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Stop these useless rants solely aimed at personal abuse with the aim of derailing the thread.
Only God can verify all the statements you made here.
Indian Army wants futuristic vehicle for its Armoured corps
- Thread starter Lions Of Punjab
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Only God can verify all the statements you made here.
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After reading this, I do not understand one thing.Just read what extend our pride of the nation defence forces can go to scuttle indigenous efforts.
This is from CAG report, no fiction.
ABSENCE OF LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
_______________________________
The most significant setback to production of MBT Arjun was the change in requirements put forth by the Army in February 2007. The tanks produced by HVF, Avadi were to be issued to the Army after inspection at the factory site in the Joint Receipt Inspection by the representatives of HVF, DRDO and Army.
The issued tanks were put through two trials - the Field Trial and the Accelerated usage-cum-reliability trials (AUCRT), by the Army. Joint Receipt Inspection was conducted (March 2005) for first five MBT Arjun manufactured (2003-04) in the pilot phase, one year after production.
The inspection of the second lot of nine pilot MBT Arjun, took place in February 2007, two years after production. By 2007, 53 MBT had already been produced by HVF, Avadi.
It was during this inspection in February 2007 that Army reported water ingress in the fighting compartment of tank while crossing shallow parts of a river and raised two additional requirements in the design of the MBT Arjun viz. zero level ingress of water in the fighting compartment and lead time for fording (time from tank’s entry into water to exit from water) to be minimised to 30 minutes.
We noticed that the corresponding benchmark fixed by the Army for T-90 tank was more relaxed, allowing 2.5 litres of water ingress. The requirement of zero level water ingress for medium fording was not stipulated in the Army’s requirements (GSQR of 1985) or in subsequent stages of development which had seen many changes in design.
In fact, the Joint Action Plan (of Army and DRDO), in August 1999, had cleared the medium fording capability of MBT Arjun. This issue was also not raised in the Joint Receipt Inspection of the first batch of pilot MBT Arjun. The new requirements necessitated the DRDO to modify the design of the second lot of nine pilot MBT Arjun.
The same got modified and were issued to Army by September 2007. The first lot of five pilot tanks was brought back from Army, got modified and issued to Army till October 2007. Balance 39 tanks of the bulk production were dismantled, reworked and issued to the Army in 2008-10. The whole task of dismantling and reassembly of 53 MBTs entailed an additional cost of Rs 84 lakh.
The Ministry stated (May 2014) that modifications were considered essential to improve overall performance from user’s perspective. The reply undermines the impact of the modifications in derailing the production and issue of MBT Arjun, which was a significant factor that led to an import of T-90 tanks that cost Rs 4,913 crore in November 2007 as discussed in Paragraph 8.3.4. The reply also does not address why the benchmarks on MBT Arjun regarding water ingress and fording, were more stringent than the corresponding requirements on T-90 tank.
Medium fording was one of the eight instances we noticed, where Army placed benchmark of parameters on MBT Arjun which were more stringent in comparison to those placed on T-90 tanks. These are detailed in Annexure XIX. We could not assess the impact of these benchmarks on the performance of the two tanks from our scrutiny of the Report on comparative trials of MBT Arjun and T-90 tank (February/ March 2010- referred to in Paragraph 8.3.2.8 ).
While we appreciate the Army’s quest for improving the quality of MBT Arjun, the imposition of more stringent parameters precluded a level playing field and more importantly, the inability to freeze the designs led to several changes in design, consequent delays in acceptance of MBT Arjun by the Army and in the overall, the production and issue of MBT Arjun.
___________________________
IMPACT OF 'EVOLVING' GSQRs
___________________________
Changes in design
Mention was made in Report No. 3 of 2006 of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India about the frequent changes in design leading to delay in development of MBT Arjun. The development of MBT prototype was to be completed by April 1982 but after going through several modifications in design, the prototype was cleared by the Army in 1998.
Given this concern on several changes in design, the Scientific Advisor to the Raksha Mantri had confirmed (2004) in a note to the Ministry that the design for MBT stood frozen.
This was, however, not the case. We found that 316 amendments to design of various assemblies were carried out even after freezing of the design and up to August 2010.
The changes were mostly justified by the Ministry in its reply (May 2014) as necessitated for product improvement and modifications based on user’s feedback on quality problems.
The reply does not take cognizance of the fact that even after clearing the production after acceptance of the prototype (1998), the designs continued to be re-worked for 12 years thereafter and frozen only in 2010.
_________________________________
ARJUN - T-90 COMPARATIVE TRIALS
_________________________________
Comparative field trials of MBT Arjun with T-90 tanks took place in February/ March 2010. Till such time, the Army had been consistently reporting quality problems in MBT Arjun; this was also reported to the Standing Committee on Defence (2007-08). The comparative trials were on four parameters viz. fire power, survivability, reliability and miscellaneous issues of the tank with weightage of 40, 35, 15 and 10 respectively.
As per the trial report, MBT Arjun performed marginally better than the T-90 tank in accuracy and consistency of firepower. However, T-90 tank performed better in lethality and missile firing capability. The Army concluded (April 2010) that “Arjun had performed creditably and it could be employed both for offensive and defensive tasks with same efficacy of T-90 tank.” The Army also recommended upgrades to make the Arjun tank a superior weapon platform. We were informed (February 2014) that the Mark-II version of MBT Arjun was under trials by the Army and that it would include the upgrades recommended by the Army.
We found that the MBT Arjun and T-90 tank were not exactly comparable in missile firing ability; the higher score of T-90 tank was mainly due to missile firing ability which was not in the design of MBT Arjun. Barring missile firing ability, the scores of MBT Arjun and T-90 tank would be 25.77 and 24.50 respectively in firepower. In the overall comparative score, T-90 tank scored 75.01, marginally higher than MBT Arjun which scored 72.46, mainly because of higher score on missile firing ability of T-90 tank.
__________________
T-90 PRODUCTION
__________________
The Russian Firm, M/s Rosoboronexport (ROE) was expected to transfer the design details in the Transfer-of-Technology (ToT) documents by March 2003. The documents were in Russian; the Army/Ordnance Factories’ efforts to get translated documents from ROE, failed. The documents were received between September 2001 and January 2003 following which HVF, Avadi concluded four contracts between September 2003 and September 2006 for translation of the documents. The translation was completed by July 2007 after the expiry of scheduled delivery period of first batch of 50 indigenous tanks by 2006-07. In all, the translation of ToT documents took almost six years.
The Ministry stated (May 2014) that translation of critical documents for indigenous manufacturing was carried out with available resource of Russian translators at HVF and there was no delay in production due to pending translation. The reply is not acceptable because delay in translation of ToT documents had certainly impacted on the indigenous production of T-90 tanks as production could not commence without the availability of translated documents.
Non-receipt of design documents for critical assemblies
We found that ToT documents in respect of some critical assemblies were not transferred by the Russian manufacturer, ROE, even after lapse of 12 years as of July 2013. An important component was the gun system (including barrel) for which the design had not been received as of May 2014. In fact, the Ministry cited this issue as the main reason for slippage in indigenous production of T-90 tank.
________________________________
QUALITY PROBLEMS WITH THE T-90
________________________________
During March 2010 to November 2013, HVF received 45 defect reports (DRs) from the Army relating to minor and major defects in the indigenous T-90 tanks. The defects mainly pertained to failure of gear box and defects in auto/electrical portion of the tanks. A Working Group was proposed (March 2012) to address these deficiencies which was not formed. The HVF, Avadi constituted (November 2004) a Failure Review Board (FRB) at factory level to investigate the reasons for defects at the users end. The FRB discussed (September 2013) the major failures and recommended remedial measures.
Accordingly, HVF implemented:
• a process audit to eliminate non-conformances in assembling process;
• introduction of 100 per cent pre-fitment and component level inspection and additional quality assurance checks at local supplier’s premises;
• extensive trials of samples supplied by the local firms after introducing improvements and before their induction into regular production; and
• deputing of HVF’s teams to field locations to ensure technical and maintenance support to the users.
Ministry told us that the FRB was a quality tool which facilitated timely action on defects. The delay in discussion of the FRB (September 2013), even when
the Army was raising quality concerns since March 2010, was not however, commented upon by the Ministry.
___________________
PRODUCTION RATE
___________________
Arjun:
The Public Accounts Committee had urged (December 2003) the Ministry to utilize the infrastructural facilities optimally so that the desired volume of production of MBT Arjun would enable increase of the indigenous content to 55 per cent. The Ministry assured the Committee that a production level, initially of 300 MBT Arjun to be raised to 500 tank later, would reduce the import content to under 30 per cent.
However, barring the initial indent of 124 tanks, the Board did not receive any further indents for MBT Arjun. Production has come to standstill since 2009-10 and to that extent, capacity created at a cost of Rs 87 crore for annual production of 30 MBT Arjun awaits utilization against Ministry’s decision for fresh orders. Meanwhile, HVF, Avadi holds idle inventory of Rs 128 crore reflected as “Work-in-progress”, which remains unutilised in the absence of fresh orders. The cost per MBT Arjun was Rs 21 crore (2009-10), against which the import content was Rs 13 crore. This brings the level of indigenisation in MBT Arjun to 38 per cent only. The initial development project on MBT Arjun had envisaged that barring the engine, all components/assemblies would be indigenously produced. Problems in sourcing major assemblies other than engines have been discussed in Paragraph 8.3.2.6.
T-90:
The production of T-90 tank at HVF, Avadi was short of the indent of November 2004 for 300 tanks, by 75 tanks as of March 2013. Even as the production was underway against the first indent, the Army placed a second indent for 236 T-90 tanks in December 2013. Meanwhile, the Ministry sanctioned (September 2011) Rs 971 crore for capacity augmentation of T-90 tank production by March 2014. This was expected to raise the capacity of Ordnance Factories from 100 per cent to 140 per cent of T-90 tanks.
It is noteworthy that Rs 96 crore was sanctioned (February 2004) for creating production capacity for 100 T-90 tanks, whereas augmentation of capacity from 100 to 140 tanks is slated for Rs 971 crore, a ten times increase in estimation over a period of seven years. Reasons for the extraordinary increase were not provided by the Ministry, in its response of May 2014. As of March 2014, only an amount of Rs 17 crore had been spent on the augmentation project and in the revised schedule, the project is expected to be completed in December 2016. The Board appears to have put the augmentation plan on a slow track as of now.
You can expect the same treatment for any DRDO entry into FRCV.
DRDO will sell and GOI will buy. If there is such rigging in favour of T-90, why have they not complained to GOI and take IA to task like any other vendor?
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The development of MBT prototype was to be completed by April 1982 but after going through several modifications in design, the prototype was cleared by the Army in 1998.
Given this concern on several changes in design, the Scientific Advisor to the Raksha Mantri had confirmed (2004) in a note to the Ministry that the design for MBT stood frozen.
This was, however, not the case. We found that 316 amendments to design of various assemblies were carried out even after freezing of the design and up to August 2010.
The changes were mostly justified by the Ministry in its reply (May 2014) as necessitated for product improvement and modifications based on user’s feedback on quality problems.
The reply does not take cognizance of the fact that even after clearing the production after acceptance of the prototype (1998), the designs continued to be re-worked for 12 years thereafter and frozen only in 2010.
Design was feezed by IA in 1998. But IA continued to add many more stringent requirement that are not even present in 1000s of T-90s it was importing is the exact point highlighted by CAG.
DOnt fool people by mentioning 1972.
Note the exact words after IA freezed design 1998 it did not order a batch of few hundred arjuns first and modify them batchwise later.
But for T-90s they were simultaneously importing fully faulty pieces and are still not able to fix them.
Thats why they intently set relaxed parameters to T-90 in Arjun comparison trials to coceal the facts about T-90.
CAG lists 8 concrete instances of how IA papered over T-90 faults.
DGMF would do exactly the same thing in FRCV RFI also. Have no doubt about it!!!
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GSQR does not matter if two tanks were pitted against each other at some point of time and one chosen over the other.
So, you are arguing that all parameters were not taken into consideration and T-90 was a better tank in 2010 when trials were done.
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well they complained. The report itself mentions none other than SA to PM directly mentioning this. Every one knew. But as usual it fell on deaf ears.
Thats why the present DM who is sincere about these things said IA GSQR looks like marvel comics stuff
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The last post by @Bhadra was pretty stupid. Why would two tanks be pitted against each other during trials if one of them is outdated by more than 2 decades!!
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You can find plenty of DODOs in the organization you are stoutly defending , which DODO produces a tank that can be better than T-90 in comparitive trials, which made the IA to fudge it in favour of T-90?
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I do not think it is as simple as you mentioned. Either DRDO knew about the problems with Arjun or they too like IA were compromised.
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This DM is not a moron like antony. An IIT educated engineer will take these baboos to task. Also this DGMF hiding behind science fiction will be taken care of.
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Well no one is saying that DRDO is 100% pure Dhood ka Dhula
But we all have seen that T90 vs Arjun testing sheet that shows unfair and unequal standards for Arjun.
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Therein lies the sham called heavy -medium tank faulty logic.
When they square up in battle better tanks win. No one is going to laud the lighter tanks better fuel efficiency and better logistics adaptability.
Entire IA knows which tank is out dated, Certainly not Arjun.
thats why instead of T-90 vs Arjun comparison which will lead to Arjun replacing fully obsolete T-72s, DGMF is trying this new FRCV to replace T-72 track.
Result will be a disaster. The thousands of T-72s that are in urgent need of being replaced is being made to serve for another two decades compromising the security of the country.
And DGMF's pipe dream of being the sole custodian of IP rights of this wizard FRCV is a stupid scam being played on this country.
DO you really expect global tank majors to toil for ten years to produce a world beating tank , just for prize money ,and transfer all the crucial tech like,
1. Gun TOT,
2. State of the art Fire control computer systems,
3.Suspension,
4. new age armor
to DGMF? Which hist country will allow this benevolence to be showered on DGMF?
Last heard Dassault simply refused to transfer even non-engine, non radar, non-spectra , non avionics, just tyres and airframe tech to HAL!!!
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There are only things which come out of it. One, either DRDO is compromised and sold off to foreign vendors, or two, they are incompetent and cannot build a case for selling their stuff. In both cases, it needs a major revamp.
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Well logistics do matter. A light tank in the battlefield is better than a great tank sitting in garage. But yes, I do not buy the logic that this is the biggest problem and is insurmountable.
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Standardizing on sarvantra 70 ton bridging equipment will solve most of the logistics.
And only T-72 is 40 ton.T-90 is 50 ton tank, SO T-90 too can not cross the 40 ton capable british era bridges in indian border, just like Arjun it too will need logistics support.
As former IA chif gen shankar roy choudry said that in every battle between heavier western tanks and medium or light russian tanks , the heavies have always won.These heavies were all deployed in all type of third world counties that have even poorer infra than india.
India in the 1950 deployed 52 ton centurians in border areas, where was the logistics then?
Only after 1972 T-72s were imported.
Bhadra
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@ersakthivel
Producing one page of CAG report selectively and exclusively without other aspects of the report shows your ill intention, fraudulent behaviour and deliberate misrepresentation.
Do not do it or I will paste thread with the entire report.
A small portion for you :
8.3 Indigenous production of MBT Arjun and T-90 Bhisma Tanks
8.3.1 Introduction.
8.3.1.1 In order to achieve self-reliance in manufacture of Armoured Fighting
Vehicles, Ministry of Defence (Ministry) sanctioned a project in May 1974 for
design and development of first indigenous tank of India i.e. Main Battle Tank
– Arjun by Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) at a
cost of ` 16 crore. The scope of the project was to manufacture 12 prototypes
by April 1982. The DRDO completed its work on the design of MBT Arjun in
March 1995 at a cost of ` 306 crore; the Ordnance Factory Board (Board) was
tasked (1999) to establish the facilities for its manufacture.
__________________________________________
What a farce you all are !! You take 21 years to complete a design then how can you respond to DGMF RFI by 30 Jul 2015. I understand DRDO predicaments !! I understand why there is a "Rudali Brigade" here. I also understand why there is "Hadkamp" in DODO Camp on DFI.
As per @sob it is not so in DRDO !!!
you want me to quote the entire fascinating report? I am sure you do not want that lest you loose your pantaloons due to loss of weight !!.
This is kalayuga where time is at premium and not satayaga where you will take 21 years for a design ... That is the length of service of your previous director. So he was waiting for his retirement. Now you must also be in the same condition passing your convictions to all of us..
Producing one page of CAG report selectively and exclusively without other aspects of the report shows your ill intention, fraudulent behaviour and deliberate misrepresentation.
Do not do it or I will paste thread with the entire report.
A small portion for you :
8.3 Indigenous production of MBT Arjun and T-90 Bhisma Tanks
8.3.1 Introduction.
8.3.1.1 In order to achieve self-reliance in manufacture of Armoured Fighting
Vehicles, Ministry of Defence (Ministry) sanctioned a project in May 1974 for
design and development of first indigenous tank of India i.e. Main Battle Tank
– Arjun by Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) at a
cost of ` 16 crore. The scope of the project was to manufacture 12 prototypes
by April 1982. The DRDO completed its work on the design of MBT Arjun in
March 1995 at a cost of ` 306 crore; the Ordnance Factory Board (Board) was
tasked (1999) to establish the facilities for its manufacture.
__________________________________________
What a farce you all are !! You take 21 years to complete a design then how can you respond to DGMF RFI by 30 Jul 2015. I understand DRDO predicaments !! I understand why there is a "Rudali Brigade" here. I also understand why there is "Hadkamp" in DODO Camp on DFI.
As per @sob it is not so in DRDO !!!
you want me to quote the entire fascinating report? I am sure you do not want that lest you loose your pantaloons due to loss of weight !!.
This is kalayuga where time is at premium and not satayaga where you will take 21 years for a design ... That is the length of service of your previous director. So he was waiting for his retirement. Now you must also be in the same condition passing your convictions to all of us..
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But that does not explain gsqr was different for T90s and Arjun? It was not a fair comparison then now is it?
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This is a much more valid rebuttal. But still does not explain why the standards for Arjun were earmarked higher than that for T90s? Was it rigged or was it because they were given at later dates. If the latter is the case, give us links for that. And pls do post all the valid negatives in the Arjun programs from cag report. Let's hear both sides of the story.
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CAG report mentions tests were conducted in Feb/March 2010. I still do not understand, why two tanks with huge technical difference will be tested at the same time.
From the report:
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Exactly thas what pointed out by CAG.
the first round of specs given for arjun was for 105 mm 40 ton tank.
While it was designed and prototyped, they changed the specs.
again,
.
While it was designed and prototyped, they changed the specs.
again,
.
While it was designed and prototyped, they changed the specs.
again,
.
While it was designed and prototyped, they changed the specs.
again.
This continued till 2010 and it i still continuing in 2015 in th form of arjun mk2.
this is what we call fraud!!!
It is akin to political command giving army instructions like , move ten miles east, ten miles west repeatedly for one month.
And then if they ask the commander why you are at the same place what will he do?
Do you remember how waterloo was lost?
A reserve faction of napolean army moved between two battlefields back and forth without contributing much to either of the battles.
And DGMF's pipe dream of being the sole custodian of IP rights of this wizard FRCV is a stupid scam being played on this country.
DO you really expect global tank majors to toil for ten years to produce a world beating tank , just for prize money ,and transfer all the crucial tech like,
1. Gun TOT,
2. State of the art Fire control computer systems,
3.Suspension,
4. new age armor
5. APS,
6.remote turet tech,
to DGMF? Which host country of the tank maker will allow this benevolence of such strategic tech ,to be showered on DGMF?
hell russians even refused to fit the AC on the God damned desert crap called t-90!!!
Last heard Dassault simply refused to transfer even non-engine, non radar, non-spectra , non avionics, just tyres and airframe tech to HAL!!!, that too for the world's biggest military deal worth 20 billions!!!!
In this kaliyuga which global tank maker will compete to run out of business after ten years?
SO who is playing rudali chor here, DGMF wet dreams fanboys or DRDO supporters?
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bhadra guy will answer only after the end of kaliyuga!!!
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