To defeat Maoists, grasp the ground reality
The belief that development can run concurrently with military operation is naïve. In an unpredictable and turbulent environment where destruction, mayhem and murder are the rule rather than the exception, the environment is hardly conducive to sustained development. It's time to grasp the ground reality!
The Maoists skate on thin ice — driven by an esoteric abstract — ideology. It appears convoluted to the lettered, let alone a tribal. It is too recondite an abstract to be sustainable under relentless military pressure. Had Maoism been fired by tangible, evocative, emotive issues like religion and ethnicity, may be it could've struggled on.
All tribals are not Maoists. Their deprivations, exploited through sophistry to harbinger salvation, draw them to the Maoist fold. The majority possibly enlist or support because of strong personal reasons or herd mentality.
Many well-intentioned people have opined that peace is attainable through dialogue and development is the sole panacea to the Maoist problem that too being undertaken concurrent with the military operations.
The idea, though well intentioned, is a non-starter. Maoists avow overthrowing the republic by force, rejecting democratic processes. Would they join in dialogue? Or would it be stratagem to seize breathing space to rest, refit and reorganise to return as a more menacing force than ever before? Historically, insurgents do not enter dialogue unless they are made to realise the futility of their effort eg North-East or Kashmir insurgencies. The Maoists are yet to reach that state, currently riding a new high after the Sildah and Dantewada attacks. Will they abdicate their growing ascendancy?
The argument is patently bogus that the state is waging war and the hapless Maoists are merely reciprocating. Isn't violence their means to achieve their aim? The Constitution mandates the States and the Centre maintain law and order. Maoists mandated to unleash murder and mayhem? There lies the subtle antithesis that eludes Maoist camp followers.
The belief that development can run concurrently with military operation is naïve. In an unpredictable and turbulent environment where destruction, mayhem and murder are the rule rather than the exception, the environment is hardly conducive to sustained development. The communication towers and schools were representatives of development and were razed to the ground. The net result was tremendous loss to the exchequer, and a colossal waste in effort and labour, lending to a confidence deficit in the Government.
However, concurrently feasible is the rejuvenating, albeit locally, of the State administration that has totally collapsed. Demotivated and surly administrators on punishment posting are hardly the ones to deliver. They should give way to those with integrity and courage, are deprivation ready and who can deliver. The basic necessities, including educating the tribal in trade and skills to keep them gainfully employed and schemes like the NREGS should be vigorously, fairly, transparently pursued to bring succour. Successfully implemented, it would wean away the tribal from the Maoists and provide the much needed, currently non-existent, intelligence. The main bone of contention is forest resource contractors and mining conglomerates raping the environment and destroying the tradition way of life. They must be reined in. They must be mandated to protect the environment and be sensitive to tribal customs and traditional way of life. Co-opted, they should provide tribal employment and contribute generously to welfare schemes. Failing to do so, should invite the penalty of losing their licence. This will demonstrate that the administration is just, unbiased and sincerely concerned about the tribal and would affirmatively disprove Maoist propaganda.
As far as winning the hearts and minds, rehabilitation of surrendered Maoists is a major aspect of counter-insurgency operations. It must be just and fair. Absorbing them in the police or the paramilitary is erroneous. Disillusioned with the Government rehabilitation, they may return to the Maoist fold. In such an eventuality, the end-state would be the Government 'presenting' a better trained individual, who is aware of the Government's counter-insurgency policy, mode of operations, the weapon systems, the state of training, morale and motivation, the hierarchy and their prowess and weaknesses and so on. The surrendered insurgent gone sour could additionally take a weapon along as a trophy of homecoming! Hence, the rehabilitation should focus solely on training surrendered insurgents in skills or trade that permit eking a decent and profitable existence. Ideally, they should be rehabilitated far from their roots so that they are not in a position to either influence anyone or get influenced by their erstwhile comrade. Rare would be a case returning to the deprivations of the jungle abandoning a new and profitable life!
That said, how does the nation enforce its writ?
Prima facie, there is no indication of any tenacity of purpose except orally.
Successful operations depend on making sound decisions, which subsequently develop into plans to be executed by subordinate staff and commanders.
Effective decision-making takes account of all aspects of operational planning such as deliberate planning prior to operations (contingency planning), responsive planning during operations and the concurrent planning of future operations.
This philosophy recognises that a conflict includes constant changes, uncertainty and time constraints and an adversary who will not necessarily behave as predicted. It acknowledges that prior to operations, detailed and thorough analysis must be conducted to develop the best possible plan and a range of contingency plans. However, it also acknowledges that developing the 'best plan' is often unrealistic.
The development and conduct of operations depends on an integral and continuous aspect known the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield and planning consists of four steps:
# Mission analysis: This assists in identifying the mission and tasks essential to the successful outcome of the plan. This results in a clear statement of the commander's mission and intent.
# Course of action development: Involves identifying a range of COAs. COAs are broad courses or options open to the commander to accomplish the mission. The number of COAs developed depends on the time made available in the commander's guidance.
# Course of action analysis: Involves planning each feasible COA, beyond engagement, through to its intended end-state. The results of COA analysis surfaces COAs with clear advantages and disadvantages.
# Decision and execution: The commander compares the strengths and weaknesses of each modified COA, and decides which COA will be developed into a plan and executed. The products of this step are the plan of action, contingency plans and supporting plans and orders.
The purpose of the IPB is to update the commander and staff with the situation as it develops, to identify opposition vulnerabilities and opportunities to defeat them, and to anticipate and identify likely and dangerous enemy actions. IPB recognises that part of the nature of conflict is uncertainty and that decisions must be made despite incomplete information. Importantly, IPB focusses information-gathering sources on proving or disproving those assumptions and, which COA the threat has adopted.
If that is how operations are organised, has Operation Green Hunt been organised in a military manner or as an ad hoc police mode of conducting local law and order issues?
The mission is to destroy Maoism. However, the approach of the States and the Centre are divergent. The Centre perceives it as a law and order problem (with the Centre as a facilitator) and hence it is the States' responsibility. The States believe it's a joint mission. The Maoists are not against any State or States per se, and instead is focussing on overthrowing the republic by violence. The manifestation of the republic is the Centre and therefore, it is an insurgency. If it is an insurgency, then the Centre is avoiding involvement in an uncertain long haul and is passing the buck to the States. Abdicating responsibility could be construed as dereliction of duty.
The Home Ministry must have vetted the COAs available to it. Apparently, it appears flawed. The Maoist attacks in Sildah and Dantewada indicate that each feasible COA, beyond engagement, was not thought through to its intended end-state; or else in Sildah, would there have been the bizarre deployment next to a market (to suit political needs) or send untrained CRPF men into Maoist territory? Apparently, neither the Home Ministry nor the CRPF fathoms the tenets of counter-insurgency. If they did, they would have baulked before sending the adhoc party into Dantewada. The breathless proclamation that 45-day training, a week's or a pre-induction being more than adequate to beard the lion in his den signifies ignorance! It takes years to convert a young soldier into a soldier and many years more to equip him with experience to be a counter-insurgent machine!
If COAs were thought through, then the Dantewada operation would not have pivoted on bases. It aimed at clearing/dominating a certain area and then falling back on the base. This has lent credence by the Dantewada DIG's rather astounding assertion that an area 'cleared' soon becomes 'infested' by Maoists, requiring 'sanitisation'. This statement suggests that there is an awareness deficit in how counter-insurgency is conducted. Counter-insurgency is no kabaddi match, where having struck, one scurries back to base and safety. Counter-insurgency involves domination of insurgent areas and isolating the population from Maoist influence. Equally beyond belief is an officer's claim that CRPF's 7.62 SLRs were no match for the Maoists' AK 47. It suggests that the CRPF is yet to understand tactics and its effect of weaponry, let alone counter-insurgency. Weapons are no philosopher's stone granting immortality. Immortality has a chance if augmented with minor tactics. Adroit use of ground with effective use of the weapon is but axiomatic. Both are complementary in defeating insurgents and for one's own survival. The lathicharge and rubber-bullet psyche hardly does for counter-insurgency. Further, unlike in police actions, numbers are not important. Unit cohesiveness, and training as a sub-unit, is what is material for efficient effectiveness. The cavalier launching of the rag-tag sub-unit of A company (45 men), C company (12 men) and G company (15 men) of the 62nd Battalion CRPF, operating out of Chintalnar base flouts all canons of counter-insurgency and was a ripe prescription for disaster to happen, and it happened. In short, missions against Maoists, which is a full-blown insurgency and not a law and order problem, must be addressed as an insurgency. It is incumbent of the Centre to involve itself more robustly. The perception collision between the States and the Centre has led to a muddle-headed chaos, compounded with the inapt and unworkable police psyche underscoring the disastrous outcomes so far.
The Centre's responsibility to quell the insurgency would vector, as per form, on the Army's participation. Notwithstanding, what is reckonable is whether there is surplus manpower for tasking and if the overuse of service weapons and equipment reducing the service life is acceptable. Given the Ministry of Defence's paranoia of scandals, without any replacement or modernisation in the offing, it is moot point. It is the Government's call if counter-insurgency is supreme over defence of the nation.
It has been stated that the Army will not be used, exception being Special Force units. It remains indistinct as far as the mode of employment that has been envisaged. Are they to be used for what is known as man-hunting which involves capturing or killing important insurgents dubbed as high-value targets? To employ the SF in direct military operations would mean squandering a potent force for what regular forces can accomplish.
Since one cannot forsake operational readiness against external aggression, the option is to gear up the CRPF and authentically and sincerely train them for effective counter-insurgency rather than using them merely to slot voids in numbers with units of untrained personnel and enter the comfort zone. The strategy should aim at 'brainwashing' the CRPF of its police mentality and convert them into a military-like mindset to address counter-insurgency efficiently.
Understandable is the Centre's infuriation at the Maoists' unbridled march, showing up the Centre as bumblingly impotent. Strategy requires understanding ground realities — the strengths and weaknesses — rather than being spurred by infuriation and bruised egos. Ground realities have been given the go by or else there is no rationale that in Sildah, the personnel were located in a market, and in Dantewada, in one stroke, 76 men perished like flies! And to believe the audacious claim that the personnel were fully trained and counter-insurgency capable! The CRPF was kitted for counter-insurgency if the weapons captured by the Maoist is any indicator. It was just that they were untrained. Historically, such a large force has never perished in an insurgent ambush. In all probability, they were resting not having taken the mandated precautions and were caught off guard. And to believe that on a mission to flush out insurgents they camped the night in a Maoist-friendly village! This type of languorous mindset must be ruthlessly obliterated and substituted by an aggressive, proactive, confident, no nonsense derring-do.
If the State and Central Forces lack training and numbers, then how will the Maoists be tackled?
First of all, what is essential is the confidence and knowledge to undertake the task. Apparently, the forces require time to achieve this state. In the interim, since there is no dearth of ex-servicemen with adequate counter-insurgency experience, such officers and men could be inducted in the various units and headquarters employed against the Maoists on the lines of US advisors with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. No egos would be bruised since CRPF commanders would be nominally in command. Such advisors would be the core group for operational planning, off and on the job training and for advice while conducting counter-insurgency. This would give a fillip to CRPF's self-confidence and expertise in counter-insurgency.
The Maoists are well funded through extortion and the largesse from sympathisers within and outside the country. They are well-stocked in arms with Nepal and Myanmar as conduits. Their training regimen, shown on television, indicates professionalism. It will be a long haul. There is no scope for laxity or being lackadaisical, more so as the initiative is with the Maoists. Initiative has to be wrested from them.
The area under Maoist influence is immense. Given the resources with the Government a single operation addressing all areas is impracticable. Concentration of force and economy of effort is the keystone. Specific areas have to be addressed with maximum resources, while containing areas elsewhere. An initial success is a paramount prerequisite to restore the confidence of the force and avenging the recent mauling at Sildah and Dantewada. Success shall visit once there is the radical metamorphosis in the mindset and mode of execution of operations. The police's modus operandi of base-based operation to return and hunker down has to give way to dominating the area and isolating the population from Maoist influence. Base-bound operations are self-annulling. Operations through a grid of posts are the gospel. Clearing an area of Maoists, the posts sited are tactically and administratively sound and mutually supporting to dominate that area through patrols, raids and ambushes. They should be co-located next to villages. Such co-location enhances local confidence as also isolates the Maoist influence being militarily proactive. Their proximity prevents moral and material support to the Maoists. Co-locating posts near villages assists population surveillance and categorising them as pro-Government, fence-sitters and pro-insurgents. The latter would be kept in check, while pro-Government elements could assist as 'eyes and ears'. Population rosters would control movement of population wherein excessive visitation outside the village would trigger motive determination. Likewise, visitors from outside the village would be monitored and bona fides ascertained. Discrete check of the village's foodgrain, material stock and sowing of fields could indicate stocking or sowing greater than the village's legitimate requirement. It would be an indicator of planned assistance to the Maoists. This could be negated with intensified patrolling and night curfews. Hence, the Government's writ would be established to some extent and influence of the Maoists checked. Intensive civic action and participating in local festivals by the post personnel would, by a long chalk, promote pro-Government sympathies.
On the aspect of inducting the Indian Air Force, logistic support will be a boon. Yet, the same aspect that harries the Army ie the overuse of service equipment without any sight of replacement will be worrisome. The US's Foliage Penetration, Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Tracking, Engagement Radar programme is trying to develop a low-frequency radar to track dismounted personnel under foliage. Therefore, given the yearning for deploying unmanned aerial vehicles, one hopes that the IAF UAVs are equally sophisticated and are in situ and not in the experimental stage.
Satellite surveillance, ground penetration radars, acoustic sensors, IR break beam, seismic sensors, ground surveillance radars, pressure transducers, tethered, guided, free floating balloons could prove positive force multipliers.
Technology is a great boon. In the final analysis, it is the man behind the machine who will change the environment in favour of the Government. Aimless employment of technology will not yield the desired result.
Offensive air support against the Maoists has to be seen beyond the comfort zone. The Maoists will not be based in open terrain. They will use close country under forest canopy cover, ravines and re-entrants. This type of terrain does not lend for effective offensive air support.
No insurgency can flourish without astute leadership, personnel, stores, weapons and equipment. Therefore, the aim should be to eliminate the leadership — a difficult task, prevent fresh recruitment, destroy their weapons through raids and ambushes, seal the routes for replenishment and ensure isolating local support, both moral and material. This is what holds the key.
If insurgency comes, why is the political will and correct employment of trained and motivated force still far behind?
[url=
