Please list the technologies used in the Arjun that you consider third class.
Things and technologies where Indian Mechanised forces are grappling with are more than described here :
Army’s Armour Drives
http://defencesecurityindia.com/armys-armour-drives/
Looking ahead to the induction and mordernisation of the ambitious Main Battle Tank (MBT) programme, the Indian Army is challenged by some grave issues like night blindness of the tanks , ordnance shortage and the fatigue of T-90s including many others
Rahul Bedi
The Indian army’s ambitious main battle tank (MBT) induction and modernisation programmes are in a state of flux, afflicted by delays and an overarching lack of planning and resource management.
Its continually postponed plans to equip 61 armoured regiments that remain hobbled by the army’s vacillation and inefficiency in formulating realistic qualitative requirements (QRs) for its MBT fleet. Interminable bureaucratic delays by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in approving badly-needed imports and upgrade contracts merely exacerbate the problem.
“Defence planners remain helpless in augmenting the army’s armour capabilities which are ageing and years behind schedule” defence analyst Lieutenant General Vijay Kapoor, a retired armoured corps officer said.
All those involved in the planning processes-the user, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) and the MoD-seem collectively incapable of cooperating to effectively boost the army’s crucial armour profile, he added.India’s former Army chief, General Deepak Kapoor had added to the gravity of this shortcoming.
In a candid, but worrying admittance, he had declared in January 2010, that around 80 per cent of the Indian Army’s MBTs, projected to operate in an essentially volatile and unfriendly neighbourhood, were ‘night blind’. The armoured columns of neighbouring nuclear rivals Pakistan and China, on the other hand, he had stated, were 80 and 100 per cent night-fighting capable.
“One of the major areas of my concerns is to remove the night blindness of the tanks, so that we are able to effectively fight at night as we are able to do in the day,” Gen Kapoor had declared, revealing one of the army’s enduring but worst kept secret, which remains unresolved.
“There are projects in the pipeline for ensuring the kind of night vision capability that some of our adversaries have, but these take three to four years to fructify” the army chief had stated, helplessly reiterating what some of his predecessors had similarly conceded privately, but failed to rectify.
The Indian Army operates a mix of some 2400 imported and licence built ‘Ajeya’ T72M1s MBTs, 657 ‘Bhishma’ T90s platforms and 124 indigenously designed by Avadi-based, Combat Vehicles Research and Development Establishment (CVRDE) and OFB-built Arjun Mk I tanks.
India imported 310 T90s in 2001-124 in completed form and the remaining 186 in kit form for assembly by the Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) at Avadi, near Chennai – for Rs 36.25 billion. Thereafter, in 2007 it inked another Rs 49 billion deal for 347 additional T 90 MBTs.
The latter import followed delays by the HVF in building 1000 T 90s under the 2001 purchase agreement due to problems in translating a warehouse full of Russian technical manuals and Moscow’s reluctance in transferring technology to locally construct the MBT, especially with regard to metallurgy in forging its 125 mm barrels.
By 2022, the Indian Army aims on operating around 1650 T90s, which along with Arjun MK I and its upgraded Mk II model will, in due course, replace the T 72M1s that are presently undergoing incremental upgradation. But this proposed switch stands largely postponed for now as the HVFs capacity to licence build the superior MBTs and Arjun’s remains limited.
The army has already inducted its first batch of 124 DRDO-developed and the OFB-run HVF-built Arjun MK Is, it ordered in 2000. Deliveries of an equal number it signed up for in August 2010 – which together,are enough to equip four regiments and scheduled for completion by 2016. For the follow-on order, the HVF plans on building 24 Arjun MK Is in the first batch till December 2014 and 50 units each year thereafter, till the total order of 124 is completed.
Alongside, the army is considering ordering some 250 Arjun Mk IIs, which incorporate 93 improvements-including 19 major ones-over Arjun Mk I. The upgraded platform, in which Israel Military Industries and Elbit Systems of Israel are collaborating closely with the DRDO’s CVRDE centre at Avadi, is presently undergoing the final round of user trials in Rajasthan.
CVRDE head P Shiv Kumar said improvements in Arjun Mk II, implemented in tandem with the Indian Army, include equipping the MBT with advanced thermal imaging sights for night fighting and the capability to fire Israel Aerospace Industry (IAI)-designed semi-active laser guided LAHAT missiles from its 120mm rifled gun to neutralise enemy tanks.
Weighing seven tons more than the 60-ton Arjun Mk I, the Arjun Mk II will also be fitted with indigenously developed explosive reactive armour (ERA) to counter armor piercing fin stabilised discarding sabot (APFSDS), high explosive anti-tank rounds and rocket-propelled grenade attacks and advanced land navigation and communication systems.
Additionally, it has a mine plough and an improved suspension and tracks to bear the additional load. An auxiliary power unit with an 8.5 kw capacity – up from Arjun Mk Is 4.5 kw-containerisation of its ammunition and modifications to its hull and turret to give it a lower and less vulnerable silhouette, constituting part of the improvement package. Panoramic sights, an upgraded gun barrel with an equivalent firing charge of 500 rounds, an automatic target tracking system, tank commanders’ panoramic sight and digital control harness complete the MBTs upgrade.
CVRDE is also collaborating with a local private sector manufacturer to develop a Mobile Camouflaging System to mitigate the threat of interference from enemy sensors and smart munitions for fitment onto the MBT at a later stage.
But efforts to indigenously upgrade the MBTs power-pack to 1500 cc to endure the supplementary weight have been shelved and Arjun Mk II will continue with Mk Is 1400cc German MTU 838Ka-501 diesel engine and semi-automatic RENK RK-304A transmission.
However, the Arjun Mk II fitted with a large proportion of imported systems, is expected to cost an exorbitant Rs 370 million ($5.96 million) each, once completed, defence minister A K Antony told Parliament in August 2011. In comparison, Arjun MK I with over 60 per cent imported components is priced at around Rs 170 million per tank, less than half the price of its upgraded model. The proven T 90S, on the other hand, were procured for $2.2-2.5 million per unit or nearly three platforms for the price of one Arjun Mk II.
In a significant development, the anticipated success of Arjun Mk II has more or less put paid to the army’s plans to develop a 50-ton future main battle tank (FMBT) to replace the upgraded T 72M1s, 2020 onwards.
In December 2010 Defence Minister A K Antony had informed Parliament that the FMBT would be developed within a decade. He said the army had conceptualised its requirements and the DRDO was carrying out a feasibility study.
The DRDO, for its part, had seconded a team of academics, technicians and army officers to develop the FMBTs transmission and engine called the Bharat Power Pack. “We are confident that we will be ready with the FMBT prototype in five to seven years,” S Sundaresh, DRDOs chief controller of armaments and combat engineering division had said in Chennai in late 2010. Working with a foreign consultant, in all probability from Israel, he said the DRDO was looking to develop a modular design FMBT capable of being upgraded whenever new technology emerged.
But the Directorate General of Mechanised Forces (DGMF), which after several years has failed to effectively formulate the proposed FMBTs preliminary specification qualitative requirements (PSQR), recently proposed the project’s abandonment. Instead, it is believed to have indicated its preference for gradually upgrading Arjun’s operational capability and agility, by reducing its excessive weight without compromising on fire power, for eventual deployment in mountainous terrain.
The DGMF reasoned that building a third MBT production line alongside the T90s and Arjun presented neither economic nor logistic or even operational logic. Besides, it argued that there had been no major breakthroughs in armoured vehicle technology in recent decades and consequently was of the view that the future of indigenous tank building needed to flow from MBT Arjun. This proposal, however, is still under review.
Meanwhile, Project Rhino under which 1900-2200 T 72M1MBTs that form the backbone of the army’s armour formations that were being upgraded, has suffered recurring setbacks.
The retrofit envisages fitting the T 72M1fleet with either partial or full solution thermal imaging fire control systems in addition to equipping them with ERA panels, fibre-optic gyro-based navigation and laser warning systems, frequency hopping radio sets and advanced nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) equipment.
Stabilising the tanks gun control system by attaching a new thermal shroud on the MBT’s 125mm 2A46 smooth bore gun for greater accuracy and equipping the tank with new integrated fire detection and suppression systems would have completed the staggered retrofit package to keep the T72M1s in service till 2015-2020 and possibly, even beyond.
“The T72M1s lack of night fighting capability is due largely to the army’s incompetence and the MoDs lack of equipment awareness” retired Brigadier Arun Sahgal of the Forum for Strategic Initiative in New Delhi said. Both seem incapable of working together to enhance the military’s mechanised force capability, the former armoured corps officer added.
The crucial acquisition of around 950 full solution thermal imaging fire control systems (TIFCS) – 250 of them replacements for the Drawa-T FCS from PCO-Cenzin of Poland, the $ 72.73 million contract for which was terminated in 2005-and around 750-800 third generation, thermal imaging stand alone systems (TISAS) for fitment onto around 1700-1800 T72M1s, still awaits closure.
Over the past five years the army has acquired and installed merely 300 TISAS from Israel’s Elbit Systems Electro-optics or El Op for the T72M1s for around $120,000 each. But army sources said many of these were reportedly malfunctioning because of overheating in the Rajasthan desert.
And it was only in April 2013 that the MoDs Defence Acquisition Council approved the procurement of some 4780 thermal imaging (TI) sights for the army’s mechanised fleet including Infantry Combat Vehicles (ICVs) from the state-run Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) over the next few years. Military analysts, however, believe these TI systems will be produced in collaboration with El Op with whom BEL has a close, albeit classified working relationship.
Of these, the T-72 and T 90s fleets will receive 2000 and 1200 TI sights respectively; the remaining 1580 imagers will be fitted onto the army’s Russian BMP-1 and BMP-2 ICVs which too suffer from night blindness.
Efforts at replacing the T 72M1s 780hp V12 air cooled multi-fuel injection engine with the T90s 1000hp V92S2 four-stroke V12 diesel power pack fitted with a turbo-supercharger too remains under development, contributing to the overall upgrade setback.
Operational availability of the T 72M1s too is problematic. According to the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) imported T-72 tanks require their first overhaul after 12 years or 10,000km while the second one is carried out after 22 years or 18,000 km. For HVF licence built T 72M1s, the first overhaul is after 10 years or 5,000 km and the second after 20 years or 9,000 km.
“The backlog of 1572 tanks to be overhauled as of 2005 had arisen primarily due to insufficient overhaul capacity created, failure of the factory (HVF) to make available the quality spares in time and inadequate supply of tanks due for overhaul by the Army,” the CAG stated in its report on combat vehicles tabled in Parliament in May, 2006. Consequently by 2015, the CAG warned, there would be a further accumulation of another 1983 tanks for their first and second overhaul, a situation that would ‘adversely effect’ operational readiness.
The T 72M1 fleet also faces a depletion of 125 mm AMK340 shells produced by the state-run Ordnance Factory Board with not enough rounds for the army to even carry out mandatory, bi-annual basic firing exercises over the past five years. Former army chief Gen V K Singh referred to this paucity of 125 mm tank ammunition in his April 2012 letter to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, which was leaked to a Mumbai newspaper generating widespread controversy.
Earlier in late 2011, the MoD had initiated the emergency import of 66,000 125mm APFSDS rounds from Russia for the T 72M1s on grounds of ‘operational necessity’. This had followed intimation by the army that its war wastage reserves of 125mm rounds had dropped well below ‘critical levels’. The MoD sources said the emergency ordnance procurement, reportedly at inflated prices, also obliged it to waive the offset obligation of 30 per cent mandated for all Indian military purchases over Rs 3 billion.
This ordnance shortage was also triggered by the destruction 2003 onwards of 150,000-200,000 T 72M1 AMK340 rounds worth around Rs 7 billion due to a combination of defective manufacturing and negligence in storing. The AMK-340s semi-combustible cartridge case that is filled with triple–base propellant, was found to have inadequate packing between the layers to prevent leakage in high storage temperatures, often under the open sun without even overhead protection, rendering it unsafe.
These defective rounds had also “demoralized” T 72M1crews after a series of AMK-340 rounds burst inside the MBTs barrels. In one such accident two soldiers are believed to have died some years ago at Babina. Armoured corps officers said thereafter nervous tank crews had, in several instances, refused to fire the AMK-340 rounds and when forced to do so resorted to elaborate ‘jugaad’ or innovative solutions to detonate the shells a safe distance from the tank.
T 90s ammunition too is posing a problem for the army.Initially, the T 90s fired Russian-made AMK-338 and AMK-339 rounds. But these had more or less been exhausted in training and the MBTs 125 mm smoothbore guns have yet to be configured to fire locally manufactured AMK-340 rounds, in effect leaving many platforms virtually ammunition-less.
In August 2013 the MoD signed a Rs 30-billion ($461 million) contract with the state-owned Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) for an undisclosed number of Invar anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) for the T90s fleet for delivery by 2018.
But army sources said BDL, which has been making Invar ATGMs based on the Russian 9M119M Refleks missile under a collaborative agreement with Rosoboronexport since 2006-07, would only be able to meet a part of the Indian Army’s projected requirement for some 20,000 projectiles.
A substantial portion of the remaining ordnance would need to be supplemented by imports from Russia. However, many tank officers feared that the Army’s budgetary constraints and the sharp decline in the value of the rupee against the US dollar would preclude wholly fulfilling the critical Invar ATGM deficit, further imperiling operations.
The T 90s also faced ‘fatigue’ problems and needed major overhauling as, over years they had been ‘over exposed’ in exercises by senior commanders.
Each T 90s has a maximum life of 650 on the onboard rev-counter (static running equal’s one rev per hour whilst traversing a distance of 17.5 km is one rev). However, in less than four years after the tanks entered regimental service around 2002-03 most had completed 600 revs and were in need of major overhauls. Tank gun barrels-capable of firing 220 effective full charge (EFC) rounds- too were imperiled. The T 90s can undergo a maximum of three gun changes.
A paucity of training simulators of which there were only four – two driving and two for gunnery instruction -contributed to the MBT’s overuse. To compound matters, these simulators were divided between Babina, Patiala, Jhansi and Ahmednagar forcing tank crews to waste time racing to each location. The situation was further complicated by the simulator maintenance wing being headquartered at Jhansi, resulting in delays if problems occurred at any of the other three locations.
In conclusion, the army is in the mode of processing the procurement of 300 light tanks weighing 22 tons each – 200 wheeled and 100 tracked – to equip two proposed armoured formations under raising, alongside the new Mountain Strike corps, for deployment in precipitous terrain along the unresolved Chinese frontier. Some of these proposed platforms are for employment in battlefield reconnaissance in the desert region, in urban and semi-urban environments, in riverine terrain and marshy ground. The MoD had dispatched a request for information to overseas vendors in October 2009 for these light tanks, but so far has failed to follow up on this requirement.
Why and how without knowing specifications ?
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