and HTT-40 nowhere in sight, the IAF will go for 38 more PC-7s. The defence ministry has also been made aware that HTT-40 is going to cost at least the double the amount charged by the Swiss company for PC-7.
A detailed cost analysis showed that a Pilatus PC-7 was purchased for Rs 30 crore per aircraft.

Whereas HAL's own cost structure showed that at 2011 price for 106 aircraft, each HTT-40 will cost Rs 34.9 crore. If capital cost is added then the price tag goes up to Rs 37.95 crore.
By adding design and development cost along with per annum escalation, the final cost of HTT-40 comes to Rs 67.6 crore per aircraft, double the price of PC-7.
The HAL insists that unlike Pilatus PC-7, its BTA will have a multi-role capability as it could be armed for weapon training.
It raises a question if a multi-role capability was required at all in a basic trainer. The defence ministry will also have to grapple with the issue of duplicity of trainers, which will escalate infrastructure costs further.
It will also go into the aspect if HTT-40 is based on a Beechraft aircraft which had lost bid to Pilatus. The IAF has been managing its pilot training programme without a basic trainer for some years.