Indian Army wants futuristic vehicle for its Armoured corps

[Bhadra]

The Heavy Vehicles Factory at Avadi (HVF) was assigned the task of the rollout of the indigenously produced/ assembled MBT Arjun and T-90 tanks. In all, 734 tanks were to be made available to the Army by 2010.

Annexure- XVIII gives the details of the agencies involved.

 

[pmaitra]

@Bhadra, your problem is that you identify yourself with the DGMF office.

That, or something else.

Recall how @Bhadra was insinuating that DFI members disagreeing with him are DRDO employees sitting in their offices and posting on the internet.

In DRDO offices, in OFB offices and in DPSUs almost all have internet on their computers (One of the reasons their computers are frequently hacked by the Chinese. That is also the reason why volume on DFI on Saturday and Sunday is low because you guys are not in offices) . At home also they have govt paid internet. And there is no dearth of jobless people there in those organisations who have nothing to do but be on internet and vent their frustrations AND BE INTERNET BULLIES.

 

[Bhadra]

Indigenous production of MBT Arjun

8.3.2.1 The Army placed an indent (March 2000) on the Board for delivery of 124 MBT Arjun within a tentative schedule of 2000-06. In 2002, the production schedule was shifted to 2002-09. The HVF was tasked to produce
15 MBT Arjun under the Limited Series Production (LSP) by 2004. The bulk production of 109 MBT Arjun was to commence after the field trials by the Army.

8.3.2.2 Table-45 provides the year-wise production and issue of MBT Arjun. Despite the fact that the production schedule was shifted from 2002-07 to 2002-09, the Board could not produce on time, the quantity indented by Army.

There was a slippage in production; production picked up only in 2006-07.The cumulative production of 122 MBT Arjun was still short of the indent by two MBTs which were under production and three MBTs were under inspection as of December 2013. The delays in production led to cost escalation by more than 2.5 times: from ` 17 crore per MBT to ` 44 crore.

(So all the while who was making money !!!!)

 

[Bhadra]

The Excuse of Changes in Design
​

8.3.2.3 The Ministry stated (May 2014) that though the production was completed as per original design, changes in design affected the timely delivery. Ministry’s reply is not entirely acceptable. Frequent and several amendments to the design significantly affected the production but tardiness in creation of infrastructural facilities at the Ordnance Factories, also led to delays in meeting the Army’s indent as commented in Paragraph 8.3.2.4 and 8.3.2.7. Chart-16 illustrates the timeliness in achievement of the milestones against the targets.

 

[Bhadra]

@Bhadra,


What was DRDO doing? Accommodating changes by the Army.

Oh Yah ! Keeping the funding Chanel open and miking 302 crores from estimated expenditure of 16 crores. There is no price for guessing who was making money !

What are you doing?

Waiting under the banana tree called DRDO for banana to fall .

 

[pmaitra]

The Indian Army is compromised. It is time to sniff out the moles from within the Army. This might be the tip of the iceberg. (Not exactly related to the RFI, but this is to show that the IA can be compromised.)

To add more concrete to below statement .. >>

Source : Pakistani Agent of Fear Sends Chill Down Defence Ministry Spine - The New Indian Express

================

Why enemy intel would want to know exact locations of Arjun regiments ?, That is because they know that Arjun pose a serious thread and superior to other Tin cans, Its best to know the location and in war times destroy them first, Arjun is also crown jewel of India, Destruction of Arjuns will send be a blow to Indian effort in standing on its own feet, Rest of the damage will do by our paid media by negative PR to bring down the moral in people, like they are doing it now ..
@Archer , @ersakthivel

It is true there has been a delay in getting the Arjun tank ready, but who is responsible for the delay? Here is a timeline, that surprisingly does not feature in the litany of excuses offered in defence of those that tried to sabotage the Arjun project.

I will simply add the years to quantify the delays or time taken to reach the milestones.

---------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------
GSQR 326 | 1972 | Initial requirement was finalized.
---------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------
GSQR 431 | 1982 | The 115 mm main gun was already tested prior to this year.
.........|......| New changes were requested:
.........|......| (1) Increase in width and height,
.........|......| (2) 120 mm main gun,
.........|......| (3) improved FCS.
---------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------
GSQR 467 | 1985 | Prototypes were already built by this time.
.........|......| Now, even more changes were requested:
.........|......| (1) increased lethality (whatever that means),
.........|......| (2) APFSDS through rifled barrel - possible but challenging,
.........|......| (3) semi-combustible cartridge cases
.........|......| and high energy propellants (meaning, new metallurgy
.........|......| and redesigning of the barrel and breach),
.........|......| (4) modification of FSC and sighting systems,
.........|......| (5) night vision capabilities,
.........|......| (6) Kanchan armour.
---------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------


References:
http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/indian-army/264-development-indian-arjun.html
http://pib.nic.in/archieve/others/2008/apr/r2008042813.pdf

The above is reproduced from a larger post in the thread entitled "DM: Forces repeatedly changing requirements for Indian weapons."

Pertinent points to note:

• It was the Army who asked for a change in the barrel size, from 115 mm to 120 mm. This required redesigning a lot of components of the Arjun. However, there is a tendency to put all the blame on DRDO. Had DRDO refused to accommodate these changes, DRDO would have still been accused of not cooperating with the Army.
• It was the army that requested a wider and taller tank. Now, DRDO is being blamed for making a tank that is too large.

Edited to add:

And you know the best part- DRDO has to actually agree to any gsqr revision army makes in its projects. So the gsqr cluld not have been revised without DRDO concent. So why didn't DRDO take this matter up or outright refuse the changes to gsqr?

The above two points answer your question.

 

[Bhadra]

The HVF, Avadi began production of MBT Arjun based on the design provided by DRDO with tie-ups for supply of assemblies from sources identified by the DRDO after evaluation between June 2005 and May 2008
The field trials and accelerated usage-cum-reliability trials by Army of MBT Arjun produced under Limited Series Production (LSP) indicated quality problems in respect of major assemblies. The modification of designs by
DRDO led to delays in supply of modified assemblies and in repair of defective parts, which in turn delayed the production of MBT Arjun as indicated in Table-46.

The Ministry stated (May 2014) that the modifications required by the Army were incorporated by DRDO and that rectifications were made by the manufacturers free of cost under warranty. But the fact remains that the defects had the impact of delays in production and issue of MBT Arjun to Army.

 

[Bhadra]

The Comaprative Trails
​

The story of Comparative trial is hyped by DRDO not keeping the correct perspective in mind.

The correct perspective is :

Comparative field trials of MBT Arjun with T-90 tanks took place in February/ March 2010. Till such time, the Army had been consistently reporting quality problems in MBT Arjun; this was also reported to the
Standing Committee on Defence (2007-08).

The comparative trials were on four parameters viz.
fire power,
survivability,
reliability and
miscellaneous issues of the tank

with weightage of 40, 35, 15 and 10 respectively.


( Now here is the catch and crux of the issue and indicates the frame of mind of those in DGMF.
Firepower first, protection (surviability) second and ,reliability third. Mobility no where - indicated the context in which both tanks were thought of being employed - that is, in a duel or firefight slug like Assal Uttar or Khem Karan. The DGMF seemed to be never graduating beyond that and the aspect of maneuver was given a go by or else Mobility including obstacle crossing capabilities would have been first factor)

As per the trial report, MBT Arjun performed marginally better than the T-90 tank in accuracy and consistency of firepower. However, T-90 tank performed better in lethality and missile firing capability. The Army concluded (April 2010) that “Arjun had performed creditably and it could be employed both for offensive and defensive tasks with same efficacy of T-90 tank.” The Army also recommended upgrades ( The upgrades recommended were among others, inclusion of anti-tank missile, increase in penetrating power of ammunition and mounting of explosive reactive armour panels ) to make the Arjun tank a superior weapon platform. We were informed (February 2014) that the Mark-II version of MBT Arjun was under trials by the Army and that it would include the upgrades recommended by the Army.

We found that the MBT Arjun and T-90 tank were not exactly comparable in missile firing ability; the higher score of T-90 tank was mainly due to missile firing ability of T-90 tank.
----------------------------------------------------------------

So the fanboys must understand the trial in correct perspective . Indian Army did participate in Tank Competition in Russia - they should have demanded DRDO to take Arjun there where the competition would be under different parameters. There would be nothing wrong in that.

 

[pmaitra]

( Now here is the catch and crux of the issue and indicates the frame of mind of those in DGMF.
Firepower first, protection (surviability) second and ,reliability third. Mobility no where - indicated the context in which both tanks were thought of being employed - that is, in a duel or firefight slug like Assal Uttar or Khem Karan. The DGMF seemed to be never graduating beyond that and the aspect of maneuver was given a go by or else Mobility including obstacle crossing capabilities would have been first factor)

Wrong.

If firepower were the first concern, then why was it relaxed for the T-90?

Reproduced from here.

So the fanboys must understand the trial in correct perspective . Indian Army did participate in Tank Competition in Russia - they should have demanded DRDO to take Arjun there where the competition would be under different parameters. There would be nothing wrong in that.

Fanboys only offer excuses for inferior imported candyfloss.

 

[Bhadra]

@pmaitra

I knew it that you are going to distract me and hijack this thread into Arjun. Because it is Arjun you guys want to thrust down the throat of DGMF. I was avoiding that and asked you earlier also not to distract from RFI but your silly comments dragged me into it and i tried to put an end to " Army is to blamed " theory.....

I do not know who all wants to get on the back of this poor Indian Army ? I really wonder wonder if this country has created MoD, CDA, OFB, DPSU, DRDO, MES, BRO etc to help out the Armed Forces or destroy them by lording over them !! It seems no lessons have been learnt from 1962 !!

 

[pmaitra]

@pmaitra

I knew it that you are going to distract me and hijack this thread into Arjun. Because it is Arjun you guys want to thrust down the throat of DGMF. I was avoiding that and asked you earlier also not to distract from RFI but your silly comments dragged me into it and i tried to put an end to " Army is to blamed " theory.....

I do not know who all wants to get on the back of this poor Indian Army ? I really wonder wonder if this country has created MoD, CDA, OFB, DPSU, DRDO, MES, BRO etc to help out the Armed Forces or destroy them by lording over them !! It seems no lessons have been learnt from 1962 !!

Indeed. No lesson has been learnt from 1962.

In 1962 we had a politically appointed Gen. Kaul, who was a disaster. Now, we have a big fracas involving Gen. V. K. Singh's DoB, and speculation of appointment of people in the Army ranks not based on meritocracy, but based on other considerations.

In 1962, our generals were making a lot of "bluster," and I quote the US Ambassador Galbraith, and today, we have a lot of bluster coming from DGMF (4 crew tanks, 48 tons), which the DM has correctly termed as Marvel comic stuff.

Poor Indian Army? Indeed, considering they would have had to operate the T-90 in the Thar Desert without an AC and without a functioning Fire Control System. This is neither a fault of a dodo, nor a peacock, nor a penguin.

@Bhadra, please understand that the DRDO has produced a lot of weapons systems. I can assure you, if people were sitting in DRDO offices and commenting over the internet, these weapons systems would not have magically appeared. Those scientists had to work for them. It is not quite as easy to get a science degree as you might think, but I don't expect any empathy from you. Just as getting a science degree is difficult, making working weapons systems is infinitely more difficult.

 

[ersakthivel]

Look Guys..

Tanks do not fight with each other like two wrestlers in a slug match or like two boxers... such situations seldom arise or arise in final countdown or unexpectedly ...

Tanks fight with each other by Fire and maneuver .... protection is important but not as important as Fire and Manoeuvre unless one wishes to put the arse up and head down..

Tank is supposed to be system to achieve superior manoeuvre with which it brings the opposing force to an inferior position / disadvantage and thereby destroys that force by superior position and superior fire power (fire power of all types including artillery, air and infantry firepower and engineer resources).

Mobility thus is an uncompromisable feature for a system called Tank. It is like an aircraft on the ground ..

What you say @ersakthivel .. no quote of Gen Shankar Roychaudhary please. Or I will be forced to quote other generals..

Please quote them. When did you become so shy?

"protection is important but not as important as Fire and Manoeuvre" Almost all NATO countries disagree with you.

Tank is a system that makes the last stand in the battle field. they should have top of the line protection and fire power along with agility. No compromises on any front .

Once your tank flee is weak , you have no chance of winning land war or even holding out for a decent time!!! as shown repeatedly in gulf wars ,

Air power alone can not destroy tank, since IAF too can provide decent air cover to IA tank columns.
The role of Air power is often exaggerated in recent times. And it only applies when one force has complete air superiority over battle field with attack helos like Apache freely hunting tanks.


It is impossible in indian border,because IAf has enough teeth and IA will have HAL built LCH very soon to be supplied in high hundreds at an economic cost.

mobility can never substitute for weak armor. And in it is only the power to weight ratio which determines the mobility of the tank and not total weight.Also comparison with turbine powered Abramas requiring seven trucks is irrelevant as Arjun too is fossil fuel powered.

 

[ersakthivel]

Totally Mixing Up Issues to Falsify
​

1974 - Arjun Project Sanctioned for 16 Crores ( basically to replace T-55, T-59 and Vijayant etc)
1982 - DRDO was to manufacture 12 prototypes by this time (nothing happens)
1995 - DRDO Completes "Work On Design" at the cost of 306 crores !!!
1999 - OFV Asked to establish manufacturing facilities
2000 - Army reports 38 % deficiency in tank holding ( 38 per cent is too high !! What was DRDO doing from 1974 to 2000 - increasing deficiency of Army - Is not it?)

In 2000

In 2000, the Army reported a 38 per cent shortage of tanks against its
authorised holding of 3,717 tanks. The steps taken by the Ministry during
2000-2004 to fill this need were:

• Import of 124 fully formed T-90 tanks (February 2001) from a Russian
firm M/s Rosoboronexport (ROE) at a total cost of ` 1,774 crore;

• Import of 186T-90 tanks (February 2001) as 86 Semi-knock down
(SKD) and 100 Complete Knock-Down (CKD) at a cost of ` 2,312
crore with transfer of technology (TOT) for manufacture of T-90 tanks
by the Board and training of Indian personnel;

• Phased production and issue of 124 Main Battle Tank – Arjun (MBT
Arjun) by the Board over the period 2002-07. The Board was
sanctioned ` 100 crore (May 2002) to set up the facilities for
manufacture of 30 MBT Arjun per annum; and

• Indigenous production of 300T-90 Bhisma tanks (T-90 tanks) with
ToT from M/s ROE over the period 2006-10. The Ministry sanctioned
` 96 crore (December 2003/ February 2004) for developing
infrastructure for indigenous manufacture of 100 T-90 tanks per
annum.

This is where the scandal lies,

if army has 38 percent shortage of tanks and importing totally faulty T-90s for 5000 crores from 2000 to 1010, why did it keep on tinkering with frozen Arjun design of 1998 as pointedly stated by CAG report.

Why did IA ask all the 59 arjuns to be completely dismantled and rebuilt for zero water ingress, while it was importing 1000 T-90s that still have 2.5 liter ingress in medium fording as pointed out by CAG in comparitive trials.

Reason is scandal and bribes commanded by higher defence authorities in T-90 import, nothing else. Keep moving the goal post on Arjun and ensure it "never meets" the "never ending upward spec revision of IA" and use that as a reason to import T-90 that fails the basic condition of operating in summer indian desert heats with functioning electronics with no extensive trials.

To conceal the cover up give a very lax standard to fulfill for t-90 in comparison trials with Arjun.

This is a standard practice adopted by higher defence set up on every DRDO product with import bribe as their primary motive.

The same course of action is being followed on FRCV as well. for close to a decade DRDO asked for PSQR and IA never delivered it . If it is a private sector set up(so many of you guys love to the core despite the disaster called space X) the entire DGMF would have been fired even for one month delay in issuing PSQR.

http://tarmak007.blogspot.in/2015/06/we-survived-strong-moves-to-close-tejas.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=Feed:+Tarmak007--AnIndianAerospaceDefenceBlogWithADifferenceByAnanthaKrishnanM+(Tarmak007+--+An+Indian+Aerospace+&+Defence+Blog+With+A+Difference+By+Anantha+Krishnan+M.)

As late as 2007 concerted efforts were made to close the tekjas project!!!!, All the while tons of crocodile tears were shed on ever falling mig-21s. and depleting IAf fleet.

The UPA mode of operation is crystal clear for all to see.
When V.K. Singh exposed the TATRA scam and asked for production of bofors gun from the design that is already with us all the hell broke loose and import lobby gunned him down with spurious DOB issue.

It was a slap in the face for the import lobby when Modi appointed V.K.Singh as minister of state for external affairs and then followed it up with manohar parrikar an IIT graaduate with grasp of technical things as DM.

 

[ersakthivel]

This is very funny in the case of Arjun the CAG report is perfect while in the case of the LCA the same CAG has brought out a flawed report.

The situation is not so black and white as we assume.

I would request @Bhadra to get some of his friends from the armoured corp to join us and put some perspective on this debate.

For us Arjun is the way forward and we need both Army and CVRDE to be on the same page on it.

http://forum.worldoftanks.com/index...o-pak-war-an-overview-of-the-armored-battles/

Why dont you ask our friend @Bhadra to ask IA guys about the khemkaran tank battle which was won conclusively by 52 ton centurian tanks with PA leaving close to hundred 46 ton patton tanks in the battle field?

@Bhadra ji's argument that tanks are not meant to fight tanks like wrestlers fell flat on the western front as long back as 1965.

"The armored battles which took place in this war were one of the largest tank battles in history since the Battle of Kursk in World War II.

At the beginning of the war, the Pakistani Army had both a numerical advantage in tanks, as well as better equipment overall.Pakistani armour was largely American-made; it consisted mainly of Patton M-47 and M-48 tanks, but also included many M4 Sherman tanks, some M24 Chaffee light tanks and M36 Jackson tank destroyers, equipped with 90 mm guns.

The bulk of India's tank fleet were older M4 Sherman tanks; some were up-gunned with the French high velocity CN 75 50 guns and could hold their own, whilst some older models were still equipped with the inferior 75 mm M3 L/40 gun. Besides the M4 tanks, India fielded the British-made Centurion Tank Mk 7, with the 105 mm Royal Ordnance L7 gun, and the AMX-13, PT-76, and M3 Stuart light tanks."


Close to a thousand tanks, on both sides, took part in the pitch battles and offensives. At the start of the war, India had one armoured division and one independent armoured brigade, along with six armoured regiments supporting infantry divisions. Pakistan had two armoured divisions, equipped with the then very modern M-48 Patton tanks. India had an equivalent tank in the Centurion, but their strength was limited to only four armoured regiments.


India had its largest haul of Pakistani tanks when the offensive of Pakistan's 1st Armoured Division was blunted at the Battle of Assal Uttar on September 10th. Six Pakistani armoured regiments took part in the battle, namely the 19 Lancers (Patton), 12 Cavalry (Chafee), 24 Cavalry (Patton) 4 Cavalry (Patton), 5 Horse (Patton) and 6 Lancers (Patton). These were opposed by three Indian armoured regiments with inferior tanks, Deccan Horse (Sherman), 3 Cavalry (Centurion) and 8 Cavalry (AMX-13).

The battle was so fierce & intense that at the end of the war, the 4th Indian Division (aka "The Fighting Fourth") had captured about 97 tanks in destroyed, damaged or intact condition. This included 72 Patton tanks and 25 Chafees and Shermans. 32 of the 97 tanks, including 28 Pattons, were in running condition. Indian losses in the Khem Karan sector were 32 tanks. Around 15 of them were captured by the Pakistan Army, mostly Sherman tanks.

India had its 1st Armoured Division on the offensive in this area. Equipped with four armoured regiments, this division faced stiff opposition from the Pakistani 6th Armoured Division. Some of the fiercest tank battles were fought at Phillora and then at Chawinda.

At the end of the fighting, India had claimed more than 170 tanks destroyed, of which 42 were captured in the I Corps area (11 of them intact and 31 of them in destroyed or damaged condition). India's own losses in the area were 29 tanks destroyed and another 41 damaged, that were repaired after the war. This is substantiated by a Pakistani Official History of the 6th Armoured Division "Men of Steel" that states that 35 tanks were left in Indian control (17 M48, 9 M47, 9 M36B2) but that nine of these were recovered after the war when Indian troops vacated the area held by then.
But the fierce battles of 1965 were not limited to the Battles for Khem Karan, Phillora and Chawinda alone. The Indian forces fought Pakistani armour in other sectors as well and got the better of them. The famous see-saw battle for the village of Dograi resulted in seven Pakistani tanks falling into Indian hands

Indian losses at Chamb were severe. An entire squadron of AMX-13 tanks of the 20th Cavalry was lost in trying to stem a Pakistani advance supported by a regiment of M-48 Pattons. By the end of the war, it is estimated that Pakistan lost nearly 300 tanks destroyed. India had more than 150 tanks in its hands as war trophies and it is not unsafe to assume that more tanks were destroyed, that were in Pakistani territory, both by army as well as air action. Indian losses were less than half at 128 tanks destroyed. About 40 tanks would have fell into Pakistani hands, most of them vintage AMX-13s from Chamb and Shermans from Khem Karan.


The Centurion battle tank, with its 105 mm gun and heavy armour, proved superior to the overly complex Pattons and their exaggerated reputations.

"In 1971 history repeated itself in what became known as Pakistan's Charge of the Light Brigade, a counterattack led by Pakistan Army 13th Lancers and 31st Cavalry was mauled by the Indian 54th Division around Battle of Barapind. India later set up a war memorial named "Patton Nagar" ("Patton City") in Khemkaran District, where the captured Pakistani Patton tanks are displayed."


So why is

@Bhadra

Foolin us all here that tanks dont fight each other like wrestlers!!!!, while IA itself fought tanks with tanks in 1965 and won a great victory with heavy centurians, over light pattons.

When the chips are down tanks are the last card i your hand. What is the use of having highly mobile broken chips as your last throw of dice?

 

[ersakthivel]

The Comaprative Trails
​

The story of Comparative trial is hyped by DRDO not keeping the correct perspective in mind.

The correct perspective is :

Comparative field trials of MBT Arjun with T-90 tanks took place in February/ March 2010. Till such time, the Army had been consistently reporting quality problems in MBT Arjun; this was also reported to the
Standing Committee on Defence (2007-08).

The comparative trials were on four parameters viz.
fire power,
survivability,
reliability and
miscellaneous issues of the tank

with weightage of 40, 35, 15 and 10 respectively.


( Now here is the catch and crux of the issue and indicates the frame of mind of those in DGMF.
Firepower first, protection (surviability) second and ,reliability third. Mobility no where - indicated the context in which both tanks were thought of being employed - that is, in a duel or firefight slug like Assal Uttar or Khem Karan. The DGMF seemed to be never graduating beyond that and the aspect of maneuver was given a go by or else Mobility including obstacle crossing capabilities would have been first factor)

As per the trial report, MBT Arjun performed marginally better than the T-90 tank in accuracy and consistency of firepower. However, T-90 tank performed better in lethality and missile firing capability. The Army concluded (April 2010) that “Arjun had performed creditably and it could be employed both for offensive and defensive tasks with same efficacy of T-90 tank.” The Army also recommended upgrades ( The upgrades recommended were among others, inclusion of anti-tank missile, increase in penetrating power of ammunition and mounting of explosive reactive armour panels ) to make the Arjun tank a superior weapon platform. We were informed (February 2014) that the Mark-II version of MBT Arjun was under trials by the Army and that it would include the upgrades recommended by the Army.

We found that the MBT Arjun and T-90 tank were not exactly comparable in missile firing ability; the higher score of T-90 tank was mainly due to missile firing ability of T-90 tank.
----------------------------------------------------------------

So the fanboys must understand the trial in correct perspective . Indian Army did participate in Tank Competition in Russia - they should have demanded DRDO to take Arjun there where the competition would be under different parameters. There would be nothing wrong in that.

What is the use of russian tank competition?

is the IA going to fight in the snowy russian terrain?

In hot indian climate T-90 required much diluted standards to even come as close second to arjun.

And your another claim that tanks are not wrestlers to be fielded like wrestlers, is being busted here,

"The armored battles which took place in this war were one of the largest tank battles in history since the Battle of Kursk in World War II.

At the beginning of the war, the Pakistani Army had both a numerical advantage in tanks, as well as better equipment overall.Pakistani armour was largely American-made; it consisted mainly of Patton M-47 and M-48 tanks, but also included many M4 Sherman tanks, some M24 Chaffee light tanks and M36 Jackson tank destroyers, equipped with 90 mm guns.

The bulk of India's tank fleet were older M4 Sherman tanks; some were up-gunned with the French high velocity CN 75 50 guns and could hold their own, whilst some older models were still equipped with the inferior 75 mm M3 L/40 gun. Besides the M4 tanks, India fielded the British-made Centurion Tank Mk 7, with the 105 mm Royal Ordnance L7 gun, and the AMX-13, PT-76, and M3 Stuart light tanks."


Close to a thousand tanks, on both sides, took part in the pitch battles and offensives. At the start of the war, India had one armoured division and one independent armoured brigade, along with six armoured regiments supporting infantry divisions. Pakistan had two armoured divisions, equipped with the then very modern M-48 Patton tanks. India had an equivalent tank in the Centurion, but their strength was limited to only four armoured regiments.


India had its largest haul of Pakistani tanks when the offensive of Pakistan's 1st Armoured Division was blunted at the Battle of Assal Uttar on September 10th. Six Pakistani armoured regiments took part in the battle, namely the 19 Lancers (Patton), 12 Cavalry (Chafee), 24 Cavalry (Patton) 4 Cavalry (Patton), 5 Horse (Patton) and 6 Lancers (Patton). These were opposed by three Indian armoured regiments with inferior tanks, Deccan Horse (Sherman), 3 Cavalry (Centurion) and 8 Cavalry (AMX-13).

The battle was so fierce & intense that at the end of the war, the 4th Indian Division (aka "The Fighting Fourth") had captured about 97 tanks in destroyed, damaged or intact condition. This included 72 Patton tanks and 25 Chafees and Shermans. 32 of the 97 tanks, including 28 Pattons, were in running condition. Indian losses in the Khem Karan sector were 32 tanks. Around 15 of them were captured by the Pakistan Army, mostly Sherman tanks.

India had its 1st Armoured Division on the offensive in this area. Equipped with four armoured regiments, this division faced stiff opposition from the Pakistani 6th Armoured Division. Some of the fiercest tank battles were fought at Phillora and then at Chawinda.

At the end of the fighting, India had claimed more than 170 tanks destroyed, of which 42 were captured in the I Corps area (11 of them intact and 31 of them in destroyed or damaged condition). India's own losses in the area were 29 tanks destroyed and another 41 damaged, that were repaired after the war. This is substantiated by a Pakistani Official History of the 6th Armoured Division "Men of Steel" that states that 35 tanks were left in Indian control (17 M48, 9 M47, 9 M36B2) but that nine of these were recovered after the war when Indian troops vacated the area held by then.
But the fierce battles of 1965 were not limited to the Battles for Khem Karan, Phillora and Chawinda alone. The Indian forces fought Pakistani armour in other sectors as well and got the better of them. The famous see-saw battle for the village of Dograi resulted in seven Pakistani tanks falling into Indian hands

Indian losses at Chamb were severe. An entire squadron of AMX-13 tanks of the 20th Cavalry was lost in trying to stem a Pakistani advance supported by a regiment of M-48 Pattons. By the end of the war, it is estimated that Pakistan lost nearly 300 tanks destroyed. India had more than 150 tanks in its hands as war trophies and it is not unsafe to assume that more tanks were destroyed, that were in Pakistani territory, both by army as well as air action. Indian losses were less than half at 128 tanks destroyed. About 40 tanks would have fell into Pakistani hands, most of them vintage AMX-13s from Chamb and Shermans from Khem Karan.


The Centurion battle tank, with its 105 mm gun and heavy armour, proved superior to the overly complex Pattons and their exaggerated reputations.
"In 1971 history repeated itself in what became known as Pakistan's Charge of the Light Brigade, a counterattack led by Pakistan Army 13th Lancers and 31st Cavalry was mauled by the Indian 54th Division around Battle of Barapind. India later set up a war memorial named "Patton Nagar" ("Patton City") in Khemkaran District, where the captured Pakistani Patton tanks are displayed."


So why is

@Bhadra

Foolin us all here that tanks dont fight each other like wrestlers!!!!, while IA itself fought tanks with tanks in 1965 and won a great victory with heavy centurians, over light pattons.

When the chips are down tanks are the last card i your hand. What is the use of having highly mobile broken chips as your last throw of dice?

SO Deccan horse with 52 ton centurians worsted the so called state of the art patton light tanks in direct armor to armor battle.

 

[ersakthivel]

@ersakthivel

Producing one page of CAG report selectively and exclusively without other aspects of the report shows your ill intention, fraudulent behaviour and deliberate misrepresentation.

Do not do it or I will paste thread with the entire report.

A small portion for you :

8.3 Indigenous production of MBT Arjun and T-90 Bhisma Tanks

8.3.1 Introduction.

8.3.1.1 In order to achieve self-reliance in manufacture of Armoured Fighting
Vehicles, Ministry of Defence (Ministry) sanctioned a project in May 1974 for
design and development of first indigenous tank of India i.e. Main Battle Tank
– Arjun by Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) at a
cost of ` 16 crore. The scope of the project was to manufacture 12 prototypes
by April 1982. The DRDO completed its work on the design of MBT Arjun in
March 1995 at a cost of ` 306 crore; the Ordnance Factory Board (Board) was
tasked (1999) to establish the facilities for its manufacture.

__________________________________________

What a farce you all are !! You take 21 years to complete a design then how can you respond to DGMF RFI by 30 Jul 2015. I understand DRDO predicaments !! I understand why there is a "Rudali Brigade" here. I also understand why there is "Hadkamp" in DODO Camp on DFI.

As per @sob it is not so in DRDO !!!

you want me to quote the entire fascinating report? I am sure you do not want that lest you loose your pantaloons due to loss of weight !!.

This is kalayuga where time is at premium and not satayaga where you will take 21 years for a design ... That is the length of service of your previous director. So he was waiting for his retirement. Now you must also be in the same condition passing your convictions to all of us..

pranam Bhardaji,

http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/...gest-assault-rifle-tender.68748/#post-1053756

in this kaliyug, is there any chance of this being repeated on FRCV after ten years, in case no body is ready to offer suitable bribe?

What will future IA soldier use ,Enfield 303?
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In a setback to the Indian soldier's quest for a reliable assault rifle, the Army has scrapped a four-year-old tender for purchasing 1.8 lakh weapons. In a June 15 letter to the four short-listed international firms, the Army said it was retracting the Rs 4,848-crore contract.

In 2011, the Army floated a contract to supply Multi-Caliber Assault Rifles (MCAR) for the Army and the Navy to replace the existing INSAS rifles. An initial 65,678 assault rifles and 4,680 under barrel grenade launchers were to be procured off the shelf for Rs 2,500 crore. With over 1 lakh more rifles to be built by the Ordnance Factory Board through technology transfer, it was the world's largest such rifle contract.

The scrapping of the seven-year quest is a setback to the Army's modernisation plans. Army chief general Dalbir Singh had, in January this year, identified assault rifles as one of 20 'critical requirements' including bulletproof jackets and artillery guns for the Army. The Army cannot blame anyone but itself.

The rifle quest began with the Army's unhappiness with the indigenous 5.56 mm INSAS assault rifle which entered service in the late 1990s. But the solution to the INSAS's quality issues was to ask for a weapon so expensive with specifications so outlandish that it raised questions on the Army's competence in framing General Staff Qualitative Requirements.

The Army wanted a rifle with interchangeable barrels firing different calibers, the 5.56 mm INSAS round and the 7.62 mm AK-47 round. The requirement originated in the present practice of soldiers in counterinsurgency operations using AK-47s and switching over to INSAS rifles in peace stations. Army officials say the specifications were deeply flawed.

Five international firms - Beretta of Italy, Israeli Weapons Industries (IWI), Colt Defense of the US, Ceska Zbplojovka of Czech Republic - were shortlisted. All the weapons they presented for the trials were prototypes, meaning, none of them were actually in service with their respective armies.

The contract appeared doomed right at the start in 2012 when the Army first delayed the technical evaluation of the rifles. Companies then began asking for extensions for sample submission. As of 2015, no trials of the competing weapons were conducted. A whiff of corruption accompanied the contract. It was speculated that the GSQRs were tailor-made by Army brass to favour one of the vendors.

Another concern the Army had was cost. At over Rs 2 lakh a piece, each multi-caliber assault rifle with a conversion kit cost twice the price of a regular imported assault rifle and six times the cost of a Rs 35,000 OFB-made INSAS rifle.

A General called the MCAR contract the equivalent of equipping a mass transport taxi service with Mercedes S-class saloons. Major General Mrinal Suman (retired) says the failure of the rifle contract shows the Army's deeply flawed system of framing GSQRs. "Just because you drive a car for 20 years does not give you the capability to design one.

Acquisition staff are neither trained nor equipped to select weapons," he says. Experts say it will now take the Army at least five years to acquire rifles. The infantryman's wait continues.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/army-tender-cancelled-multi-caliber-assault-rifles/1/448193.html

bhardaji, you are defending the IA which

1. set 30 minute hover time for a helo(the most a helo can do is 7 minutes , that too one from US),
2. Couldn't procure a bulletproof jacket after years of planting their butt over it, it took the new DM to label it as critical requirement and fast track it,
3.And couldn't conclude a tender for a simple multi cal rifle in a decade,

but you expect them they will succeed in their quest for RFI for FRCV?

A student who can not pass school exams is expected to complete Phd overnight?

Sure you can't blame any DODO for this, because all the DODOs are sitting under your feet in DGMF!!!!

 

[sob]

Tactics and weapons used in 1971 cannot be the criterion for selecting equipment today.

That is why specs laid down in 1974 cannot be held on to today in 2015 and also not in 1990 also.

 

[ersakthivel]

Tactics and weapons used in 1971 cannot be the criterion for selecting equipment today.

That is why specs laid down in 1974 cannot be held on to today in 2015 and also not in 1990 also.

The 1971 GSQR argument is completely useless, because it was for 40 ton 105 mm gun tank.

it was modified 4 times and mk1 was frozen only in 2010, Even now 93 changes were given to be implemented for mk2!!!! So why are you talking of 1971 as pmaitra has conclusively proven it to be irrelevant?

has the DGMF developed very futuristic strategy for 40 ton medium FRCV in 2030?

hell, after seven year they can't even by multi cal rifle ,

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/army-tender-cancelled-multi-caliber-assault-rifles/1/448193.html

============================================================================
In 2011, the Army floated a contract to supply Multi-Caliber Assault Rifles (MCAR) for the Army and the Navy to replace the existing INSAS rifles. An initial 65,678 assault rifles and 4,680 under barrel grenade launchers were to be procured off the shelf for Rs 2,500 crore. With over 1 lakh more rifles to be built by the Ordnance Factory Board through technology transfer, it was the world's largest such rifle contract.

The scrapping of the seven-year quest is a setback to the Army's modernisation plans. Army chief general Dalbir Singh had, in January this year, identified assault rifles as one of 20 'critical requirements' including bulletproof jackets and artillery guns for the Army. The Army cannot blame anyone but itself.




The rifle quest began with the Army's unhappiness with the indigenous 5.56 mm INSAS assault rifle which entered service in the late 1990s. But the solution to the INSAS's quality issues was to ask for a weapon so expensive with specifications so outlandish that it raised questions on the Army's competence in framing General Staff Qualitative Requirements.

The Army wanted a rifle with interchangeable barrels firing different calibers, the 5.56 mm INSAS round and the 7.62 mm AK-47 round. The requirement originated in the present practice of soldiers in counterinsurgency operations using AK-47s and switching over to INSAS rifles in peace stations. Army officials say the specifications were deeply flawed.

Five international firms - Beretta of Italy, Israeli Weapons Industries (IWI), Colt Defense of the US, Ceska Zbplojovka of Czech Republic - were shortlisted. All the weapons they presented for the trials were prototypes, meaning, none of them were actually in service with their respective armies.

The contract appeared doomed right at the start in 2012 when the Army first delayed the technical evaluation of the rifles. Companies then began asking for extensions for sample submission. As of 2015, no trials of the competing weapons were conducted. A whiff of corruption accompanied the contract. It was speculated that the GSQRs were tailor-made by Army brass to favour one of the vendors.

Another concern the Army had was cost. At over Rs 2 lakh a piece, each multi-caliber assault rifle with a conversion kit cost twice the price of a regular imported assault rifle and six times the cost of a Rs 35,000 OFB-made INSAS rifle.

A General called the MCAR contract the equivalent of equipping a mass transport taxi service with Mercedes S-class saloons. Major General Mrinal Suman (retired) says the failure of the rifle contract shows the Army's deeply flawed system of framing GSQRs. "Just because you drive a car for 20 years does not give you the capability to design one.

Acquisition staff are neither trained nor equipped to select weapons," he says. Experts say it will now take the Army at least five years to acquire rifles. The infantryman's wait continues.
============================================================================

Guys who can not float a tender and buy a multi cal rifle are now going to evaluate what is inside a FRCV of 2030, about which they themselves have expressed zero knowledge in RFI!!!!

this is simple treason .

All the weapons they presented for the trials were prototypes, meaning, none of them were actually in service with their respective armies

read the above sentence carefully, all the models that are going to be offered for FRCV are also prototypes only with no active service anywhere!!!

When CAG conclusively said that the reason for tejas delay was the delaying of forming IAF-ADA liasion committee for six years from 2001 onwards when first TD flew and asked IAf for response,

Also IAf too simply expressed its inability to form the liasion committee with ADA for tejas, because it lacked qualified guys who know enough to offer design suggestions to ADA!!!!

When CAG asked why they delayed weapon configuration for tejas which added a few more years on tejas delay,

IAF said that the weapon config must be finalized as close to induction!!!

This is the state of afairs in our defence forces!!!!

But how Navy does wonders with indigenous shipyards is something these IAf and IA people contrive to not to notice!!!

 

[Bhadra]

Indeed. No lesson has been learnt from 1962.

In 1962 we had a politically appointed Gen. Kaul, who was a disaster. Now, we have a big fracas involving Gen. V. K. Singh's DoB, and speculation of appointment of people in the Army ranks not based on meritocracy, but based on other considerations.

In 1962, our generals were making a lot of "bluster," and I quote the US Ambassador Galbraith, and today, we have a lot of bluster coming from DGMF (4 crew tanks, 48 tons), which the DM has correctly termed as Marvel comic stuff.

Poor Indian Army? Indeed, considering they would have had to operate the T-90 in the Thar Desert without an AC and without a functioning Fire Control System. This is neither a fault of a dodo, nor a peacock, nor a penguin.

@Bhadra, please understand that the DRDO has produced a lot of weapons systems. I can assure you, if people were sitting in DRDO offices and commenting over the internet, these weapons systems would not have magically appeared. Those scientists had to work for them. It is not quite as easy to get a science degree as you might think, but I don't expect any empathy from you. Just as getting a science degree is difficult, making working weapons systems is infinitely more difficult.

I agree with you. Had Lieutenant-General Mikhail Timofeyevich Kalashnikov who had initial job in mechanics at a tractor station and subsequently enlisted in the Red Army and assigned as a tank mechanic was a poetry lover, continued to write poetry all of his life. Had he been a BSc he would have never designed a rifle so famous after his name - Avtomat Kalashnikova model 1947.... AK -47...

To hell with you all BScs who can not even design a Rifle for our Armed Forces... (though I also happen to be MSc M Phil) perusing my doctorate on DODOs...

An Argumentative Indian ... !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

 

[Bhadra]

The Indian Army is compromised. It is time to sniff out the moles from within the Army. This might be the tip of the iceberg. (Not exactly related to the RFI, but this is to show that the IA can be compromised.)

Just FO.. Indian Army is is too proud and too big for your useless existence and miserable thoughts.